[Cites 2, Cited by 0]
Punjab-Haryana High Court
Neelam Rani vs State Of Punjab And Ors on 18 December, 2025
Author: Anupinder Singh Grewal
Bench: Anupinder Singh Grewal
LPA-3517-2025 (O&M) -1-
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT
CHANDIGARH
101 LPA-3517-2025 (O&M)
Date of decision : 05.12.2025
Neelam Rani
... Appellant
Versus
State of Punjab and others
... Respondents
CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANUPINDER SINGH GREWAL
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK MANCHANDA
Present:- Mr. Alok Mittal, Advocate (through video conferencing) and
Mr. Sylvester Stephen, Advocate for the applicant/appellant.
***
Anupinder Singh Grewal, J. (Oral)
CM-8675-LPA-2025
1. Prayer in this application is for condonation of delay of 02 days in
filing the appeal.
2. Heard.
3. For the reasons stated in the application, the same is allowed and
delay of 02 days in filing the appeal is condoned.
CM-8674-LPA-2025
1. Allowed as prayed for.
LPA-3517-2025 (O&M)
1. The appellant has challenged the judgment of the Single Bench
whereby the writ petition challenging her dismissal from service had been
declined.
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LPA-3517-2025 (O&M) -2-
2. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that there was no cogent
material to support the charges levelled against the appellant and therefore, she
could not have been terminated from service under Punjab Civil Services
Rules. He, further submits that the appellant was not initially named in the FIR
and was arraigned as accused only at a later stage. She was found innocent
during investigation and her name was kept in Column No.2 in the final report.
She has rendered unblemished service and therefore, the punishment of
dismissal from service is grossly disproportionate to the alleged misconduct.
3. Heard.
4. It is apparent that the appellant was working as Senior Assistant in
the office of Punjab Labour Welfare Board, when a written complaint was
moved before SSP, Mohali, wherein it was alleged that a huge sum of money
had been embezzled by one-Heena, who was working as Junior Assistant-cum-
Cashier. The appellant was alleged to be in connivance with the accused-Heena
who was her immediate subordinate officer. The services of the appellant were
relieved by order dated 15.04.2019 as per Rule 4 of the Punjab Civil Services
(Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1970 and subsequently, she was placed under
suspension. An enquiry had been conducted wherein adequate opportunity had
been accorded to the appellant to put forth her defence. The Enquiry Officer, on
conclusion of the enquiry, had found that the charges levelled against her had
been proved and the competent authority thereafter, had dismissed her from
service.
5. Aggrieved thereagainst, the appellant had preferred a writ petition
before the Single Bench of this Court which has been dismissed by the
impugned judgment. We are in agreement with the judgment of the Single
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Bench that scope for interference in departmental proceedings is limited
especially when it has been conducted in accordance with principles of natural
justice and the procedure laid down under the Rules. Reference can be made to
the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India and others
versus P. Gunasekaran, (2015) 2 SCC 610 wherein the Supreme Court has
culled out the scope of interference by the High Court in disciplinary
proceedings conducted by the enquiry officer. The relevant extract thereof is
reproduced hereunder:-
"13. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully disturbing to note that the
High Court has acted as an appellate authority in the disciplinary
proceedings, re-appreciating even the evidence before the enquiry officer. The
finding on Charge no. I was accepted by the disciplinary authority and was
also endorsed by the Central Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary
proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first
appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Article 226/227 of the
Constitution of India, shall not venture into reappreciation of the evidence.
The High Court can only see whether:
a. the enquiry is held by a competent authority;
b. the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf;
c. there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the
proceedings;
d. the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by
some considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case;
e. the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or
extraneous considerations;
f. the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious
that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion;
g. the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible
and material evidence;
h. the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence
which influenced the finding;
i. the finding of fact is based on no evidence. Under Article 226/227 of the
Constitution of India, the High Court shall not:
(i). re-appreciate the evidence;
(ii). interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has
been conducted in accordance with law;
(iii). go into the adequacy of the evidence;
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(iv). go into the reliability of the evidence;
(v). interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be
based.
(vi). correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be; (vii).
go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its
conscience."
6. We find no merit in the submission of learned counsel for the
appellant that since no challan was filed against her upon conclusion of the
investigation, the penalty of dismissal from service is disproportionate to the
alleged misconduct. The allegations against the appellant were serious
inasmuch as she was stated to be in connivance with her immediate subordinate
official, who was accused of embezzling a huge sum of public money
amounting to Rs.2.81 crores approximately. It is trite that the standard of proof
in a departmental enquiry is significantly different from that required to
establish a criminal charge as the departmental and criminal proceedings are
distinct in nature. In a departmental enquiry, the findings can be recorded on
the basis of 'preponderance of probabilities' while a criminal case is to be
established beyond reasonable doubt. We may refer to the judgment of the
Supreme Court in the case of Ajit Kumar Nag versus General Manager (PJ),
Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. Haldia and others, 2005(7) SCC 764 and the
relevant extract thereof is reproduced hereunder:-
"As far as acquittal of the appellant by a criminal court is concerned, in our
opinion, the said order does not preclude the Corporation from taking an
action if it is otherwise permissible. In our judgment, the law is fairly well
settled. Acquittal by a criminal court would not debar an employer from
exercising power in accordance with Rules and Regulations in force. The two
proceedings criminal and departmental are entirely different. They operate
in different fields and have different objectives. Whereas the object of
criminal trial is to inflict appropriate punishment on offender, the purpose
of enquiry proceedings is to deal with the delinquent departmentally and to
impose penalty in accordance with service Rules. In a criminal trial,
incriminating statement made by the accused in certain circumstances or
before certain officers is totally inadmissible in evidence. Such strict rules
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of evidence and procedure would not apply to departmental proceedings.
The degree of proof which is necessary to order a conviction is different
from the degree of proof necessary to record the commission of
delinquency. The rule relating to appreciation of evidence in the two
proceedings is also not similar. In criminal law, burden of proof is on the
prosecution and unless the prosecution is able to prove the guilt of the
accused 'beyond reasonable doubt', he cannot be convicted by a court of
law. In departmental enquiry, on the other hand, penalty can be imposed on
the delinquent officer on a finding recorded on the basis of 'preponderance
of probability'. Acquittal of the appellant by a Judicial Magistrate, therefore,
does not ipso facto absolve him from the liability under the disciplinary
jurisdiction of the Corporation. We are, therefore, unable to uphold the
contention of the appellant that since he was acquitted by a criminal court,
the impugned order dismissing him from service deserves to be quashed and
set aside. "
(emphasis supplied)
7. In view of the above, we do not find any manifest illegality in the
judgment of the Single Bench warranting interference by this Court in the
appeal. Consequently, the Letters Patents Appeal being devoid of any merit
stands dismissed. Pending application, if any, shall stand disposed of
accordingly.
(ANUPINDER SINGH GREWAL)
JUDGE
(DEEPAK MANCHANDA)
JUDGE
December 05, 2025
sonia gugnani
Whether speaking/reasoned : Yes/No
Whether reportable : Yes/No
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