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Dr Monika Sachdeva vs State Of Haryana And Ors
2024 Latest Caselaw 8499 P&H

Citation : 2024 Latest Caselaw 8499 P&H
Judgement Date : 23 April, 2024

Punjab-Haryana High Court

Dr Monika Sachdeva vs State Of Haryana And Ors on 23 April, 2024

Author: Harsimran Singh Sethi

Bench: Harsimran Singh Sethi

                                Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:054880



                                          Neutral Citation No.2024:PHHC:054880

      IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT
                     CHANDIGARH

223                                       CWP-8826-2019 (O&M)
                                          Decided on :23.04.2024

DR MONIKA SACHDEVA                                    .PETITIONER

                                        Versus

STATE OF HARYANA AND OTHERS                        . . . RESPONDENTS

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARSIMRAN SINGH SETHI


PRESENT: Mr. Vivek Aggarwal, Advocate for the petitioner.

            Ms. Vibha Tewari, AAG, Haryana.

            Mr. J. S. Dahiya, Advocate
            for respondents No. 4, 17, 18, 24, 27,61,
            66, 87, 88, 101, 104 and 106.

            Mr. R. K. Malik, Senior Advocate with
            Mr. Kartikey Chaudhary, Advocate for respondents No.
            5,10,12,13,16,19 to 23,26,29,30,33,34,36,37,39,40,41,45 to
            49, 51 to 53, 55,56,60,62,63,65,68,70 to 73, 76 to 79, 85,86,87,
            91 to 95, 97 to 99, 102,103, 105, 110 to 116, 118,119 and 120.

            Mr. Chander Pal Tiwana, Advocate for respondents No.
            8, 28, 75, 82.

            Mr.Naveen Kumar, Advocate for respondents No. 15, 25, 38, 58,
            83, 107.

            Ms. Pooja Chhabra, Advocate for
            Mr. Rahul Deswal, Advocate for respondent No. 31.

            Mr. Gaurav Gaur, Advocate for respondent No. 32.
            ****

HARSIMRAN SINGH SETHI , J. (Oral

1. In the present petition, the challenge is to the selection which

has been made on the post of the Female Supervisor as advertised vide

advertisement No. 1 of 2011 dated 19.03.2011 (Annexure P-1).

2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the challenge to

the selection for the post of female supervisor is on the ground that certain

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candidates were not eligible for the post in question keeping in view the

qualification prescribed in the advertisement but they still have been selected

despite the fact that they did not had a graduation degree from recognized

university.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that without

adjudging the eligibility of the candidates, the selection for the post in

question has been made which needs to be set-aside as selecting the

candidates who are ineligible keeping in view the essential qualification

prescribed amounts to injustice for the other eligible candidates.

4. Learned counsel for the respondents on the other hand submits

that all the candidates who have been selected for the post in question fulfill

the requisite qualification prescribed in the advertisement and the claim

raised by the petitioner that the selected candidates were having diploma

rather than the degree is incorrect. Learned counsel for the respondents

further submits that all the candidates selected for the post in question

fulfills the qualification of graduation which is the essential qualification

required as per the advertisement so as to be eligible for the post in question

and it is only by way of preference i.e. the graduation in Home Science or

Child Development or Nutrition which was mentioned in the advertisement

itself, which only came into play in case, two candidates are similarly

situated and one is to be given preference over the other.

5. Learned senior counsel for the private respondents reiterate the

arguments raised on behalf of the respondents-State and submits that not

even a single fact qua the ineligibility of the selected candidates has been

mentioned and in the absence of specific allegation qua the specific selected

candidate, the general allegations cannot be accepted.

6. The learned Senior counsel appearing on behalf of the

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respondents further submits that the selection process for the post in question

was over in the year 2013 whereas, the present petition has been filed in the

year 2019 i.e. after six years, hence, the same is liable to be dismissed on the

ground of delay itself, as, by the time, the present writ petition was filed, the

selected candidates were even confirmed on the post in question.

7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have gone

through the record with their able assistance.

8. It is a conceded position that the present writ petition has been

filed after a period of six years of the selection for the post in question and at

the time when the writ petition was filed, the selected candidates had already

been confirmed by the respondents. As per the judgment of the Hon'ble

Supreme Court of India in Civil Appeal No. 5027 of 2024 titled as Mrinmoy

Maity v. Chhanda Koley and others, decided on 18.04.2024, while

entertaining a writ petition, the question of delay raised on behalf of the

respondents needs to be appreciated with serious view. The delay in raising

the dispute so as to take away the crystallize right, should be taken into

consideration while passing an order in a writ petition. The relevant

paragraph of the said judgment passed in Mrinmoy Maity's case (supra) is as

under:-

"11. For filing of a writ petition, there is no doubt that no fixed

period of limitation is prescribed. However, when the

extraordinary jurisdiction of the writ court is invoked, it has to

be seen as to whether within a reasonable time same has been

invoked and even submitting of memorials would not revive the

dead cause of action or resurrect the cause of action which has

had a natural death. In such circumstances on the ground of

delay and latches alone, the appeal ought to be dismissed or the

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applicant ought to be non-suited. If it is found that the writ

petitioner is guilty of delay and latches, the High Court ought to

dismiss the petition on that sole ground itself, in as much as the

writ courts are not to indulge in permitting such indolent

litigant to take advantage of his own wrong. It is true that there

cannot be any waiver of fundamental right but while exercising

discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226, the High Court will

have to necessarily take into consideration the delay and latches

on the part of the applicant in approaching a writ court. This

Court in the case of Tridip Kumar Dingal v. State of W.B.,

(2009) 1 SCC 768 has held to the following effect:

"56. We are unable to uphold the contention. It is no doubt true

that there can be no waiver of fundamental right. But while

exercising discretionary jurisdiction under Articles 32, 226, 227

or 136 of the Constitution, this Court takes into account certain

factors and one of such considerations is delay and laches on

the part of the applicant in approaching a writ court. It is well

settled that power to issue a writ is discretionary. One of the

grounds for refusing reliefs under Article 32 or 226 of the

Constitution is that the petitioner is guilty of delay and laches.

57. If the petitioner wants to invoke jurisdiction of a writ court,

he should come to the Court at the earliest reasonably possible

opportunity. Inordinate delay in making the motion for a writ

will indeed be a good ground for refusing to exercise such

discretionary jurisdiction. The underlying object of this

principle is not to encourage agitation of stale claims and

exhume matters which have already been disposed of or settled

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or where the rights of third parties have accrued in the

meantime (vide State of M.P. v. Bhailal Bhai [AIR 1964 SC

1006 : (1964) 6 SCR 261], Moon Mills Ltd. v. Industrial

Court [AIR 1967 SC 1450] and Bhoop Singh v. Union of

India [(1992) 3 SCC 136 : (1992) 21 ATC 675 : (1992) 2 SCR

969]). This principle applies even in case of an infringement of

fundamental right (vide Tilokchand Motichand v. H.B.

Munshi [(1969) 1 SCC 110], Durga Prashad v. Chief

Controller of Imports & Exports [(1969) 1 SCC 185]

and Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India [(1970) 1 SCC 84]).

58. There is no upper limit and there is no lower limit as to

when a person can approach a court. The question is one of

discretion and has to be decided on the basis of facts before the

court depending on and varying from case to case. It will

depend upon what the breach of fundamental right and the

remedy claimed are and when and how the delay arose."

9. In the present petition, the challenge to the selection for the post

in question was raised in the year 2019 however, the selection for the post in

question stool finalized in the year 2013. By the time, the selection process

for the post in question was challenged, the selected candidates stood

confirmed on the post in question. It could be a possibility that the certain

candidates might have left other jobs so as to join the present post and setting

aside their appointment after a delay of six years even without the allegations

being proved, will be causing a hardship to them.

10. Even otherwise, on merit, the only ground raised is that the

selected candidates do not fulfill the requisite qualification for appointment

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on the post in question.

11. A bare perusal of the advertisement would show that the

candidates in order to become eligible for the post in question were required

be a graduate from the recognized university. The preference was to be given

to a candidate who is graduate in Home Science or Child Development or

nutrition. Hence, all the candidates who are graduate are eligible to compete

for the post in question. Learned counsel for the petitioner has not been able

to show the detail of any selected candidate who was ineligible as per the

qualification required in the advertisement.

12. At this stage, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that one

candidate, namely, Smt. Neelam, has a diploma done from MDU in the year

2011.

From a bare perusal of the application form of the Neelam in

column No.11 it has been already mentioned that she has done her degree in

BAMS, which makes it clear that she is a graduate. Similarly, with regard to

the grievance being raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner against

one Sudesh, whose application form has been attached at page No. 90 of the

paper book, it may be noticed that as per her application form, she has done

her degree in the year 2011 and in column No. 11, she has mentioned that she

has a bachelor degree in physical education as well, which shows that the

both the candidates namely, Neelam and Sudesh were eligible to compete for

the post in question.

13. Further with regard to the argument of the learned counsel for

the petitioner is that the qualification required for the post in question is

degree in home science or child development or nutrition, the said argument

is incorrect. The essential qualification for the post in question as mentioned

in the advertisement is as under:-

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"(i) Graduation from a recognized university preferably in

Home Science or Child Development or Nutrition.

(ii) Hindi, Sanskrit upto Matric Standard. "

14. A bare perusal of the above would show that the graduation is

the basic qualification and the preference was to be given to the candidates

who have done graduation in home science or child development or

nutrition, which means that the preference is to be given in case, two

candidates are at same footing and only one of them is to be appointed. The

said view being taken by this Court is also supported by the judgment of the

Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in CWP No. 10101 of 2014, titled as Pinky

v. State of Haryana and others, decided on 04.10.2017.

15. Learned counsel for the petitioner has not been able to rebut the

said contention keeping in view the judgment of the Co-ordinate Bench of

this Court passed in Pinky's case (supra).

16. No other argument has been raised.

17.. Hence, keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the

present case recorded herein above, no ground is made out for interference in

the present petition, hence the same stands dismissed.

18. Pending civil miscellaneous application, if any, stands disposed

of.




                                               (HARSIMRAN SINGH SETHI)
                                                       JUDGE
23.04.2024
Riya
Whether speaking/reasoned:       Yes/No
Whether Reportable:               Yes/No




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