Punjab-Haryana High Court

Kuldeep Singh And Another vs State Of Punjab And Another on 1 May, 2024

Author: Anoop Chitkara

Bench: Anoop Chitkara

                                        Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:061672



CRM-M No. 49783 of 2019
                                                                     2024:PHHC:061672
             IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH

                                                 CRM-M No. 49783 of 2019
                                                 Date of Decision: 01.05.2024
Kuldeep Singh and another
                                                                                ......Pe&&oners
                                                 Vs.

State of Punjab and another
                                                                            ......Respondents

CORAM:        HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANOOP CHITKARA

Present:      Mr. Kamal Narula, Advocate
              for the pe&&oners.

              Mr. Kanav Bansal, D.A.G., Punjab.

              Mr. Harjeet Singh, Advocate
              for respondent No.2.

                     ****

ANOOP CHITKARA J.

FIR No.    Dated              Police Sta&on                    Sec&ons
180        05.11.2019         City Fazilka, District Fazilka 420, 465, 467, 468, 471, 120-B IPC

1. The pe&&oners, arraigned as accused in the above cap&oned FIR, have come up before this Court under Sec&on 482 CrPC for quashing of the FIR and all consequen&al proceedings based on the compromise with the aggrieved person.

2. Accused and the aggrieved person have compromised the maAer, and its copy is annexed with this pe&&on as Annexure P-1. ACer that, the pe&&oners came up before this Court to quash the FIR, and in the quashing pe&&on, impleading the aggrieved person as respondent No.2.

3. On 05.12.2019, the aggrieved person Gagandeep (R-2) appeared before the JMIC, Fazilka and stated that there would be no objec&on if the court quashes this FIR and consequent proceedings. As per the concerned court's report dated 05.12.2019, the par&es consented to the quashing of FIR and consequent proceedings without any threat.

ANALYSIS & REASONING:

4. Despite the severe opposi&on of the State's counsel to this compromise,

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2024:PHHC:061672 the following aspects would be relevant to conclude this pe&&on: -

a) The accused and the private respondent have amicably seAled the maAer between them in terms of the compromise deed and the statements recorded before the concerned Court;

b) A perusal of the documents reveal that the seAlement has not been secured through coercion, threats, social boycoAs, bribes, or other dubious means;

c) The aggrieved person has willingly consented to the nulliﬁca&on of criminal proceedings;

d) There is no objec&on from the private respondent in case present FIR and consequent proceedings are quashed;

e) In the given facts, the occurrence does not aﬀect public peace or tranquillity, moral turpitude or harm the social and moral fabric of the society or involve maAers concerning public policy;

f) The rejec&on of compromise may also lead to ill will. The pendency of trial aﬀects career and happiness;

g) There is nothing on the record to prima facie consider the accused as an unscrupulous, incorrigible, or professional oﬀender;

h) The purpose of criminal jurisprudence is reformatory in nature and to work to bring peace to family, community, and society;

i) The exercise of the inherent power for quashing FIR and all consequen&al proceedings is jus&ﬁed to secure the ends of jus&ce.

5. The injured and all the accused had appeared before the Court of JMIC and had stated that they had entered into a compromise. The report of the concerned Court is extracted as follows:-

"i. There are two persons arraigned as accused in FIR; ii. None of the accused has been declared as proclaimed oﬀender;

iii. Challan in the present case has not been presented ll date; and iv. From the statements of the par es to the case, this court

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2024:PHHC:061672 is sa sﬁed that the compromise in the present case is genuine, voluntary and without any coercion or undue inﬂuence."

6. In the present case the oﬀences under Sec&ons 465, 467, 468 and 471 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 are not compoundable under Sec&on 320 CrPC. However, in the facts and circumstances peculiar to this case, the prosecu&on qua the non- compoundable oﬀences can be closed by quashing the FIR and consequent proceedings.

7. In C.B.I., New Delhi v. Duncans Agro Industries Ltd., CalcuAa, 1996(5) SCC 591, Hon'ble Supreme Court holds, [26]. ACer giving our careful considera&on to the facts and circumstances of the case and the submissions made by the respec&ve counsel for the par&es, it appears to us that for the purpose of quashing the complaint, it is necessary to consider whether the allega&on in the complaint prima facie make out an oﬀence or not. It is not necessary to scru&nise whether the allega&ons are likely to be upheld in the trial. Any ac&on by way of quashing the complaint is an ac&on to be taken at the threshold before evidences are led in support of the complaint. For quashing the complaint by way of ac&on at the threshold, it is, therefore, necessary to consider whether on the face of the allega&ons, a criminal oﬀence is cons&tuted or not. [29]. In the facts of the case, it appears to us that there is enough jus&ﬁca&on for the High Court to hold that the case was basically a maAer of civil dispute. The Banks had already ﬁled suits for recovery of the dues of the Banks on account of credit facility and the said suits have been compromised on receiving the payments from the concerned Companies. Even if an oﬀence of chea&ng is prima facie cons&tuted, such oﬀence is a compoundable oﬀence and compromise decrees passed in the suits ins&tuted by the Banks, for all intents and purposes, amount to compounding of the oﬀence of chea&ng. It is also to be noted that long &me has elapsed since the complaint was ﬁled in 1987. It may also be indicated that although such FIRs were ﬁled in 1987 and 1989, the Banks have not chosen to ins&tute any case against the alleged erring oﬃcials despite allega&ons made against them in the FIRs. Considering that the inves&ga&ons had not been completed &ll 1991 even though there was no impediment to complete the inves&ga&ons and further inves&ga&ons are s&ll pending and also considering the fact that the claims of the Banks have been sa&sﬁed and the suits ins&tuted by the Banks have been compromised on receiving payments, we do not think the said complaints should be pursued any further. In our view, proceeding further with the complaints will not be expedient. In the special facts of the case, it appears to us that the decision of the High Court in quashing the complaints does not warrant any interference under Ar&cle

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2024:PHHC:061672 136 of the Cons&tu&on. We, therefore, dismiss these appeals.

8. In Manoj Sharma v. State, 2008(4) R.C.R.(Criminal) 827: 2008(16) SCC 1, Hon'ble Supreme Court quashed the criminal proceedings holding as follows, [8]. In our view, the High Court's refusal to exercise its jurisdic&on under Ar&cle 226 of the Cons&tu&on for quashing the criminal proceedings cannot be supported. The First Informa&on Report, which had been lodged by the complainant indicates a dispute between the complainant and the accused which is of a private nature. It is no doubt true that the First Informa&on Report was the basis of the inves&ga&on by the Police authori&es, but the dispute between the par&es remained one of a personal nature. Once the complainant decided not to pursue the maAer further, the High Court could have taken a more pragma&c view of the maAer. We do not suggest that while exercising its powers under Ar&cle 226 of the Cons&tu&on the High Court could not have refused to quash the First Informa&on Report, but what we do say is that the maAer could have been considered by the High Court with greater pragma&sm in the facts of the case. As we have indicated hereinbefore, the exercise of power under Sec&on 482 Criminal Procedure Code or Ar&cle 226 of the Cons&tu&on is discre&onary to be exercised in the facts of each case.

9. In Nikhil Merchant vs C.B.I. & Anr, Cr.A 1302 of 2008, Hon'ble Supreme Court holds,

[22]. Despite the ingredients and the factual content of an oﬀence of chea&ng punishable under Sec&on 420 IPC, the same has been made compoundable under Sub-sec&on (2) of Sec&on 320 Cr.P.C. with the leave of the Court. Of course, forgery has not been included as one of the compoundable oﬀences, but it is in such cases that the principle enunciated in B.S. Joshi's case (supra) becomes relevant.

[23]. In the instant case, the disputes between the Company and the Bank have been set at rest on the basis of the compromise arrived at by them whereunder the dues of the Bank have been cleared and the Bank does not appear to have any further claim against the Company. What, however, remains is the fact that certain documents were alleged to have been created by the appellant herein in order to avail of credit facili&es beyond the limit to which the Company was en&tled. The dispute involved herein has overtones of a civil dispute with certain criminal facets. The ques&on which is required to be answered in this case is whether the power which independently lies with this Court to quash the criminal proceedings pursuant to the compromise arrived at, should at all be exercised? [24]. On an overall view of the facts as indicated hereinabove and keeping in mind the decision of this Court in B.S. Joshi's case (supra) and the compromise arrived at between the Company and the Bank as also clause 11 of the consent terms ﬁled in the

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2024:PHHC:061672 suit ﬁled by the Bank, we are sa&sﬁed that this is a ﬁt case where technicality should not be allowed to stand in the way in the quashing of the criminal proceedings, since, in our view, the con&nuance of the same aCer the compromise arrived at between the par&es would be a fu&le exercise.

10. In Jayrajsinh Digvijaysingh Rana v. State of Gujarat, 2012 (12) SCC 401, Hon'ble Supreme Court holds, [6]. It is also relevant to point out that the averments in the FIR disclosed the oﬀences punishable under Sec&ons 467, 468, 471, 420 and 120- B of Indian Penal Code.

[7]. The only ques&on for considera&on before this Court at this stage is that inasmuch as all those oﬀences are not compoundable oﬀences under Sec&on 320 of the Code (except Sec&on 420 of Indian Penal Code that too with the permission of the Court before which any prosecu&on for such oﬀence is pending), whether it would be possible to quash the FIR by the High Court under Sec&on 482 of the Code or by this Court exercising jurisdic&on under Ar&cle 136 of the Cons&tu&on of India?

[8]. The above ques&on was recently considered by this Court in Shiji @ Pappu&Ors. v. Radhika & Anr., 2011(6) Recent Apex Judgments (R.A.J.) 210 : 2012(1) R.C.R.(Criminal) 9 : (2011)10 SCC 705. The ques&on posed in that case was "Whether the criminal proceedings in ques&on could be quashed in the facts and circumstances of the case having regard to the seAlement that the par&es had arrived at." ACer adver&ng to Sec&on 482 of the Code and various decisions, this Court concluded as under :

"17. It is manifest that simply because an oﬀence is not compoundable under Sec&on 320 Criminal Procedure Code is by itself no reason for the High Court to refuse exercise of its power under Sec&on 482 Criminal Procedure Code. That power can in our opinion be exercised in cases where there is no chance of recording a convic&on against the accused and the en&re exercise of a trial is des&ned to be an exercise in fu&lity. There is a subtle dis&nc&on between compounding of oﬀences by the par&es before the trial court or in appeal on the one hand and the exercise of power by the High Court to quash the prosecu&on under Sec&on 482 Criminal Procedure Code on the other. While a court trying an accused or hearing an appeal against convic&on, may not be competent to permit compounding of an oﬀence based on a seAlement arrived at between the par&es in cases where the oﬀences are not compoundable under Sec&on 320, the High Court may quash the prosecu&on even in cases where the oﬀences with which the accused stand charged are non-compoundable. The inherent powers of the High Court under Sec&on 482 Criminal Procedure Code

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2024:PHHC:061672 are not for that purpose controlled by Sec&on 320 Criminal Procedure Code.

18. Having said so, we must hasten to add that the plenitude of the power under Sec&on 482 Criminal Procedure Code by itself, makes it obligatory for the High Court to exercise the same with utmost care and cau&on. The width and the nature of the power itself demands that its exercise is sparing and only in cases where the High Court is, for reasons to be recorded, of the clear view that con&nuance of the prosecu&on would be nothing but an abuse of the process of law. It is neither necessary nor proper for us to enumerate the situa&ons in which the exercise of power under Sec&on 482 may be jus&ﬁed. All that we need to say is that the exercise of power must be for securing the ends of jus&ce and only in cases where refusal to exercise that power may result in the abuse of the process of law. The High Court may be jus&ﬁed in declining interference if it is called upon to appreciate evidence for it cannot assume the role of an appellate court while dealing with a pe&&on under Sec&on 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Subject to the above, the High Court will have to consider the facts and circumstances of each case to determine whether it is a ﬁt case in which the inherent powers may be invoked."

[9]. On going through the factual details, earlier decision, various oﬀences under Sec&on 320 of the Code and invoca&on of Sec&on 482 of the Code, we fully concur with the said conclusion. In the case on hand, irrespec&ve of the earlier dispute between Respondent No. 2-the complainant and the appellant being Accused No. 3 as well as Accused Nos. 1 and 2 subsequently and aCer geRng all the materials, relevant details etc., the present appellant (Accused No. 3) sworn an aﬃdavit with bona ﬁde inten&on securing the right, &tle and interest in favour of Respondent No. 2 herein-the Complainant. In such bona ﬁde circumstances, the power under Sec&on 482 may be exercised. Further, in view of the seAlement arrived at between Respondent No. 2-the complainant and the appellant (Accused No. 3), there is no chance of recording a convic&on insofar as the present appellant is concerned and the en&re exercise of trial is des&ned to be an exercise in fu&lity. Inasmuch as the maAer has not reached the stage of trial, we are of the view that the High Court, by exercising the inherent power under Sec&on 482 of the Code even in oﬀences which are not compoundable under Sec&on 320, may quash the prosecu&on. However, as observed in Shiji (supra), the power under Sec&on 482 has to be exercised sparingly and only in cases where the High Court is, for reasons to be recorded, of the clear view that con&nuance of the prosecu&on would be nothing but an abuse of the process of law. In other words, the exercise of power must be for securing the ends of jus&ce and only in cases where refusal to exercise

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2024:PHHC:061672 that power may result in the abuse of the process of law. [10]. In the light of the principles men&oned above, inasmuch as Respondent No. 2-the Complainant has ﬁled an aﬃdavit highligh&ng the stand taken by the appellant (Accused No. 3) during the pendency of the appeal before this Court and the terms of seAlement as stated in the said aﬃdavit, by applying the same analogy and in order to do complete jus&ce under Ar&cle 142 of the Cons&tu&on, we accept the terms of seAlement insofar as the appellant herein (Accused No. 3) is concerned.

[11]. In view of the same, we quash and set aside the impugned FIR No. 45/2011 registered with Sanand Police Sta&on, Ahmedabad for oﬀences punishable under Sec&ons 467, 468, 471, 420 and 120B of Indian Penal Code insofar as the appellant (Accused No. 3) is concerned. The appeal is allowed to the extent men&oned above.

11. In Central Bureau of Inves&ga&on v. Jagjit Singh, (2013) 10 SCC 686, Hon'ble Supreme Court holds, [14]. In the present case, the speciﬁc allega&on made against the respondent-accused is that he obtained the loan on the basis of forged document with the aid of oﬃcers of the Bank. On inves&ga&on, having found the ingredients of chea&ng and dishonestly inducing delivery of property of the bank (Sec&on 420 Indian Penal Code) and dishonestly using as genuine a forged document (Sec&on 471 Indian Penal Code), charge sheet was submiAed under Sec&ons 420/471 Indian Penal Code against the accused persons.

[15]. The debt which was due to the Bank was recovered by the Bank pursuant to an order passed by Debts Recovery Tribunal. Therefore, it cannot be said that there is a compromise between the oﬀender and the vic&m. The oﬀences when commiAed in rela&on with Banking ac&vi&es including oﬀences under Sec&ons 420/471 Indian Penal Code have harmful eﬀect on the public and threaten the well being of the society. These oﬀences fall under the category of oﬀences involving moral turpitude commiAed by public servants while working in that capacity. Prima facie, one may state that the bank as the vic&m in such cases but, in fact, the society in general, including customers of the Bank is the suﬀerer. In the present case, there was neither an allega&on regarding any abuse of process of any Court nor anything on record to suggest that the oﬀenders were en&tled to secure the order in the ends of jus&ce.

12. In Gold Quest Interna&onal Private Limited v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2014:INSC:611 [Para 3], (2014) 15 SCC 235, Hon'ble Supreme Court holds, [3]. Brief facts of the case are that the appellant is an Interna&onal Numisma&c Company which has opera&ons in over sixty countries. It is pleaded that it conducts its business with

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2024:PHHC:061672 necessary licence. The mul& level marke&ng through direct selling of products is being adopted by the Company in the interest of the consumers by elimina&ng the middleman and rewarding the consumer by reducing the prices. The appellant- company has over sixteen thousand members/consumers in and around the city of Chennai alone. A complaint was made in the year 2003 by Respondent No. 7 against the appellant-company alleging non-compliance of issuance of numisma&c gold coin on receipt of L 16,800/- from wife of Respondent No. 7 as per the promise made by the appellant-company. Some other customers also had complaints on the basis of which Respondent No. 4 registered a case under Sec&on 420 of the Indian Penal Code read with Sec&ons 4, 5 & 6 of the Prise Chits and Money Circula&on (Banning) Act, 1978. The appellant-company ﬁled a writ pe&&on being W.P.No. 26784 of 2003 before the High Court of Judicature at Madras praying therein that the FIR registered against it be quashed. Since all the claimants including the complainant seAled the dispute with the appellant-company and entered into an agreement, learned Single Judge of the High Court by its order dated 19th April, 2005 quashed the FIR, and disposed of the aforesaid writ pe&&on. However, the State- respondents challenged the said order dated 19th April, 2005 passed by the learned Single Judge whereby the FIR No. 307 of 2003 was quashed, before the Division Bench of the High Court. The Division Bench allowed the writ appeal being W.A.No. 1178 of 2005 ﬁled by the State-respondents and directed Respondent No. 4 to inves&gate the crime. Hence, this appeal. [8]. In view of the principle laid down by this Court in the aforesaid cases, we are of the view in the disputes which are substan&ally matrimonial in nature, or the civil property disputes with criminal facets, if the par&es have entered into seAlement, and it has become clear that there are no chances of convic&on, there is no illegality in quashing the proceedings under Sec&on 482 Cr.P.C. read with Ar&cle 226 of the Cons&tu&on. However, the same would not apply where the nature of oﬀence is very serious like rape, murder, robbery, dacoity, cases under Preven&on of Corrup&on Act, cases under Narco&c Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act and other similar kind of oﬀences in which punishment of life imprisonment or death can be awarded. ACer considering the facts and circumstances of the present case, we are of the view that learned Single Judge did not commit any error of law in quashing the FIR aCer not only the complainant and the appellant seAled their money dispute but also the other alleged suﬀerers entered into an agreement with the appellant, and as such, they too seAled their claims.

13. In Parbatbhai Aahir v State of Gujarat, 2017:INSC:1003 [Para 15], (2017) 9 SCC 641, a three Judges Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court, laid down the broad principles for quashing of FIR, which are reproduced as follows: -

[16]. The broad principles which emerge from the precedents on the subject, may be summarized in the following proposi&ons:

16 (i) Sec&on 482 preserves the inherent powers of the High

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2024:PHHC:061672 Court to prevent an abuse of the process of any court or to secure the ends of jus&ce. The provision does not confer new powers. It only recognises and preserves powers which inhere in the High Court;

16 (ii) The invoca&on of the jurisdic&on of the High Court to quash a First Informa&on Report or a criminal proceeding on the ground that a seAlement has been arrived at between the oﬀender and the vic&m is not the same as the invoca&on of jurisdic&on for the purpose of compounding an oﬀence. While compounding an oﬀence, the power of the court is governed by the provisions of sec&on 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The power to quash under Sec&on 482 is aAracted even if the oﬀence is non-compoundable.

16 (iii) In forming an opinion whether a criminal proceeding or complaint should be quashed in exercise of its jurisdic&on under Sec&on 482, the High Court must evaluate whether the ends of jus&ce would jus&fy the exercise of the inherent power; 16 (iv) While the inherent power of the High Court has a wide ambit and plenitude it has to be exercised; (i) to secure the ends of jus&ce or (ii) to prevent an abuse of the process of any court; 16 (v) The decision as to whether a complaint or First Informa&on Report should be quashed on the ground that the oﬀender and vic&m have seAled the dispute, revolves ul&mately on the facts and circumstances of each case and no exhaus&ve elabora&on of principles can be formulated; 16 (vi) In the exercise of the power under Sec&on 482 and while dealing with a plea that the dispute has been seAled, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the oﬀence. Heinous and serious oﬀences involving mental depravity or oﬀences such as murder, rape and dacoity cannot appropriately be quashed though the vic&m or the family of the vic&m have seAled the dispute. Such oﬀences are, truly speaking, not private in nature but have a serious impact upon society. The decision to con&nue with the trial in such cases is founded on the overriding element of public interest in punishing persons for serious oﬀences;

16 (vii) As dis&nguished from serious oﬀences, there may be criminal cases which have an overwhelming or predominant element of a civil dispute. They stand on a dis&nct foo&ng in so far as the exercise of the inherent power to quash is concerned; 16 (viii) Criminal cases involving oﬀences which arise from commercial, ﬁnancial, mercan&le, partnership or similar transac&ons with an essen&ally civil ﬂavour may in appropriate situa&ons fall for quashing where par&es have seAled the dispute;

16 (ix) In such a case, the High Court may quash the criminal proceeding if in view of the compromise between the disputants, the possibility of a convic&on is remote and the con&nua&on of a criminal proceeding would cause oppression and prejudice; and 16 (x) There is yet an excep&on to the principle set out in proposi&ons (viii) and (ix) above. Economic oﬀences involving the ﬁnancial and economic well-being of the state have

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2024:PHHC:061672 implica&ons which lie beyond the domain of a mere dispute between private disputants. The High Court would be jus&ﬁed in declining to quash where the oﬀender is involved in an ac&vity akin to a ﬁnancial or economic fraud or misdemeanour. The consequences of the act complained of upon the ﬁnancial or economic system will weigh in the balance.

14. In Ramgopal v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, Cr.A 1489 of 2012, decided on 29.09.2021, Hon'ble Supreme Court holds, [11]. True it is that oﬀences which are 'non-compoundable' cannot be compounded by a criminal court in purported exercise of its powers under Sec&on 320 Cr.P.C. Any such aAempt by the court would amount to altera&on, addi&on and modiﬁca&on of Sec&on 320 Cr.P.C, which is the exclusive domain of Legislature. There is no patent or latent ambiguity in the language of Sec&on 320 Cr.P.C., which may jus&fy its wider interpreta&on and include such oﬀences in the docket of 'compoundable' oﬀences which have been consciously kept out as non-compoundable. Nevertheless, the limited jurisdic&on to compound an oﬀence within the framework of Sec&on 320 Cr.P.C. is not an embargo against invoking inherent powers by the High Court vested in it under Sec&on 482 Cr.P.C. The High Court, keeping in view the peculiar facts and circumstances of a case and for jus&ﬁable reasons can press Sec&on 482 Cr.P.C. in aid to prevent abuse of the process of any Court and/or to secure the ends of jus&ce. [12]. The High Court, therefore, having regard to the nature of the oﬀence and the fact that par&es have amicably seAled their dispute and the vic&m has willingly consented to the nulliﬁca&on of criminal proceedings, can quash such proceedings in exercise of its inherent powers under Sec&on 482 Cr.P.C., even if the oﬀences are non-compoundable. The High Court can indubitably evaluate the consequen&al eﬀects of the oﬀence beyond the body of an individual and thereaCer adopt a pragma&c approach, to ensure that the felony, even if goes unpunished, does not &nker with or paralyze the very object of the administra&on of criminal jus&ce system.

[13]. It appears to us those criminal proceedings involving non- heinous oﬀences or where the oﬀences are predominantly of a private nature, can be annulled irrespec&ve of the fact that trial has already been concluded or appeal stands dismissed against convic&on. Handing out punishment is not the sole form of delivering jus&ce. Societal method of applying laws evenly is always subject to lawful excep&ons. It goes without saying, that the cases where compromise is struck postconvic&on, the High Court ought to exercise such discre&on with rec&tude, keeping in view the circumstances surrounding the incident, the fashion in which the compromise has been arrived at, and with due regard to the nature and seriousness of the oﬀence, besides the conduct of the accused, before and aCer the incidence. The touchstone for exercising the extraordinary power under Sec&on 482 Cr.P.C. would be to secure the ends of jus&ce. There can be no hard and fast line constric&ng the power of the High Court to

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2024:PHHC:061672 do substan&al jus&ce. A restric&ve construc&on of inherent powers under Sec&on 482 Cr.P.C. may lead to rigid or specious jus&ce, which in the given facts and circumstances of a case, may rather lead to grave injus&ce. On the other hand, in cases where heinous oﬀences have been proved against perpetrators, no such beneﬁt ought to be extended, as cau&ously observed by this Court in Narinder Singh &Ors. vs. State of Punjab &Ors. [(2014) 6 SCC 466, ¶ 29], and Laxmi Narayan [(2019) 5 SCC 688, ¶ 15].

[14]. In other words, grave or serious oﬀences or oﬀences which involve moral turpitude or have a harmful eﬀect on the social and moral fabric of the society or involve maAers concerning public policy, cannot be construed between two individuals or groups only, for such oﬀences have the poten&al to impact the society at large. Eﬀacing abominable oﬀences through quashing process would not only send a wrong signal to the community but may also accord an undue beneﬁt to unscrupulous habitual or professional oﬀenders, who can secure a 'seAlement' through duress, threats, social boycoAs, bribes or other dubious means. It is well said that "let no guilty man escape, if it can be avoided."

15. In Madan Mohan Abbot v. State of Punjab, (2008) 4 SCC 582, Hon'ble Supreme Court holds, [5]. It is on the basis of this compromise that the applica&on was ﬁled in the High Court for quashing of proceedings which has been dismissed by the impugned order. We no&ce from a reading of the FIR and the other documents on record that the dispute was purely a personal one between two contes&ng par&es and that it arose out of extensive business dealings between them and that there was absolutely no public policy involved in the nature of the allega&ons made against the accused. We are, therefore, of the opinion that no useful purpose would be served in con&nuing with the proceedings in the light of the compromise and also in the light of the fact that the complainant has, on 11th January 2004, passed away and the possibility of a convic&on being recorded has thus to be ruled out. We need to emphasise that it is perhaps advisable that in disputes where the ques&on involved is of a purely personal nature, the Court should ordinarily accept the terms of the compromise even in criminal proceedings as keeping the maAer alive with no possibility of a result in favour of the prosecu&on is a luxury which the Courts, grossly overburdened as they are, cannot aﬀord and that the &me so saved can be u&lised in deciding more eﬀec&ve and meaningful li&ga&on. This is a common sense approach to the maAer based on ground of reali&es and beneﬁt of the technicali&es of the law.

16. In Shakuntala Sawhney v Kaushalya Sawhney, (1979) 3 SCR 639, at P 642, Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that the ﬁnest hour of Jus&ce arises propi&ously when

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2024:PHHC:061672 par&es, who fell apart, bury the hatchet and weave a sense of fellowship or reunion.

17. In the light of the judicial precedents referred to above, given the terms of compromise, placement of par&es, and other factors peculiar to the case, the contents of the compromise deed and its objec&ves point towards its acceptance.

18. In Himachal Pradesh Cricket Associa&on v State of Himachal Pradesh, 2018:INSC:1039 [Para 47], 2018 (4) Crimes 324, Hon'ble Supreme Court holds "[47]. As far as Writ Pe&&on (Criminal) No. 135 of 2017 is concerned, the appellants came to this Court challenging the order of cognizance only because of the reason that maAer was already pending as the appellants had ﬁled the Special Leave Pe&&ons against the order of the High Court rejec&ng their pe&&on for quashing of the FIR/Chargesheet. Having regard to these peculiar facts, writ pe&&on has also been entertained. In any case, once we hold that FIR needs to be quashed, order of cognizance would automa&cally stands vi&ated."

19. Considering the en&re facts, compromise, and in the light of the above- men&oned judicial precedents, I believe that con&nuing these proceedings will not suﬃce any fruiYul purpose whatsoever. In the facts and circumstances peculiar to this case, the Court invokes the inherent jurisdic&on under sec&on 482 CrPC and quashes the FIR and all subsequent proceedings qua the pe&&oner(s). The bail bonds of the pe&&oner are accordingly discharged. All pending applica&on(s), if any, stand closed.

Pe++on allowed in the terms men+oned above. All pending applica&ons, if any, stand disposed of.




                                                            (ANOOP CHITKARA)
                                                               JUDGE
01.05.2024
Jyo& Sharma


Whether speaking/reasoned:           Yes
Whether reportable:                  No.






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