Punjab-Haryana High Court
Bharat Rattan vs State Of Haryana And Others on 18 April, 2024
Author: G.S. Sandhawalia
Bench: G.S. Sandhawalia
Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:052205-DB
Neutral Citation No. 2024:PHHC:052205 -DB
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
(109) LPA-925-2024 (O&M)
Decided on : 18.04.2024
Bharat Rattan ......Appellant(s)
Versus
State of Haryana & others ......Respondent(s)
CORAM : HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE G.S. SANDHAWALIA,
ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE
HON'BLE MS.JUSTICE LAPITA BANERJI
Present: Mr.Vijay Pal, Advocate for the appellant (s).
Mr.Deepak Balyan, Addl.A.G., Haryana.
*****
G.S. Sandhawalia, Acting Chief Justice (Oral)
1. Consideration in the present appeal, which is barred by 402 days
in filing, is against the judgment of the Learned Single Judge dated 03.02.2023
passed in CWP-32052-2018.
2. Vide the said judgment, the Learned Single Judge directed that
the appellant shall be offered the post of Warder on the basis of the assurance
given vide Annexures P-6 & P-7, within a period of three months. However,
the benefit of salary, seniority, increment etc. for the post of Warder was
granted from the day he joins the post. Thus, the present appeal challenges
this aspect of the denial.
3. The argument raised by counsel for the appellant is that the
seniority aspect was wrongly denied as the appellant is getting the same pay-
scale as a Peon on which post he was initially appointed.
4. It is also pertinent to notice that the State expeditiously complied
with the order on 01.03.2023 (Annexure A-1) which is mentioned in the
application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. It is after a
period of more than a year, the present appeal has been filed on 09.04.2024.
The ground for condoning the delay is that since the appellant was on
probation for a period of 2 years, his services were liable to be terminated if he
would prefer the appeal and also that there is not much difference of pay from
the post of Peon.
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(109) LPA-925-2024 (O&M) -2-
5. The reason for making out a case of sufficient cause is not
convincing. Apparently the appellant having reaped the fruits of litigation
chose to be satisfied with the same. It is after a period of over a year now he is
seeking the issue of seniority and salary w.e.f. 2006 onwards. We are also of
the considered opinion that if such an exercise is permitted, without
impleading the concerned persons who are not even party herein, they would
be adversely affected and the same would lead to a lot of heart-burning within
the Department.
6. Once the appellant did not exercise his right expeditiously, he
cannot now turn around and seek condonation of delay as a matter of right.
Reliance can be placed upon the principles laid down by the Apex Court in
Oriental Aroma Chemical Industries Ltd. Vs. Gujarat Industrial
Development Corporation & another, 2010 (5) SCC 459 and Isha
Bhattacharya Vs. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur, Nafar
Academy & others, 2014 (4) SCC (Crl.) 450 wherein it has specifically been
held that if the explanation is fanciful and there is lack of bona fide, then the
delay is not to be condoned. Relevant portion of the judgment reads as under:
"15. From the aforesaid authorities the principles that can broadly be
culled out are:
i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented, non-
pedantic approach while dealing with an application for
condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise
injustice but are obliged to remove injustice.
ii) The terms "sufficient cause" should be understood in their
proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the
fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in
proper perspective to the obtaining fact situation.
iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical
considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for
emphasis.
iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of
delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant
is to be taken note of.
v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation
of delay is a significant and relevant fact.
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(109) LPA-925-2024 (O&M) -3-
vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should
not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the
courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate
eventuate there is no real failure of justice.
vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsule the
conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally
unfettered free play.
viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay
of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of
prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be at-
tracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach
whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation.
ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its
inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into
consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the
courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in
respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a
total go by in the name of liberal approach.
x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged
in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not
to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation.
xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud,
misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the
technicalities of law of limitation.
xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinized and
the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial
discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on
individual perception.
xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing a
collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude.
16. To the aforesaid principles we may add some more guidelines
taking note of the present day scenario. They are: -
a) An application for condonation of delay should be drafted
with careful concern and not in a half hazard manner harbouring
the notion that the courts are required to condone delay on the
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bedrock of the principle that adjudication of a lis on merits is
seminal to justice dispensation system.
b) An application for condonation of delay should not be dealt
with in a routine manner on the base of individual philosophy
which is basically subjective.
c) Though no precise formula can be laid down regard being
had to the concept of judicial discretion, yet a conscious effort
for achieving consistency and collegiality of the adjudicatory
system should be made as that is the ultimate institutional
motto.
d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a non-serious
matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can be exhibited in a
non-challant manner requires to be curbed, of course, within
legal parameters."
7. Another factor which weighs with us is that after the appellant
was appointed on 30.11.2004 (Annexure P-7), the first request for appointment
at a higher post of Clerk was rejected on 22.02.2007 (Annexure P-9). The
appellant did not challenge the said order. The second rejection by the State
was more than 10 years later on 16.10.2018 (Annexure P-12) which led to the
filing of the writ petition. In such circumstances, it is the appellant himself
who let the water pass under the bridge and now cannot expect it to run
upstream.
8. Accordingly, keeping in view the peculiar circumstances, we do
not find it a fit case to condone the delay in filing the appeal and the
application for condonation of delay of 402 days in filing the appeal is hereby
dismissed. Resultantly, the main appeal as well as all pending application
bearing CM-2268-LPA-2024 also stand dismissed.
(G.S. SANDHAWALIA)
ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE
(LAPITA BANERJI)
18.04.2024 JUDGE
Sailesh
Whether speaking/reasoned : Yes
Whether Reportable : No
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