Punjab-Haryana High Court
Jagjit Singh vs Union Of India And Others on 23 April, 2024
Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:041142
CWP No.8238 of 2024 (O&M)
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT
CHANDIGARH
CWP No.8238 of 2024 (O&M)
Date of decision: 23.04.2024
Jagjit Singh
....Petitioner
Versus
Union of India and others
....Respondents
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE NAMIT KUMAR
Present: Mr. Varun Goyal, Advocate
for the petitioner.
Mr. Sunish Bindlish, Advocate
for respondent No.2.
NAMIT KUMAR J. (Oral)
1. The petitioner has invoked the jurisdiction of this Court by
filing the present petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of
India, seeking a writ of certiorari for quashing the charge-sheet served
with memorandum bearing No.Endrst No.Tarn Taran (10A)-2019/15370
dated 29.03.2019 (Annexure P-1), Endrst No.Tarn Taran (10B)-
2019/15373 dated 29.03.2019 (Annexure P-2), Endrst No.Tarn Taran
(23)-2024/82438 dated 09.02.2024 (Annexure P-3) and Endrst No.Tarn
Taran (18)-2018/5273 dated 21.06.2018 (Annexure P-4), issued to the
petitioner by respondent No.3 under the Punjab Civil Services
(Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1970. Further a writ of mandamus has
been sought for directing respondent No.3 to withdraw the abovesaid
charge-sheets (Annexures P-1 to P-4) in view of letter dated 11.06.2019.
2. It is the case of the petitioner that he has joined as
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Inspector Grade II in respondent No.3 - Punjab State Civil Supplies
Corporation Limited (hereinafter referred to as 'PUNSUP') and he was
appointed as common charge-holder for taking care of Wheat Crop. He
has been issued charge-sheets dated 29.03.2019 (Annexures P-1 and P-
2), 09.02.2024 (Annexure P-3) and 21.06.2018 (Annexure P-4),
regarding less storage gain/assured gain in wheat stocks for the crop
years 2012-13, 2013-14, 2014-15 at PUNSUP Storage Centre Tarn
Taran. He further submits that there are no storage norms for the said
period for the Food Corporation of India to make deductions from the
bills of the Corporation and resultantly coercive recovery from the
employees by initiating disciplinary proceedings against them and for
filing of the charge-sheets is untenable as it have been issued in total
contravention of the judgments, policies, documents and hence, the
charge-sheets itself are violative of the statutory provisions of the rules,
regulations and policies governing the conditions of service of the
petitioner and no evidence has been adduced by the Corporation on
which the claims have been vested. He further submits that the matter
relating to storage gain in wheat stocks and storage loss in rice stocks is
sub-judice before this Court in CWP No.27725 of 2013, titled as
"Punjab State Warehousing Corporation Field Employees Union vs
Union of India and others", along with bunch of petitions, which is
pending for 24.05.2024. There are no scientific norms on the basis of
which charge-sheets have been issued, therefore, the action of the
respondents in issuing the charge-sheets dated 29.03.2019 (Annexures
P-1 and P-2), 09.02.2024 (Annexure P-3) and 21.06.2018 (Annexure P-
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4), is totally illegal and arbitrary and the same may be quashed. He has
placed reliance upon certain interim orders passed in connected cases by
this Court, Annexures P-5 to P-9, whereby the respondents were
restrained to proceed ahead with charge-sheet(s)/show cause notice(s).
Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that no show-cause
notice has been issued to the petitioner and without affording any
opportunity of hearing, the petitioner has been charge-sheeted by
respondent No.3, which is against the principles of natural justice. He
has placed reliance on the judgment of Madhya Pradesh High Court in
"Nikhat Khan vs State of M.P. and others", 2020(3) M.P.L.J. 422.
3. Per contra, learned counsel for respondent No.2, who has
caused appearance on the strength of advance copy served upon him,
has opposed the submissions made by learned counsel for the petitioner
on the ground that the charge-sheets (Annexures P-1 to P-4) have
rightly been served upon the petitioner and the petitioner has
approached this Court at the very initial stage and without even
responding to the charge-sheets.
4. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the
record.
5. A perusal of the charge-sheets dated 29.03.2019
(Annexures P-1 and P-2), 09.02.2024 (Annexure P-3) and 21.06.2018
(Annexure P-4) would show that the same has been issued on account of
the negligence committed by the petitioner while performing his official
duty.
6. The issue which arises for consideration before this Court
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is as to whether show cause notice/charge-sheet can be challenged in a
writ petition. The said issue is not res integra as it has been held by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court and by this Court in various judgments that the
scope of interference by this Court in the cases like the present one is
very limited. Firstly, if the show cause notice has been issued by the
incompetent authority, other than the disciplinary authority and
secondly, if it is issued due to mala fide intention of the authority
concerned. The present show cause notice has not been challenged on
these two grounds as it is not the case of the petitioner that the show
cause notice has been issued by the incompetent authority or due to
mala fide intention of the issuing authority i.e. the Managing Director of
the PUNSUP. Moreover, writ does not lie against a charge-sheet or
show-cause notice as it does not give any cause of action. Unless some
adverse order is passed in pursuance to the said charge-sheet, employee
has no right to invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court or the Civil
Court to impugn the charge-sheet. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in The
Special Director and another v. Mohd. Ghulam Ghouse and another,
2004(1) S.C.T. 671 has held that ordinarily no writ lies against the
show-cause notice and the writ petition cannot be entertained as a
matter of routine. The relevant portion from the said judgment is as
under: -
"5. This Court in a large number of cases has deprecated
the practice of the High Courts entertaining writ petitions
questioning legality of the show causes notices stalling
enquiries as proposed and retarding investigative process
to find actual facts with the participation and in the
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presence of the parties. Unless, the High Court is satisfied
that the show cause notice was totally non est in the eye
of law for absolute want of jurisdiction of the authority to
even investigate into facts, writ petitions should not be
entertained for the mere asking and as a matter of
routine, and the writ petitioner should invariably be
directed to respond to the show cause notice and take all
stands highlighted in the writ petition. Whether the show
cause notice was founded on any legal premises is a
jurisdictional issue which can even be urged by the
recipient of the notice and such issues also can be
adjudicated by the authority issuing the very notice
initially, before the aggrieved could approach the Court.
Further, when the Court passes an interim order it should
be careful to see that the statutory functionaries specially
and specifically constituted for the purpose are not
denuded of powers and authority to initially decide the
matter and ensure that ultimate relief which may or may
not be finally granted in the writ petition is accorded to the
writ petitioner even at the threshold by the interim
protection, granted."
7. To the same effect is the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in Union of India and another v. Kunisetty Satyanarayana,
2007(1) S.C.T. 452, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as
under: -
"12. It is well settled by a series of decisions of this Court
that ordinarily no writ lies against a charge sheet or show-
cause notice vide Executive Engineer, Bihar State
Housing Board v. Ramdesh Kumar Singh and others, JT
1995(8) SC 331, Special Director and another v. Mohd.
Ghulam Ghouse and another, 2004(1) SCT 671 (SC) :
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AIR 2004 Supreme Court 1467, Ulagappa and others v.
Divisional Commissioner, Mysore and others, 2001(10)
SCC 639, State of U.P. v. Brahm Datt Sharma and
another, AIR 1987 Supreme Court 943 etc.
13. The reason why ordinarily a writ petition should not be
entertained against a mere show-cause notice or charge-
sheet is that at that stage the writ petition may be held to
be premature. A mere charge-sheet or show-cause notice
does not give rise to any cause of action, because it does
not amount to an adverse order which affects the rights of
any party unless the same has been issued by a person
having no jurisdiction to do so. It is quite possible that
after considering the reply to the show-cause notice or
after holding an enquiry the authority concerned may drop
the proceedings and/or hold that the charges are not
established. It is well settled that a writ lies when some
right of any party is infringed. A mere show-cause notice
or charge-sheet does not infringe the right of any one. It is
only when a final order imposing some punishment or
otherwise adversely affecting a party is passed, that the
said party can be said to have any grievance.
14. Writ jurisdiction is discretionary jurisdiction and hence
such discretion under Article 226 should not ordinarily be
exercised by quashing a show-cause notice or charge
sheet.
15. No doubt, in some very rare and exceptional cases the
High Court can quash a charge-sheet or show-cause notice
if it is found to be wholly without jurisdiction or for some
other reason if it is wholly illegal. However, ordinarily the
High Court should not interfere in such a matter."
8. A Division Bench of this Court in Ved Pal Gupta v.
Punjab and Haryana High Court, Chandigarh, 2014(2) S.C.T. 793 has
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held as under: -
"15. In Secretary, Ministry of Defence and others v.
Prabhash Chandra Mirdha, 2012 (4) RSJ 484, it has been
laid down by the Supreme Court that ordinarily a writ
application does not lie against a charge sheet or show
cause notice for the reason that it does not give rise to any
cause of action. It does not amount to an adverse order
which affects the right of any party unless the same has
been issued by a person having no jurisdiction/competence
to do so. A writ lies when some right of a party is
infringed. In fact, charge sheet does not infringe the right
of a party. It is only when a final order imposing the
punishment or otherwise adversely affecting a party is
passed, it may have a grievance and cause of action. Thus,
a charge sheet or show cause notice in disciplinary
proceedings should not ordinarily be quashed by the
Court. It was further held that normally a charge sheet is
not quashed prior to the conclusion of the inquiry on the
ground that the facts stated in the charge sheet are
erroneous for the reason that correctness or truth of the
charge is the function of the disciplinary authority. It was
also held that neither the disciplinary proceedings nor the
charge sheet should be quashed at an initial stage as it
would be a premature stage to deal with the issues. The
position prevailing at present in the department inquiry is
that a sitting Judge of the High Court on the
Administrative side is seized of the inquiry and
proceedings are going on. Evidence is being recorded. The
petitioner would have every right to submit his point of
view in accordance with law before the inquiry officer.
Therefore, at this stage, it would be wholly inappropriate
to interfere in the inquiry that is going on at an
intermediary stage and nullifying or in any case keep in
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abeyance the proceedings that are going on. At this stage it
would in fact even be inappropriate to comment one way
or the other on the charges that have been levelled and the
reply that has been filed by the petitioner to the same. This
is solely domain of the Inquiry Officer who is seized of the
matter.
16. The learned Senior counsel for the petitioner has,
however, referred to the case State of Punjab v. V. K.
Khanna, 2001(1) S.C.T. 933 : AIR 2001 Supreme Court
343. In the said case the learned Senior counsel has laid
emphasis on the aspect wherein it has been held that while
it is true that justifiability of charges at the stage of
initiating a disciplinary proceedings cannot possibly be
delved into by any Court pending inquiry but it is equally
well settled that in the event there is an element of malice
or mala fide motive involved in the matter of issue of a
charge sheet or the concerned authority is so biased that
the inquiry would be a mere farcical show and the
conclusions are well known then and in that event law
courts are otherwise justified in interfering at the earliest
stage so as to avoid the harassment and humiliation of a
public official. It is not a question of shielding any misdeed
that the Court would be anxious, it is the due process of
law which should permeate in the society and in the event
of there being any affectation of such process of law that
law courts ought to rise up to the occasion. There is no
dispute to said proposition, however, the same would more
appropriately apply in case there is a charge of mala fide.
In the present case though it has been alleged that the
issuance of charge sheet and subsequent proceedings
arising therefrom are completely mala fide, baseless and
against the record, however, the allegations of mala fide
have been made in a vague manner. In State of Punjab v.
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Chamal Lal Goyal, 1995(2) S.C.T. 343 : JT 1995 (2) SC
18 with respect to the charge of mala fide, it was observed
that the said charge was made in a vague manner. It was
not specified which officer was ill-disposed towards the
respondent (delinquent official in the said case) and in
what manner did he manage to see that the charges are
served upon him when his case was to come up for
consideration for promotion. It was held that in the
absence of any clear allegation against any particular
official and in the absence of impleading such person eo
nominee so as to enable him to answer the charge against
him, the charge of mala fide cannot be sustained. The ratio
of the said judgment applies in the present case and in the
absence of specific allegations of mala fide, the averment
is unfounded and would not warrant any consideration."
9. The other argument advanced by learned counsel for the
petitioner vis-a-vis interim orders passed in connected cases, cannot be
countenanced with as the same have no binding effects to be followed in
all subsequent cases. Reliance is placed upon the judgment passed by
Hon'ble Supreme Court in Empire Industries Ltd. and others Vs.
Union of India and others : 1985(3) SCC 314, wherein it has been held
as under:-
"58. Good deal of arguments was canvassed before us for
variation or vacation of the interim orders passed in these
cases. Different Courts sometimes pass different orders as
the Courts think fit. It is a matter of common knowledge
that the interim orders passed by particular Courts on
certain consideration are not precedents for other cases
may be on similar facts. An argument is being built up
now-a-days that once an interim order has been passed by
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this Court on certain factors specially in fiscal matters, in
subsequent matters on more or less similar facts, there
should not be a different order passed nor should there be
any variation with that kind of interim order passed. It is
submitted at the Bar that such variance creates
discrimination. This is an unfortunate approach. Every
Bench hearing a matter on the facts and circumstances of
each case should have the right to grant interim orders on
such terms as it considers fit and proper and if it had
granted interim order at one stage, it should have right to
vary or alter such interim orders. We venture to suggest,
however, that a consensus should be developed in matter of
interim orders."
10. To the same effect is the judgment passed by the Division
bench of this Court in Maneta Automotive Components Pvt. Ltd. Vs.
Commr. of C. Ex., Rohtak : 2014(310) ELT 663, wherein it has been
observed as under :-
"4. After hearing learned counsel for the appellant, we do
not find any merit in the appeal. In the matter of interim
orders, no strict rules of precedents are applicable.
However, in the present case, the Tribunal while directing
the appellant to deposit Rs. 40 lacs as a pre-deposit for
hearing of the appeal has noticed as under:-
"It is admitted fact that duty free raw material was
imported by appellant in terms of Customs
Notification above. Had the raw material not been
imported, the appellant would have been at par with
domestic players. Peculiarly appellant availed
customs duty exemption at the cost of exchequer.
Scrap was inbuilt in the duty free material imported.
Ignorance of Customs duty forgone on the scrap
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aspect would place domestic players in
disadvantageous position and shall run counter to
the principle laid down in Hyderabad Asbestos
Cement Products - 2000 (115) ELT 20 (SC).
Therefore, as a course of equality before law, we
direct the appellant to make deposit Rs.40 lakhs
within four weeks from today and make compliance
on 26-02-2014. We may add that an interim order
has no precedential value and we are guided by the
ratio laid down by Apex Court in the case of Empire
Industries - 1985 (20) ELT 179 (SC), Dunlop India
Ltd. - 1985 (19) ELT 22 (SC), Benara Valves Ltd.
2006 (204) ELT 513 (SC) and Vijay Prakash D.
Mehta - 1989 (39) ELT 178 (SC)."
5. In the present case, the appellant has been required
to pre-deposit Rs. 40 lacs on demand of duty and penalty
of Rs. 3 crores which is about 13.33% which cannot be
said to be unreasonable. Even otherwise, from the
argument of the learned counsel for the appellant, it would
emerge that on combined liability of two periods of Rs. 8
crores, the appellant would be depositing Rs. 50 lacs only
which cannot be held to be excessive in any manner. The
quantum required to be pre-deposited would vary if the
total demand increases.
6. Adverting to the judgment in Vishnu Traders's case
(supra) relied by the learned counsel for the appellant, it
was in the facts and circumstances of that particular case
that the observations were noticed by the Hon'ble Supreme
Court and was also held that in the matters of
interlocutory orders, the principle of binding precedents
do not apply. No help can be derived by the appellant from
the aforesaid pronouncement."
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11. Another argument has been raised by learned counsel for the
petitioner that if the proceedings in pursuance to the charge-sheets are
allowed to be proceeded further, then the respondents are likely to pass
order of punishment especially of recovery. The said argument is pre-
emptive and cannot be accepted at this stage. In any case, even if, any
order of recovery is ultimately passed by the respondents, after holding
a regular departmental enquiry, the same can always be challenged by
the affected employee in accordance with law and may pray for stay of
the said recovery.
12. In view of the above, no case to quash the charge-sheets
dated 29.03.2019 (Annexures P-1 and P-2), 09.02.2024 (Annexure P-3)
and 21.06.2018 (Annexure P-4), is made out and the present petition is
accordingly, dismissed as premature.
(NAMIT KUMAR)
JUDGE
23.04.2024
yakub
Whether speaking/reasoned: Yes/No
Whether reportable: Yes/No
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