Punjab-Haryana High Court
Dusmanta Kumar Behera, Ias And Others vs Daya Rani on 7 January, 2025
Bench: Sureshwar Thakur, Sudeepti Sharma
Neutral Citation No:=2025:PHHC:002831-DB
CACP No. 33 of 2024 (O&M) -1-
in COCP No. 2913 of 2024
in CWP No. 8306 of 2015
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH.
CACP No. 33 of 2024 (O&M)
in COCP No. 2913 of 2024
in CWP No. 8306 of 2015
Reserved on: 27.11.2024
Pronounced on: 07.1.2025
Dusmanta Kumar Bahera and others .....Appellants
Versus
Daya Rani ....Respondent
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SURESHWAR THAKUR
HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE SUDEEPTI SHARMA
Argued by: Mr. Ankur Mittal, Addl. A.G., Haryana
Mr. Pardeep Prakash Chahar, Sr. DAG, Haryana,
Mr. Saurabh Mago, DAG, Haryana
Ms. Kushaldeep Kaur, Advocate and
Mr. Siddhant Arora, Advocate
for the appellants.
Mr. Suresh Kumar Kaushik, Advocate
for the respondent.
****
SURESHWAR THAKUR, J.
1. The instant appeal has been directed against the order dated
28.8.2024, as passed by the learned Contempt Bench of this Court in
COCP No. 2913 of 2024.
Brief facts of the case.
2. In the year 1979, the respondent herein was appointed as a
Craft Teacher in the Panchayat Samiti concerned, and her services were
regularized vide order dated 4.5.1983, and, on 30.4.2014, she retired
from the post of Craft Teacher. The respondent herein instituted CWP
No. 8306 of 2015 before this Court with a prayer therein to direct the
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appellants to release her arrears of salary for the period 1.1.2006 to
31.1.2010, benefits of third ACP scale, and all retiral benefits along
with interest @ 18% per annum on account of delay. Vide order dated
7.3.2024, the said petition was disposed by this Court. The operative
part of the said order becomes extracted hereinafter.
"13. As the respondents have not released the pensionary
benefits after the retirement and the petitioner is litigating the
same for the last 10 years, the petitioner will also be liable for
interest on the arrears/arreas of the pensionary benefits which
will be released to the petitioner, keeping in view the judgment
of the Coordinate Bench of this Court in J.S. Cheema Vs. State
of Haryana, 2014(13) RCR (Civil) 355, wherein it has been
held that where an amount belonging to an employee, has been
retained and used by the respondents, upon the release of the
said amount, on a later date, the interest has to be given. The
relevant paragraph of J.S. Cheema's case (supra) is as under: -
"The jurisprudential basis for grant of interest is the fact that
one person's money has been used by somebody else. It is in
that sense rent for the usage of money. If the user is
compounded by any negligence on the part of the person with
whom the money is lying it may result in higher rate because
then it can also include the component of damages (in the
form of interest). In the circumstances, even if there is no
negligence on the part of the State it cannot be denied that
money which rightly belonged to the petitioner was in the
custody of the State and was being used by it."
14. The respondents are directed to release all the
pensionary benefits for which the petitioner becomes entitled
by this order, within a period of 08 weeks of the receipt of the
certified copy of this order.
15. At this stage, learned counsel for the petitioner submits
that as the petitioner is entitled for the grant of benefit of 3rd
ACP which was not granted to him, hence, liberty be granted to
the petitioner to approach the Department by way of
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appropriate representation to claim the benefit of 3rd ACP and
the respondents be directed to decide the said represntation as
expeditiously as possible."
3. Subsequently CM-5415-CWP-2024 in CWP-8306-2015
became filed by the respondent herein seeking modification of the order
(supra) whereby though the interest was awarded to the respondent
herein but the rate thereof became not mentioned in the order (supra).
Vide order dated 9.4.2024, the said application was disposed of by this
Court. The operative part of the said order becomes extracted
hereinafter.
"Keeping in view the fact that the interest had already been
granted to the applicant-petitioner but the rate of interest
has not been mentioned, keeping in view Section 34 of the
CPC, the amount for which the applicant-petitioner is
entitled for as arrears, will be paid with interest @ 6% per
annum from the date it became due till the actual payment of
the same.
This order be read with continuation of the order
dated 07.03.2024 (Annexure A-1.) "
4. Since the orders (supra) remained purportedly uncomplied,
thereby the respondent herein preferred COCP No. 2913 of 2024, before
this Court, with a prayer therein to intiate contempt proceedings against
the contemnors concerned, thus on account of the appellants herein
purportedly wilfully disobeying the order (supra) passed by this Court.
It has been further alleged therein, that even after the passing of the
orders (supra), the respondents concerned have not complied with the
directions of this Court, which amounts to wilful disobedience on their
part.
5. The learned Contempt Court concerned, vide order dated
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28.8.2024, passed the hereinafter order upon the COCP (supra).
"Considering the fact that directions to consider the claim of
the petitioner was passed on 7.3.2024 and 9.4.2024, a period of
more than five months has elapsed, thus, in case the compliance
report is not filed within the aforesaid stipulated period, the
officer concerned shall join the proceedings through video-
conferencing and would be liable to pay litigation costs to the
petitioner to the tune of Rs.50,000/- from his/her own pocket. "
6. The order (supra), passed by the learned Single Judge
(Contempt Court) has caused pain to the appellants herein and has led
them to file thereagainst the instant appeal before this Court.
7. In pursuance to the said order, the appellants filed a status
report, thus detailing thereins that against the orders dated 7.3.2024 and
dated 9.4.2024, LPA No. 2424 of 2024 has been filed which is pending
adjudication.
Submissions of the learned counsels for the appellants
8. The learned counsels for the appellants have argued before
this Court that the Hon'ble Contempt Bench rather has exceeded its
jurisdiction by imposing costs of Rs. 50,000/- that too, on the first date
of hearing of the contempt petition. They further submit that the order
imposing costs of Rs. 50,000/- is incidental to and/or is inextricably
connected with an order qua the imposition of fine of Rs. 2,000/- as
mandated in Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. Therefore,
it is argued, that the said imposed fine amount, that too at the very
threshold of the contempt petition, thus tantamounts to the imposition of
punishment, upon the present appellants. Resultantly, it is argued, that
as such, the instant appeal is maintainable before this Court, and, that
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the impugned order dated 28.8.2024, as passed by the learned Single
Judge, be quashed and set aside.
9. Reiteratedly, the learned counsels contend, with much
vigour before this Court, that when as such the impugned order is
proclived towards imposing punishment upon the contemnors, and, that
too, without asking from the appellants rather a well reasoned
explanation qua therebys compliance theretos thus wanting. Therefore,
it is further argued, that since the appellants may have a permissible
valid defence rather for accounting for the delay, if any, in the making
of compliance to the order (supra), besides it is also contended that even
if the order (supra) embodied a clear obeyable mandamus, therebys too,
some opportunity may have been granted to the appellants to mete
compliance thereto. However, since neither any explanation has been
asked to be furnished by the learned Contempt Court, from the
appellants rather for the delay, if any, in the makings of compliance to
the supra order, nor when any opportunity, if required for seeking
extension of time for making compliance thereto, thus became granted.
Consequently, it is argued that in a most slipshod and arbitrary manner,
the learned Contempt Court, has proceeded to make the order (supra),
which as stated supra, is proclived towards imposing punishment, upon
the present appellants, besides therebys it intends to, without making the
requisite discernments from the records, rather create a right in the
respondent to seek enforcement of the order (supra), despite may be it
not being complyable at all.
10. In nutshell, the learned counsels for the appellants have
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argued, that therebys the instant case is covered within the domain of
principle No. IV of the verdict made by Hon'ble Apex Court, in case
titled as "Midnapore Peoples' Coop. Bank Ltd. And others V.
Chunilal Nanda and others" reported in (2006) 5 SCC 399. The said
principle is extracted hereinafter.
IV. Any direction issued or decision made by the High Court on
the merits of a dispute between the parties, will not be in the
exercise of 'jurisdiction to punish for contempt' and therefore,
not appealable under section 19 of CC Act. The only exception
is where such direction or decision is incidental to or
inextricably connected with the order punishing for contempt,
in which event the appeal under section 19 of the Act, can also
encompass the incidental or inextricably connected directions.
11. In addition, the learned counsels for the appellants have
argued, that the instant case is not covered within the domain of
principle No. V of the judgment (supra), as at the outset, the learned
Contempt Court, did not decide any issue, nor made any direction
relating to the merits of the dispute, wherebys alone the said decision
was open to a challenge in an intra-court appeal, than in an appeal filed
within the domain of principle No. IV.
12. The reason which the learned counsel for the appellants,
thus assigns for making the above submission, is grooved in the factum
that, since the pleadings were not complete at the stage of making of the
order (supra). Therefore, only when the pleadings are complete,
whereafters upon making well informed discernments of the pleadings,
thus when subsequently a well informed decision or direction becomes
passed, rather covering the merits of the dispute emerging amongst the
parties, thereupon alone the impugned directions may have been
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covered within the ambit of principle No. V, as enclosed in
Midnapore Peoples' Coop. Bank Ltd.'s case (supra). Consequently,
the learned counsels submit, that the instant case is not covered within
the ambit of principle No. V, as enclosed in the judgment (supra)
rendered by the Apex Court, rather the instant case is covered within the
ambit of principle No. IV of the judgment (supra).
Submissions of the learned counsels for the respondent
13. On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing for the
respondent has most vehemently contended, that the instant contempt
appeal is not maintainable before this Court. In making the said
submission, he refers to the provisions as embodied in Section 19 of the
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act of
1971') provisions whereof becomes extracted hereinafter, whereins, it
becomes mandated, that an appeal against an order passed by the
Contempt Bench concerned, is maintainable, but yet only against such
an order or a decision, as becomes made by the Contempt Bench
concerned, wherebys punishment for contempt becomes recorded.
"19. Appeals.--(1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any
order or decision of the High Court in the exercise of its
jurisdiction "to punish for contempt"--
(a) where the order or decision is that of a single judge, to a
Bench of not less than two judges of the Court;
(b) where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the
Supreme Court:
Provided that where the order or decision is that of the Court of
the Judicial Commissioner in any Union territory, such appeal
shall lie to the Supreme Court.
(2) Pending any appeal, the appellate Court may order that--
(a) the execution of the punishment or order appealed against
be suspended;
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(b) if the appellant is in confinement, he be released on bail;
and
(c) the appeal be heard notwithstanding that the appellant has
not purged his contempt.
(3) Where any person aggrieved by any order against which an
appeal may be filed satisfies the High Court that he intends to
prefer an appeal, the High Court may also exercise all or any of
the powers conferred by sub-section (2).
(4) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed--
(a) in the case of an appeal to a Bench of the High Court,
within thirty days;
(b) in the case of an appeal to the Supreme Court, within sixty
days, from the date of the order appealed against."
14. Furthermore, he also argues that since a reading of the
impugned order, displays that no such order, thus becomes passed by
the learned Contempt Court concerned, wherebys but punishment has
been imposed upon the contemnors. Resultantly, he argues that the
instant appeal is not maintainable before this Court.
15. Furthermore, he argues that the supra order is only
challengeable through a motion cast under Article 136 of the
Constitution of India, becoming made before the Apex Court, than
through the filing of the instant appeal before this Court.
16. In addition, he also submits that in the proceedings for
contempt, the High Court is required to be deciding whether any
contempt of Court is committed and, if so, what should be the
punishment and the matter incidental thereto. He further submits, that
the clear mandamus (supra) as embodied in the orders rendered by this
Court on 7.3.2024 and 9.4.2024, did evidently become intentionally
disobeyed. Therefore, he argues that through the making of the
impugned operative parts (supra), the learned Contempt Bench
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concerned, thus has remained within the frontiers of the jurisdiction
conferred upon it, therebys there is no justification for any interference
therewith being made, by this Court.
Inferences of this Court
17. Before proceeding to determine the validity of the making
of the impugned order, it is necessary to initially extract the apposite
regulatory guidelines, as become underlined in the judgment rendered
by the Apex Court in case titled as Modern Food Industries (India) Ltd
and another versus Sachidanand Dass and another reported in 1995
Supp (4) Supreme Court Cases 465 The relevant paragraphs of the
judgments (supra) become extracted hereinafter.
"2. The learned single Judge of the High Court by his
order dated 10.1.1992 quashed the order of termination of
the services of the first respondent, by the appellants and
directed his reinstatement and payment of back-salary.
Appellants preferred an appeal to the Division Bench and
also sought a stay, pending appeal, of the operation of the
learned single Judge's order. The Division Bench did not
take up the appeal for admission nor considered the prayer
for interlocutory stay. In the meanwhile, on the allegation
that the learned single Judge's order had not been obeyed,
the first respondent moved for initiation of proceedings for
contempt against the appellants pursuant to which the High
Court directed the Chairman of the first appellant to appear
in person so that the complaint of contempt be proceeded
with.
3. Before the High Court, appellants urged that before any
contempt proceedings could be initiated, it was necessary
and appropriate for the Division Bench to examine the
prayer for stay, or else, the appeal itself might become
infructuous. This did not commend itself to the High Court
which sought to proceed with the contempt first. We are
afraid, the course adopted by the High Court does not
commend itself as proper. If, without considering the prayer
for stay, obedience to the Single Judge's order was insisted
upon at the pain of committal for contempt, the appellants
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may find, as has now happened, the very purpose of appeal
and the prayer for interlocutory stay infructuous. It is true
that a mere filing of an appeal and an application for stay do
not by themselves absolve the appellants from obeying the
order under appeal and that any compliance with the
learned single Judge's order would be subject to the final
result of the appeal. But then the changes brought about in
the interregnum in obedience of the order under appeal
might themselves be a cause and source of prejudice.
Wherever the order whose disobedience is complained about
is appealed against and stay of its operation is pending
before the Court, it will be appropriate to take up for
consideration the prayer for stay either earlier or at least
simultaneously with the complaint for contempt. To keep the
prayer for stay stand-by and to insist upon proceeding with
the complaint for contempt might in many conceivable cases,
as here, cause serious prejudice, this is the view taken in
State of J. and K. v. Mohammad Yaqoob Khan, (1992) 4
SCC 167.
18. It has been forthrightly stated in the verdict (supra) that the
contempt action has to be sparingly drawn, and, is to be avoided to be
drawn, as a measure to coerce the purported errant litigant to make
compliances with certain directions or orders, especially when the relief
granted by the writ Court becomes appealed against, whereupon the
outcome of the availed remedy by the purported errant litigant rather is
prima facie required to be awaited. Moreover, thereins also occurs a
trite underscoring to the effect, that the action for contempt has to
become quartered within the tritely settled contours, inasmuch as,
immense care and caution is required to be exercised by the Contempt
Court, as ultimately the objective of rearing of an able contempt
petition, thus is to ensure the maintaining of the majesty, and, dignity of
self speaking binding orders/directions passed by the Courts of law.
19. Furthermore, the Apex Court in a judgment rendered in
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case titled as State of J and K versus Mohd. Yaqoob Khan and others
reported in (1992) 4 Supreme Court Cases 167 has held as under:-
6. We do not agree. The scope of a contempt proceeding is
very different from that of the pending main case yet to be
heard and disposed of (in future). Besides, the respondents in a
pending case are at a disadvantage if they are called upon to
meet the merits of the claim in a contempt proceeding at the
risk of being punished. It is, therefore, not right to suggest that
it should be assumed that the initial order of stay got confirmed
by the subsequent orders passed in the contempt matter.
7. We, therefore, hold that the High Court should have first
taken up the stay matter without any threat to the respondents
in the writ case of being punished for contempt. Only after
disposing it of, the other case should have been taken up. It is
further significant to note that the respondents before the High
Court were raising a serious objection disputing the claim of
the writ petitioner. Therefore, an order in the nature of
mandatory direction could not have been justified unless the
court was in a position to consider the objections and record a
finding, prima facie in nature, in favour of the writ petitioner.
Besides challenging the claim on merits, the respondent was
entitled to raise a plea of non-maintainability of a writ
application filed for the purpose of executing a decree. It
appears that at an earlier stage the decree in question was
actually put in execution when the parties are said to have
entered into a compromise. According to the case of the State
the entire liability under the decree (read with the compromise)
has already been discharged. The dispute, therefore, will be
covered by Section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code. It will be a
serious question to consider whether in these circumstances the
writ petitioner was entitled to maintain his application under
Article 226 of the Constitution at all. We do not want to decide
any of these controversies between the parties at this stage
except holding that the orders passed in the contempt
proceeding were not justified, being premature, and must,
therefore, be entirely ignored. The High Court should first take
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up the stay matter in the writ case, and dispose it of by an
appropriate order. Only thereafter it shall proceed to consider
whether the State and its authorities could be accused of being
guilty of having committed contempt of court."
20. The further entwined therewith issue, which is required to
be also decided is whether the Contempt Court, can substitute itself into
an Executing Court, and, that too when an appeal against the relevant
order/direction is subjudice. In the above regard, the Apex Court in case
titled as R.N.Dey versus Bhagyabati Pramanik and others reported in
(2000) 4 Supreme Court Cases 400, has held as under:-
"7. We may reiterate that weapon of contempt is not to be
used in abundance or misused. Normally, it cannot be used for
execution of the decree or implementation of an order for
which alternative remedy in law is provided for. Discretion
given to the Court is to be exercised for maintenance of Court's
dignity and majesty of law. Further, an aggrieved party has no
right to insist that Court should exercise such jurisdiction as
contempt is between a contemnor and the Court. It is true that
in the present case, the High Court has kept the matter pending
and has ordered that it should be heard along with the First
Appeal. But, at the same time, it is to be noticed that under the
coercion of contempt proceeding, appellants cannot be directed
to pay the compensation amount which they are disputing by
asserting that claimants were not the owners of the property in
question and that decree was obtained by suppressing the
material fact and by fraud. Even presuming that claimants are
entitled to recover the amount of compensation as awarded by
the trial Court as no stay order is granted by the High Court, at
the most they are entitled to recover the same by executing the
said award wherein the State can or may contend that the
award is nullity. In such a situation, as there was no wilful or
deliberate disobedience of the order, the initiation of contempt
proceedings was wholly unjustified."
21. The further entwined therewith issue, which is required to
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become also adjudicated, is that, whether the Contempt Court can grant
substantive relief, despite the same not being covered by the
order/judgment, besides espcially when the apposite order/judgment
rather evidently is the subject matter of the corrective/remedial judicial
proceedings. In the above regard, the relevant guidelines become
embodied in the judgment rendered by the Apex Court in case titled as
Sudhir Vasudeva, Chairman and Managing Director, Oil and natural
Gas Corporate Limited and others versus M. George Ravishekaran
and others reported in (2014) 3 Supreme Court Cases 373. The
relevant paragraph of the judgment (supra) becomes extracted
hereinafter
"19. The power vested in the High Courts as well as this
Court to punish for contempt is a special and rare power
available both under the Constitution as well as the Contempt
of Courts Act, 1971. It is a drastic power which, if misdirected,
could even curb the liberty of the individual charged with
commission of contempt. The very nature of the power casts a
sacred duty in the Courts to exercise the same with the greatest
of care and caution. This is also necessary as, more often than
not, adjudication of a contempt plea involves a process of self
determination of the sweep, meaning and effect of the order in
respect of which disobedience is alleged. Courts must not,
therefore, travel beyond the four corners of the order which is
alleged to have been flouted or enter into questions that have
not been dealt with or decided in the judgment or the order
violation of which is alleged. Only such directions which are
explicit in a judgment or order or are plainly self evident ought
to be taken into account for the purpose of consideration as to
whether there has been any disobedience or willful violation of
the same. Decided issues cannot be reopened; nor the plea of
equities can be considered. Courts must also ensure that while
considering a contempt plea the power available to the Court
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in other corrective jurisdictions like review or appeal is not
trenched upon. No order or direction supplemental to what has
been already expressed should be issued by the Court while
exercising jurisdiction in the domain of the contempt law; such
an exercise is more appropriate in other jurisdictions vested in
the Court, as noticed above. The above principles would
appear to be the cumulative outcome of the precedents cited at
the bar, namely, Jhareswar Prasad Paul and Another v. Tarak
Nath Ganguly and Others, (2002) 5 SCC 352, V.M.Manohar
Prasad v. N. Ratnam Raju and Another, (2004) 13 SCC 610,
Bihar Finance Service House Construction Cooperative
Society Ltd. v Gautam Goswami and others (2008) 3 SCC 339
and Union of India and Others v. Subedar Devassy PV (2006)
1 SCC 613."
22. Therefore, the maintainability of the instant appeal against
the order (supra) made by the learned Contempt Bench, but is required
to be both delved into, besides is required to be adjudicated upon.
23. Be that as it may, this Court is also required to impart a
signification to the statutory coinage "jurisdiction to punish for
contempt" as occurs in sub-Section (1) of Section 19 of the Act of 1971.
Though, the meaning imparted thereto, by the learned counsel for the
respondent, is that, unless an order for imposition of punishment is
made upon the present appellants, therebys alone the instant appeal
directed against the impugned order, rather is maintainable, whereas, the
impugned order rather not imposing punishment upon the present
appellants, therebys the appeal filed thereagainst is not maintainable.
24. However, the said argument is required to be rejected, inter
alia on the following grounds:-
(a) The meaning to be imparted to the statutory coinage
(supra) is not, that the contemnor has to await the pronouncement of
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punishment upon him. Contrarily the meaning to be imparted to the
statutory coinage (supra), is that, any order or decision recorded by the
learned Single Bench of this Court, while exercising contempt
jurisdiction, rather manifesting any proclivities towards ultimately
punishing the alleged contemnor for contempt. Resultantly therebys the
apposite maneuverings (supra), as are also clearly discernible from the
making of the apposite order, thus makings the apposite appeal to be
maintainable before the Appellate Court.
(b) The coinage "to punish for contempt" which exists
subsequent to the coinage "any order or decision of the High Court" is
an expression, whose effective impact cannot be restricted to the era of
ultimate awardings of punishment, as therebys any vitiated order passed
during the pendency of the contempt proceedings, despite existence of
valid extenuating explications (supra), thus well forbidding the learned
Single Benches, from initiating contempt action, besides when for
tangible reasons, rather apposite extensions of time are accordable, thus
for making compliance(s) with the order alleged to be purportedly
disobeyed, but may yet become also ill-countenanced. Resultantly
therebys if yet this Court also overlooks the beneficent mitigating
effects of all the possible, thus permissible extenuating pleas,
thereupons the said raised possible extenuating pleas, as become earlier
arbitrarily rejected by the learned Single Bench of this Court, but would
also similarly become arbitrarily rejected even by this Court.
25. Resultantly therebys the learned Single Bench of this Court
appears to rather than, as expostulated in verdicts (supra), that contempt
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jurisdiction is to be sparingly exercised or becoming potentialized only
for upholding the majesty, and, dignity of the obeyable directions or the
orders passed by the Courts of law, thus through initiating contempt
action against the persons concerned, but contrarily rather has
whimsically and arbitrarily miskewed the contempt jurisdiction.
26. Ultimately, the preponderant reason, for this Court
concluding that the above submission addressed before this Court by the
learned counsel for the respondent, as appertains to the maintainability
of the present appeal, is required to be rejected, whereas, in this Court
declaring that the instant appeal becomes maintainable, thus becomes
hinged upon the hereinafter principles, relating to the maintainability of
appeals by the Appellate Court concerned, principles whereof, become
engrafted in paragraph No.11 of the verdict made by Hon'ble Apex
Court, in case titled as "Midnapore Peoples' Coop. Bank Ltd. And
others V. Chunilal Nanda and others" reported in (2006) 5 SCC 399,
paragraph whereof becomes extracted hereinafter.
"11. The position emerging from these decisions, in regard to
appeals against orders in contempt proceedings may be
summarized thus :
I. An appeal under section 19 is maintainable only against an
order or decision of the High Court passed in exercise of its
jurisdiction to punish for contempt, that is, an order imposing
punishment for contempt.
II. Neither an order declining to initiate proceedings for
contempt, nor an order initiating proceedings for contempt nor
an order dropping the proceedings for contempt nor an order
acquitting or exonerating the contemnor, is appealable under
Section 19 of the CC Act. In special circumstances, they may be
open to challenge under Article 136 of the Constitution.
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III. In a proceeding for contempt, the High Court can decide
whether any contempt of court has been committed, and if so,
what should be the punishment and matters incidental thereto.
In such a proceeding, it is not appropriate to adjudicate or
decide any issue relating to the merits of the dispute between
the parties.
IV. Any direction issued or decision made by the High Court on
the merits of a dispute between the parties, will not be in the
exercise of 'jurisdiction to punish for contempt' and therefore,
not appealable under section 19 of CC Act. The only exception
is where such direction or decision is incidental to or
inextricably connected with the order punishing for contempt,
in which event the appeal under section 19 of the Act, can also
encompass the incidental or inextricably connected directions.
V. If the High Court, for whatsoever reason, decides an issue or
makes any direction, relating to the merits of the dispute
between the parties, in a contempt proceedings, the aggrieved
person is not without remedy. Such an order is open to
challenge in an intra-court appeal (if the order was of a learned
Single Judge and there is a provision for an intra-court appeal),
or by seeking special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the
Constitution of India (in other cases).
The first point is answered accordingly."
27. Exceptions to the arguments raised (supra) by the learned
counsel for the respondent against the maintainability of the present
appeal, thus become well grooved in principle No. IV, whereins, it is
expounded that any direction or decision which is incidental to or is
inextricably connected with the order punishing for contempt, therebys,
the said does make the contempt appeal maintainable. Conspicuously
also when for all the reasons (supra), the learned Contempt Bench
concerned, through the making of the impugned order, has evidently
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proclived towards punishing the contemnors for contempt, wherebys
also the instant appeal is maintainable.
28. Moreover also when through the making of the impugned
order, the learned Contempt Court of this Court has prohibited the
appellants from either asking for extensions of time, if required, besides
also has untenably restrained them, thus from purveying justifiable
reasons for the order (supra) made by this Court, may be not requiring
preemptory compliance, rather may be for the reason that the directions
made thereins were not well banked upon the precedents referred to
thereins. Importantly also when an LPA had been filed against the
decision (supra) recorded by this Court, whereupon it was required by
the learned Contempt Bench to rather than at the very threshold make
the impugned order, thus await the outcome of the LPA (supra).
29. Lastly, the principles of law which are required to hereafter
become considered to be applied by the learned Contempt Court, are the
ones which are stated in the instant case and also are the ones, as
become underlined in the verdict rendered by this Court in CACP No.
20 of 2024, titled as T.V.S.N. Prasad and others versus Resham Singh.
30. Despite repeated insistences being made upon the learned
Contempt Bench of this Court to comply with the supra principles, yet
the learned Contempt Bench of this Court has repeatedly failed to do so.
Therefore, the learned Contempt Bench of this Court is directed to
ensure that hereafter strict compliances become made to the supra
principles, rather than in a slipshod and arbitrary manner, thus orders
alike the ones which are impugned before this Court, thus becoming
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passed.
31. Significantly during the pendency of the instant appeal, the
appellants have filed CM-22079-CII-2024 rather for placing on record
the order dated 3.12.2024, passed by the learned Contempt Court in
contempt petition bearing COCP No. 2913 of 2024. The said order
passed by the learned Contempt Court is extracted hereinafter.
"Learned counsel for the respondents points out that in
contempt appeal bearing CACP-33-2024, titled "Dusmanta
Kumar Behera, IAS and others versus Daya Rani", preferred
by the respondents, the interim order dated 28.9.2024 passed in
the present contempt petition, has been stayed vide order dated
21.11.2024 passed by the Hon'ble Division Bench.
(2) In view of the above, learned counsel for the petitioner
does not press the present petition at this stage with liberty to
seek revival, if required, subject to final outcome of the
aforesaid contempt appeal.
(3) Ordered accordingly.
(4) Rule stands discharged."
32. The passing of the hereinabove extracted order by the
learned Contempt Court concerned, despite an appeal bearing No.
CACP-33-2024 being subjudice before this Court, to the considered
mind of this Court, unnecessarily intrudes into the exercise of appellate
jurisdiction by this Court upon CACP-33-2024, especially when the
supra appeal seeking the invalidatings of the order rendered on
28.8.2024 upon COCP No. 2913 of 2024 rather is under the active
consideration of this Court. Since this Court for reasons (supra) has
opined, that no contempt proceedings were drawable against the present
appellants, therefore, it appears that the learned Contempt Bench,
despite the contempt appeal (supra) being subjudice before this Court,
has passed the order (supra) merely to escape the effects of this Court
recording findings (supra), wherebys this Court has declared illegal the
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makings of an order by the Contempt Bench, wherebys imposition of
costs has been made upon the appellants.
33. Conspicuously also when the present appeal is but a
continuation of the apposite contempt petition, therefore, this Court
alone held the competent jurisdiction to decide both the contempt
petition as well as the appeal as has arisen therefroms.
34. Last but not the least in terms of the provisions of Section
23 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, provisions whereof become
extracted hereinafter, wherebys the procedures for regulating the
exercise of contempt jurisdiction becomes permitted to be created by the
High Court, thus this High Court has formulated the relevant procedural
rules which become nomenclatured as the Contempt of Court (Punjab
and Haryana) Rules, 1974 (for short 'the Rules of 1974').
"23. Power of Supreme Court and High Courts to make
rules.--
The Supreme Court or, as the case may be, any High Court,
may make rules, not inconsistent with the provisions of this
Act, providing for any matter relating to its procedure."
35. The relevant provisions which are of striking importance in
the instant case become embodied in Rules 9, 10 and 11 of the Rules of
1974, rules whereof become extracted hereinafter.
"9. In the case of a civil contempt other than a contempt
referred to in section 14, the High Court may take action
(a) on its own motion; or
(b) on a petition presented by the party aggrieved; or
(c) in the case of any civil contempt of a subordinate court,
on reference made to it by that Court.
10. (1) In the case of civil contempt, other than a contempt
referred to in section 14, the person charged may file his
affidavit by way of reply to the charge and shall serve a copy
thereof on the petitioner on his counsel at least seven days
before the date of hearing.
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(2) No further return, affidavit or document shall be filed
except with the leave of the High Court.
11. In the case of a civil contempt, the High Court may
determine the matter of charge either on affidavits filed or on
such further evidence as may be taken by itself or recorded by
a subordinate court in pursuance of a direction made by it, and
pass such order as the justice of the case requires, having
regard to the provisions of sections 12 and 13 of the Act."
36. Importantly it is stated in Rule 10 of the Rules of 1974 that
when proceedings qua commission of any purported civil contempt,
other than a contempt referred to in Section 14, thus become launched,
therebys the person charged is required to file an affidavit by way of
reply to the charge.
37. As such, the underpinnings which generate therefroms are
that the successful trial of the formulated charge appertaining to the
commission of any alleged civil contempt, thus is to be made, only after
satisfaction becoming drawn by the learned Contempt Bench, that the
person so charged but makes a feeble and weak plea in his reply on
affidavit, rather for justifying the purported contumacy, as become
allegedly committed by him. Resultantly therebys, since at the very
threshold the learned Contempt Bench, even without framing a charge
appertaining to the alleged commission of civil contempt, and, also
subsequently without proceeding to consider the justifiable extenuating
cause, as would become echoed in the reply on affidavit, wherebys the
contemnor may be amenable for being discharged, rather reiteratedly
has proceeded to conclude that civil contempt has been committed.
Resultantly, in terms of the supra rules formulated by the High Court,
the learned Contempt Bench of this Court but has, at the very threshold
rather derogated from the supra stated established procedure, thus in its
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recording a finding, that the present appellants indulged in
contumacious conduct.
38. Now the instant case is not the only one where the
contemnors have been led to institute appeals against the alike instant
impugned order(s), rather the said are repeatedly made, despite the
appeals arising thereagainst becoming decided in favour of the
appellants, and, with trite underpinnings therein, thus anviled upon the
supra expostulations of law, which rather well forbade the learned
Contempt Bench concerned, from drawing contempt proceedings,
unless adherence becomes made to the supra established procedure(s).
Therefore, the said repeated passing of orders deeply disturbs the
judicial conscience of this Court.
39. Moreover, the edifice of the judiciary is erected upon the
principle of propriety, besides upon the norm of constitutional decorum,
as adherences theretos, thus preserves the exalted institution of the High
Court. The well preservations theretos do spur, through strict
adherences being made vis-a-vis the supra norms, as therebys alone
public faith and confidence in this exalted institution rather remains
uneroded.
40. Resultantly, the supra breaches vis-a-vis the norms of
propriety by the learned Contempt Bench concerned, as emanate(s)
from despite earlier orders being passed by this Court, in the exercise of
appellate jurisdiction, thus wherebys orders alike the present one, thus
became quashed, yet repeatedly thus alike the earlier quashed orders,
but orders rather becoming re-rendered, by the learned Single Bench of
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this Court. The said does not well augur for preserving either the norm
of propriety nor the supra departures augur well qua the necessity of
instilling faith and public confidence in the administration of justice.
Final order
41. Hence, there is merit in the instant appeal and the same is
allowed, and the impugned order dated 28.8.2024, as becomes drawn by
learned Single Bench is quashed, and, set aside, and, the present
appellants are discharged accordingly.
42. In addition, the order dated 3.12.2024, passed upon COCP
No. 2913 of 2024 is declared to be holding no legal consequence.
43. The miscellaneous application(s), if any, is/are also
disposed of.
44. A copy of this order be forthwith sent to the learned
Contempt Bench concerned, for subsequently complete adherence being
made to the above expostulated principles of law, and, it is expected that
hereafter the supra norms of propriety and judicial decorum remain
uneroded.
45. Moreover, a copy of this order be sent for the kind perusal
of the Hon'ble Chief Justice.
(SURESHWAR THAKUR)
JUDGE
(SUDEEPTI SHARMA)
JUDGE
January 07, 2025
Gurpreet
Whether speaking/reasoned : Yes/No
Whether reportable : Yes/No
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