Punjab-Haryana High Court
Chandigarh Transport Undertaking vs The Presiding Officer And Others on 21 October, 2024
Author: Anil Kshetarpal
Bench: Anil Kshetarpal
In the High Court of Punjab and Haryana, at Chandigarh
Letters Patent Appeal No. 1877 of 2018 (O&M)
Reserved On: 25.09.2024
Pronounced On: 21.10.2024
Chandigarh Transport Undertaking
... Appellant(s)
Versus
The Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Union Territory, Chandigarh and
Others
... Respondent(s)
CORAM: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Sheel Nagu, Chief Justice.
Hon'ble Mr. Justice Anil Kshetarpal.
Present: Mr. Gaurav Mohunta, Additional Standing Counsel
and Mr. Yashasvi Goyal, Advocate,
for the appellant(s).
Anil Kshetarpal, J.
CM-4872-LPA-2018
1. For the reasons stated in the application, the same is allowed.
Delay of 272 days in filing the appeal stands condoned.
CM-4871-LPA-2018
2. For the reasons stated in the application, the same is allowed.
Delay of six days in refiling the appeal stands condoned.
LPA-1877-2018
3. Brief Facts
3.1 Through this intra Court appeal, the correctness of the Labour
Court's award passed on a reference under Section 10(1)(c) of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as "the 1947 Act") which, in turn,
has been affirmed by the learned Single Judge, has been assailed.
3.2 Gurnam Singh-respondent No.3, despite the receipt of notice of
the appeal, has not entered appearance. He was working as a Driver with the
appellant. Another driver, namely Kehar Singh, brought Bus bearing
registration plate No. CHW-8955 to the yard for parking. After parking the
bus, he went to get his bed as he used to stay at Ambala. On his return, he
found respondent No.3, who was not on duty, on the driver's seat of the bus.
He started the bus and drove it in rash and negligent manner resulting into an
accident at the intersection of Sectors 28-29-30 in which a cyclist died on the
spot whereas the pillion rider suffered injuries. The police registered a case
against respondent No.3 and the departmental proceedings were also
initiated against him. The article of charge served on the petitioner reads as
under:-
"Article of Charge
On 04.12.1987, Shri Kehar Singh Driver No.243 was on duty
with bus No.CHW-8955, while he parked his bus in Sector-28
and went to get his bed as he had to stayed at Ambala. On his
return from him he found Shri Gurnam but Singh D-355 who
was not on duty with the said was sitting on the drivers seat and
started the bus. While Shri Gurnam Singh driver was driving
the bus No.CHW-8955 with rash and negligent manners,
caused an accident in inter section of Sector 28/29/30. In this
accident, a cyclist died on the spot and other pillion rider met
some injuries. The accident took place due to rash and
negligent driving of the bus by Sh.Gurnam Singh, Driver
No.355 and the police has registered a case U/S.279/337/304
against him. Thus Shri Gurnam Singh D-355 is guilty for
causing fatal accident by taking bus forcibly from Sh.Kehar
Singh Driver 243 which amounts to grave misconduct on his
part."
3.3 In the disciplinary inquiry, it was found that the charges are
proved against respondent No.3. Ultimately, a show cause notice was issued
and the disciplinary authorities reduced the pay scale of respondent No.3 for
a period of five years to the time scale and the suspension period was also
limited to grant of subsistence allowance during his suspension period. The
respondent No.3 sent a demand notice which was referred to the Labour
Court under Section 10(1)(c) of the 1947 Act. By filing an application, the
learned counsel representing respondent No.3 did not challenge the
correctness of the inquiry report but limited his submission only to the
provisions of Section 11A of the 1947 Act. The Presiding Officer substituted
the punishment with the stoppage of two increments with cumulative effect.
It was also ordered that respondent no.3 shall not be entitled to any arrears
on account of any modification in the punishment. The management filed a
writ petition which was dismissed on the following three grounds:-
I) Misconduct or negligence against respondent No.3 to the
extent of using bus which was not allotted to him, is
proved.
II) No doubt, the Labour Court has not assigned any reason
as to why the penalty has been modified but the event of
the alleged incident relates to the year 1987 whereas the
penalty was imposed in the year 1994.
III) There would not be a much difference in view of the
pillion rider while modifying the penalty order.
4. Submissions put forth by the Learned Counsel
Representing the Appellant
4.1 The appellant's counsel while drawing attention of the Court to
Section 11A of the 1947 Act, has submitted that the Labour Court had no
jurisdiction to modify the punishment while exercising the powers under
Section 11A. He submits that Section 11A is attracted only in the eventuality
when the punishment awarded is discharge or dismissal of the workman
which is not the case herein. He further submits that the power of Labour
Court to reduce the sentence is not unlimited and the discretion to reduce the
punishment can be exercised only where the punishment is wholly
disproportionate to the gravity of misconduct or the existence of the
mitigating circumstances.
5. Discussion and Analysis
5.1 We have considered the submissions of the learned counsel
representing the appellant and with his able assistance, perused the paper
book.
5.2 It is evident that the workmen filed an application under
Section 11A of the 1947 Act before the Labour Court while categorically
submitting that he does not wish to challenge the correctness of the
DEEPAK KUMAR BHARDWAJdisciplinary inquiry. It appears that the Labour Court as well as the learned
Single Judge overlooked that Section 11A of the 1947 Act was not
applicable, which is extracted as under:-
"11A. Powers of Labour Courts, Tribunals and National
Tribunals to give appropriate relief in case of discharge or
dismissal of workmen.--Where an industrial dispute relating to
the discharge or dismissal of a workman has been referred to a
Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal for adjudication
and, in the course of the adjudication proceedings, the Labour
Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal, as the case may be, is
satisfied that the order of discharge or dismissal was not
justified, it may, by its award, set aside the order of discharge
or dismissal and direct reinstatement of the workman on such
terms and conditions, if any, as it thinks fit, or give such other
relief to the workman including the award of any lesser
punishment in lieu of discharge or dismissal as the
circumstances of the case may require.
Provided that in any proceeding under this section the
Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal, as the case may
be, shall rely only on the materials on record and shall not take
any fresh evidence in relation to the matter."
5.3 It is evident that Section 11A of the 1947 Act is applicable only
in the case of discharge or dismissal of the workman. This is sine qua non
for invoking the enabling power under Section 11A of the 1947 Act. Hence,
the order passed by the Labour Court, which, in turn, has been affirmed by
the learned Single Judge was the result of material irregularity going to the
root of the matter. Reliance, in this regard, can be placed upon the judgment
of the Supreme Court in The General Secretary, South India Cashew
Factories Workers' Union v. The Managing Director, Kerala State Cashew
Development Corporation Limited and Others (2006) 5 SCC 201. In fact,
Section 11A was inserted on 15.03.1971 by Act No. 45 of 1971. The
language of the statute is clear and categoric. The enabling discretion given
to the Labour Court, Tribunal/National Tribunal to interfere with the
quantum of punishment is only when the industrial dispute relating to the
discharge or dismissal of the workman comes up for adjudication. This is not
applicable if the Labour Court is deciding the reference against any other
order of penalty.
5.4 In any case, it is evident that the learned Single Judge has found
that the Labour Court has failed to record any reason. In these
circumstances, it was not appropriate for the learned Single Judge to uphold
the award. Moreover, the learned Single Judge has also erred in observing
that the misconduct or negligence against respondent No.1 would be to the
extent of using of bus which was not allotted to him. Once respondent No.3
did not challenge the correctness of the inquiry report, the charge of
misconduct as extracted above stood proved. The acquittal of respondent
No.3 in a criminal case would not nullify the findings reported by the
Inquiry Officer. In a criminal case, the standard of proof is much higher
when compared with the departmental inquiry. The acquittal in criminal case
would not be sufficient to nullify the effect of punishment awarded after the
departmental proceedings. Similarly, the Labour Court has no jurisdiction to
interfere with the punishment unless it is established that the punishment is
disproportionate to the gravity of misconduct or there was existence of the
mitigating circumstances. It is evident that on account of misconduct of
respondent No.3, one person lost his precious life whereas another suffered
injuries. In these circumstances, it was not appropriate for the Labour Court
to interfere with the order of punishment. Similarly, the learned Single Judge
has erred in observing that the substituted punishment will not be of much
difference. The question is not of difference, but the question is "whether the
Labour Court had the jurisdiction to intermeddle with the discretion
exercised by the punishing authority which has the primary jurisdiction to
impose punishment? The Labour Court gets the jurisdiction only in case of
dismissal or discharge of workman where the punishment is disproportionate
to the gravity of misconduct or the existence of mitigating circumstances. In
this case, neither the Labour Court nor the learned Single Judge has found
that Section 11A is extracted.
5.5 It is correct that the submission based on the scope of Section
11A has not been taken either before the Labour Court or the learned Single
Judge, however, this being purely a legal issue which goes to the root of the
matter, hence, the appellant's counsel has been permitted to make
submissions.
6. Decision
6.1 Keeping in view the aforesaid facts, the present appeal is
allowed and the reference stands answered against respondent No.3.
6.2 The miscellaneous application(s) pending, if any, shall also
stand disposed of.
(Anil Kshetarpal) (Sheel Nagu)
Judge Chief Justice
October 21, 2024
"DK"
Whether speaking/reasoned :Yes/No
Whether reportable : Yes/No
