Punjab-Haryana High Court
Harmesh Singh Thoda vs State Of Punjab And Others on 19 November, 2024
Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:155349
CRM-M-40559-2021(O&M) -1-
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
201 CRM-M-40559-2021(O&M)
Date of decision: 19th November, 2024
Harmesh Singh Thoda
...Petitioner
Versus
State of Punjab and others
...Respondents
CORAM: HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE MANISHA BATRA
Present: Mr. Harsh Chopra, Advocate for the petitioner.
Mr. A.S. Samra, AAG, Punjab.
Mr. Ashok Giri, Advocate for respondents No.2 and 3.
***
MANISHA BATRA, J (ORAL):-
The petitioner is making prayer for quashing of FIR No. 202
dated 30.10.2020 registered under Section 420 of IPC, 1860 at Police Station
Nurpur Bedi, Rupnagar and the proceedings having emanated therefrom.
2. For the sake of continuity and coherence, hereinafter the parties
shall be referred to as per their original nomenclature as given at the time of
trial.
3. Brief facts of the case relevant for the purpose of disposal of
this petition are that the aforementioned FIR was registered on the
complaints lodged by the complainants Surjit Singh and Surinder Singh
alleging therein that the accused was running committee business. The
complainants had joined two committees each for a period of fifteen months
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with the petitioner. The instalment of one committee was of a sum of Rs.
1,00,000/- per month and of the other one, it was of Rs. 50,000/- per month.
The complainant-Surinder Singh had deposited a sum total of amount of Rs.
22,50,000/- in the said committees, whereas the complainant-Surjit Singh
had deposited an amount of Rs. 30,00,000/-. The accused, however, failed to
return the aforementioned amount to the complainants. On insistence of the
complainants to return their money, the accused executed sale deed of a plot
measuring 10 marlas in favour of the respondent No.1-Surjit Singh on
19.04.2017, the value of this plot was Rs. 2,00,000/- and accused promised
to return the remaining amount in installments. He executed two sale deeds
of plot having worth of Rs. 6,35,000/- and Rs. 1,10,000/- respectively in
favour of respondent No.2 and promised to return the remaining amount in
instalments but failed to fulfill his promise. The complainants therefore,
prayed for taking action in the matter. On the basis of their complaints, a
case under Section 420 of IPC was registered against the accused.
4. It is argued by learned counsel for the petitioner-accused that he
has been falsely implicated in this case. He is alleged to have committed the
offence under Section 420 of IPC. However, even on taking the allegations
as levelled against him at their face value, the ingredients for commission of
offence of cheating have not even been prima facie made out. The
complainants themselves admitted execution of sale deeds by the petitioner
in their favour. They had got the same executed in lieu of the amount of
money given by them. Subsequently, they started pressurizing the petitioner
to cancel the sale deeds due to the fact that the value of the purchased plots
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had been lowered down. The allegations do not show that there was any
fraudulent or dishonest intention on the part of the petitioner to induce the
complainants to invest money with him. There is no proof of payment of
amount of Rs. 22,50,000/- and Rs. 30,00,000/- respectively by the
complainants in his favour. The alleged transactions of money are even
otherwise seven years old and there was huge delay in lodging the FIR. The
relief claimed by the complainants has been hit by the law of limitation.
With these broad submissions, it is urged that the FIR in question is liable to
be set aside. To fortify his arguments, learned counsel for the petitioner has
placed reliance upon the judgments cited as Sushil Sethi and another vs.
State of Arunachal Pradesh and others, AIR 2020 (SC) 765, 'Ajay Mitra
vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and others, 2003 AIR (Supreme Court)
1069', Lalit Chaturvedi and others vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and another,
2024(2) RCR (Criminal) 73 and in CRA-2340-2023 in 'Mohammad Wajid
and another Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others'.
5. On the other hand, learned State counsel assisted by learned
counsel for respondents No.2 and 3-complainants, vehemently argued that
there was a prima facie case on record to prove that the petitioner had
induced the complainants to deposit money in the form of committees by
way of installments with them by alluring them to give 30% more amount
along with the principal amount after fifteen months of the deposit thereof
but had failed to return the same. Inquiry had been conducted against the
petitioner which proved the factum of payment of money having taken
place. The plots which were sold to the complainants were having much
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lesser value. Huge amount of money was due to be payable by the petitioner.
The complainants as well as several other persons have been duped of their
hard earned money by the petitioner. Therefore, it is urged that the petition
does not deserve to be allowed.
6. At the outset, it will be profitable to look into the scope and
ambit of the Court's power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. as spelt out in several
judicial pronouncements of Hon'ble Supreme Court as well as different
High Courts. The well settled proposition of law is that in exercise of
inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C., the High Court is not expected to
analyze all the facts, which are to be placed before the High Court. The
power conferred under this section is very specific and to secure the ends of
justice or to prevent the abuse of process of Court or to make any such
orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under the Code, such
power can be exercised to prevent abuse of process of Court. Hon'ble
Supreme Court has drawn up some guidelines in some categories of cases by
way of illustration to circumscribe the exercise of inherent power under
Section 482 of Cr.P.C. to prevent abuse of process of any Court or to secure
the ends of the justice or to give effect to an order of the Court. A celebrated
pronouncement on this point is the case cited as State of Haryana vs.
Bhajan Lal : (1992) SUPP 1 SCC 335, wherein several guidelines have
been laid down. Some of them, which are relevant for the purpose of
disposal of the present petition, are reproduced as under:
(i). Where the allegations made in the First Information
Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face
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value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie con-
stitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.
(ii). Where the allegations in the First Information Report
and other materials, if any, accompanying the F.I.R. do not
disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation
by police officers under Section 156 (1) of the Code except
under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Sec-
tion 155(2) of the Code.
(iii). Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR
or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the
same do not disclose the commission of any offence and
make out a case against the accused.
(iv). Where, the allegations in the F.I.R. do not constitute a
cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable of-
fence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer
without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under
Section 155(2) of the Code.
(v). Where the allegations made in the F.I.R. or complaint
are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of
which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion
that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the
accused.
(vi). Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of
the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under
which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution
and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a
specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, pro-
viding efficacious redress for the grievance of the ag-
grieved party.
(vii). Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended
with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously
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instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance
on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private
and personal grudge.
7. Reference can further be made to Gian Singh vs. State of
Punjab : (2012) 10 SCC 303, wherein Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed
that the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal complaint or an FIR,
in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction, is distinct and different from the
power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section
320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory
limitation but it has to be exercised in accordance with the guidelines
engrafted in such power viz; (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent
abuse of the process of any Court. Reference can also be made to Padal
Venkata Rama Reddy @ Ramu vs. Kovvuri Satyanarayana Reddy & Ors. :
(2011) 12 SCC 437, wherein it was observed that the inherent power under
Section 482 Cr.P.C. can be exercised only when no other remedy is available
to the litigant and not in a situation where a specific remedy is provided by
the statute. Reliance can further be placed upon State of Andhra Pradesh vs.
Gourishetty Mahesh and others : 2010 Criminal Law Journal 3844,
wherein the Apex Court has propounded that while exercising jurisdiction
under Section 482 Cr.P.C., the High Court would not ordinarily embark upon
an enquiry whether the evidence in question is reliable or not or whether on
a reasonable appreciation of it, accusation would not be sustained as that is
the function of the trial Court.
8. It is also well settled proposition of law that the exercise of
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powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash proceedings is an exception and
not a rule. In Monika Kumar vs. State of U.P. : (2006) 8 SCC 781, the Apex
Court has propounded that the inherent jurisdiction under Section 482
Cr.P.C., though wide, is to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution,
only when such exercise is justified by the test specifically laid down in the
section itself and appreciation of evidence is not permissible at the stage of
quashing of proceedings in exercise of this power. The inherent powers do
not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction upon the High Court to act according to
whims and caprice.
9. Reference can also be made to the authority cited as M/s
Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Maharashtra and others :
2021 SCC OnLine SC 315, wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court, after
analyzing and examining several judicial precedents, had observed that the
Courts should not thwart any investigation into the cognizable offences;
criminal proceedings ought not to be scuttled at the initial stage; the power
of quashing should be exercised sparingly with circumspection in the 'rarest
of rare cases' and while examining the FIR/complaint, quashing of which is
sought, the Court should not embark upon inquiry as to the reliability or
genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR/complaint. It
was also observed that in cases where no cognizable offence or offence of
any kind is disclosed in the first information report, the Court should not
permit an investigation to go on.
10. Reference can also be made to CBI v. Aryan Singh : 2023 SCC
OnLine SC 379, wherein Hon'ble Apex Court observed that while exercising
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powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., the Courts have a very limited
jurisdiction and are only required to consider "whether any sufficient
material is available to proceed further against the accused for which the
accused is required to be tried or not". In Kaptan Singh vs. State of U.P.
and others, 2021 SCC Online SC 580 and Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar
vs. State of Maharashtra, (2020) 3 SCC (Criminal) 672, it was observed
that the appreciation of evidence is not permissible at the stage of quashing
of proceedings in exercise of powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. as this
power is an exception and not a rule. Inherent jurisdiction under Section 482
of Cr.P.C. though wide is to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with
caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid
down in the section itself. It is also well settled proposition of law that the
Court is not required to go into the merits of the allegations and/or entering
into the merits of the case as if it is exercising the appellate jurisdiction
and/or conducting the trial, at the stage of exercising powers under Section
482 of Cr.P.C. In order to examine as to whether the factual contents of the
FIR disclose any cognizable offence or not, the High Court cannot act like
investigating agency nor can exercise the powers like an appellate court. The
said question is required to be examined keeping in view the contents of the
FIR and prima facie material, if any, requiring any proof.
11. This Court has considered the contentions raised by learned
counsel for the parties in the light of the above discussed proposition of law
and on applying the same, to the peculiar facts and circumstances of the
present case, it has emerged that the petitioner has been booked and charge
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sheeted for commission of offence punishable under Section 420 of IPC on
the allegations that he had induced respondents No. 2 and 3-complainants to
invest their money in the committees organized by him on instalment basis,
by making representation that they would be fetching 30% more amount
along with the invested amount after fifteen months of the deposit thereof.
As alleged, he did not return even the principal amount and made false
representations to dupe the money of respondents No. 2 and 3. The
investigation in this case has been completed. Challan stands presented. For
establishing the offence of cheating, it is to be shown that the accused had
fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of making promise or
representation. On going through the contents of the FIR, it is revealed that
the allegations disclose a prima facie case against the petitioner which
justify registration of criminal proceedings against him. It cannot be stated
that the allegations so levelled are bereft of basic facts and are of such nature
which taken to be correct at their face value, do not disclose any offence.
Rather on appraising the material placed on record, on the touchstone of the
above discussed legal position, this Court of the opinion that the allegations
show a prima facie case to the effect that the petitioner had induced
respondents No. 2 and 3 to deposit money in the committees organized by
him by alluring them of fetching huge profit and non-return of the said
amount prima facie shows his dishonest intention since the very beginning.
The argument that the petitioner would not have transferred plots in the
names of the complainants if he was having any fraudulent or dishonest
intention, cannot be accepted at this stage, since it has not been proved that
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the plots so transferred were equivalent to the value of the money deposited
by respondents No.2 and 3 or that the transfers were made in lieu of the
money due. It appears that by seeking to quash the FIR and criminal
proceedings, the petitioner intends to stifle a legitimate prosecution. The
allegations levelled in the FIR do not advance the case of the petitioner at
this stage to seek quashing thereof. Disputed questions of fact cannot be
dealt into by this Court at this stage to exercise jurisdiction under Section
482 of Cr.P.C. to quash the FIR in question. Keeping in view the facts and
circumstances of the case, this Court finds no ground, whatsoever to
interfere at this stage for quashing of FIR in question as well as the charge
sheet filed in the same. The petition is accordingly dismissed.
12. It is, however, clarified that the observations made hereinabove
shall not be construed as an expression of opinion on the merits of the case.
13. Since the main petition has been dismissed, pending
application, if any, is rendered infructuous.
[MANISHA BATRA]
JUDGE
19th November, 2024
Parveen Sharma
1. Whether speaking/ reasoned : Yes
2. Whether reportable : Yes
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