[Cites 10, Cited by 0]

Punjab-Haryana High Court

Manjeet Kaur vs Punjab State Power Corporation Limited ... on 9 December, 2025

                                           1

CWP-28419
    28419-2023




      IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
                    AT CHANDIGARH

236

                                           CWP
                                           CWP-28419-2023
                                           Date of Decision: December 09,, 2025

Manjeet Kaur
                                                                   .....Petitioner


                                      VERSUS


The Punjab State Power Corporation Ltd. and others
                                                                    ..Respondents




CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARPREET SINGH BRAR

Present :   Mr. Ashok Bhardwaj,, Advocate for the petitioner.
            Mr. Kunal Mulwani, Advocate for respondents No.1 to 3.
            Ms. Tanvi Jain, Advocate for respondent No.4 (through V.C).

HARPREET SINGH BRAR,
               BRAR J. (Oral)

1. The present writ petition has been filed under Article 226

/227

of the Constitution of India for issuance of an appropriate writ or order in

the nature of certiorari for quashing the revised PPO dated 04.10.2019

(Annexure P-6), P 6), vide which the petitioner has been allowed half family

pension only, despite the fact that the deceased employee obtained divorced

from his previous wife, vide judgment and decree dated 07.12.2007

(Annexure P-4), P 4), performed marriage with the petitioner on 04.05.2008 and

1 of 8

CWP-28419 28419-2023

subsequently expired on 15.02.2019. Further for issuance of a writ in the

nature of mandamus directing the respondents No.1 to 3 to release full

family pension to the petitioner w.e.f. 16.02.2019, when the husband of

petitioner expired and respondents may also be directed to make payment of

arrears of family with interest @ 18% p.a. p.a. due to delayed payment of family

pension.

2. Learned counsel for the petitioner, inter alia,, contends that the

entire family pension has not been released to the petitioner despite the fact

that her husband, late Sh. Mukand Singh, expired on 15.02.2019 15.02.2019,, and at the

time of his death, she was the only surviving legally wedded wife. Learned

counsel further submits that the husband of the petitioner retired from

service on 31.05.2012 after serving the respondent respondent-Corporation Corporation as an

Assistant Lineman. Respondent Respondent No.4 is claiming herself to be the wife of

late Sh. Mukand Singh and has filed a suit for declaration asserting her

entitlement to pensionary and other benefits such as provident fund, gratuity

etc. It is submitted that the respondent-Corporation, respondent Corporation, in it itss reply before the

trial Court, took a categorical stand that late Sh. Mukand Singh had

nominated the petitioner as his nominee after obtaining a divorce from his

first wife, respondent No.4, and that the petitioner alone is entitled to

pensionary benefits.

benefits. Learned counsel further submits that respondent No.4

had already obtained a decree of divorce from late Sh. Mukand Singh under

Section 13--B B of the Hindu Marriage Act vide judgment and decree dated

07.12.2007 (Annexure P-4).

P 4). It was the petitioner who had been taking care

2 of 8

CWP-28419 28419-2023

of the deceased husband. It is further submitted that the suit filed by

respondent No.4 was dismissed under Order 17 Rule 3 CPC vide judgment

and decree dated 12.01.2023 (Annexure P P-3).

3). Respondent No.4 neither

sought restoration nor ever controverted controverted the stand taken by the petitioner in

her written statement by filing any rejoinder before the trial Court. There is

no denial of the fact that respondent No.4 obtained divorce on 07.12.2007

from late Sh. Mukand Singh, and the said judgment and decree (Annexure

P-4)

4) has never been assailed by her. Learned counsel further refers to letter

dated 17.04.2023 (Annexure P-8), P 8), wherein the Senior Executive Engineer of

the respondent-Corporation respondent Corporation concluded that late Sh. Mukand Singh

performed his second marriage marriage with the petitioner on 04.05.2008 after

obtaining divorce from his previous wife, i.e., respondent No.4, on

07.12.2007, and that after the retirement of the deceased, the petitioner alone

became entitled to the entire family pension being the legall legally wedded wife.

3. Per contra, learned counsel for respondents No.1 to 3 refers to

Clause-3(b) 3(b) of Family Pension Scheme and submits that a judicially

separated wife or husband would be entitled to family pension in case such

separation is not granted on the ground of adultery and the surviving spouse

was not held guilty of committing adultery. Learned counsel further refers to

Note-1 1 attached to the Explanation xplanation A of the above said scheme and submits

that when a government employee is survives bby y more than one widow, the

pension will pay to them in equal shares.

3 of 8

CWP-28419 28419-2023

4. On the other hand, learned counsel for respondent No.4 refers

to an affidavit executed on 11.03.2016 by late Sh. Mukand Singh before the

Executive Magistrate, Tehsil Khanauri, Distri District Sangrur (Annexure R-4/1), 4/1),

appended with her reply. In the said affidavit, the deceased stated that he had

married the petitioner in the Panchayat and had later divorced her, and that

she had no right to claim any government dues or property. Learned cou counsel nsel

further refers to receipt Annexure R-4/2, R 4/2, purportedly executed at the time of

the last rites of late Sh. Mukand Singh, and submits that at the time of his

death, respondent No.4 was looking after him and her children performed

his last rites. It is asserted asserted that the petitioner was never the legally wedded

wife of late Sh. Mukand Singh.

5. In rebuttal, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that

respondent No.4 has no locus standi to challenge validity of marriage

between petitioner and late Sh. Mukand kand Singh Singh. Further urther the reliance placed

by the learned counsel for the respondent(s) respondent(s)-Corporation on Clause-3(b) of

Family Pension Scheme is totally misplaced, as a judicially separated wife

cannot be equated with the divorced wife.

6. I have heard the learned arned counsel for the parties and have

perused the case file with their able assistance. It transpires that the

adjudication of the issues involved in the present writ petition necessitates

appreciation of disputed questions of fact, which this Court, whil whilee exercising

its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, is not equipped to

undertake.

4 of 8

CWP-28419 28419-2023

7. It is settled law that where disputed questions of facts are

involved, a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not the

proper remedy. A two-Judge two Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in S.P.S.

Rathore v. State of Haryana, (2005) 10 SCC 11,, speaking through Justice

Y.K. Sabharwal, has held as follows:

"16. In Chairman, Grid Corpn. of Or Orissa issa Ltd. (Gridco) v. Sukamani Das [(1999) 7 SCC 298] the question which arose for consideration was, can the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution award compensation for death caused due to electrocution on account of negligence, when the liability was emphatically denied on the ground that the death had not occurred as a result of negligence, but because of an act of God or of acts of some other persons. The Court held that it is the settled legal position that where disputed questions of facts are involved, a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is not a proper remedy. Therefore, questions as to whether death occurred due to negligence negligence or due to act of God or of some third person could not be decided properly on the basis of affidavits only, but should be decided by the civil court after appreciating the evidence adduced by the parties. In T.N. Electricity Board v. Sumathi [(2000 [(2000)) 4 SCC 543] it was held that when a disputed question of fact arises and there is clear denial of any tortious liability, remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution may not be proper. The Court carve carved d out exception to this general rule by observing that, it should not be understood that in every case of tortious liability, recourse must be had to a suit. When there is negligence on the face of it and infringement of Article 21 is there, it cannot be said said that there will be any bar to proceed under Article 226 of the Constitution."

8. Further a two-Judge Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court in

Orissa Agro Industries Corporation Ltd. Vs. Bharati Industries 2005 (12)

725 while speaking through Justice Arijit Pasayat, observed that as follows:

5 of 8

CWP-28419 28419-2023

"9. A bare perusal of the High Court's judgment shows that there was clear non non-application application of mind. On one hand the High Court observed that the di disputed sputed questions cannot be gone into a writ petition. It was also noticed that essence of dispute was breach of contract. After coming to the above conclusions the High Court should have dismissed the writ petition. Surprisingly, the High Court proceeded to t examine the case solely on the writ petitioner's assertion and on a very curious reasoning that though the appellant appellant-Corporation Corporation claimed that the value of articles lifted was nearly rupees 14.90 lakhs no details were specifically given. From the counter- counter affidavit filed before the High Court it is crystal clear that relevant details disputing claim of the writ petitioner were given. Value of articles lifted by the writ petitioner is a disputed factual question. Where a complicated question of fact is involved ved and the matter requires thorough proof on factual aspects, the High Court should not entertain the writ petition.

Whether or not the High Court should exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution would largely depend upon the nature of dispute ispute and if the dispute cannot be resolved without going into the factual controversy, the High Court should not entertain the writ petition. As noted above, the writ petition was primarily founded on allegation of breach of contract. Question whether the action of the opposite party in the writ petition amounted to breach of contractual obligation ultimately depends on facts and would require material evidence to be scrutinised and in such a case writ jurisdiction should not be exercised. (See : State of Bihar v. Jain Plastic & Chemicals Ltd., 2002(1) SCC 216).

10. In a catena of cases this Court has held that where dispute revolves round ound questions of fact, the matter ought not be entertained under Article 226 of the Constitution. (See :

Chairman, Grid Corporation of Orissa LTd. (GRIDCO) and Ors. v. Sukamani Das (Smt.) Smt.) and Anr., 1999(4) RCR (Civil) 174 (SC) : (1999(7) SCC 298)."

9. A Two-Judge Judge bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in

Chairman, Grid Corporation of Orissa Ltd. (Gridco) Vs. Smt. Sukamani

298, while speaking through Justice G.T Nanavati made Das 1999 (7) SCC 298,

the following observations:

6 of 8

CWP-28419 28419-2023

"6. In our opinion, the High Court committed an error in entertaining the writ petitions even though they were not fit cases for exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution. The High Court went wrong in proceeding on the basis that as the deaths had taken place because of electrocution as a result of the deceased coming into contact with snapped live wires of the electric transmission lines of the appellants, that "admittedly/prima facie amounted to negligence on the part of the appellants". The High Court failed to appreciate that all these cases were actions in tort and negligence was required to be established firstly by the claimants. Mere fact that the wire of the electric transmission line belonging to the appellant No. 1 had snapped and the deceased had come into contact with it and had died was not by itself sufficient for awarding compensation. It also required to be examined whether the wire had snapped as a result of any negligence of the appellants and under which circumstances the deceased had come into contact with the wire. In view of the specific defences raised by the appellants in each of these cases they deserved an opportunity to prove that proper care and precautions were taken in maintaining the transmission lines and yet the wires had snapped because of circumstances beyond their control or unauthorised intervention of third parties or that the deceased had not died in the manner stated by the petitioners. These questions could not have been decided properly on the basis of affidavits only. It is the settled legal position that where disputed questions of facts are involved a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is not a proper remedy. The High Court has not and could not have held that the disputes in these cases were raised for the sake of raising them and that there wass no substance therein. The High Court should have directed the writ petitioners to approach the Civil Court as it was done in OJC No. 5229 of 1995.

10. Reliance in this regard may be placed on the judgement

rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Shubhas Jain v. Rajeshwari

Shivam, 2021 SCC Online SC 562 , Union of India v. Puna Hinda, (2021)

10 SCC 690 and of this Court in Sanchalakshri v. Vijayakumar

Raghuvirprasad Mehta and another, 1999(1) SCT 88 (SC) : JT 1998(8)

SC 55.

7 of 8

CWP-28419 28419-2023

11. It is trite that a writ petition under Article 226 is not an

appropriate remedy for resolving disputed questions of fact. In such cases,

the High Court cannot transform itself into a court of first instance to

reappreciate evidence or decide intricate factual factual disputes.