Punjab-Haryana High Court
M/S Jagjit Industries Ltd vs Vichar Singh on 19 November, 2024
Author: Alka Sarin
Bench: Alka Sarin
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT
CHANDIGARH
RSA-2913-1996 (O&M)
Reserved on : 21.10.2024
Pronounced on : 19.11.2024
M/s JAGATJIT INDUSTRIES LTD. ....Appellant
VERSUS
VICHAR SINGH ....Respondent
CORAM : HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE ALKA SARIN
Present : Mr. Vivek Salathia, Advocate for the appellant.
Mr. Naresh Prabhakar, Advocate for the respondent.
ALKA SARIN, J.
1. The present regular second appeal has been preferred by the
plaintiff-appellant challenging the judgment and decree dated 03.10.1996
passed by the First Appellate Court whereby the judgment and decree dated
25.05.1992 passed by the Trial Court was reversed.
2. Brief facts relevant to the present lis are that the plaintiff-
appellant herein filed the present suit for restraining the defendant-
respondent from making any construction or encroaching upon the vacant
land contiguous to the house occupied by the defendant-respondent being an
employee of the plaintiff-appellant Company. It was averred in the plaint
that the plaintiff-appellant was owner in possession of vast land as shown in
the site plan and the copy of the jamabandi. On a portion of land comprised
in Khasra Nos.1780/4-2, 1781/8-0, 1782/8-0, 1786/8-0, 1787/4-18, 1788/3-
13, the plaintiff-appellant had constructed houses where the defendant-
RSA-2913-1996 -2-
respondent and other employees of the plaintiff-appellant were allowed to
reside. Their possession was permissive otherwise they have no right to
occupy the property. The property had been given for use and occupation
only. In portion of Khasra Nos.1782 and 1786 the defendant-respondent was
allowed to reside in the house constructed by the plaintiff-appellant. The
defendant-respondent had collected building material near the site with the
purpose of encroaching upon the area shown in red in the rough site plan.
3. The defendant-respondent appeared and filed his written
statement averring therein that the plaintiff-appellant had nothing to do with
the site in dispute and that it was part of the house of the defendant-
respondent. It was further the stand taken that there are as many as 300 odd
houses in the area where the defendant-respondent is residing. The
ownership of the plaintiff-appellant was also controverted. It was further
averred that the defendant-respondent had been in possession of the house
and the site in dispute for the past 40 years and that he had become owner of
the same by way of adverse possession.
4. From the pleadings of the parties the following issues were
framed :
1. Whether the plaintiff is owner in possession of the
property in dispute ?
2. Whether the defendant has become owner of the
site in dispute by adverse possession ?
3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the injunction
prayed for ?
RSA-2913-1996 -3-
4. Whether the plaintiff has no cause of action ?
5. Relief.
5. The Trial Court held that the plaintiff-appellant had proved its
ownership of the property and as also the fact that the defendant-respondent
was residing in the house with the permission of the plaintiff-appellant. The
plea of adverse possession was rejected. It was held that the plaintiff-
appellant had proved its title, possession over the disputed property and
hence the decree of injunction was passed. Aggrieved by the same an appeal
was preferred by the defendant-respondent. The First Appellate Court vide
impugned judgment and decree dated 03.10.1996 reversed the judgment and
decree dated 25.05.1992 passed by the Trial Court and, while affirming the
finding regarding adverse possession as given by the Trial Court, held that
the plaintiff-appellant had no right to restrain the defendant-respondent from
making construction on the portion of the land occupied by him and that the
plaintiff-appellant could file a suit for possession. Hence, the present regular
second appeal by the plaintiff-appellant.
6. The learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant would contend
that it is an admitted position that 300 odd houses were built by the plaintiff-
appellant for the residence of it's employees and one such house is occupied
by the defendant-respondent. Learned counsel has referred to the fact that
the defendant-respondent had himself filed a suit (Ex.P-4) wherein on the
West there was vacant land shown. The said suit was subsequently
withdrawn on 25.10.1989. Learned counsel would further contend that the
plea of adverse possession was rejected by both the Courts. It is further the
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argument that once the plea of adverse possession was rejected the
ownership of the plaintiff-appellant stood proved inasmuch as adverse
possession can only be claimed against a true owner. It is further the
contention that permission was given to the defendant-respondent to only
reside in the house being an employee of the plaintiff-appellant and that he
had no right to encroach upon the said land and that before the encroachment
could actually be made the civil suit was filed by the plaintiff-appellant for
injunction. Hence it could not be said that the defendant-respondent was in
possession of the said vacant land in any manner.
7. Per contra, the learned counsel for the defendant-respondent
would contend that the defendant-respondent has been held to be in
possession of the suit land and that the suit was only for injunction and
hence the plaintiff-appellant would have to file a suit for possession in case
the plaintiff-appellant wanted possession of the property.
8. Heard.
9. In the present case admittedly the suit land belongs to the
plaintiff-appellant who is the owner of the same as well as the adjoining
areas where a factory has been built by the plaintiff-appellant. 300 odd
houses were constructed for the use and occupation of the employees of the
plaintiff-appellant. The said accommodation provided to the employees is a
measure of goodwill and a gratuitous gesture. The defendant-respondent had
earlier also tried to encroach upon the property and had also filed a civil suit
(Ex.P-4) for permanent injunction for restraining the defendant therein i.e.
the plaintiff-appellant herein from taking forcible possession of the house
RSA-2913-1996 -5-
and in that suit on the West vacant land was shown. Both the Courts have
concurrently rejected the plea of adverse possession. The ownership of the
plaintiff-appellant is not in dispute as both the Courts have concurrently held
the plaintiff-appellant to being the owner of the suit property. Once the
plaintiff-appellant is shown to be the owner of the suit property and the
plaintiff-appellant had filed the suit for permanent injunction before any
construction could be raised coupled with the fact that the defendant-
respondent had failed to show any right, title or interest over the disputed
property, the impugned judgment and decree passed by the First Appellate
Court cannot be sustained.
10. In view of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the
case of Pankajakshi (Dead) through LRs & Ors. vs. Chandrika & Ors.
[AIR 2016 SC (Civil) 1091] there would be no requirement to frame
substantial questions of law.
11. In view of the above, the present regular second appeal is
allowed, and the impugned judgment and decree passed by the First
Appellate Court is set aside and those of the Trial Court are restored.
Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed off.
19.11.2024 (ALKA SARIN)
Aman Jain JUDGE
NOTE : Whether speaking/non-speaking: Speaking
Whether reportable: Yes/No
