Punjab-Haryana High Court

Sukhpal Singh & Ors vs State Of Haryana & Ors on 27 March, 2025

Bench: Sureshwar Thakur, Vikas Suri

                              Neutral Citation No:=2025:PHHC:042482-DB




CWP No. 1764 of 2016 (O&M)                  -1-




        In the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh


                                            CWP No. 1764 of 2016 (O&M)
                                            Reserved on: 11.3.2025
                                            Date of Decision: 27.3.2025

Sukhpal Singh and others                                    ......Petitioners

                                          Versus

State of Haryana and others                                 .....Respondents

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SURESHWAR THAKUR
       HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIKAS SURI

Argued by: Mr. Ashish Aggarwal, Senior Advocate with
           Mr. Arshat Kalia, Advocate and
             Mr. D.K.Tuteja, Advocate
             for the petitioners.

             Mr. Ankur Mittal, Addl. A.G., Haryana,
             Ms. Svaneel Jaswal, Addl. A.G. Haryana,
             Mr. Pardeep Prakash Chahar, Sr. DAG, Haryana.
             Mr. Saurabh Mago, DAG, Haryana,
             Mr. Gaurav Bansal, DAG, Haryana and
             Mr. Karan Jindal, AAG, Haryana
             for the respondents-State.

             Mr. Ankur Mittal, Advocate,
             Ms. Sharvi Dadhwal, Advocate,
             Ms. Gurcharan Kaur, Advocate,
             Ms. Kushaldeep K. Manchanda, Advocate and
             Ms. Saanvi Singla, Advocate
             for respondent-HUDA.
                        ****

SURESHWAR THAKUR, J.

1. Through the instant petition, the petitioners seek the quashing of

notification dated 9.9.2013 (Annexure P-1), and, also seeks the quashing of

notification dated 31.12.2013 (Annexure P-2). The said notifications were

respectively issued under Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894

(for short 'the Act of 1894'). The consequent thereto award dated 29.12.2015

has also been asked to be quashed, and, set aside.

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2. The instant writ petition became remanded by the Hon'ble

Supreme Court vide order dated 21.02.2024. The operative part of the said

order is extracted hereinafter.

"...........Accordingly, the impugned orders are set aside and the matters are remitted to the High Court for fresh consideration of all the other issues on merits that have been raised in the respective petitions in accordance with law........"

3. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioners argues, that

since the notifications (supra) as became passed under Section 4 and under

Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as "the

Act of 1894"), were so passed, thus prior coming into force of the Right to

Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation

And Resettlement Act, 2013 (hereinafter referred to as the "Act of 2013").

However, when the date of making of the award (supra), thus occurred

subsequent to the coming into force of the Act of 2013. Therefore, he argues

that no legal relevance can become assigned to the issuance of the

notifications (supra).

4. Therefore, he submits that the notification(s) (supra), are

required to be quashed, and, set aside, thus on the ground, that since on the

date of the award (supra), the 'Act of 2013' had assumed force thus, thereby

the proceedings for acquisition were required to be launched under the 'Act

of 2013', than under the 'Act of 1894'.

5. The above raised contention before this Court by the learned

counsel for the petitioners, is no longer res integra, as it becomes completely

answered by a verdict drawn by the Hon'ble Apex Court in case titled as

"Haryana State Industrial and Infrastructure Development Corporation

Ltd. And others V Deepak Aggarwal and others" to which Civil Appeal

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No.5947-5948 of 2022 arising out of SLP(C) Nos.16631-16632 of 2018

became assigned. The Hon'ble Apex Court in paragraph No.31 of the verdict

(supra), paragraph whereof, becomes extracted hereinafter, had thereins

formulated the question of law, thus for an answer being rendered thereons.

"31. Now, we will consider the other common questions involved in the captioned appeals. They pertain to the questions as to whether Section 4 notification issued under the L.A. Act prior to 01.01.2014 (date of commencement of 2013 Act) could continue or survive after 01.01.2014 and, as to whether Section 6 notification under the L.A. Act could be issued after 01.01.2014."

6. A reading of the hereinabove extracted formulated question of

law, reveals that the issue which engaged the Hon'ble Apex Court

appertained to whether the initiation of proceedings under the 'Act of 1894',

commenced on the date of the making of a notification under Section 4 of

the said Act, or whether the initiation of acquisition proceedings under the

'Act of 1894', commenced on the date of making of a declaration under

Section 6 of the 'Act of 1894'. It appears that the reason for the drawing of

questions of law (supra), arose from the provisions occurring in Section

24(1) of the 'Act of 2013', provisions whereof stands extracted hereinafter.

"24. Land acquisition process under Act No. 1 of 1894 shall be deemed to have lapsed in certain cases.-(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, in any case of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894,--

(a) where no award under section 11 of the said Land Acquisition Act has been made, then, all provisions of this Act relating to the determination of compensation shall apply; or

(b) where an award under said section 11 has been made, then such proceedings shall continue under the

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provisions of the said Land Acquisition Act, as if the said Act has not been repealed."

7. Moreover, the Hon'ble Apex Court was engaged in making an

interpretation of the phraseology "proceedings initiated under the 'Act of

1894', as occurs in Section 24(1) of the 'Act of 2013'. In rendering an answer

to the above question of law, the Hon'ble Apex Court in paragraph No.32

thereof, paragraph whereof becomes extracted hereinafter, had expostulated,

that the initiation of acquisition proceedings under the 'Act of 1894', thus

occurs on the date of making of a notification under Section 4 of the said

Act, and, that the initiation of acquisition proceedings under the 'Act of

1894', does not occur, on the date of issuance of a declaration under Section

6 of the 'Act of 1894'.

"We think that while considering those questions we will have to bear in mind the purposes and the legislative history of the 2013 Act and also the intention of the legislature in drafting the same in the manner in which it now exists. We have already dealt with those aspects. One crucial aspect discernible from Section 24(1)(a) has also to be taken note of in this context. The combined effect of Section 24(1) and clause (a) thereof is that if land acquisition proceeding under the L.A. Act was initiated prior to 01.01.2014, the date of coming into force of the 2013 Act, and if it was not culminated in an award under Section 11 of the L.A. Act, then all the provisions of the 2013 Act relating to the determination of compensation should apply to such acquisition proceedings. Thus, it is obvious that in case of non- passing of an award in terms of Section 11 of the L.A. Act where the acquisition proceedings have been initiated prior to 01.01.2014, all provisions under the 2013 Act relating to the determination of compensation alone would apply to such acquisition proceedings. In other words, it would mean that in such circumstances the land acquisition proceedings should

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continue, but all the provisions relating to the determination of compensation under the 2013 Act alone will be applicable to such proceedings, meaning thereby, the 2013 Act would come into play only at that stage. There can be no doubt with respect to the position that between the initiation of land acquisition proceedings by issuance and publication of notice under Section 4(1) of the L.A. Act and the stage at which compensation for the acquisition calls for determination, there are various procedures to be followed to make the acquisition in accordance with the law. The question is when Section 24(1) of the 2013 Act makes it clear with necessary implication that all provisions of the 2013 Act relating to the determination of compensation alone would be applicable to such proceedings initiated under the L.A. Act but, not culminated in an award, how the procedures are to be regulated during the intervening period till the proceedings reach the stage of determination of compensation. There cannot be any uncertainty on that aspect. The procedures to be undertaken and the manner in which they are to be regulated cannot remain uncertain. They are conducted either in the manner provided under the L.A. Act or in the manner provided under the 2013 Act. But then, in view of Section 24(1)(a), the provisions relating to the determination of compensation alone can be applied to such proceedings or in other words, there is only a restricted application of the provisions of the 2013 Act in relation to such proceedings. The inevitable conclusion can only be that what is applicable to the various procedures to be undertaken during the period up to the stage of determination of compensation are those prescribed under the L.A. Act. We have no doubt that without such a construction, the provisions under Section 24(1)(a) would not work out, in view of the restrictive application of the 2013 Act. It is in this context that the decision in Ambica Quarry Works' case (supra) assumes relevance. Any construction of the said provision without taking into the

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legislative intention, referred hereinbefore would defeat the legislative intention as also the very objects of the 2013 Act. Certainly, it would not be in public interest to allow such proceedings to lapse or allow the authorities to follow the procedures during such period according to their sweet will. A uniform procedure has to be followed in respect of such proceedings. The acquisitions initiated for public purposes should go on in a fair and transparent manner with a view to achieve the intent and purport of the 2013 Act and at the same time, the persons affected shall have definite idea about the manner in which procedures would be conducted. The Party 'B' would not be justified in describing such situations of necessity and the consequential application of provisions which are actually saved on account of the construction of Section 24 as an attempt to bring the words expressly employed in Section 24(1)(b) and absent in Section 24(1)(a), by indirect method to Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act. The aforesaid conclusions and findings would make the contentions of Party 'B' that Section 4(1) notification issued prior to 01.01.2014 could not survive after 01.01.2014 and also that Section 6 notification under the L.A. Act could not be issued after 01.01.2014, unsustainable. In fact, all such procedures and formalities shall be continued till the determination of compensation by applying all the provisions for determination of compensation, under the 2013 Act. A contra-construction, in view of the restrictive application of the provisions to such proceedings during its continuance, would make the provisions under Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act unworkable."

8. Moreover, while making the above interpretation to the above

statutory phraseology, which occurs in the 'Act of 2013', the Hon'ble Apex

Court in paragraph 32 carried in verdict (supra), thus proceeded to declare,

that if the notification under Section 4 of the 'Act of 1894', is issued prior to

the coming into force of the 'Act of 2013', thereby if the award, which was

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otherwise to be drawn in terms of Section 11, of the 'Act of 1894', thus is not

drawn prior to the coming into force of the 'Act of 2013', or is drawn on

coming into force of the 'Act of 2013', yet the Acquiring Authority

concerned, rather in terms of the provisions extracted (supra), becoming

endowed with or being preserved a liberty, to yet proceed to make an award

under the 'Act of 1894', besides the making of an award under the 'Act of

1894', thus post the coming into force of the 'Act of 2013', rather assuming

force. Importantly, yet the compensation being amenable to become

determined in terms of the statutory principles contemplated under the 'Act

of 2013'.

9. In consequence, it has to be now determined, whether the

Acquiring Authority concerned, issued the notification under Section 4 of

the Act of 1894, thus prior to the coming into force of the Act of 2013,

inasmuch as, whether the said notification became issued prior to

01.01.2014, thus whereons the 'Act of 2013' assumed force and/or came into

operation.

10. In the above regard, it is not disputed, that the notifications as

issued respectively under Section 4 of the Act of 1894, and, under Section 6

of the Act of 1894 were issued respectively on 09.9.2013, and, on

31.12.2013, and when the date of issuance of the said notifications, is prior

to the coming into force of the 'Act of 2013'. Therefore, in terms of the

verdict (supra), the acquisition proceedings became initiated as such under

the 'Act of 1894'. Consequently, even if the date of making of the award

which became passed in consequence thereof, was passed but after coming

into force of the 'Act of 2013', inasmuch as, it became rendered on

29.12.2015. Nonetheless, the trite factum of issuance of the notifications

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(supra) rather on a date, but prior to the coming into force of the 'Act of

2013', has the conspicuous relevance and import, thus for therebys validating

the subsequently issued award passed qua the subject lands.

11. Furthermore, it is further indicated in the reply on affidavit that

possession of the acquired lands became assumed vide rapat roznamcha No.

263 dated 29.12.2015. Moreover, the assessed compensation amount under

award (supra), comprised in a sum of Rs. 1,21,08,097/- became tendered

before the learned Reference Court concerned, on 5.03.2022 vide demand

draft No. 200094 dated 05.03.2022 and the same is readily available for its

disbursement to the petitioners upon moving an appropriate application by

him in this regard. In addition, the entire compensation has been calculated

as per the parameters laid down in the 'Act of 2013'. Therefore, the

acquisition proceedings but have become fully and lawfully concluded but

subject to the compensation determined under the award concerned, thus

being made in terms of the 'Act of 2013'.

12. Even otherwise, the notification for acquisition became issued

in the year 2013, therefore, the institution of the instant writ petition, rather

in the year 2016, makes it to become imbued with gross pervasive stains of

delay and laches.

13. Even the Hon'ble Apex Court in a judgment rendered in case

titled "M/s Star Wire (India) Ltd. V/s State of Haryana and others",

reported in (1996) 11 SCC 698, has in the relevant paragraph of its verdict,

paragraph whereof becomes extracted hereinafter, thus declared that any

belated challenge, as made to the relevant lawfully fully terminated

acquisition proceedings, thus is hit by the vices of delay and laches, and

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thereby too, the said belated motion as existing in the instant petition, is but

required to be declared as misconstituted.

"Shri P.P. Rao, learned senior counsel for the petitioner, contends that the petitioner had no knowledge of the acquisition proceedings; as soon as it came to know of the acquisition, it had challenged the validity of the acquisition proceedings and, therefore, it furnishes cause of action to the petitioner. He further contends that the writ petition could not be dismissed on the ground of laches but was required to be considered on merits. We find no force in the contention. Any encumbrance created by the erstwhile owner of the land after publication of the notification under Section 4(1) does not bind the State if the possession of land is already taken over after the award came to be passed. The land stood vested in the State free from all encumbrances under Section 16. In Gurmukh Singh & Ors. vs. The State of Haryana [J] 1995 (8) SC 208], this Court had held that a subsequent purchaser is not entitled to challenge the legality of the acquisition proceedings on the ground of lack of publication of the notification. In Y.N. Garg vs State of Rajasthan [1996 (1) SCC 284] and Sneh Prabha vs. State of U.P. [1996 (7) 325], this Court had held the alienation made by the erstwhile owner of the land after publication of the notification under Section 4(1), do not bind either the State Government or the beneficiary for whose benefit the land was acquired. The purchaser does not acquire any valid title. Even the colour of title claimed by the purchaser was void. The beneficiary is entitled to have absolute possession free from encumbrances. In U.P. Jal Nigam, Lucknow through its Chairman & Anr. vs. M/s Kalra Properties (P) Ltd., Lucknow & Ors. {(1996) 1 SCC 124], this Court had further held that the purchaser of the property, after the notification under Section 4(1) was published, is devoid of right to challenge the validity of the notification or irregularity in taking possession of the land before publication of the declaration under Section 6. As regards laches in approaching the Court, this Court has been consistently taking the view starting from State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr. vs. Bhailal Bhai & Ors. [AIR 1964 SC 1006] wherein a Constitution Bench had held that it is not either desirable or expedient to lay down a rule of universal application but the unreasonable delay denies to the petitioner, the discretionary extraordinary remedy of mandamus, certiorari or any other relief. The same was view reiterated in catena of decisions, viz., Rabindranath Bose & Ors. vs. The Union of India & Ors. [(1970 (1) SCC 84]; State of Mysore & Ors. vs. Narsimha Ram Naik [AIR 1975 SC 2190]; Aflatoon & Anr. vs. Lt. Governor of Delhi [ (1975) 4 SCC 285]; M/s. Tilokchand Motichand & Ors. vs. H.B. Munshi, Commissioner of Sales Tax, Bombay & Anr. [AIR 1970 SC 898]; State of Tamil Nadu & Ors. etc. V. L. Krishnan & Ors. etc. [JT 1995 (8)

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SC 1]; Improvement Trust, Faridkot & Ors. vs. Jagjit Singh & Ors. [1987 Supp. SCC 608]; State of Punjab & Ors. vs. Hari Om Co-operative House Building Society Ltd., Amritsar [1987 Supp. SCC 687]; Market Committee, Hodal vs. Krishan Murari & Ors. [JT 1995 (8) SC 494] and State of Haryana vs. Dewan Singh [(1996 (7) SCC 394] wherein this Court had held that the High Court was not justified in interfering with the acquisition proceedings. This Court in the latest judgement in Municipal Corporation of Great Bombay vs. The Industrial Development & Investment Co. Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. [JT 1996 (8) SC 16], reviewed the entire case law and held that the person who approaches the Court belatedly will be told that laches close the gates of the Court for him to question the legality of the notification under Section 4(1), declaration under Section 6 and the award of the Collector under Section 11.

14. Conspicuously also since it has been stated, in the reply on

affidavit, already on record, that the subject lands are an integral component

of the layout plans, thereby when they are facilitating the relevant public

purposes. Consequently, when public purpose than the ill individualistic

interest of the petitioners is rather to be furthered. Resultantly, this Court

finds no merit in the instant petition, and, is constrained to dismiss it.

Final Order of this Court.

15. In aftermath, this Court finds no merit in the writ petition, and,

with the above observations, the same is dismissed. The impugned

notification(s), and consequent thereto award are maintained and affirmed.

16. The miscellaneous application(s), if any, is/are also disposed of.

(SURESHWAR THAKUR) JUDGE