Punjab-Haryana High Court
Balwinder Singh vs State Of Punjab & Ors on 13 March, 2024
Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:036091
2024:PHHC:036091
CWP-20174-2009 -1-
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
206 CWP-20174-2009
Date of Decision: 13.03.2024
Balwinder Singh ...Petitioner
Versus
State of Punjab and others ...Respondents
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE JAGMOHAN BANSAL
Present:- Mr. C.S. Jattana, Advocate for the petitioner
Mr. Pawan Kumar, Deputy Advocate General, Punjab
***
JAGMOHAN BANSAL, J. (Oral)
1. The petitioner through instant petition under Articles 226/227 of
the Constitution of India is seeking setting aside of:-
i. order dated 20.09.2004 (Annexure P-6) whereby
Disciplinary Authority has awarded punishment of
dismissal;
ii. order dated 28.07.2005 (Annexure P-8) whereby Appellate
Authority has dismissed appeal of the petitioner; and
iii. order dated 25.07.2007 (Annexure P-10) whereby revision
petition of the petitioner has been dismissed.
2. The petitioner on 06.02.1989 joined respondent-department as
Constable. An FIR No.20 of 1991 under Sections 379, 409, 120-B of Indian
Penal Code, 1860 read with Sections 3 and 4 of Terrorist and Disruptive
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Activity (Prevention) Act was registered against him at Police Station at GRP,
Amritsar. On registration of FIR, the Assistant Inspector General of Govt.
Railway Police, Punjab dismissed him from service vide order dated
22.01.1991 (Annexure P-1) without holding any regular inquiry. The Trial
Court vide judgment dated 17.11.1992 (Annexure P-2) acquitted him in the
above-said FIR. Thereafter, he preferred CWP No.6773 of 1993 before this
Court seeking setting aside of dismissal order. By order dated 11.12.2002
(Annexure P-3), this Court set aside dismissal order dated 22.01.1991,
however, granted liberty to the respondents to hold regular inquiry against
him which was dispensed with under Article 311(2) of Constitution of India
while passing the said order.
The petitioner was reinstated vide order dated 26.05.2003 and
departmental proceedings was initiated against him. Superintendent-cum-
Assistant Inspector General of Police, Railways Punjab, Patiala vide order
dated 20.09.2004 (Annexure P-6), dismissed him from service. He
unsuccessfully preferred appeal and revision before the departmental
authorities.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that as per Rule 16.3
of Punjab Police Rules, 1934 (for short '1934 Rules'), the petitioner could not
be departmentally punished because he has been acquitted in the criminal
trial. The foundation of departmental proceedings and criminal trial was same.
The evidence led by the department in criminal as well as departmental
proceedings were same, thus, he could not be punished in view of his acquittal
in the criminal trial.
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4. Per contra, learned State counsel submits that the petitioner was
departmentally punished after holding regular inquiry. The petitioner was
involved in a heinous offence of conspiracy with militants. The departmental
proceedings were adjudicated on different parameters. The petitioner has been
acquitted on the ground of benefit of doubt. He concedes that petitioner was
departmentally punished on account of registration of FIR and evidence in
both the proceedings were common.
5. I have heard the arguments of learned counsels for both sides and
perused the record with their able assistance.
6. The entire dispute revolves around interpretation of Rule 16.3 of
1934 Rules, thus, it would be inevitable to look at aforesaid Rule which is
reproduced as below:
"16.3. Action following on a judicial acquittal. -
(1) When a Police Officer has been tried and acquitted by a
criminal court he shall be not be punished departmentally on
the same charge or on a different charge upon the evidence
cited in the criminal case, whether actually led or not, unless -
(a) the criminal charge has failed on technical grounds;
or
(b) in the opinion of the Court or of the Superintendent
of Police, the prosecution witnesses have been won
over; or
(c) the Court has held in its judgment that an offence
was actually committed and that suspicion rests upon
the police officer concerned; or
(d) the evidence cited in the criminal case discloses facts
unconnected with the charge before the court which
justify departmental proceedings on a different charge;
or
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(e) additional evidence admissible under rule 16.25(1)
in departmental proceedings is available.
(2) Departmental proceedings admissible under sub-rule (1)
may be instituted against Lower Subordinates by the order of
the Superintendent of Police but may be taken against Upper
Subordinates only with the sanction of Deputy Inspector
General of Police, and a police officer against whom such
action is admissible shall not be deemed to have been
honorably acquitted for the purpose of rule 7.3 of the Civil
Services Rules (Punjab), Volume I, Part I."
7. The acquittal from criminal proceedings does not automatically
entitle immunity from departmental action. A police officer may be subjected
departmental punishment despite acquittal in criminal proceedings as per
exceptions carved out in Rule 16.3 of 1934 Rules. If acquittal is not based
upon exceptions carved out in Rule 16.3 of 1934 Rules, a police officer is
entitled to immunity from departmental action.
8. From the perusal of impugned orders and facts on record, it is
evident that appellate authority has not adverted with Rule 16.3 of 1934 Rules
while passing the said order. Rule 16.3 of 1934 Rules is directly applicable to
every departmental proceedings as soon as criminal proceedings are dropped.
The competent authority is duty bound to ascertain applicability of Rule 16.3
of 1934 Rules in the departmental proceedings. As the Appellate Authority
has not adverted with Rule 16.3 of 1934 Rules while passing impugned
orders, the impugned orders dated 28.07.2005 (Annexure P-8) and 25.07.2007
(Annexure P-10) deserve to be set aside and accordingly set aside. To cut
short the litigation, instead of disciplinary authority, the appellate authority is
directed to pass a fresh order within three months from today.
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9. This Court would hasten to add that if the appellate authority
decides to reinstate the petitioner, he shall not be entitled to back wages as
conceded by learned counsel for the petitioner.
(JAGMOHAN BANSAL)
JUDGE
13.03.2024
Mohit Kumar
Whether speaking/reasoned Yes/No
Whether reportable Yes/No
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