Punjab-Haryana High Court
Puneet Mittal vs State Of Haryana And Another on 20 November, 2024
Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:152500
CWP Nos.13169, 13288 and 13292 of 2024
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT
CHANDIGARH
Date of decision: 20.11.2024
1. CWP No.13169 of 2024
Puneet Mittal
....Petitioner
Versus
State of Haryana and another
....Respondents
2. CWP No.13288 of 2024
Puneet Mittal
....Petitioner
Versus
State of Haryana and another
....Respondents
3. CWP No.13292 of 2024
Puneet Mittal
....Petitioner
Versus
State of Haryana and another
....Respondents
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE NAMIT KUMAR
Present: Mr. Sumeet Mahajan, Sr. Advocate
with Mr. Saksham Mahajan, Advocate
Mr. Shrey Sachdeva, Advocate
and Ms. Shruti Singla, Advocate
for the petitioner (in all the writ petitions)
Mr. Saurabh Mohunta, DAG, Haryana.
(in all the writ petitions)
NAMIT KUMAR J.
1. This judgment shall dispose of CWP Nos.13169, 13288 and
13292 of 2024, as common questions of law and facts are involved
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therein for adjudication. For the sake of convenience, facts are taken
from CWP No.13169 of 2024, titled as "Puneet Mittal vs State of
Haryana and another".
2. The writ petition i.e. CWP No.13169 of 2024, has been
filed by the petitioner under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of
India, seeking a writ of certiorari, quashing the show cause notices
dated 13.03.2024 (Annexure P-8), dated 29.04.2024 (Annexure P-9),
dated 06.12.2023 (Annexure P-17), dated 25.01.2022 (Annexure P-19)
and dated 03.03.2022 (Annexure P-22), issued by respondent No.2 to
the petitioner. Further a writ of mandamus has been sought for directing
the respondent - State not to initiate any disciplinary proceedings
against the petitioner for the following works (i) construction of
building of Govt. College for Women at Ambala City in Ambala
District, (ii) construction of Administrative Block, Phase 3 in the
campus of Mini Secretariat, Ambala Cantt. and (iii) construction of
residential accommodation for doctor/paramedical staff in Civil
Hospital, Ambala Cantt.
3. The undisputed facts of the case are that the petitioner was
recruited as Assistant Engineer (Civil) AT PSD-II Kurukshetra vide
order dated 21.02.2014 and he was posted as Sub-Divisional Engineer
in Ambala Circle, PWD (B&R) Department, Haryana, in the year 2016
and was promoted on 30.10.2021 to the post of Executive Engineer and
was thereafter transferred to Kurukshetra. In the Ambala Circle, one
Sukhbir Singh was posted as Superintending Engineer in the month of
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August, 2021 and he initiated action against the contractor namely M/s.
Garg and Company and against the petitioner and many other officers
posted in supervision of project being executed by the said contractor
and there being animosity between the Superintending Engineer and the
contractor due to some extraneous reasons and in order to squeeze the
said contractor, the said Superintending Engineer started preparing
reports without any evidence and justification against him and various
government officials, who were Incharge at the site on various
constructions work in order to give false impression that the contractor
is hand in glove with various SDEs, Executive Engineer and Junior
Engineers, to release payments to him against bills for which the
material has not been utilized. The said contractor filed CWP No.6347
of 2022, titled as "M/s. Garg and Company vs State of Haryana and
others" before this Court. In the said writ petition, Sukhbir Singh,
Superintending Engineer, PWD (B&R), Haryana, was also impleaded as
respondent No.5 and in the said petition, on 11.07.2022, the following
order was passed:-
"Learned Additional Advocate General appearing
for the State of Haryana as well as the learned counsel
appearing for the petitioners pray for further time as the
endeavour for amicable resolution of the dispute is still in
progress.
At this stage, Mr. Narula, learned counsel appearing
on behalf of respondent-Sukhbir Singh, Superintending
Engineer, PWD, Haryana submits that he has filed reply to
the allegations made by the petitioners. He further submits
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that here is a case where the petitioner is guilty of having
committed several frauds with the authorities.
At this stage, it is to be noted that this Court had
dealt with several petitions filed by the petitioners and
some of which have been referred for arbitration with the
consent of the parties. We may point out that similar
allegations were made against respondent-Sukhbir Singh,
S.E. even in those petitions. And as shall be significant to
observe, Mr. Anurag Rastogi, IAS, Additional Chief
Secretary, Public Works Department, Haryana had
appeared in Court on 27.04.2022 and had stated that the
parties would conjointly discuss the matter and resolve the
dispute amicably. Those proceedings are still pending. But
respondent-Sukhbir Singh, Superintending Engineer,
Ambala Circle, Public Works Department, B&R, District
Ambala, who too was present in Court on 27.04.2022 and
was conscious of the assurance given by the Additional
Chief Secretary, still interjected and passed orders against
the petitioners. Evidently the act of the Superintending
Engineer, who is subordinate to the Additional Chief
Secretary of the Public Works Department, is in
contravention to the statement made by the Additional
Chief Secretary before this Court as also the order passed
on 27.04.2022.
Not just that, even though the Court had not yet
issued any notice in the matter, and without any
authorization from the State Government, the officer on his
own, and contrary to the stand taken by the Additional
Chief Secretary before this Court, has even filed the written
statement.
When confronted with the aforesaid aspects, learned
counsel appearing for respondent-Sukhbir Singh,
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Superintending Engineer, prays for and is permitted to
withdraw the reply/response filed by him before this Court.
He further undertakes that respondent No.5-Sukhbir Singh
would not interfere in the matter. Taking note of the above,
respondent-Sukhbir Singh, Superintending Engineer, is
permitted to withdraw the reply/response filed by him.
List again on 13.09.2022.
A copy of this order be placed in the connected
files."
Thereafter, on the adjourned date i.e. 13.09.2022, the
following order was passed:-
"Learned Senior Additional Advocate General,
Haryana, on instructions from the Additional Chief
Secretary, PWD (B&R), submits that in view of the
statement, made before this Court, the authorities do not
propose to take any action on the orders and
recommendations of Sukhbir Singh, Superintending
Engineer-respondent No.7. He further submits that in terms
of the undertaking given before this Court, the parties are
on the verge of resolving the disputes, most of which have
since been settled and there is every likelihood that the
entire dispute would be resolved by 15.11.2022.
Learned Senior counsel entering appearance on
behalf of the contempner prays for and is granted time to
file an affidavit.
Sukhbir Singh, Superintending Engineer-Respondent
No.7, is directed to remain present in Court, on the next
date of hearing.
Adjourned to 07.12.2022.
A photocopy of this order be placed on the files of
other connected cases."
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4. The grievance of the petitioner is that despite the
undertaking given in the said writ petition, the petitioner has been issued
show cause notices dated 13.03.2024 (Annexure P-8), dated 29.04.2024
(Annexure P-9), dated 06.12.2023 (Annexure P-17), dated 25.01.2022
(Annexure P-19) and dated 03.03.2022 (Annexure P-22), by respondent
No.2, whereby explanation of the petitioner has been sought.
5. Learned Senior counsel for the petitioner submits that the
impugned show cause notices dated 13.03.2024 (Annexure P-8), dated
29.04.2024 (Annexure P-9), dated 06.12.2023 (Annexure P-17), dated
25.01.2022 (Annexure P-19) and dated 03.03.2022 (Annexure P-22),
have been issued to the petitioner without any justification and are
against the undertaking given before this Court in CWP No.6347 of
2022. He further submits that the same have been issued with mala fide
intention of Sh. Sukhbir Singh, the then Superintending Engineer and,
therefore, the same are liable to be set-aside.
6. Per contra, learned State counsel has opposed the claim of
the petitioner and submits that the instant petition, challenging show
cause notices dated 13.03.2024 (Annexure P-8), dated 29.04.2024
(Annexure P-9), dated 06.12.2023 (Annexure P-17), dated 25.01.2022
(Annexure P-19) and dated 03.03.2022 (Annexure P-22), seeking
explanation of the petitioner is not maintainable as no adverse order(s)
have been passed against the petitioner. He further submits that although
allegations have been levelled against the then Superintending Engineer
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Sukhbir Singh, however, he has not been impleaded as party respondent
in the present petition.
7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the
record.
8. The only question which arises for consideration in the present
petition is as to whether the show cause notices dated 13.03.2024
(Annexure P-8), dated 29.04.2024 (Annexure P-9), dated 06.12.2023
(Annexure P-17) dated 25.01.2022 (Annexure P-19) and dated
03.03.2022 (Annexure P-22) whereby explanation of the petitioner has
been sought can be challenged in the present petition or not.
The said issue is not res integra as it has been held by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court and by this Court in various judgments that the
scope of interference by this Court in the cases i.e. challenging show
cause notices is very limited. Firstly, if the show cause notice has been
issued by the incompetent authority, other than the disciplinary authority
and secondly, if it is issued due to mala fide intention of the authority
concerned. The present show cause notices have not been challenged on
these two grounds as it is not the case of the petitioners that the show
cause notices have been issued by the incompetent authority or due to
mala fide intention of the issuing authority. Moreover, writ does not lie
against a charge-sheet or show-cause notice as it does not give any rise
to the cause of action. Unless some adverse order is passed in pursuance
to the said show cause notice/charge-sheet, employee has no right to
invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court or the Civil Court to impugn
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the same. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Transport Commissioner,
Madras Vs. Thiru A. Radha Krishna Moorthy : 1995(1) S.C.T. 728 has
held that the truth and correctness of the charges cannot be gone into by
the Court, more particularly at a stage prior to conclusion of disciplinary
inquiry as even after imposition of punishment, the Court has no
jurisdiction to go into the truth of allegations/charges except in a case
where they are based on no evidence. The Court can only examine the
procedural correctness of the decision making process. The relevant
portion from the said judgment reads as under:-
"7. So far as the truth and correctness of the charges is
concerned, it was not a matter for the Tribunal to go into-
more particularly at a stage prior to the conclusion of the
disciplinary enquiry. As pointed out by this Court
repeatedly, even when the matter comes to the Tribunal
after the imposition of punishment, it has no jurisdiction to
go into truth of the allegations/charges except in a case
where they are based on no evidence i.e., where they are
perverse. The jurisdiction of the Tribunal is akin to that of
the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is
power of judicial review. It only examines the procedural
correctness of the decision-making-process. For this
reason the order of the Tribunal insofar as it goes into or
discusses the truth and correctness of the charges, is
unsustainable in law."
9. Further, in Union of India Vs. Upendra Singh : 1994(2)
S.C.T. 771, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under :-
"4. When the matter went back to the Tribunal, it went
into the correctness of the charges on the basis of the
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material produced by the respondent and quashed the
charges holding that the charges do not indicate any
corrupt motive or any culpability on the part of the
respondent. We must say, we are not a little surprised at the
course adopted by the Tribunal. In its order dated
September 10, 1992 this Court specifically drew attention
to the observations in A.N. Saxena that the Tribunal ought
not to interfere at an interlocutory stage and yet the
Tribunal chose to interfere on the basis of the material
which was yet to be produced at the inquiry. In short, the
Tribunal undertook the inquiry which ought to be held by
the disciplinary authority (or the inquiry officer appointed
by him) and found that the charges are not true. It may be
recalled that the jurisdiction of the Central Administrative
Tribunal is akin to the jurisdiction of the High Court under
Article 226 of the Constitution. Therefore, the principles,
norms and the constraints which apply to the said
jurisdiction apply equally to the Tribunal. If the original
application of the respondent were to be filed in the High
Court it would have been termed, properly speaking, as a
writ of prohibition. A writ of prohibition is issued only
when patent lack of jurisdiction is made out. It is true that
a High Court acting under Article 226 is not bound by the
technical rules applying to the issuance of prerogative
writs like certiorari, prohibition and mandamus in United
Kingdom, yet the basic principles and norms applying to
the said writs must be kept in view, as observed by this
Court in T.C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa and another, AIR
1954 Supreme Court 440. It was observed by Mukherjea,
J. speaking for the Constitution Bench :
"The language used in Articles 32 and 226 of our
Constitution is very wide and the powers of the
Supreme Court as well as of all the High Courts in
India extend to issuing of orders, writs or directions
including writs in the nature of 'habeas corpus,
mandamus, quo warrant, prohibition and certiorari'
as may be considered necessary for enforcement of
the fundamental rights and in the case of the High
Courts, for other purposes as well. In view of the
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express provisions in our Constitution we need not
now look back to the early history or the procedural
technicalities of these writs in English law, nor feel
oppressed by any difference or change of opinion
expressed in particular cases by English Judges. We
can make an order or issue a writ in the nature of
,certiorari' in all appropriate cases and in
appropriate manner, so long as we keep to the broad
and fundamental principles that regulate the
exercise of jurisdiction in the matter of granting
such writs in English law."
5. The said statement of law was expressly affirmed by
a Seven-Judge Bench inSmt. Ujjam Bai v. State of Uttar
Pradesh and another, AIR 1962 Supreme Court 1621 at
1625. The reason for this dictum is self evident. If we do
not keep to the broad and fundamental principles that
regulate the exercise of jurisdiction in the matter of
granting such writs in English law, the exercise of
jurisdiction becomes rudderless and unguided, it tends to
become arbitrary and capricious. There will be no
uniformity of approach and there will be the danger of the
jurisdiction becoming personalized. The parameters of
jurisdiction would vary from Judge to Judge and from
Court to Court. (Some say, this has already happened.)
Law does advance. Jurisprudence does undoubtedly
develop with the passage of time, but not by forgetting the
fundamentals. You have to build upon the existing
foundations and not by abandoning them. It leads to
confusion; it does not assist in coherence in thought or
action.
6. In the case of charges framed in a disciplinary
inquiry the tribunal or court can interfere only if on the
charges framed (read with imputation or particulars of
the charges, if any) no misconduct or other irregularity
alleged can be said to have been made out or the charges
framed are contrary to any law. At this stage, the tribunal
has no jurisdiction to go into the correctness or truth of
the charges. The tribunal cannot take over the functions
of the disciplinary authority. The truth or otherwise of the
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charges is a matter for the disciplinary authority to go
into. Indeed, even after the conclusion of the disciplinary
proceedings, if the matter comes to court or tribunal, they
have no jurisdiction to look into the truth of the charges
or into the correctness of the findings recorded by the
disciplinary authority or the appellate authority as the
case may be. The function of the court/tribunal is one of
judicial review, the parameters of which are repeatedly
laid down by this Court. It would be sufficient to quote
the decision in H.B. Gandhi, Excise and Taxation
Officer-cum-Assessing Authority, Karnal and other v. M/s
Gopi Nath & Sons and other, (1992 Supp. (2) SCC 312).
The Bench comprising M.N. Venkatachaliah, J. (as he then
was) and A.M. Ahmadi, J., affirmed the principle thus :
"Judicial review, it is trite, is not directed against the
decision but is confined to the decision-making
process. Judicial review cannot extend to the
examination of the correctness or reasonableness of
a decision as a matter of fact. The purpose of
judicial review is to ensure that the individual
receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the
authority after according fair treatment reaches, on
a matter which it is authorized by law to decide, a
conclusion which is correct in the eyes of the Court.
Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but
a review of the manner in which the decision is
made. It will be erroneous to think that the Court sits
in judgment not only on the correctness of the
decision making process but also on the correctness
of the decision itself."
7. Now, if a court cannot interfere with the truth or
correctness of the charges even in a proceeding against the
final order, it is un-understandable how can that be done
by the tribunal at the stage of framing of charges? In this
case, the Tribunal has held that the charges are not
sustainable (the finding that no culpability is alleged and
no corrupt motive attributed), not on the basis of the
articles of charges and the statement of imputations but
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mainly on the basis of the material produced by the
respondent before it, as we shall presently indicate."
10. The abovesaid judgments have been followed by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Orissa and Another Vs. Sangam
Keshari Misra and another : 2010(4) S.C.T. 591, wherein it has been
held as under:-
"9. The learned counsel for first respondent would further
argue that the charge memorandum ought to have been
quashed not only on a technical ground but even on merits
without reserving any liberty to the State Government to
proceed in accordance with law. He submitted that the
following circumstances would make it clear that the said
charge memorandum was mala fide and issued with
ulterior motive to affect his career as a senior IAS officer:
(a) The copy of the High Court order could be obtained by
applying for a certified copy, and there was no need for
any one, much less for him, to impersonate any one else to
get a certified copy, (b) It is difficult to believe that an
officer of a rank of Special Secretary would personally go
to the office of an Additional Govt. Advocate just to receive
a certified copy; (c) The first respondent was in no way
concerned with either Misc. Case No. 238 of 2001 or Misc.
Case No.236/2001 on the file of the High Court and he had
nothing to do with the order dated 17.1.2002 therein.
Receiving a free copy of the said order would not in any
way benefit him or adversely affect anyone else; (d) The
charge against him is so absurd and preposterous that it is
liable to be rejected outright, and (e) The background facts
would disclose the hand of one P.K. Nayak, IAS, who is
inimically disposed towards the first respondent. Though
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there appears to be some merit in the said contentions of
the first respondent, it is unnecessary to examine the
correctness of these contentions as normally a charge
sheet is not quashed prior to the conducting of the
enquiry on the ground that the facts stated in the charge
are erroneous. It is well settled that the correctness or
truth of the charge is the function of the disciplinary
authority. (vide Union of India vs. Upendra Singh,
1994(2) S.C.T. 771 : 1994(3) SCC page 357). Therefore we
reject the contention that the charge to have been quashed
without reserving to the State to proceed in accordance
with law."
11. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in The Special Director and
another Vs. Mohd. Ghulam Ghouse and another : 2004(1) S.C.T. 671
has held that ordinarily no writ lies against the show-cause notice and
the writ petition cannot be entertained as a matter of routine. The
relevant portion from the said judgment is as under: -
"5. This Court in a large number of cases has deprecated
the practice of the High Courts entertaining writ petitions
questioning legality of the show causes notices stalling
enquiries as proposed and retarding investigative process
to find actual facts with the participation and in the
presence of the parties. Unless, the High Court is satisfied
that the show cause notice was totally non est in the eye
of law for absolute want of jurisdiction of the authority to
even investigate into facts, writ petitions should not be
entertained for the mere asking and as a matter of
routine, and the writ petitioner should invariably be
directed to respond to the show cause notice and take all
stands highlighted in the writ petition. Whether the show
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cause notice was founded on any legal premises is a
jurisdictional issue which can even be urged by the
recipient of the notice and such issues also can be
adjudicated by the authority issuing the very notice
initially, before the aggrieved could approach the Court.
Further, when the Court passes an interim order it should
be careful to see that the statutory functionaries specially
and specifically constituted for the purpose are not
denuded of powers and authority to initially decide the
matter and ensure that ultimate relief which may or may
not be finally granted in the writ petition is accorded to the
writ petitioner even at the threshold by the interim
protection, granted."
12. To the same effect is the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in Union of India and another Vs. Kunisetty Satyanarayana :
2007(1) S.C.T. 452, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as
under: -
"12. It is well settled by a series of decisions of this Court
that ordinarily no writ lies against a charge sheet or show-
cause notice vide Executive Engineer, Bihar State
Housing Board v. Ramdesh Kumar Singh and others, JT
1995(8) SC 331, Special Director and another v. Mohd.
Ghulam Ghouse and another, 2004(1) SCT 671 (SC) :
AIR 2004 Supreme Court 1467, Ulagappa and others v.
Divisional Commissioner, Mysore and others, 2001(10)
SCC 639, State of U.P. v. Brahm Datt Sharma and
another, AIR 1987 Supreme Court 943 etc.
13. The reason why ordinarily a writ petition should not
be entertained against a mere show-cause notice or
charge-sheet is that at that stage the writ petition may be
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held to be premature. A mere charge-sheet or show-cause
notice does not give rise to any cause of action, because it
does not amount to an adverse order which affects the
rights of any party unless the same has been issued by a
person having no jurisdiction to do so. It is quite possible
that after considering the reply to the show-cause notice or
after holding an enquiry the authority concerned may drop
the proceedings and/or hold that the charges are not
established. It is well settled that a writ lies when some
right of any party is infringed. A mere show-cause notice
or charge-sheet does not infringe the right of any one. It is
only when a final order imposing some punishment or
otherwise adversely affecting a party is passed, that the
said party can be said to have any grievance.
14. Writ jurisdiction is discretionary jurisdiction and
hence such discretion under Article 226 should not
ordinarily be exercised by quashing a show-cause notice or
charge sheet.
15. No doubt, in some very rare and exceptional cases
the High Court can quash a charge-sheet or show-cause
notice if it is found to be wholly without jurisdiction or for
some other reason if it is wholly illegal. However,
ordinarily the High Court should not interfere in such a
matter."
13. A Division Bench of this Court while examining the same
issue in Ved Pal Gupta Vs. Punjab and Haryana High Court,
Chandigarh : 2014(2) S.C.T. 793 has held as under: -
"15. In Secretary, Ministry of Defence and others v.
Prabhash Chandra Mirdha, 2012 (4) RSJ 484, it has been
laid down by the Supreme Court that ordinarily a writ
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application does not lie against a charge sheet or show
cause notice for the reason that it does not give rise to any
cause of action. It does not amount to an adverse order
which affects the right of any party unless the same has
been issued by a person having no jurisdiction/competence
to do so. A writ lies when some right of a party is infringed.
In fact, charge sheet does not infringe the right of a party.
It is only when a final order imposing the punishment or
otherwise adversely affecting a party is passed, it may have
a grievance and cause of action. Thus, a charge sheet or
show cause notice in disciplinary proceedings should not
ordinarily be quashed by the Court. It was further held that
normally a charge sheet is not quashed prior to the
conclusion of the inquiry on the ground that the facts stated
in the charge sheet are erroneous for the reason that
correctness or truth of the charge is the function of the
disciplinary authority. It was also held that neither the
disciplinary proceedings nor the charge sheet should be
quashed at an initial stage as it would be a premature
stage to deal with the issues. The position prevailing at
present in the department inquiry is that a sitting Judge of
the High Court on the Administrative side is seized of the
inquiry and proceedings are going on. Evidence is being
recorded. The petitioner would have every right to submit
his point of view in accordance with law before the inquiry
officer. Therefore, at this stage, it would be wholly
inappropriate to interfere in the inquiry that is going on at
an intermediary stage and nullifying or in any case keep in
abeyance the proceedings that are going on. At this stage it
would in fact even be inappropriate to comment one way or
the other on the charges that have been levelled and the
reply that has been filed by the petitioner to the same. This
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is solely domain of the Inquiry Officer who is seized of the
matter.
16. The learned Senior counsel for the petitioner has,
however, referred to the case State of Punjab v. V. K.
Khanna, 2001(1) S.C.T. 933 : AIR 2001 Supreme Court
343. In the said case the learned Senior counsel has laid
emphasis on the aspect wherein it has been held that while
it is true that justifiability of charges at the stage of
initiating a disciplinary proceedings cannot possibly be
delved into by any Court pending inquiry but it is equally
well settled that in the event there is an element of malice
or mala fide motive involved in the matter of issue of a
charge sheet or the concerned authority is so biased that
the inquiry would be a mere farcical show and the
conclusions are well known then and in that event law
courts are otherwise justified in interfering at the earliest
stage so as to avoid the harassment and humiliation of a
public official. It is not a question of shielding any misdeed
that the Court would be anxious, it is the due process of
law which should permeate in the society and in the event
of there being any affectation of such process of law that
law courts ought to rise up to the occasion. There is no
dispute to said proposition, however, the same would more
appropriately apply in case there is a charge of mala fide.
In the present case though it has been alleged that the
issuance of charge sheet and subsequent proceedings
arising therefrom are completely mala fide, baseless and
against the record, however, the allegations of mala fide
have been made in a vague manner. In State of Punjab v.
Chamal Lal Goyal, 1995(2) S.C.T. 343 : JT 1995 (2) SC
18 with respect to the charge of mala fide, it was observed
that the said charge was made in a vague manner. It was
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CWP Nos.13169, 13288 and 13292 of 2024
not specified which officer was ill-disposed towards the
respondent (delinquent official in the said case) and in
what manner did he manage to see that the charges are
served upon him when his case was to come up for
consideration for promotion. It was held that in the
absence of any clear allegation against any particular
official and in the absence of impleading such person eo
nominee so as to enable him to answer the charge against
him, the charge of mala fide cannot be sustained. The ratio
of the said judgment applies in the present case and in the
absence of specific allegations of mala fide, the averment
is unfounded and would not warrant any consideration."
14. Now adverting to the facts of the present case, it is clear
that the petitioner has not even filed any reply to any of the show cause
notice. Although, allegations of mala fide have been levelled against Sh.
Sukhbir Singh, the then Superintending Engineer but he has not been
impleaded as party respondent. Another argument has been raised by
learned counsel for the petitioner that if the proceedings in pursuance to
the show cause notices are allowed to be proceeded further, then the
respondents are likely to pass the order of punishment against the
petitioner. The said argument is pre-emptive and cannot be accepted at
this stage. In any case, even if, any order of punishment is ultimately
passed by the respondents against the petitioner, after holding a regular
departmental enquiry, the same can always be challenged by the
affected employee in accordance with law. In all the writ petitions, the
petitioner has approached this Court at the very initial stage of issuance
of show cause notice. As of date, no punishment order has been passed
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Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:152500
CWP Nos.13169, 13288 and 13292 of 2024
against the petitioner and, therefore, no cause has arisen to the petitioner
to invoke the extra-ordinary jurisdiction of this Court.
15. In view of the above, no case to quash the show cause
notices dated 13.03.2024 (Annexure P-8), dated 29.04.2024 (Annexure
P-9), dated 06.12.2023 (Annexure P-17) dated 25.01.2022 (Annexure
P-19) and dated 03.03.2022 (Annexure P-22), is made out. However, it
is made clear that the petitioner shall be at liberty to take all the pleas
which have been taken in the present petition(s) at an appropriate stage.
16. Consequently, all the petitions are dismissed being
premature.
17. Pending miscellaneous applications, if any, are also
disposed of.
(NAMIT KUMAR)
20.11.2024 JUDGE
yakub
Whether speaking/reasoned: Yes/No
Whether reportable: Yes/No
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