Punjab-Haryana High Court
Tehal Singh vs State Of Punjab And Other on 13 March, 2024
Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:035914
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126
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
CWP-5789-2024
Date of Decision:13.03.2024
TEHAL SINGH ......... Petitioner
Versus
STATE OF PUNJAB AND OTHER ..... Respondents
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE JAGMOHAN BANSAL
Present : Mr. Parminder Singh Sekhon, Advocate
for the petitioner.
Mr. Aman Dhir, DAG, Punjab.
****
JAGMOHAN BANSAL, J. (Oral)
1. The petitioner through instant petition under Articles
226/227 of the Constitution of India is seeking setting aside of:-
i. order dated 17.06.2019 (Annexure P-3) whereby
Disciplinary Authority has awarded punishment of
dismissal;
ii. order dated 11.10.2019 (Annexure P-4) whereby
Appellate Authority has dismissed appeal of the
petitioner; and
iii. order dated 02.07.2020 (Annexure P-5) whereby
revision petition of the petitioner has been dismissed.
2. The petitioner was working with respondent-department as
Assistant Sub-Inspector. Departmental proceedings came to be initiated
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against the petitioner for accepting bribe. An FIR No.7 dated 07.08.2017
under Sections 7 and 13 (2) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (as
amended by Amendment Act, 2018) was registered against the petitioner.
The Senior Superintendent of Police dismissed him from service by order
dated 17.06.2019 (Annexure P-3). He unsuccessfully preferred appeal
and revision before the departmental authorities. The Trial Court vide
judgment dated 09.08.2023 (Annexure P-7) has acquitted the petitioner in
the above-said FIR.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that as per Rule
16.3 of Punjab Police Rules, 1934 (for short '1934 Rules'), the petitioner
could not be departmentally punished because he has been acquitted in
the criminal trial. The foundation of departmental proceedings and
criminal trial was same. The evidence led by the department in criminal
as well as departmental proceedings were same, thus, he could not be
punished in view of his acquittal in the criminal trial.
4. Per contra, learned State counsel submits that the petitioner
was departmentally punished prior to judgment of acquittal, thus, he
cannot claim benefit of Rule 16.3 of 1934 Rules. The departmental
proceedings were adjudicated on different parameters. The petitioner has
been acquitted on the ground of benefit of doubt. He concedes that
petitioner was departmentally punished on account of registration of FIR
and evidence in both the proceedings were common.
5. I have heard the arguments of learned counsels for both sides
and perused the record with their able assistance.
6. The entire dispute revolves around interpretation of Rule
16.3 of 1934 Rules, thus, it would be inevitable to look at aforesaid Rule
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which is reproduced as below:
"16.3. Action following on a judicial acquittal. -
(1) When a Police Officer has been tried and acquitted by
a criminal court he shall be not be punished
departmentally on the same charge or on a different
charge upon the evidence cited in the criminal case,
whether actually led or not, unless -
(a) the criminal charge has failed on technical
grounds; or
(b) in the opinion of the Court or of the
Superintendent of Police, the prosecution witnesses
have been won over; or
(c) the Court has held in its judgment that an
offence was actually committed and that suspicion
rests upon the police officer concerned; or
(d) the evidence cited in the criminal case discloses
facts unconnected with the charge before the court
which justify departmental proceedings on a
different charge; or
(e) additional evidence admissible under rule
16.25(1) in departmental proceedings is available.
(2) Departmental proceedings admissible under sub-rule
(1) may be instituted against Lower Subordinates by the
order of the Superintendent of Police but may be taken
against Upper Subordinates only with the sanction of
Deputy Inspector General of Police, and a police officer
against whom such action is admissible shall not be
deemed to have been honorably acquitted for the purpose
of rule 7.3 of the Civil Services Rules (Punjab), Volume I,
Part I."
7. The acquittal from criminal proceedings does not
automatically entitle immunity from departmental action. A police officer
may be subjected departmental punishment despite acquittal in criminal
proceedings as per exceptions carved out in Rule 16.3 of 1934 Rules. If
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acquittal is not based upon exceptions carved out in Rule 16.3 of 1934
Rules, a police officer is entitled to immunity from departmental action.
8. The contention of the respondent that the petitioner
was acquitted after adjudication of departmental proceedings
cannot be countenanced because there would be discrimination if
contention of the respondent is accepted. On the same set of
allegations, two employees in different districts may be subjected
to departmental and criminal proceedings or there may be a case
where on the identical set of allegations two employees in the same
district are subjected to department and criminal proceedings. In
case, both the employees are acquitted from the criminal trial and
in case of one employee departmental proceedings are still pending
he would be entitled to benefit of Rule 16.3 of 1934 Rules whereas
an employee against whom departmental proceedings have already
concluded would not be entitled to benefit of Rule 16.3 of 1934
Rules. It would be violative of fundamental right of equality
guaranteed by Article 14 of the Constitution. The State cannot
make hostile discrimination.
9. From the perusal of impugned orders and facts on record, it
is evident that appellate authority had no opportunity to advert with Rule
16.3 of 1934 Rules while passing said order. Rule 16.3 of 1934 Rules is
directly applicable to every departmental proceedings as soon as criminal
proceedings are dropped. The competent authority is duty bound to
ascertain applicability of Rule 16.3 of 1934 Rules in the departmental
proceedings. As the appellate authority has not adverted with Rule 16.3
of 1934 Rules while passing impugned orders, the impugned orders dated
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17.06.2019 (Annexure P-3), order dated 11.10.2019 (Annexure P-4) and
order dated 02.07.2020 (Annexure P-5) deserve to be set aside and
accordingly set aside. To cut short the litigation, instead of disciplinary
authority, the appellate authority is directed to pass a fresh order within
three months from today.
( JAGMOHAN BANSAL )
JUDGE
13.03.2024
Ali
Whether speaking/reasoned Yes/No
Whether Reportable Yes/No
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