Punjab-Haryana High Court
Arjun vs State Of Haryana on 23 April, 2024
Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:054930
CRM-M-18458-2024 -1-
2024:PHHC:054930
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
217
CRM-M-18458-2024
Date of Decision :April 23, 2024
ARJUN .....Petitioner
VERSUS
STATE OF HARYANA .....Respondent
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE KULDEEP TIWARI
Present : Mr. Sandeep Verma, Advocate
for the petitioner.
Mr.Avinash Jain, DAG, Haryana.
KULDEEP TIWARI. J.(Oral)
1. Through the instant petition, the petitioner craves for
indulgence of this Court for his being enlarged on regular bail, in case
FIR No.538, dated 30.11.2023, under Sections 148, 149, 307, 323, 452,
506 of the IPC, registered at Police Station Kalanaur, District Rohtak.
ALLEGATIONS AGAINST THE PETITIONER
2. The case as set up by complainant-Ajay, which resulted into
registration of the instant FIR, is that on a fateful day i.e. 29.11.2023, the
present petitioner alongwith Ajay alias Lala, Sahil, Kali alias Arman,
Aman, Rahul, Golu wife of Arjun, Shakuntala wife of Ajit, gave beatings
to them, by entering the house of his uncle. The present petitioner
alongwith Ajay and Rahul gave beatings to Parveen (injured), son of
Rajendra (uncle of the complainant), on his head with a stick, and when
the complainant tried to stop them, all of them gave beatings to the
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complainant, his sister Payal and also gave beatings to his aunt-Meena,
wife of Rajendra.
3. As per the prosecution, four persons have suffered injuries.
The injury which are attributed to the present petitioner, is on the head of
aforesaid Parveen, though that was declared to be simple in nature, since
it was on the head, and caused by a hard blunt weapon, therefore, the
provision of Section 307 IPC was invoked, despite there being no
medical opinion that the injury is dangerous to life.
SUBMISSIONS OF LEARNED COUNSEL FOR THE PETITIONER
4. In asking for the relief (supra), learned counsel for the
petitioner submits that the petitioner is behind bars for approximately 5
months, and the specific injury which is attributed to the petitioner, is
declared to be a simple in nature.
5. He further submits that the other two co-accused of the
petitioner, who also entered alongwith the present petitioner, in the
house of the complainant, have been extended the relief of regular bail by
the learned trial Court concerned.
6. He further submits that three persons i.e. present petitioner-
Arjun, Ajay and Rahul, are stated to have caused injuries to aforesaid-
Parveen, whereas, per the MLR there is only one injury on the head of
Parveen, that too simple in nature.
SUBMISSIONS OF THE LEARNED STATE COUNSEL
7. Per contra, the learned State counsel opposes the asked for
relief of grant of regular bail to the petitioner, on the ground that the
injured-Parveen, has suffered 29 stitches due to the injuries caused by the
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present petitioner.
8. He further, on instructions imparted to him by ASI Arvind,
submits that the final report has been filed after completion of the
investigation way back on dated 22.02.2024, and the learned trial Court
concerned, has framed charges against the petitioner and other co-
accused on dated 18.03.2024, and out of total 22 prosecution witnesses
cited by the prosecution, none has been examined till date.
9. He has also placed on record a custody certificate qua the
petitioner, which is taken on record, and, it reflects that the petitioner has
suffered incarceration of 4 months and 20 days as on today, and he is not
involved in any other criminal case.
ANALYSIS
10. "Bail is the Rule and Jail is an Exception". This basic
principle of criminal jurisprudence was laid down by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court, way back in 1978, in its landmark judgment titled "State
of Rajasthan V. Balchand alias Baliay", 1977 AIR 2447, 1978 SCR (1)
535. This principle finds its roots in one of the most distinguished
fundamental rights, as enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution of
India. Though the underlying objective behind detention of a person is to
ensure easy availability of an accused for trial, without any
inconvenience, however, in case the presence of an accused can be
secured otherwise, then detention is not compulsory.
11. The right to a speedy trial is one of the rights of a detained
person. However, while deciding application for regular bail, the Courts
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shall also take into consideration the fundamental precept of criminal
jurisprudence, which is "the presumption of innocence", besides the
gravity of offence(s) involved.
12. In "Nikesh Tarachand Shah V. Union of India", (2018) 11
SCC 1, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has recorded the following:-
"14. In Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab,
(1980) 2 SCC 565 at 586-588, the purpose of granting
bail is set out with great felicity as follows:-
"27. It is not necessary to refer to decisions which
deal with the right to ordinary bail because that right
does not furnish an exact parallel to the right to
anticipatory bail. It is, however, interesting that as
long back as in 1924 it was held by the High Court of
Calcutta in Nagendra v. King-Emperor the object of
bail is to secure the attendance of the accused at the
trial, that the proper test to be applied in the solution
of the question whether bail should be granted or
refused is whether it is probable that the party will
appear to take his trial and that it is indisputable that
bail is not to be withheld as a punishment. In two
other cases which,significantly, are the 'Meerut
Conspiracy cases' observations are to be found
regarding the right to bail which deserve a special
mention. In K.N. Joglekar v. Emperor [AIR 1931 All
504 : 33 Cri LJ 94] it was observed, while dealing
with Section 498 which corresponds to the present
Section 439 of the Code, that it conferred upon the
Sessions Judge or the High Court wide powers to
grant bail which were not handicapped by the
restrictions in the preceding Section 497 which
corresponds to the present Section 437. It was
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observed by the court that there was no hard and fast
rule and no inflexible principle governing the exercise
of the discretion conferred by Section 498 and that the
only principle which was established was that the
discretion should be exercised judiciously. In Emperor
v. Hutchinson [AIR 1931 All 356, 358 : 32 Cri LJ
1271] it was said that it was very unwise to make an
attempt to lay down any particular rules which will
bind the High Court, having regard to the fact that the
legislature itself left the discretion of the court
unfettered. According to the High Court, the variety of
cases that may arise from time to time cannot be safely
classified and it is dangerous to make an attempt to
classify the cases and to say that in particular classes
a bail may be granted but not in other classes. It was
observed that the principle to be deduced from the
various sections in the Criminal Procedure Code was
that grant of bail is the rule and refusal is the
exception. An accused person who enjoys freedom is
in a much better position to look after his case and to
properly defend himself than if he were in custody. As
a presumably innocent person he is therefore entitled
to freedom and every opportunity to look after his own
case. A presumably innocent person must have his
freedom to enable him to establish his innocence.
28. Coming nearer home, it was observed by Krishna
Iyer, J., in Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. Public Prosecutor
[(1978) 1 SCC 240 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 115] that: (SCC p.
242, para 1)
"... the issue of bail is one of liberty, justice, public
safety and burden of the public treasury, all of which insist
that a developed jurisprudence of bail is integral to a
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socially sensitized judicial process. . . . After all, personal
liberty of an accused or convict is fundamental, suffering
lawful eclipse only in terms of procedure established by law.
The last four words of Article 21 are the life of that human
right."
29. In Gurcharan Singh v. State (Delhi Administration)
[(1978) 1 SCC 118 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 41] it was observed by
Goswami, J., who spoke for the court, that: (SCC p. 129,
para 29)
"There cannot be an inexorable formula in the matter
of granting bail. The facts and circumstances of each case
will govern the exercise of judicial
discretion in granting or cancelling bail."
30. In AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE (2d, Volume 8, p.
806, para 39), it is stated:
"Where the granting of bail lies within the discretion
of the court, the granting or denial is regulated, to a large
extent, by the facts and circumstances of each particular
case. Since the object of the detention or imprisonment of
the accused is to secure his appearance and submission to
the jurisdiction and the judgment of the court, the primary
inquiry is whether a recognizance or bond
would effect that end."
It is thus clear that the question whether to grant bail
or not depends for its answer upon a variety of
circumstances, the cumulative effect of which must enter
into the judicial verdict. Any one single circumstance cannot
be treated as of universal validity or as necessarily
justifying the grant or refusal of bail."
13. Also, in Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre v. State of
Maharashtra, Criminal Appeal No.2271 of 2010, the Hon'ble Supreme
Court has insisted upon striking a perfect balance of sanctity of an
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individual's liberty as well as the interest of the society, in grant or
refusing bail. The relevant extract of the judgment (supra) is reproduced
hereinafter:-
3. The society has a vital interest in grant or
refusal of bail because every criminal offence is the
offence against the State. The order granting or
refusing bail must reflect perfect balance between the
conflicting interests, namely, sanctity of individual
liberty and the interest of the society. The law of bails
dovetails two conflicting interests namely, on the one
hand, the requirements of shielding the society from
the hazards of those committing crimes and
potentiality of repeating the same crime while on bail
and on the other hand absolute adherence of the
fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence
regarding presumption of innocence of an accused
until he is found guilty and the sanctity of individual
liberty.
14. This Court has examined the instant petition on the
touchstone of the hereinabove extracted settled and legal principle(s) of
law and is of the considered opinion that the instant petition is amenable
for being allowed.
FINAL ORDER
15. Be that as it may be, considering the fact that the petitioner
has suffered incarceration of 4 months and 20 days, as on today, and out
of total 22 prosecution witnesses cited by the prosecution, none has been
examined so far, coupled with the fact that two other co-accused of the
petitioner have already been extended the benefit of regular bail by the
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learned trial Court concerned, this Court deems it fit and appropriate to
grant the concession of regular bail to the petitioner. Therefore, without
commenting upon the merits and circumstances of the present case, the
present petition is allowed. The petitioner is ordered to be released on
bail, on furnishing of bail bond and surety bond to the satisfaction of
concerned Chief Judicial Magistrate/trial Court/Duty Magistrate.
16. However, it is clarified that if in future, the petitioner is
found indulging in commission of similar offences, as are involved
herein, the respondent-State shall be at liberty to make an appropriate
application seeking cancellation of regular bail, as granted by this Court.
Moreover, anything observed here-in-above shall have no effect on the
merits of the trial and is meant for deciding the present petition only.
(KULDEEP TIWARI)
April 23, 2024 JUDGE
dharamvir
Whether speaking/reasoned. : Yes/No
Whether Reportable. : Yes/No
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