Punjab-Haryana High Court
Gurpreet Singh vs State Of Punjab on 25 April, 2024
Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:056590
CRM-M-19095-2024 -1-
2024:PHHC:056590
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
222 CRM-M-19095-2024
Date of Decision :April 25, 2024
GURPREET SINGH .....Petitioner
VERSUS
STATE OF PUNJAB .....Respondent
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE KULDEEP TIWARI
Present : Mr. Jupinder Pal Singh Brar, Advocate
for the petitioner.
Mr. Akshay Kumar, AAG, Punjab.
KULDEEP TIWARI. J.(Oral)
1. Through the instant petition, the petitioner craves for
indulgence of this Court for his being enlarged on regular bail, in case
FIR No.4, dated 06.01.2024, under Section 379 of the IPC (Sections 382,
411, 201 and 34 IPC, and Section 25/27 of the Arms Act, and Section 27
of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substance Act, 1985, (for short
'NDPS Act,), were added later on), registered at Police Station City
Malout, Disttrict Shri Mukatsar Sahib.
ALLEGATIONS AGAINST THE PETITIONER
2. The instant FIR was registered on a statement by ASI
Kuldeep Singh. The relevant extract of the FIR reads as under:-
"Statement of ASI Kuldeep Singh No. 125/SMS/PCR Giddarbaha
Son of Jarnail Singh, Resident of Street No.11, Patel Nagar, Malout,
aged about 54 years, Mobile No. 80549-23225, stated that I am a
resident of the said address and posted on PCR, Giddarbaha. My
duty shift is from 8.00 AM to 8 PM. On 5.1.2024 at around 8.15 PM,
after finishing my duty shift, I took off my uniform and put on civil
clothes and drank alcohol and got into my car Honda City No.DL-
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7CF-6078 color gray and went to Malout from Gidderbaha. Back at
around 8.45 pm. I arrived at Malout town. I was allotted one pistol
9MM No.18596297 with butt no. 159 from Department of Police,
District Sri Muktsar Sahib on dated 24.11.2002, which the said pistol
9MM having 08 cartridges in its Magazine was in my possession.
After reaching Malout, I went to my friend's house of resident Ekta
Nagar Malout, then we both got into my car and started going to my
rented house which is at Harjinder Nagar Malout via Burjan Road.
When we reached Burjan Gate Malout, my car was suddenly stopped
and at the same time another car Skoda Color Black whose number I
couldn't read came and stopped behind my car in which there was a
sikh youth and three young men whom I asked to push my car, at that
time on the dashboard of my car, my service pistol and my 2 mobile
phone brand Samsung Touch Screen Color Black. In which Sim No.
78142-43886 and Samsung Keypad Color Black with sim no.80549-
23225 and sim no. 94636-47070 were lying. Those unknown youths
pushed my car to start, while pushing the car, those youths saw my
pistol and my mobile phone lying in my car. From that place, they
slowly followed my Skoda Car, when I and my friend reached my
rented house, we got out of the car and started opening the main gate
of the house and after opening the gate. When I looked in my car, my
official pistol and both my mobile phones were not in the car and as
soon as, they left in their car. I have a firm belief that four unknown
youths in that Skoda Car Stole my official pistol body number
18596297, Butt No.159 including 08 cartridges and my mobile
phone Samsung touch screen and Samsung Keypad from my car. I
have been searching for that Skoda Car and the unknown youth on
my own but, so far I have not been able to find anything about them.
I have come to the police station to inform that the Skoda Car
unknown youth should be searched and legal action should be taken.
I have suffered my statement, heard and admitted to be correct."
SUBMISSIONS OF LEARNED COUNSEL FOR THE
PETITIONER
3. In asking for the relief (supra), learned counsel for the
petitioner submits that in fact there was no dope test conducted despite
Section 37 of the NDPS Act, has been invoked.
4. He further submits that there is no iota of allegations, what
to talk about evidence, which could bring the case within the ambit of
Sections 382 and 411 of the IPC.
5. He further submits at the best it is a case of Section 379 IPC,
if at all the case of prosecution treated to be as gospel truth at this stage.
6. He further submits that the petitioner has suffered
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incarceration about more than 3 months, and he is not involved in any
other criminal case.
SUBMISSIONS OF THE LEARNED STATE COUNSEL
7. Per contra, the learned State counsel opposes the asked for
relief of grant of regular bail, and submits that in fact the petitioner and
other co-accused, have stolen the service pistol of the complainant-ASI
Kuldeep Singh, who had asked the petitioner and other co-accused, to
help him to push his case, which unfortunately at the time of occurrence,
had stopped.
8. He further, on instructions imparted to him by police official
concerned, submits that the final report has been presented and the
charges have also been framed by the learned trial Court concerned.
9. He also files a custody certificate qua the petitioner, which is
taken on record, and, it reflects that the petitioner has suffered
incarceration of 3 months and 14 days as on today, and, he is not
involved in any other criminal case.
ANALYSIS
10. "Bail is the Rule and Jail is an Exception". This basic
principle of criminal jurisprudence was laid down by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court, way back in 1978, in its landmark judgment titled "State
of Rajasthan V. Balchand alias Baliay", 1977 AIR 2447, 1978 SCR (1)
535. This principle finds its roots in one of the most distinguished
fundamental rights, as enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution of
India. Though the underlying objective behind detention of a person is to
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ensure easy availability of an accused for trial, without any
inconvenience, however, in case the presence of an accused can be
secured otherwise, then detention is not compulsory.
11. The right to a speedy trial is one of the rights of a detained
person. However, while deciding application for regular bail, the Courts
shall also take into consideration the fundamental precept of criminal
jurisprudence, which is "the presumption of innocence", besides the
gravity of offence(s) involved.
12. In "Nikesh Tarachand Shah V. Union of India", (2018) 11
SCC 1, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has recorded the following:-
"14. In Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab,
(1980) 2 SCC 565 at 586-588, the purpose of granting
bail is set out with great felicity as follows:-
"27. It is not necessary to refer to decisions which
deal with the right to ordinary bail because that right
does not furnish an exact parallel to the right to
anticipatory bail. It is, however, interesting that as
long back as in 1924 it was held by the High Court of
Calcutta in Nagendra v. King-Emperor the object of
bail is to secure the attendance of the accused at the
trial, that the proper test to be applied in the solution
of the question whether bail should be granted or
refused is whether it is probable that the party will
appear to take his trial and that it is indisputable that
bail is not to be withheld as a punishment. In two
other cases which,significantly, are the 'Meerut
Conspiracy cases' observations are to be found
regarding the right to bail which deserve a special
mention. In K.N. Joglekar v. Emperor [AIR 1931 All
504 : 33 Cri LJ 94] it was observed, while dealing
with Section 498 which corresponds to the present
Section 439 of the Code, that it conferred upon the
Sessions Judge or the High Court wide powers to
grant bail which were not handicapped by the
restrictions in the preceding Section 497 which
corresponds to the present Section 437. It was
observed by the court that there was no hard and fast
rule and no inflexible principle governing the exercise
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of the discretion conferred by Section 498 and that the
only principle which was established was that the
discretion should be exercised judiciously. In Emperor
v. Hutchinson [AIR 1931 All 356, 358 : 32 Cri LJ
1271] it was said that it was very unwise to make an
attempt to lay down any particular rules which will
bind the High Court, having regard to the fact that the
legislature itself left the discretion of the court
unfettered. According to the High Court, the variety of
cases that may arise from time to time cannot be safely
classified and it is dangerous to make an attempt to
classify the cases and to say that in particular classes
a bail may be granted but not in other classes. It was
observed that the principle to be deduced from the
various sections in the Criminal Procedure Code was
that grant of bail is the rule and refusal is the
exception. An accused person who enjoys freedom is
in a much better position to look after his case and to
properly defend himself than if he were in custody. As
a presumably innocent person he is therefore entitled
to freedom and every opportunity to look after his own
case. A presumably innocent person must have his
freedom to enable him to establish his innocence.
28. Coming nearer home, it was observed by
Krishna Iyer, J., in Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. Public
Prosecutor [(1978) 1 SCC 240 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 115]
that: (SCC p. 242, para 1)
"... the issue of bail is one of liberty, justice,
public safety and burden of the public treasury, all of
which insist that a developed jurisprudence of bail is
integral to a socially sensitized judicial process. . . .
After all, personal liberty of an accused or convict is
fundamental, suffering lawful eclipse only in terms of
procedure established by law. The last four words of
Article 21 are the life of that human right."
29. In Gurcharan Singh v. State (Delhi
Administration) [(1978) 1 SCC 118 : 1978 SCC (Cri)
41] it was observed by Goswami, J., who spoke for the
court, that: (SCC p. 129, para 29)
"There cannot be an inexorable formula in the
matter of granting bail. The facts and circumstances
of each case will govern the exercise of judicial
discretion in granting or cancelling bail."
30. In AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE (2d, Volume
8, p. 806, para 39), it is stated:
"Where the granting of bail lies within the
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discretion of the court, the granting or denial is
regulated, to a large extent, by the facts and
circumstances of each particular case. Since the
object of the detention or imprisonment of the accused
is to secure his appearance and submission to the
jurisdiction and the judgment of the court, the primary
inquiry is whether a recognizance or bond
would effect that end."
It is thus clear that the question whether to
grant bail or not depends for its answer upon a variety
of circumstances, the cumulative effect of which must
enter into the judicial verdict. Any one single
circumstance cannot be treated as of universal validity
or as necessarily justifying the grant or refusal of
bail."
13. Also, in Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre v. State of
Maharashtra, Criminal Appeal No.2271 of 2010, the Hon'ble Supreme
Court has insisted upon striking a perfect balance of sanctity of an
individual's liberty as well as the interest of the society, in grant or
refusing bail. The relevant extract of the judgment (supra) is reproduced
hereinafter:-
"3. The society has a vital interest in grant or
refusal of bail because every criminal offence is the
offence against the State. The order granting or
refusing bail must reflect perfect balance between the
conflicting interests, namely, sanctity of individual
liberty and the interest of the society. The law of bails
dovetails two conflicting interests namely, on the one
hand, the requirements of shielding the society from
the hazards of those committing crimes and
potentiality of repeating the same crime while on bail
and on the other hand absolute adherence of the
fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence
regarding presumption of innocence of an accused
until he is found guilty and the sanctity of individual
liberty."
14. This Court has examined the instant petition on the
touchstone of the hereinabove extracted settled and legal principle(s) of
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law and is of the considered opinion that the instant petition is amenable
for being allowed.
FINAL ORDER
15. This Court has considered the allegations, and prima facie is
of the view that no offence whatsoever under Section 27 of the NDPS
Act, is made out against the present petitioner, and further after
considering the fact that the petitioner has suffered incarceration of 3
months and 14 days, as on today, and the trial is at the initial stage, this
Court deems it fit and appropriate to grant the concession of regular bail
to the petitioner. Therefore, without commenting upon the merits and
circumstances of the present case, the present petition is allowed. The
petitioner is ordered to be released on bail, on furnishing of bail bond and
surety bond to the satisfaction of concerned Chief Judicial
Magistrate/trial Court/Duty Magistrate.
16. However, it is clarified that if in future, the petitioner is
found indulging in commission of similar offences, as are involved
herein, the respondent-State shall be at liberty to make an appropriate
application seeking cancellation of regular bail, as granted by this Court.
Moreover, anything observed here-in-above shall have no effect on the
merits of the trial and is meant for deciding the present petition only.
17. Nonetheless, at this stage, this Court also takes cognizance
of the fact that the complainant-ASI Kuldeep Singh, who as per his own
version was under the influence of alcohol, was carrying the official
pistol at the date and time of the occurrence, let a copy of this order be
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sent to the Senior Superintendent of Police concerned, for its examination
regarding the conduct the complainant-ASI Kuldeep Singh, and
thereupon take appropriate action.
(KULDEEP TIWARI)
April 25, 2024 JUDGE
dharamvir
Whether speaking/reasoned. : Yes/No
Whether Reportable. : Yes/No
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