[Cites 14, Cited by 0]
Punjab-Haryana High Court
Hari Singh vs State Of Haryana And Others on 24 December, 2025
Author: Anupinder Singh Grewal
Bench: Anupinder Singh Grewal
CWP-22585-2025 & CWP-23247-2025 -1-
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
Reserved on : 27.11.2025
Pronounced on : 24.12.2025
Uploaded on : 24.12.2025
1. CWP-22585-2025 (O&M)
Hari Singh ...Petitioner
Vs.
State of Haryana and others ...Respondents
2. CWP-23247-2025 (O&M)
Amit Chandna through
GPA Holder Jatin Dhawan ...Petitioner
Vs.
State of Haryana and others ...Respondents
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANUPINDER SINGH GREWAL
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK MANCHANDA
Present: Mr. Sandeep Sharma, Advocate
for the petitioner(s).
Mr. Deepak Bhardwaj, Addl. A.G.Haryana.
Mr. Ankur Mittal, Sr.Advocate with
Ms. Kushaldeep Kaur, Advocate and
Ms. Ashna Singh, Advocate for the respondent-HSVP.
***
DEEPAK MANCHANDA, J.
By this common order, the aforementioned two writ petitions shall
stand disposed of as same involves similar question of law. Therefore, facts of
CWP-22585-2025 are being considered for the adjudication of both the
petitions.
2. Through this petition the petitioner has challenged the imposition
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of the current price in violation of the judgment in Rajiv Manchanda and
others vs. HUDA, 2018 (4) RCR (Civil) 508, as the allotment letter dated
28.07.2025 reflects a revised rate of Rs. 2,61,14,900/- (2025-26) instead of the
2018 rate. Additionally, the petitioner has sought quashing of the Condition No.
27 of the same letter, which prohibits transfer of the plot for five years. This
Court has already dealt with the similar issue in CWP-16389-2025 titled as
"Ram Lal Mahendru Vs. State of Haryana and others" decided on
22.12.2025 and find that the facts of this petition are partially covered by the
said judgment qua charging of current price but the second prayer seeking
quashing of condition No.27 of the allotment letter dated 28.07.2025, which
bars transfer of the plot for five years, needs to be adjudicated.
3. Heard.
4. A bare perusal of the pleadings reveals that, by order dated
26.08.2025, this Court issued notice of motion, granting respondent-HSVP
time to obtain instructions. No reply has been filed till date. Beyond the issue
of charging the current price, the petitioner also challenges Condition No. 27 of
the allotment letter issued to the petitioner, which is reproduced below:
"The plot cannot be transferred before expiry of 5
years from issue of this allotment letter except in inheritance
case."
5. To adjudicate upon this issue, we draw strength from the judgment
passed by Co-ordinate Bench in LPA-2096-2011, titled as "Haryana Urban
Development Authority Vs. Sandeep", where object of rehabilitation in
reference to oustee has been discussed in detail, whereby relying upon the
judgment passed in State of U.P. Vs. Pista Devi, AIR 1986 SC 2025, the
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Coordinate Bench observed that the question of allotment of the plots to the
oustees, came up for consideration before the Hon'ble Supreme Court where it
has been observed that when land for the purposes of land development in
urban areas is acquired, the developing authority should provide a house or
shop site of reasonable size on reasonable terms to each of the expropriated
persons, who have no houses or shops/buildings in the urban area in question
with an object for settlement of those land owners.
6. Further in State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Narmada Bachao
Andolan and another, 2011 (7) SCC 639, the Supreme Court dealt with the
similar issue. The relevant extract is reproduced here below:-
"26. It is desirable for the authority concerned to ensure that as far as
practicable persons who had been living and carrying on business or other
activity on the land acquired, if they so desire, and are willing to purchase
and comply with any requirement of the authority or the local body, be given
a piece of land on the terms settled with due regard to the price at which the
land has been acquired from them. However, the State Government cannot be
compelled to provide alternate accommodation to the oustees and it is for the
authority concerned to consider the desirability and feasibility of providing
alternative land considering the facts and circumstances of each case.
27. In certain cases, the oustees are entitled to rehabilitation. Rehabilitation
is meant only for those persons who have been rendered destitute because of
a loss of residence or livelihood as a consequence of land acquisition. The
authorities must explore the avenues of rehabilitation by way of employment,
housing, investment opportunities, and identification of alternative lands.
"10. ... A blinkered vision of development, complete apathy towards those
who are highly adversely affected by the development process and a cynical
unconcern for the enforcement of the laws lead to a situation where the rights
and benefits promised and guaranteed under the Constitution hardly ever
reach the most marginalised citizens." (Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd. Vs. Mathias
Oram (2010) 11 SCC 269)
For people whose lives and livelihoods are intrinsically connected to the
land, the economic and cultural shift to a market economy can be traumatic.
(Vide State of U.P. v. Pista Devi AIR 1986 SC 2025, Narpat Singh v. Jaipur
Development Authority AIR 2002 SC 2036, Land Acquisition Officer v.
Mahaboob (2009) 14 SCC 54, Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd. v. Mathias Oram
(2010) 11 SCC 269 and Brij Mohan v. HUDA (2011) 2 SCC 29.) The
fundamental right of the farmer to cultivation is a part of right to livelihood.
"Agricultural land is the foundation for a sense of security and freedom from
fear. Assured possession is a lasting source for peace and prosperity." India
being a predominantly agricultural society, there is a "strong linkage between
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the land and the person's status in [the] social system".
28. However, in case of land acquisition, "the plea of deprivation of right to
livelihood under Article 21 is unsustainable". (Vide Chameli Singh v. State of
U.P. (1996) 2 SCC 549 and Samatha v. State of A.P. (1997) 8 SCC 191). This
Court has consistently held that Article 300-A is not only a constitutional
right but also a human right. (Vide Lachhman Dass v. Jagat Ram (2007) 10
SCC 448 and Amarjit Singh v. State of Punjab (2010) 10 SCC 43). However,
in Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar v. State of Gujarat 1995 Supp. (1) SCC 596,
this Court held: (SCC pp. 620 & 632, paras 30 & 58)
"30. Thus it is clear that right to property under Article 300-A is not a basic
feature or structure of the Constitution. It is only a constitutional right. ...
***
58. ...The principle of unfairness of the procedure attracting Article 21 does
not apply to the acquisition or deprivation of property under Article 300-A
giving effect to the directive principles."
29. This Court in Narmada Bachao Andolan Vs. Union of India (2000) 10
SCC 664 held as under: (SCC pp. 702-03, para 62)
"62. The displacement of the tribals and other persons would not per se result
in the violation of their fundamental or other rights. The effect is to see that
on their rehabilitation at new locations they are better off than what they
were. At the rehabilitation sites they will have more and better amenities than
those they enjoyed in their tribal hamlets. The gradual assimilation in the
mainstream of the society will lead to betterment and progress." (...emphasis
supplied)
30. In State of Kerala v. Peoples Union for Civil Liberties (2009) 8 SCC 46,
this Court held as under: (SCC p. 95, paras 102-03) "
102. Article 21 deals with right to life and liberty. Would it bring within its
umbrage a right of tribals to be rehabilitated in their own habitat is the
question?
103. If the answer is to be rendered in the affirmative, then, for no reason
whatsoever even an inch of land belonging to a member of Scheduled Tribe
can ever be acquired. Furthermore, a distinction must be borne between a
right of rehabilitation required to be provided when the land of the members
of the Scheduled Tribes are acquired vis-à-vis a prohibition imposed upon the
State from doing so at all."
31. Thus, from the abovereferred judgments, it is evident that acquisition of
land does not violate any constitutional/fundamental right of the displaced
persons. However, they are entitled to resettlement and rehabilitation as per
the policy framed for the oustees of the project concerned.
7. The Coordinate Bench relied upon the aforementioned paragraphs
and observed that under the head "land for land," the constitution requires
removal of economic inequalities and to provide facilities and opportunities for
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a decent standard of living while protecting the economic interests of the
weaker segments of the society. We also hold that the purpose of allotting a
plot to an oustee has been recognized solely for the purpose of rehabilitation,
within the ambit of humanitarian considerations of fairness and equity, and not
as a matter of right. The allotment of a plot under the oustee quota arises,
specifically for the settlement of a landowner whose land has been acquired by
the State authority and not for speculative gain.
8. Thus, the rights of an oustee have been recognized as a special
category and are expressly addressed in State policy, which has led to the
allotment of a plot to the petitioner. It is, therefore, evident that the purpose of
allotment is part of the rehabilitation process and not a means for profiteering.
The condition incorporated in the allotment letter for non-transfer also
recognizes this rehabilitation principle, prescribing a five-year lock-in period
during which transfer of the plot is only permitted in cases of inheritance, and
not otherwise.
9. We also agree with the rationale for including the saving clause in
the allotment letter, as the object is clear; it is intended to prevent financial
gain. If same is allowed, it would defeat the purpose and object of allotting
land to an oustee. The policy of allotment makes it clear that the State framed
this policy solely for rehabilitation, to accommodate persons like the petitioner
who lost land due to acquisition. While compensation has also been awarded
for such acquisition, but the petitioner has been further accommodated as part
of a welfare and benevolent scheme.
10. We believe that the allotment has been made with a laudable
objective and not for any monetary benefits. Therefore, the condition imposed
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at the time of allotment is not arbitrary, but rather is in consonance with the
object of the policy and established legal principles. The Hon'ble Supreme
Court in "Estate Officer, Haryana Urban Development Authority and others
v. Nirmala Devi" has also addressed a similar issue and observed as follows:
"95. We summarise our final conclusion and dispose of all the
appeals with the following directions:
xxxx
(vii) The State of Haryana as well as HUDA shall ensure that land
grabbers or any other miscreants may not form a cartel and try to
take undue advantage of the allotment of plots. At the end it
should not happen that unscrupulous elements ultimately derive
any benefit or advantage from allotment of land to the oustees. In
this regard the State and HUDA will have to remain very vigilant.
(viii) We believe that since the allotment of plot is with a laudable
object and not for any monetary gain, a condition should be
imposed at the time of allotment that the allotee shall not be
entitled to transfer the plot to any third party without the
permission of the competent authority and in any case not within
five years from the date of the allotment."
11. Given the above discussion, we find no merits in the prayer made
by the learned counsel for the petitioner with regard to the quashing of
Condition No.27 of the allotment letter and same is hereby rejected.
Consequently, the writ petition is partially allowed in terms of the judgment
passed in Ram Lal Mahendru's case (supra).
(DEEPAK MANCHANDA) (ANUPINDER SINGH GREWAL )
JUDGE JUDGE
24.12.2025
vanita
Whether speaking/reasoned : Yes/No
Whether Reportable : Yes/No
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