Punjab-Haryana High Court
State Of Hy.Etc vs Mani Ram on 9 August, 2024
Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:103210
1
RSA-71 of 2001 (O&M)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
RSA-71 of 2001 (O&M)
Reserved on
on: 31.7.2024
Pronounced on: 09.08.2024
Haryana State and others
......Appellants
Versus
Mani Ram
......Respondent
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE NAMIT KUMAR
Argued by:: - Mr. Saurabh Mohunta, DAG, Haryana
Haryana,
for the appellant.
Mr. Lalit Rishi, Advocate,
for the respondent.
NAMIT KUMAR, J.
1. By way of present Regular Second Appeal appellants-
defendants have assailed the judgment and decree dated 18.10.2000 of
the lower appellate Court,
Court Hisar, whereby judgment and decree dated
17.12.1999 passed by the Court of learned Additional Civil Judge
(Senior Division), Hisar, has been reversed and suit of the respondent
respondent-
plaintiff for declaration has been decreed.
2. Parties to the lis are being referred as per their status
before the trial Court. Brief facts of the case are that the plaintiff filed
a suit for declaration pleading therein
rein that he is serving as Sub
Inspector in the Haryana Roadways, Hisar, on regular basis against the
permanent post. It was pleaded that without conducting regular enquiry
as per Rules, plaintiff was awarded punishment of stoppage of two
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increments with cumulative effect vide orders dated 16.10.1969 and
30.10.1970,, by the General Manager, Haryana Roadways Hisar, and
the same are illegal, null and void having been passed in contravention
of the mandatory provisions of law, rules, principles of natural justice
and without hearing the plaintiff. After hearing the learned counsel for
the parties and appreciating the evidence on record, trial Court
dismissed the suit of the plaintiff, vide judgment and decree dated
17.12.1999. Aggrieved against the judgment and decree of the trial
Court, plaintiff preferred an appeal, which was accepted by the lower
appellate Court vide judgment and decree dated 18.10.2000. Henc
Hence,
the present Regular Second Appeal by the defendants.
3. Learned State counsel contended that lower appellate
Court erred in law in decreeing the suit of the respondent
respondent-plaintiff as
the same was hopelessly time barred. He further submitted that
impugned
d orders were passed in the years 1969 and 1970 and suit was
instituted in the year 1998 and as per settled principles of law, the suit
should have been filed within the period of three years from the date of
passing of impugned orders. Therefore, he
he has pprayed for setting aside
the impugned judgment and decree passed by the lower appellate Court
by allowing the present appeal.
4. Per contra,, learned counsel for the respondent supported
the judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court. He contended
that the orders of stoppage of two increments of the respondent were
void and against the principles of natural justice as the same were
passed without affording any opportunity of hearing to him and without
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holding any enquiry.
enquiry He further contended
ntended that there is no limitation to
challenge the void orders. In support of his contentions, learned
counsel placed reliance upon
on the judgments of this Court in The State
of Punjab v. Parkash Singh, 1993(3) S.C.T. 394; Malkiat Singh v.
State of Haryana,
Haryan 2007(4) S.C.T. 801; Makhan Singh v. The State of
Punjab and others, 2009(3) S.C.T. 123 and State of Punjab v.
Niranjan Singh, 2014(4) S.C.T. 437.
5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused
the record.
6. The operation of the judgment and decree rendered by the
lower appellate Court was stayed on 11.01.2001. Thereafter, the matter
was admitted on 25.07.2003 and stay was ordered to continue.
7. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Punjab and others
v. Gurdev Singh (1991)4 SCC 1 has held that even a void order is
required to be challenged within a period of limitation. The relevant
discussion is in para 4 which is extracted as under: -
"4.. First of all, to say that the suit is not governed by the
law of Limitation runs afoul of our Limitation Act. The
statute of limitation was intended to provide a time limit
for all suits conceivable. Section 3 of the Limitation Act
provides that a suit, appeal or application instituted after
the prescribed "period of limitation"
imitation" must subject to the
provisions of Sections 4 to 24 be dismissed although
limitation has not been set up as a defence, Section
Section-2(J)
defines the expression "period of limitation" to mean the
period of limitation prescribed in the Schedule for suit
suit,
appeal or application. Section 2(J) also defines,
"prescribed period" to mean the period of limitation
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computed in accordance with the provisions of the Act.
The Court's function on the presentation of plaint is simply
to examine whether, on the assumed facts the plaintiff is
within time. The Court has to find out when the "right to
sue" accrued to the plaintiff. If a suit is not covered by any
of the specific articles prescribing a period of limitation, it
must fail within the residuary article. The purp
purpose of the
residuary article is to provide for cases which could not be
covered by any other provision in the Limitation Act. The
residuary article is applicable to every variety of suits not
otherwise provided for. Article 113 (corresponding to
Article 1200 of the Act 1908) is a residuary article for cases
not covered by any other provisions in the Act. It
prescribes a period of three years when the right to sue
accrues. Under Article 120 it was six years which has
been reduced to three years under Article 113. According
to the third column in Article 113, time commences to run
when the right to sue accrues. The words "right to sue"
ordinarily mean the right to seek relief by means of legal
proceedings. Generally, the right to sue accrues only when
the 'causee of action arises, that is, the right to prosecute to
obtain relief by legal means. The suit must be instituted
when the right asserted in the suit is infringed or when
there is a clear and unequivocal threat to infringe that
right by the defendant againstt whom the suit is insti
insti- tuted
(See: (i) Mt. Bole v. Mt. Koklam and Ors., AIR 1930 PC
270 and (ii) Gannon Dunkerley and Co. v. The Union of
India, AIR 1970 SC 1433)."
8. Further, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of
Punjab and others v. Rajinder Singh, (1999) SCC (L&S) 664 making
reference to the judgment in Gurdev Singh's case (supra) held as
under: -
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"4. After conducting departmental enquiry, by
proceedings dated 10-12-1981,
1981, two increments with
cumulative effect were stopped. The suit w
was filed on 15-1-
1988. Article 58 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act 21 of
1963 prescribes three years limitation from the date of the
order, to seek a declaration that the impugned order was
illegal and did not bind him. The residuary provision is
Article
cle 113 also equally prescribes the limitation of three
years. The limitation starts running from the date of
passing of the order withholding increments. On expiry of
three years from that date, the limitation expires by the
efflux of time. Consequently, the suit gets barred by
limitation. Section 3 of the Limitation Act directs the court
to take notice of the bar of limitation before proceeding
further. This legal position was set at rest by the judgment
of this Court in State of Punjab v. Gurdev Singh, ((1991) 4
SCC 1.. The suit of the respondent is barred by limitation."
9. To the similar effect is the judgment of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in the case of State of Punjab and another v. Balkaran
Singh
h (2006) 12 SCC 709.
10. A Co-ordinate
ordinate Bench of this Court in Punjab State v.
Hardev Singh, 1997(2) SCT 101,
101 while relying upon the judgments of
the Hon'ble Supreme Court,
Court dismissed the suit of the plaintiff seeking
decree of declaration as the same was filed beyond the prescribed
period of limitation.
11. In the present case, orderss of stoppage of annual
increments were passed on 16.10.1969 and 30.10.1970, whereas suit
for declaring the said orders null and void was filed on 23.02.1998 i.e.
after a period of 28 years, which is hopelessly
pelessly time barred. Thus, the
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judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court is not sustainable in
the eyes of law.
12. Judgments relied upon by learned counsel for the
respondent are not applicable to
to the facts of the present case and are in
teeth to the judgments passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, as
referred above, therefore, no benefit of the same can be given to him.
13. No other point has been urged.
14. In view of the above, appeal is allowed. The judgment
and decree dated 18.10.2000, passed
sed by the lower appellate Court,
Hisar, is set aside and suit of the respondent
respondent-plaintiff is dismissed.
Decree-sheet
sheet be prepared accordingly.
15. Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of
accordingly.
(NAMIT KUMAR)
09.08.2024 JUDGE
R.S.
Whether speaking/reasoned : Yes/No
Whether Reportable : Yes/No
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