Punjab-Haryana High Court
Tribune Employees & Friends Coop. Group ... vs State Of Haryana And Ors on 30 April, 2024
Author: Sureshwar Thakur
Bench: Sureshwar Thakur
Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:060371-DB
CWP No. 24513 of 2014 (O&M) -1- 2024:PHHC:060371-DB
In the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh
CWP No. 24513 of 2014 (O&M)
Reserved on : 09.4.2024
Date of Decision: 30.4.2024
The Tribune Employees and Friends Co-operative
Group Housing Society Ltd. ......Petitioners
Versus
State of Haryana and others .....Respondents
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SURESHWAR THAKUR
HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE SUKHVINDER KAUR
Argued by: Mr. Chetan Mittal, Senior Advocate with
Mr. R.S.Randhawa, Advocate
for the petitioner.
Mr. Ankur Mittal, Addl. A.G., Haryana with
Mr. Saurabh Mago, DAG, Haryana.
****
SURESHWAR THAKUR, J.
1. Through the instant petition, the petitioner seeks the quashing of
the impugned order dated 21.10.2014 (Annexure P-1), wherebys the High
Powered Committee, as became constituted, through the orders of this Court
rendered in CWP No. 12848 of 2000 titled as Jasbir Singh Siali versus State
of Haryana and others, thus rejected the present petitioner's claim for the
subject lands becoming released from acquisition.
2. The further relief as asked for in the instant writ petition, is for
the quashing of the notification issued under Section 4 of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short 'the Act of 1894), and, also for the quashing
of the notification issued under Section 6 of the Act of 1894.
3. In short, the grounds, as raised in the instant writ petition for
throwing a challenge to the impugned Annexure P-1 become rested on (a)
the respondent concerned, discriminating against the present petitioner in its
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refraining from releasing the subject lands from acquisition, despite the
lands of other similarly situated land owners concerned, becoming released
from acquisition. (b) The High Powered Committee has not followed the
relevant policy wherebys given the petitioner being the owner of the subject
land prior to the issuance of notification under Section 4 of the Act of 1894,
therebys the subject lands were required to be considered to be released from
acquisition. (c) The objections raised by the petitioner under Section 5-A of
the Act of 1894 rather not being lawfully considered, nor any lawful/valid
speaking order, thus for rejecting the said objection, becoming rendered by
the competent authority concerned. (d) Since the exercisings of power of
eminent domain by the acquiring authority concerned, is for creating a
housing colony over the subject lands, thus at the instance of the beneficiary
department of the State, but when the petitioner society requires the subject
lands for raising thereons dwelling units rather for housing thereins the
members of the petitioner society, therebys the non release of the subject
lands rather from acquisition, thus ousts the tenable legitimate expectation of
the petitioner from raising a housing colony over the subject lands.
4. It has been candidly set-forth in the reply on affidavit, that the
petitioner society applied for the grant of licence on 23.3.1995, and, the said
request was declined by the Town and Country Planning Department. The
declinings of accordings of licence to the petitioner society, is stated in reply
on affidavit, to premised on the ground, that the proposed site falling in the
Mansa Devi Urban Complex, whereins, in terms of the development plan of
Chandigarh Periphery, all the developmental activities become enjoined to
become undertaken by the State Government or through its agencies.
Furthermore, it has also been stated in reply on affidavit, that the said
rejection order has acquired conclusivity, thus for the reason that it remained
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unchallenged, besides the petitioner applying for the grant of licence on
11.1.2001, but since the said application was made after the issuance of
declaration under Section 6 of the Act of 1894. Resultantly it is stated in
reply on affidavit, that the said application was not required to be
considered, nor the said application for the according of the espoused licence
to the petitioner society, rather for undertaking the developmental activities
on the subject lands, but could be considered on the date of issuance of a
notification under Section 4 of the Act of 1894, as at the said phase, thus all
rights, titles and interests qua the subject lands vested in the acquiring
authority concerned. Resultantly, therebys it has also been stated in the
reply, that the petitioner had no locus standi to claim that licence be
accorded to it for raising a housing colony on the subject land.
5. Though, the policy decision (supra) is made by the respondent
concerned, thus in terms of the provisions relating to the development of the
periphery existing in the Periphery of Chandigarh, whereins, the
development activities to be taken thereovers, thus become enjoined to be
taken only by the Government or through its agencies. However, it is stated
in reply on affidavit, that in SLP(C) No. 28411 of 2011 titled as Kishore
Chabbra versus State of Haryana and others, the Hon'ble Apex Court
through an interim order dated 31.10.2011, rather had stayed the action
taken by the State Government on the basis of the policy decision. The
operative part of the said interim order is extracted hereinafter.
"Till the next date, all the actions taken by the State
Government on the basis of the policy decision shall remain
stayed"
6. However, it has been further revealed in the reply on affidavit,
that the Hon'ble Apex Court vide order dated 13.2.2012, had rather observed
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that the State shall be free to implement the policy decision contained in
circular dated 26.10.2007 in appropriate deserving cases. The operative part
of the order (supra) is extracted hereinafter.
"The submission of the learned senior counsel for the State is
accepted and in modification of the last portion of interim
order dated 31.10.2011, the following order is passed:-
The petitioner shall not dispossess from the land, factory
etc. belonging to him but the State shall be free to implement
the policy decision contained in Circular dated 27.10.2007 in
appropriate deserving cases"
7. Therefore, it is contended, that in terms of the above extracted
order, the respondent concerned, came to a conclusion, that the subject land
did not deserve to become released from acquisition.
8. The relevant paras of the reply (supra) are extracted hereinafter.
"x x x x x
That it is respectfully submitted that the land in dispute is being
acquired for the planned development of Sector 1, 2, 3, 5B, 5C
& 6, Mansa Devi Complex, Panchkula. The acquired/awarded
land is being utilized by the Haryana Urban Development
Authority (HUDA) for notified public purpose. In Sector-1,
Gymkhana Club Building, a Power House, Rajiv Gandhi Park
(partly) and Paradise Park have been constructed and a water
works site is under construction. It is pertinent to mention that
land use of sector 1 has been changed from area reserved for
IT uses to open space zone keeping in view the need to protect
the water shed area of Sukhna Lake (an undertaking was also
given by the State in CWP No. 7649 of 2003) and accordingly
parks have been developed in the area in possession of HUDA,
rest of the area of Sector 1 will also be developed as open
space zone once the possession is taken over after vacation of
stay orders by this Hon'ble Court. In the layout plan of Sector
2, total 1435 plots have been provided, out of which 131 nos. of
plots stand allotted. The remaining plots could not be floated
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due to area under litigation. In Sector-5B, commercial sites,
hotel sites, police post etc. Have been provided on land
measuring 41 acres, wherein development works stand
completed. In Sector-6, 375 nos. of residential plots of various
categories and 6 nos. of Group Housing Sites, Mela Parking
sites etc. have been provided in the lay out plan. Out of the
total plots, 266 nos. of plots stand allotted and developments
works stands completed on an area measuring approximately
90 acres of land.
x x x x x
13. That the contents of Para No. 13 of the petition are
matter of record to the extent of the issuance of the policy dated
24.01.2011. It is worthwhile to mention that the policy dated
24.01.2011 specifically provides that only such cases with
respect to which an application under Section 3 of Haryana
Development and Regulation of Urban Areas Act, 1975 has
been made prior to issuance of Section 6 for converting to the
land into colony may be considered for release subject to the
condition that ownership of the land is prior to Section 4
notification. In view of the aforesaid the case of the petitioner is
not covered under the policy because the earlier application
filed by the petitioner was rejected on 13.06.1999 and it was
after issuance of declaration under Section 6 of the Act of 1894
that the petitioner applied for grant of license.
14. That the contents of Para No. 14 of the petition are wrong
and hence denied. The case of the petitioner is not covered
under the policy because the earlier application filed by the
petitioner was rejected on 13.06.1999 and it was after issuance
of declaration under Section 6 of the Act of 1894 that the
petitioner applied for grant of license.
15. That the contents of Para No. 15 of the petition are
wrong and hence denied. It is submitted that in the cases of
acquisition, the public purpose acts as a polestar and the
private interest must give way to the public interest at large.
The decision in which manner the acquired land is to be
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utilized is an executive action and cannot be dictated at the
behest of the land owner. The land is question is being acquired
for the planned and integrated development of Sector 1, 2, 3,
5B, 5C & 6, Mansa Devi Complex, Panchkula. The
acquired/awarded land is being utilized by the Haryana Urban
Development Authority (HUDA) for notified public purpose. In
Sector-1, Gymkhana Club Building, a Power House, Rajiv
Gandhi Park (partly) and Paradise Park have been constructed
and a water works site is under construction. It is pertinent to
mention that land use of sector 1 has been changed from area
reserved for IT uses to open space zone keeping in view the
need to protect the water shed area of Sukhna Lake (an
undertaking was also given by the State in CWP No. 7649 of
2003) and accordingly parks have been developed in the area
in possession of HUDA, rest of the area of Sector 1 will also be
developed as open space zone once the possession is taken over
after vacation of stay orders by this Hon'ble Court. In the
layout plan of Sector 2, total 1435 plots have been provided,
out of which 131 nos. Of plots stand allotted. The remaining
plots could not be floated due to area under litigation. In
Sector-5B, commercial sites, hotel sites, police post etc. Have
been provided on land measuring 41 acres, wherein
development works stand completed. In Sector-6, 375 nos. of
residential plots of various categories and 6 nos, of Group
Housing Sites, Mela Parking sites etc. have been provided in
the lay out plan. Out of the total plots, 266 nos. of plots stand
allotted and developments works stands completed on an area
measuring approximately 90 acres of land. The land is required
by HUDA for achieving the defined objective. Any release of
land shall adversely hamper the planned and integrated
development of the Complex.
x x x x x
21. That in reply to the contents of Para No. 21 of the
petition, it is submitted that the representation of the petitioner
has been rejected on the ground that land measuring 9.44 acres
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falls within the designated open space zone of the Development
Plan, therefore, thus land is not in conformity with the zoning
regulations to consider grant of licence for group housing
colony, therefore cannot be released. 7.14 acres of total
claimed land falls in the alignment of 60 mtrs. wide peripheral
road and further 1.25 acres land is falling in 18 mtrs. wide
road circulation and 1.004 acres is falling in 12 mtrs. wide
circulation. Further it was noted that 0.64 acres of land affects
the planning of plots. In the manner as stated aforesaid, the
request for release of 19.474 acres of land was rejected and the
decision on the remaining land was adjourned sine die in view
of the orders of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India.
22. That the contents of Para No. 22 of the petition are
wrong and hence denied. It is submitted that Section 24(2) of
the Act of 2013 applies only to such cases wherein even though
the award was announced more than 5 years prior to coming
into force of the Act, 01.01.2014, however, neither the
possession has been taken nor the compensation has been paid.
In view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of
India in Indore Development Authority Vs. Manohar Lal and
others AIR 2020 SC 1496, the five years period shall be
determined after deducting the period during which the stay
was in operation since in the case in hand the stay is operating
since 07.03.2001 till date, therefore, Section 24(2) of the Act of
2013 would not be applicable.
23. That the contents of Para No. 23 of the petition are
wrong and hence denied. The acquisition proceedings in
question were stayed by the Hon'ble High Court vide order
dated 18.05.2001 passed in C.M. No. 13086 of 2001 in CWP
No. 876 of 2001 titled as Dr. B. Singh Vs. Union of India and
others. The said order continued till 07.02.2003 and the
representations filed by the said petitioner in terms of the order
dated 07.02.2003 were rejected on 02.07.2003, therefore after
excluding the period form 18.05.2001 till 02.07.2003 the
revised date for announcement of award was on or before
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27.04.2004 and the award was announced on 09.10.2003 which
is within the limitation period of two years form the date of
issuance of declaration under Section 6 of the Act of 1894 after
excluding the period during which stay was in operation as per
explanation appended to Section 11-A of the Act of 1894.
24. That in reply to the contents of Para No. 24 of the
petition, it is respectfully submitted that the judgment dated
15.07.2008 passed in C.W.P. No. 12510 of 2000 and 12513 of
2000 was passed in different set of circumstances wherein the
construction was existing on the land in question and the
objection under Section 5-A filed by the petitioner therein was
rejected on the ground that the construction raised is
unauthorised in nature whereas the petitioner contended before
the Hon'ble Court that the construction was raised after taking
due permission from the concerned authorities. Suffice to
mention that aforesaid order has been challenged before
Hon'ble Supreme Court of India by filing SLP (C) No. 18585-
18586 of 2009 converted into Civil Appeal No. 7420-7421 of
2010 which is still pending consideration before the Hon'ble
Supreme Court of India, therefore, no parity can be claimed by
the petitioner with the aforesaid order passed in CWP No.
12510 of 2000 and 12513 of 2000. The detailed submissions
made in the preliminary submissions are reiterated and the
same may kindly be read as part and parcel of the reply to the
instant para.
25. That the contents of Para No. 25 of the petition are
wrong and hence denied. It is respectfully submitted that the
due hearing was given while deciding the objections filed under
Section 5-A of the Act of 1894 and no parity can be drawn from
the decision of this Hon'ble Court in C.W.P. No. 12510 of 2000.
x x x x x
30. That in reply to the contents of Para No. 30 of the petition,
it is respectfully submitted that merely because the petitioner
society is also intending to develop the land into the residential
colony, it will not bar the State to acquire the land for the
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residential and commercial purpose. As submitted in the
preliminary submissions the land in question affects the major
part of planning including open space, plot and roads.
Therefore, in any case said land cannot be released from the
acquisition proceedings.
x x x x x
42. That the contents of Para No. 42 of the petition are
wrong and hence denied. The plots allotted to the societies are
after carrying out the development of Sector. The petitioner is
trying to project the case of allotment as if the land has been
released in favour of those societies whereas fact of the matter
is that it is the plots which are allotted to the societies in the
same manner as is allotted to the individuals after carrying out
the planned development in the area."
Reasons for dismissing the instant petition
9. For the reasons to be assigned hereinafter, this Court does not
find any merit in the instant petition, and, is constrained to dismiss it.
10. Since the Hon'ble Apex Court in the hereinabove extracted
order, had but in appropriate deserving cases, permitted the State to
implement the policy decision contained in the circular dated 26.10.2007,
thereby when excepting, the appropriate deserving cases, thus the
thereunders contemplated development activities, thus become enjoined to
become undertaken in the periphery of Chandigarh, rather only by the
Government or through its agencies. Resultantly, unless the instant case was
an appropriate deserving case therebys in terms of the circular (supra), the
undertakings of developmental activity in the periphery of Chandigarh, thus
by the Government or by its agencies, is to be construed to be a validly
undertaken or a validly executable developmental activity.
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11. Though the petitioner society claims, that its case for releasing
the subject lands from acquisition, though was a deserving case, yet the
merit of its claim for releasing the subject lands has been untenably ousted.
12. The above argument becomes rested on the ground, that to other
societies the respondent concerned, releasing their plots from acquisition
whereas, vis-a-vis the petitioner society such orders for release becoming not
made. Therefore, it is argued, that thereby the respondent concerned, has
practised invidious discrimination against the present petitioner.
13. However, the above argument is rudderless, as a reading of the
impugned order discloses, that the releases of lands as made to the other
society(ies) was in fact made to those society(ies), and/or to its members, but
only pursuant to the developmental works becoming completed in the zone,
or the area concerned. Consequently, since therebys the said allotments
were made to those society(ies) but only after completion of developmental
activities on the acquired lands. Consequently, the petitioner society cannot
be construed to be at par with the making of allotments of lands, rather to
those society(ies), whereovers complete developmental activities were made,
but after the completion of acquisition proceedings. The said allotments, as
such can not be construed to be releases to such allottees, nor thereby the
petitioner society can claim any parity with such allotments made to the
society(ies) concerned, but after completion of developmental activities
thereovers, and, that too after completion of unimpugned acquisition
proceedings.
14. The learned senior counsel for the petitioner, has vehemently
argued before this Court, that when the petitioner housing society would also
be raising dwelling units over the subject lands, and, especially when the
purpose of acquisition is similar to the said purpose for which the society
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has been created. Resultantly, he contends, that since thereby when there is
no deviation from the public purpose, as stated in the acquisition
notification. In sequel, the petitioner society has a legitimate expectation
qua the subject lands being not acquired, and/or upon their acquisition, thus
the subject lands being ordered to be released from acquisition.
15. The above argument also does not find any favour from this
Court, and, is hereby rejected. The reason being, that unless there was a
validly accorded licence to the petitioner society to raise a housing colony
on the acquired lands, thereupon no construction was amenable to be raised
thereons. It is apparent on a reading of the reply on affidavit, furnished to
the instant petition, that though the petitioner society had applied on
23.1.1995, thus for the grant of licence to it, but the said application became
rejected, rather on the ground, that the licence to construct was asked to be
made in respect of the land, which was covered by the circular (supra),
whereunders, there is an interdiction against the raising of construction in
the Chandigarh periphery, excepting by the State Government or through its
agencies. Enigmatically, the said rejection order made on the petitioner's
application for grant of licence to it for making constructions over the
subject lands, has remained unchallenged, thereby it acquires conclusivity.
Therefore, the petitioner society is estopped to claim, that yet it be granted
licence for therebys constructions being validly raised over the subject lands.
16. Be that as it may, the petitioner society also applied for the
grant of a fresh licence on 11.1.2001, but since the above said notification
for acquisition became issued under Section 4 of the Act of 1894, and, when
at the said phase, there was a complete vestment of right, title and interest in
the acquiring authority concerned. Resultantly, the said application was
required to be rejected, and, or was required not to be considered.
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Necessarily for the reason, that in case the said licence became granted
therebys the undertakings of development of the area, whereins, the said
lands fell, when is to be undertaken solitarily by the State Government or its
agencies, rather would become forestalled. The further sequel thereof, is
that, the petitioner cannot seek to oust the power of eminent domain vested
in the acquiring authority, thus on the premise, that the petitioner society has
a purported holistic objective to raise a residential colony on the subject
lands, thus for its members becoming housed in the dwelling units which
become constructed thereons.
17. The purported limitation on the above said power of lawful
releases, as becomes created in the instant case, through the circular (supra),
but when the said circular is made with a profound contemplation to subject
the petition lands to acquisition so as to achieve salutary purpose of ensuring
curbing density of urban development in the zone concerned, especially
when the subject lands fall around the catchment periphery near Sukhna
Lake. Therefore, it appears, that the above profound contemplation when is
intended to be furthered or is intended to be fully activated, thus through the
apposite development activities becoming undertaken by the State
Government or its agencies. Contrarily, the said salutary purpose rather
would remain under a dire threat, in case the developmental activities are
permitted to be carried by the non-government agencies, as the present
petitioner society(ies) are. Consequently, for furthering the salutary purpose
(supra), the circular has been issued. Resultantly, when the petitioner society
may choose to make brazen constructions over the subject lands, thereby
when may defeat the larger public interest of low density urban development
taking place around the periphery near Sukhna Lake, whereins, the subject
lands exist. Consequently, to avoid environmental degradation, besides to
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promote a friendly ambience around Sukhna Lake, the denial of licence to
the petitioner society, and/or to bring the subject lands to acquisition does
not suffer from any vice of arbitrariness or discrimination, nor the power of
eminent domain becomes exercised arbitrarily.
18. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in its judgment rendered in
"Bannari Amman Sugars Ltd. V/s Commercial Tax Officer and others",
2005(1) SCC 625, has held that though it is now firmly established that the
Government can change its policy at any time, in public interest, which must
override private interest, however, withdrawal of representation or promise,
which induced a person to change his position to his disadvantage, must not
be arbitrary and unreasonable and must satisfy the requirement of Articles
14 and 19 of the Constitution. It has also been held that in order to determine
the reasonableness of the change of a policy, the Court will see:-
(i) whether there is any unfairness involved;
(ii) the nature of the right alleged to have been infringed;
(iii) the underlying purpose of the restriction imposed;
(iv) the extent and urgency of the evil sought to be remedied
thereby,
(v) the disproportion of the imposition,
(vi) the prevailing condition at the relevant time enter into
judicial verdict.
In this judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has also held that
the reasonableness of the legitimate expectation has to be determined with
respect to the circumstances. The relevant paragraphs of the judgment are
reproduced hereinafter:-
"16. If the State acts within the bounds of reasonableness, it would
be legitimate to take into consideration the national priorities and
adopt trade policies. As noted above, the ultimate test is whether on
the touchstone of reasonableness the policy decision comes out
unscathed.
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17. Reasonableness of restriction is to be determined in an objective
manner and from the standpoint of interests of the general public
and not from the standpoint of the interests of persons upon whom
the restrictions have been imposed or upon abstract consideration. A
restriction cannot be said to be unreasonable merely because in a
given case, it operates harshly. In determining whether there is any
unfairness involved the nature of the right alleged to have taken
infringed, the underlying purpose of the restriction imposed, the
extent and urgency of the evil sought to be remedied thereby, the
disproportion of the imposition, the prevailing condition at the
relevant time enter into judicial verdict, the reasonableness of the
legitimate expectation has to be determined with respect to the
circumstances relating to the trade or business in question.
Canalisation of a particular business in favour of even a specified
individual is reasonable where the interests of the country are
concerned or where the business affects the economy of the country.
XX XX XX
19. In order to invoke the doctrine of promissory estoppel clear,
sound and positive foundation must be laid in the petition itself by
the party invoking the doctrine and bald expressions without any
supporting material to the effect that the doctrine is attracted
because the party invoking the doctrine has altered its position
relying on the assurance of the Government would not be sufficient
to press into aid the doctrine. The Courts are bound to consider all
aspects including the results sought to be achieved and the public
good at large, because while considering the applicability of the
doctrine, the Courts have to do equity and the fundamental
principles of equity must for ever be present in the mind of the
Court.
20. In Shrijee Sales Corporation and Anr. v. Union of India, 1897
(3) SCC 398) it was observed that once public interest is accepted as
the superior equity which can override individual equity the
principle would be applicable even in cases where a period has been
indicated for operation of the promise. If there is a supervening
public equity, the Government would be allowed to change its stand
and has the power to withdraw from representation made by it
which induced persons to take certain steps which may have gone
adverse to the interest of such persons on account of such
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withdrawal. Moreover, the Government is competent to rescind from
the promise even if there is no manifest public interest involved,
provided no one is put in any adverse situation which cannot be
rectified. Similar view was expressed in Pawan Alloys and Casting
Pvt. Ltd. Meerut etc. v. U.P. State Electricity Board and Others
(AIR 1997 Supreme Court 3810) and in Sales Tax Officer and
Anr. v. Shree Durga Oil Mills and Anr., 1998 (1) SCC 573), it was
further held that the Government could change its industrial policy if
the situation so warranted and merely because the resolution was
announced for a particular period, it did not mean that the
government could not amend and change the policy under any
circumstances. If the party claiming application of the doctrine
acted on the basis of a notification it should have known that such
notification was liable to be amended or rescinded at any point of
time, if the government felt that it was necessary to do so in public
interest."
19. From the hereinabove extracted paragraphs, it becomes amply
clear that even the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that if there is a
supervening public equity, the Government would be allowed to change its
stand and has the power to withdraw from any representation as made by it.
20. A Larger Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in its judgment
drawn upon Writ Petition Nos.151, 152, 153, 176 to 182, 186 to 189 and
198 of 1971 and Civil Appeal Nos.1398, 1416 and 1417 of 1972, Decided
on: 18.09.1973, titled as "State of Kerala and another V/s The Gwalior
Rayon Silk Mfg. (Wvg.) Co. Ltd. etc.", has held that any agreement between
a private individual and the government does not create estoppel upon the
latter to exercise its executive power. The relevant paragraph of the
judgment (supra) reads as under:-
"23. Mr. Menon who appeared for the respondent in Civil Appeal
No. 1398/72 put forward a plea of equitable estoppel peculiar to his
client company. It appears that the Company established itself in
Kerala for the production of rayon cloth pulp on an understanding
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that the Government would bind itself to supply the raw material.
Later Government was unable to supply the material and by an
agreement undertook not to legislate for the acquisition of private
forests for a period of 60 years if the Company purchased forest
lands for the purpose of its supply of raw-materials. Accordingly, the
Company purchased 30,000 acres of private forests from the
Nilambhuri Govila Kannan estate for Rs. 75/- lakhs and, therefore,
it was argued that, so far as the company is concerned, the
agreement not to legislate should operate as equitable estoppel
against the States. We do not see how an agreement of the
Government can preclude legislation on the subject. The High Court
has rightly pointed out that the surrender by the Government of its
legislative powers to be used for pubic good cannot avail the
company or operate against the Government as equitable estoppel."
21. In the present case, there is no wrangle that the petitioner(s) has
not been granted any NOC/CLU/Licence by the respondent-State or its
instrumentality, whereas grants thereof may debar the respondent-State to
exercise its power of eminent domain. Even otherwise also, a Division
Bench of this Court, in its judgment rendered in case of Laxmi Educational
Society (Supra), has categorically held that the grant, if any, of
NOC/CLU/Licence/any other permission would not grant any immunity to
the land, for all times to come, from its acquisition being made by the State,
especially when it is required for a public purpose, as private interests are to
succumb to the larger public interest. Resultantly, therebys the circular
(supra) prevails over or predominates over the individualistic interest of the
petitioner society. In sequel, any purported legitimate expectation of the
petitioner society, to thus claim the same on its mere registration, and,
without any building licence being granted to it, rather has to succumb to the
supervening public equity, which has been created through the circular (supra).
22. Likewise, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has also, in case of State
of Haryana V/s Vinod Oil and General Mills (Supra), held that even the
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grant of CLU/Licence will not operate as an estoppel for the State to acquire
the land for the public purpose. The relevant paragraph of the judgment
(supra) is extracted hereinafter:-
"8. Permission for change of land use and developing the area as an
industry, in our view, has no relevance while considering the validity
of acquisition. If we are to hold that once permission is granted for
change of land use for developing the area as an industry and
thereafter State cannot acquire it, then a situation may arise that
for all time to come, the particular area cannot be acquired which
may not be in the larger public interest. We are also unable to
agree with the view taken by the High Court that the action of the
respondents/State in approving setting up of a factory and then
acquiring the same is unreasonable. It is not as if the lands where
factories are set up are immune from any acquisition. The only
effect of permission for such change in land use and approval for
construction and developing the area as an industry can be
recognized as valid only to the extent as to confer right upon the
land owners to recover the appropriate compensation.
9. The land was acquired for development and utilization of the
same for residential and commercial purposes in Sector 9 & 11,
Hissar. So far as the purpose of acquisition of land is concerned, the
High Court observed that "the acquisition is not for essential public
services such as development of infrastructure, railways, metro or
the purpose related thereto, irrigation, water supply, drainage, road,
communication etc.....". High Court was not correct in observing
that only development of infrastructure, railways or irrigation, water
supply, drainage, road etc. are primary public purposes. Public
purpose includes a purpose involving general interest of community
as opposed to the interest of an individual directly or indirectly
involved. Individual interest must give way to public interest as far
as public purpose in respect of acquisition of land is concerned."
23. In view of the hereinabove extracted legal propositions, as also
the facts and circumstances discussed hereinabove, it can be easily
concluded that the exercising of the power of eminent domain by the
respondent-State, was thus to achieve a larger public interest, whereupon it
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rather enjoys precedence over any legitimate expectation, as allegedly
created in favour of a private individual.
The reasons for declining the relief relating to make a lapsing
declaration in terms of Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation
and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and
Resettlement Act, 2013 (for short 'the Act of 2013').
24. In case titled "State of Bihar and Ors. V/s Project Uchcha
Vidya, Sikshak Sangh and Ors.", (2006) 2 Supreme Court Cases 545, the
Hon'ble Supreme Court has categorically held that the rule of estoppel has
no application where recourses are made to unchallenged constitutional
provisions or an unchallenged statute. Consequently, when the circular
(supra) has not been quashed, and, set aside, therefore its mandate is
required to be enforced as such. Resultantly, therebys the order rejecting the
petitioner's licence is a validly made order, besides therebys the exercisings
of power of eminent domain by the acquiring authority is infused with
legality. The relevant paragraph of case (supra) is reproduced hereinafter:-
"77. We do not find any merit in the contention raised by the learned
counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents that the principle of
equitable estoppel would apply against the State of Bihar. It is now
well known, the rule of estoppel has no application where contention
as regards a constitutional provision or a statute is raised. The right
of the State to raise a question as regards its actions being invalid
under the constitutional scheme of India is now well recognized. If
by reason of a constitutional provision, its action cannot be
supported or the State intends to withdraw or modify a policy
decision, no exception thereto can be taken. It is, however, one thing
to say that such an action is required to be judged having regard to
the fundamental rights of a citizen but it is another thing to say that
by applying the rule of estoppel, the State would not be permitted to
raise the said question at all. So far as the impugned circular dated
18.02.1989 is concerned, the State has, in our opinion, a right to
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support the validity thereof in terms of the constitutional
framework."
25. Insofar as the reliance placed by the learned counsel for the
petitioner(s) upon Navjyoti Co-op. Group Housing Society (Supra), to
substantiate his argument(s), is concerned, the same appears to be a
misplaced reliance, as this judgment in fact supports the view adopted by
this Court. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in Navjyoti's case (Supra), has held
that the petitioner(s)-Housing Society was entitled to 'legitimate
expectation' for therebys its making an insistence upon the respondent
concerned, to consistently follow the past practice in the matter of allotment.
It has been further held that the doctrine of 'legitimate expectation' imposes
a duty on public authority to act fairly by taking into consideration all
relevant factors relating to such 'legitimate expectation'. However, the
Hon'ble Apex Court on its finding thereins, that there was no tangible
compelling reason with the respondent therein to alter its procedures,
therebys in the decision (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court favourably applied
vis-a-vis the petitioner therein the doctrine of 'legitimate expectation'. The
relevant paragraph of the judgment (supra) reads as under:-
"16. It may be indicated here that the doctrine of 'legitimate
expectation' imposes in essence a duty on public authority to act
fairly by taking into consideration all relevant factors relating to
such 'legitimate expectation'. Within the conspectus of fair dealing in
case of 'legitimate expectation', the reasonable opportunities to
make representation by the parties likely to be affected by any
change of consistent past policy, come in. We, have not been shown
any compelling reasons taken into consideration by the Central
Government to make a departure from the existing policy of
allotment with reference to seniority in Registration by introducing a
new guideline. On the contrary, Mr. Jaitley the learned Counsel has
submitted that the DDA and/or Central Government do not intend to
challenge the decision of the High Court and the impugned
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memorandum of January 20, 1990 has since been withdrawn. We
therefore feel that in the facts of the case it was only desirable that
before introducing or implementing any change in the guideline for
allotment, an opportunity to make representations against the
proposed change in the guideline should have been given to the
registered Group Housing Societies, if necessary, by way of a public
notice."
26. However, the ratio of law laid down in judgment (supra) is not
applicable vis-a-vis the present petitioner, as reiteratedly, neither 'legitimate
expectation' thus for reasons (supra), becomes aroused vis-a-vis the
petitioner, neither the act of the respondent-State, as comprised in its well
exercising the power of eminent domain, thus is arbitrary nor is
unreasonable, rather it is aimed at accomplishing the requisite public
purpose as becomes embodied in the apposite circular.
27. The further reliance placed by the learned counsel for the
petitioner(s), upon the case of Food Corporation of India (Supra), is also a
misconceived reliance, as therein also, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held
that legitimate expectation is a relevant factor, thus requiring adequate
consideration for facilitating a fair decision-making process. Whether the
expectation of the claimant is reasonable or legitimate in the relevant
context, is a question of fact in each case and this question has to be
determined not according to the claimant's perception but in larger public
interest. The relevant paragraph of the judgment (supra) is extracted
hereinafter:-
"8. The mere reasonable or legitimate expectation of a citizen, in
such a situation, may not by itself be a distinct enforceable right, but
failure to consider and give due weight to it may render the decision
arbitrary, and this is how the requirement of due consideration of a
legitimate expectation forms part of the principle of non-
arbitrariness, a necessary concomitant of the rule of law. Every
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legitimate expectation is a relevant factor requiring due
consideration in a fair decision making process. Whether the
expectation of the claimant is reasonable or legitimate in the context
is a question of fact in each case. Whenever the question arises, it is
to be determined not according to the claimant's perception but in
larger public interest wherein other more important considerations
may outweigh what would otherwise have been the legitimate
expectation of the claimant. A bona fide decision of the public
authority reached in this manner would satisfy the requirement of
non-arbitrariness and withstand judicial scrutiny. The doctrine of
legitimate expectation gets assimilated in the rule of law and
operates in our legal system in this manner and to this extent."
28. Now, insofar as the other argument(s), as raised by the learned
senior counsel for the petitioner is concerned, which pertains to petitioner
being entitled for release of land, as an application was made by it for grant
of licence, which however became wrongly rejected, despite its being well
entitled for grant of licence, but also deserves rejection. The reason for
rejecting the said argument is embedded in the factum, that since the order,
thus declining the petitioner's application for licence to build remained
unchallenged, thereby it acquires conclusivity. Furthermore, also on the
ground, that the apposite fresh application was well rejected on the premise,
that it was made as a guise to challenge the launching of acquisition
proceedings. Since at that stage, there is complete vestment of right, title
and interest in the acquiring authority concerned, over the subject lands.
Therefore, the non consideration or rejection of the said application, as
became made post the launching of the acquisition proceedings, is to be
deemed to be flawless.
29. Moreover, since it is also informed to this Court by the learned
counsel for the respondent(s) that no land, as brought to acquisition through
the impugned acquisition proceedings, has been released, on account of
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grant of licence. Therefore, the petitioner cannot even plead any perpetration
of discrimination vis-a-vis them.
30. The petition land(s) is an inevitable and insegregable
component of the layout plan and this aspect has been considered even by
the High Powered Committee, as is evident from the order dated 21.10.2014.
Therefore too, consequently, this Court does not deem it fit and appropriate
to, merely for the benefit of the petitioner, make any untenable tinkerings
with the layout plan, which is meant to subserve a public purpose.
31. Reiteratedly, the plea of discrimination, as raised by the
petitioner thus purportedly founded on the ground that it becomes well
leveraged from the allotments being made to certain societies, rather
deserves rejection. The reason being that the allotments, as made to certain
societies were after complete developmental activities taking place there,
and, that too after the lawful conclusion of unimpugned acquisition
proceedings. Resultantly, therebys the present petitioner cannot claim parity
with the said societies. Consequently, the plea of discrimination, as raised by
the learned counsel for the petitioner does not warrant any attention, as
evidently therebys there occurs no discrimination, vis-a-vis, the petitioner.
32. The learned senior counsel for the petitioner has claimed that
the impugned acquisition proceedings be declared to become lapsed, as no
award has been passed within the statutory period, as prescribed under
Section 11 of the Act of 1894. It has been further argued that since there was
status quo operating only qua possession, therefore, there was no restraint
upon the acquiring authority concerned to pass an award pursuant to
issuance of declaration under Section 6 of the Act of 1894, and that too,
within the period prescribed for the making of an award.
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33. Before adjudicating the above made argument, it would be
relevant to, at this juncture, make a survey of the provisions, as enclosed in
Section 11-A of the Act of 1894, which is extracted hereinafter:-
[11A. Period shall be which an award within made.- The Collector
shall make an award under section 11 within a period of two years
from the date of the publication of the declaration and if no award is
made within that period, the entire proceeding for the acquisition of
the land shall lapse:
Provided that in a case where the said declaration has been
published before the commencement of the Land Acquisition
(Amendment) Act, 1984 (68 of 1984), the award shall be made
within a period of two years from such commencement.
Explanation- In computing the period of two years referred to in this
section, the period during which any action or proceeding to be
taken in pursuance of the said declaration is stayed by an order of a
Court shall be excluded.]
34. A bare glance at the explanation, as attached to the hereinabove
extracted Section, makes it graphically clear that for the purpose of
computing two years, such period shall be excluded, during which any
action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of declaration, is stayed by
order of Court.
35. As elaborated hereinabove, the declaration under Section 6 was
issued on 15.03.2000. In CWP-6357-2000, which was a part of a set of
several writ petitions, this Court had passed an interim order on 22.5.2000 to
maintain status-quo. The writ petition (supra) was finally disposed of, vide a
common order dated 12.8.2011, as passed in lead petition of said bunch, i.e.
CWP-12848-2000, titled as "Jasbir Singh Siali Vs. The State of Haryana and
others", whereby, a direction was issued upon the State/High Powered
Committee concerned, to decide the claim of the petitioner(s) therein,
besides a direction was also made to maintain status quo regarding
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possession of land, till communication of said decision to the High Powered
Committee and 15 days thereafter.
36. Accordingly, the High Powered Committee, as constituted,
considered the representation(s) of all concerned and passed a detailed order
on 21.10.2014, thereby declining the relief(s), as asked by the concerned.
Since the declining order caused pain to the landowner(s) concerned, thus
they approached this Court through filing the writ petition at hand
whereupon, on 4.12.2014, a direction was made to the parties concerned to
maintain status quo.
37. Therefore, the status quo order against dispossession, and, the
directions made to the High Powered Committee to consider the
representation(s) of the landlooser(s) concerned, especially the said phase
during which the representation(s) were subjudice before the authority
concerned, did all well restrain the acquiring authority concerned to, within
the limitation period prescribed in Section 11 of the Act of 1894, thus make
an award under Section 11 of the Act of 1894. Consequently, the above
phase, whereby, the respondent(s) was precluded to draw an award, did
naturally fall within the domain of the explanation, as attached to Section
11-A of the Act of 1894, rather for computing the statutory period of two
years for the passing of an award. Since immediately post the making of
rejection order by the High Powered Committee, the instant petition was
filed and thereon, on 4.12.2014, yet again the parties were directed to
maintain status quo with respect to the petition land(s). Therefore, when the
validity of the rejection order was under consideration, thereby too, even
during the said phase, the respondent(s) concerned could be well construed
to become ably deterred to make an award within the period of limitation, as
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prescribed under Section 11 of the Act of 1894.
38. In "Faizabad-Ayodhya Development Authority, Faizabad V/s
Dr. Rajesh Kumar Pandey & Ors.", Civil Appeal No.2915 of 2022, it has
been declared that when no award under Section 11 is passed after issuance
of a declaration under Section 6 of the Act of 1894, owing to pendency of
any proceeding and/or interim stay granted, therebys the landowners shall
not be entitled to compensation under Section 24(1) of the Act of 2013.
Consequently, the era of pendency of the instant writ petition(s) before this
Court, purportedly against the rejection order made by the High Powered
Committee, did during that era, thus well preclude the authority concerned to
make an award. Therefore, an interim stay, passed thereins, even if it was a
stay against dispossession, rather makes the said fact to be construable to be
a well made deterrence upon the acquiring authority against its passing an
award under Section 11 of the Act of 1894. In sequel, the said period is to be
excluded, in terms of the explanation attached to Section 11-A of the Act of
1894, besides in terms of the judgment (supra), from making the relevant
computation, therebys also there is no entitlement endowed to the
petitioner(s) to claim compensation under Section 24(1) of the Act of 2013.
39. Moreover, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in its judgment rendered
in Yusufbhai Noormohmed Nendoliya's case (Supra) has also held that the
explanation to Section 11-A is couched in the widest possible terms and
there is no warrant for limiting the signification of the coinages, as occur in
the explanation, thus to actions or proceedings, but only preceding the
making of the award under Section 11. Contrarily, the signification of the
statutory coinage (supra) also extends to the stage of passing of an award.
Therefore, when during the phase of status quo, as became granted by this
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Court, therebys an embargo became foisted, upon the acquiring authority
concerned, from taking possession of the land, and, therefore, such period
has to be excluded while computing the statutory period of two years for the
making of an award, since the making of a declaration under Section 6 of the
Act of 1894. The reason being that the amplitude of the significations of the
statutory coinage (supra) extends to, besides infuses an order of status quo or
against dispossession, thus with the elemental vigour qua therebys a well
restraint being caused against the passing of an award under Section 11 of
the Act of 1894.
40. The law laid down in judgment (supra) was reiterated and re-
affirmed by a Three Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, while
drawing a judgment in case titled as "State of Maharashtra Vs. Moti Ratan
Estate" (Supra), wherein, it has been held that:-
"7.5 On considering catena of decisions of this Court, referred to
hereinabove, the following propositions of law can be culled out:
(i) when the scheme of the acquisition is one, interim stay granted in
respect of one pocket of land would operate even with respect to
other pockets of land and in such a situation the authorities are
justified in not proceeding with the acquisition proceedings and
therefore the acquisition proceedings would not lapse;
(ii) interim order of stay granted in respect of one of the land owners
would have a complete restraint for the authorities to proceed
further;
(iii) when the stay has been granted in one matter and where the
scheme was one, the authorities were justified to stay their hands;
(iv) the extended meaning of the words "stay of the action or
proceedings under Section 11A of the Act" would mean that any
interim effective order passed by the court which may come in the
way of the authorities to proceed further;
(v) Explanation to Section 11A of the Act is in the widest possible
terms and there is no warrant for limiting the action or proceedings,
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referred to in the explanation, to actions or proceedings preceding
the making of the award under Section 11 of the Act and therefore
the period of injunction obtained by the land holders staying the
acquisition and authorities from taking possession of the land has to
be excluded in computing the period of two years."
41. Furthermore, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in case titled as
"Faizabad-Ayodhya Development Authority, Faizabad V/s Dr. Rajesh
Kumar Pandey & Ors.", has again considered this issue and while relying
upon various propositions of law, held that in case, where on the date of
commencement of the Act of 2013, no award under Section 11 is passed
after the makings of the apposite declaration, thus owing to pendency of any
proceeding and/or interim stay granted by the court, thereby such landlord
shall not be entitled to compensation under Section 24(1) of the Act of 2013,
rather shall be entitled to compensation only under the Act of 1894.
Therefore, in view of the exposition, as made therein and as relates to
pendency of any proceeding, comprising a well deterrence upon the
acquiring authority to make an award under Section 11 of the Act of 1894.
Consequently, thereby too, all throughout, when the order qua status quo,
and, the order qua status quo, qua against dispossession were in force,
therebys there was a well made restraint upon the authority concerned to
pass an award under Section 11 of the Act of 1894. Resultantly, the said
period has to be excluded for computing the relevant period of limitation.
42. In the above referred judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has
also relied upon a decision rendered by it in the case of "State of Gujarat
Vs. Essar Oil Ltd.," 2012 (3) SCC 522, wherein, it has been observed that
the principle of restitution is a remedy against unjust enrichment or unjust
benefit. The relevant extract of the judgment rendered in Faizabad-Ayodhya
Development Authority's case (supra) is reproduced hereinafter:-
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"15. In the case of Indore Development Authority (supra), even this
Court applied the principle of restitution. It is observed that the
principle of restitution is founded on the ideal of doing complete
justice at the end of litigation, and parties have to be placed in the
same position but for the litigation and interim order, if any, passed
in the matter. Applying the principle of restitution, it is further
observed that no party could take advantage of a litigation. It is
further observed and held that the principle of restitution is a
statutory recognition of the rule of justice, equity and fair play. The
court has inherent jurisdiction to order restitution so as to do
complete justice. This is also on the principle that an unsuccessful
litigant who had the benefit of an interim order in his favour cannot
encash or take advantage of the same on the enforcement of the Act,
2013 by initially stalling the acquisition process and later seeking a
higher compensation under the provisions of Act, 2013. We say so
for the reason that if at the instance of a landowner, who has
challenged the acquisition, an interim order has been passed by a
Court is successful then the proceeding of acquisition or the
acquisition notification would be quashed. Then there would be no
occasion to determine any compensation. But on the other hand, if a
landowner, who has the benefit of an interim order in his favour
whilst a challenge is made to the acquisition, is unsuccessful, he
cannot then contend that he must be paid compensation under the
provision of the Act, 2013 on its enforcement, whereas a landowner,
who did not have the benefit of any interim order is paid
compensation determined under the provisions of the Act, 1894,
which is lesser than what would be computed under the Act, 2013.
15.1 Following the decision of this Court in the case of State of
Gujarat Vs. Essar Oil Ltd., (2012) 3 SCC 522, it is observed that the
principle of restitution is a remedy against unjust enrichment or
unjust benefit. Following the decision of this Court in the case of A.
Shanmugam Vs. Ariya Kshatriya Rajakula Vamsathu Madalaya
Nandhavana Paripalanai Sangam, (2012) 6 SCC 430, it is observed
that the restitutionary jurisdiction is inherent in every court, to
neutralise the advantage of litigation. A person on the right side of
the law should not be deprived, on account of the effects of
litigation; the wrongful gain of frivolous litigation has to be
eliminated if the faith of people in the judiciary has to be sustained.
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XXXXXXXX
17. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, it is
observed as under:-
(i) It is concluded and held that in a case where on the date of
commencement of Right to Fair Compensation and
Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and
Resettlement Act, 2013, no award has been declared under
Section 11 of the Act, 1894, due to the pendency of any
proceedings and/or the interim stay granted by the Court,
such landowners shall not be entitled to the compensation
under Section 24(1) of the Act, 2013 and they shall be entitled
to the compensation only under the Act, 1894.
18. In view of the above discussion and for the reasons stated above
and in view of our conclusion above, all these appeals are allowed.
The impugned judgment(s) and order(s) passed by the High Court
are quashed and set aside. The concerned appropriate Authority(s)
to declare the award under Section 11 of the Act, 1894 with respect
to the lands in question and determine the compensation under the
provisions of the Act, 1894 by taking into consideration Section 114
of the Act, 2013 read with Section 6 of the General Clauses Act,
1897, wherever applicable and the original landowners shall be
paid the compensation accordingly, under the provisions of the Act,
1894."
43. Moreover, in the judgment (supra), following observations were
summarized:-
"(i) The time of five years is provided to the authorities to take
action, not to sleep over the matter;
(ii) Only in cases of lethargy or inaction and default on the part of
the authorities and for no other reason lapse of acquisition can
occur;
(iii) Lapse of acquisition takes place only in case of default by the
authorities acquiring the land, not caused by any other reason or
order of the court;
(iv) The additional compensation @ 12% provided under Section 69
of the Act, 2013 has been excluded from the period acquisition
proceedings have been held up on account of the interim injunction
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order of any court;
(v) If it was not possible for the acquiring authorities, for any reason
not attributable to them or the Government, to take requisite steps,
the period has to be excluded;
(vi) In case the authorities are prevented by the court's order,
obviously, as per the interpretation of the provisions such period has
to be excluded;
(vii) The intent of the Act, 2013 is not to benefit landowners only.
The provisions of Section 24 by itself do not intend to confer benefits
on litigating parties as such, while as per Section 114 of the Act,
2013 and Section 6 of the General Clauses Act the case has to be
litigated as per the provisions of the Act, 1894.
(viii) It is not the intendment of the Act, 2013 that those who have
assailed the acquisition process should get benefits of higher
compensation as contemplated under Section 24;
(ix) It is not intended by the provisions that in case, the persons, who
have litigated and have obtained interim orders from the Civil
Courts by filing suits or from the High Court under Article 226 of
the Constitution should have the benefits of the provisions of the Act,
2013 except to the extent specifically provided under the Act, 2013;
(x) In cases where some landowners have chosen to take recourse to
litigation and have obtained interim orders restraining taking of
possession or orders of status quo, as a matter of practical reality it
is not possible for the authorities or the Government to take
possession or to make payment of compensation to the landowners.
In several instances, such interim orders also have impeded the
making of an award;
(xi) However, so far as awards are concerned, the period provided
for making of awards under the Act, 2013 (sic 1894 Act) could be
excluded by virtue of Explanation to Section 11-A, which provided
that in computing the period of two years, the period during which
any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the declaration
is stayed by an order of a court shall be excluded;
(xii) The litigation initiated by the landowners has to be decided on
its own merits and the benefits of Section 24(2) should not be
available to the litigants in a straitjacket manner. In case there is no
interim order, they can get the benefits they are entitled to, not
otherwise. Delays and dilatory tactics and sometimes wholly
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frivolous pleas cannot result in benefitting the landowners under
sub-section (1) of Section 24 of the Act, 2013;
(xiii) Any type of order passed by this Court would inhibit action on
the part of the authorities to proceed further, when a challenge to
acquisition is pending;
(xiv) Interim order of stay granted in one of the matters of the
landowners would cause a complete restraint on the authorities to
proceed further to issue declaration;
(xv) When the authorities are disabled from performing duties due to
impossibility, it would be a sufficient excuse for them to save them
from rigour of provisions of Section 24. A litigant may have a good
or a bad cause, be right or wrong. But he cannot be permitted to
take advantage of a situation created by him by way of an interim
order passed in his favour by the Court at his instance. Although
provision of Section 24 does not discriminate between landowners,
who are litigants or non-litigants and treat them differently with
respect to the same acquisition, it is necessary to view all of them
from the stand point of the intention of the Parliament. Otherwise,
anomalous results may occur and provisions may become
discriminatory in itself;
(xvi) The law does not expect the performance of the impossible;
(xvii) An act of the court shall prejudice no man;
(xviii) A party prevented from doing an act by certain circumstances
beyond his control can do so at the first subsequent opportunity;
(xix) When there is a disability to perform a part of the law, such a
charge has to be excused. When performance of the formalities
prescribed by a statute is rendered impossible by circumstances
over which the persons concerned have no control, it has to be taken
as a valid excuse;
(xx) The Court can under its inherent jurisdiction ex debito justitiae
has a duty to mitigate the damage suffered by the defendants by the
act of the Court;
(xxi) No person can suffer from the act of Court and an unfair
advantage of the interim order must be neutralised;
(xxii) No party can be permitted to take shelter under the cover of
Court's order to put the other party in a disadvantageous position;
(xxiii) If one has enjoyed under the Court's cover, that period cannot
be included towards inaction of the authorities to take requisite
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steps under Section 24 as the State authorities would have acted and
passed an award determining compensation but for the Court's
order."
44. Therefore, in view of the ratio decidendi, as laid down by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court and as elaborated hereinabove, when orders of
status quo regarding possession became granted by this Court in favour of
the landowner(s) concerned and they have been reaping fruits of the said
order, therebys now such landowner(s) concerned, cannot alter their stand,
and, use the said status quo order qua status quo of possession, as a leverage
for its claiming a relief, that the instantly launched acquisition proceedings
be declared to become lapsed, on account of non passing of an award within
the period of limitation prescribed under Section 11 of the Act of 1894. In
other words, the petitioners cannot approbate and reprobate.
45. Consequently, the arguments as made by the learned senior
counsel for the petitioner, for thereby its seeking release of petition land(s),
thus on the anvil of lapsing provisions, do not carry any vigour, rather are
rejected for the reasons detailed hereinabove.
46. Insofar as the plea of lapsing of impugned acquisition
proceedings, by dint of Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 is concerned, the
same is halfheartedly raised in the instant petition. Moreover, the said issue
is no more res integra, as the Hon'ble Supreme Court has already decided
this issue in its judgment rendered in "Indore Development Authority v.
Manoharlal", 2020 AIR (Supreme Court) 1496, and, in "Faizabad-Ayodhya
Development Authority, Faizabad V/s Dr. Rajesh Kumar Pandey & Ors.",
Civil Appeal No.2915 of 2022. Therefore, this issue warrants no further
adjudication.
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Final Order of this Court.
47. In aftermath, this Court finds no merit in the writ petition, and,
with the above observations, the same is hereby dismissed. The impugned
order is maintained and affirmed.
48. The pending application(s), if any, is/are also disposed of.
(SURESHWAR THAKUR)
JUDGE
(SUKHVINDER KAUR)
JUDGE
April 30th, 2024
Gurpreet
Whether speaking/reasoned : Yes/No
Whether reportable : Yes/No
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