Punjab-Haryana High Court
Sunny Bansal vs State Of Punjab And Others on 13 December, 2023
Neutral Citation No:=2023:PHHC:159675
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132
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
CWP-17772-2023
Date of Decision:13.12.2023
SUNNY BANSAL ......... Petitioner
Versus
STATE OF PUNJAB AND OTHERS ..... Respondents
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE JAGMOHAN BANSAL
Present : Mr. K.S. Brar, Advocate for the petitioner.
Mr. Aman Dhir, DAG, Punjab.
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JAGMOHAN BANSAL, J. (Oral)
1. The petitioner through instant petition under Articles
226/227 of the Constitution of India is seeking setting aside of tentative
list (Annexure P-3) and result dated 30.09.2011 (Annexure P-4).
2. The cause of action arose in 2010-2011 whereas petitioner
has come before this Court in 2023 i.e. after more than 13 years from the
date of cause of action.
3. On being asked the reason of delay, learned counsel for the
petitioner could not advance any plausible reason.
4. No hard-and-fast rule can be laid down as to when the High
Court should refuse to exercise its jurisdiction in favour of a party who
moves it after considerable delay and is otherwise guilty of laches.
Discretion must be exercised judiciously and reasonably. In the event that
the claim made by the applicant is legally sustainable, delay should be
condoned. Where illegality is manifest, it cannot be sustained on the sole
ground of laches. When substantial justice and technical considerations
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are pitted against each other, the cause of substantial justice deserves to
be preferred. State cannot deprive vested right because of a non- eliberate
delay.
In Eastern Coalfields Ltd. v. Dugal Kumar (2008) 14 SCC
295, supreme court has considered scope of interference in case of delay
and laches. Court has held:
"24. As to delay and laches on the part of the
writ petitioner, there is substance in the
argument of learned counsel for the appellant
Company. It is well settled that under Article
226 of the Constitution, the power of a High
Court to issue an appropriate writ, order or
direction is discretionary. One of the grounds to
refuse relief by a writ court is that the petitioner
is guilty of delay and laches. It is imperative,
where the petitioner invokes extraordinary
remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution,
that he should come to the court at the earliest
reasonably possible opportunity. Inordinate
delay in making the motion for a writ is indeed
an adequate ground for refusing to exercise
discretion in favour of the applicant."
In Tilokchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi (1969) 1 SCC
110 and Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India (1970) 1 SCC 84,
Supreme Court has ruled that even in cases of violation or infringement
of fundamental rights, a writ court may take into account delay and
laches on the part of the petitioner in approaching the court and if there is
gross or unexplained delay, the court may refuse to grant relief in favour
of such petitioner.
In Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply & Sewerage Board
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V. T.T. Murali Babu (2014) 4 SCC 108, Supreme Court has ruled:
'16. Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches
should not be lightly brushed aside. A writ court
is required to weigh the explanation offered and
the acceptability of the same. The court should
bear in mind that it is exercising an
extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction. As a
constitutional court it has a duty to protect the
rights of the citizens but simultaneously it is to
keep itself alive to the primary principle that
when an aggrieved person, without adequate
reason, approaches the court at his own leisure
or pleasure, the court would be under legal
obligation to scrutinise whether the lis at a
belated stage should be entertained or not. Be it
noted, delay comes in the way of equity. In
certain circumstances delay and laches may not
be fatal but in most circumstances inordinate
delay would only invite disaster for the litigant
who knocks at the doors of the court. Delay
reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a
litigant--a litigant who has forgotten the basic
norms, namely, 'procrastination is the greatest
thief of time' and second, law does not permit
one to sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay does
bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis.'
In Union of India v. N. Murugesan, (2022) 2 SCC 25, court
has observed that a neglect on the part of a party to do an act which law
requires must stand in his way for getting the relief or remedy. The Court
laid down two essential factors i.e. first, the length of the delay and
second, the developments during the intervening period. Delay in
availing the remedy would amount to waiver of such right. Relevant
extracts of the judgment read as:
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"20. The principles governing delay, laches,
and acquiescence are overlapping and
interconnected on many occasions. However,
they have their distinct characters and distinct
elements. One can say that delay is the genus to
which laches and acquiescence are species.
Similarly, laches might be called a genus to a
species by name acquiescence. However, there
may be a case where acquiescence is involved,
but not laches. These principles are common
law principles, and perhaps one could identify
that these principles find place in various
statutes which restrict the period of limitation
and create non-consideration of condonation in
certain circumstances. They are bound to be
applied by way of practice requiring prudence
of the court than of a strict application of law.
The underlying principle governing these
concepts would be one of estoppel. The question
of prejudice is also an important issue to be
taken note of by the court.
21. The word "laches" is derived from the
French language meaning "remissness and
slackness". It thus involves unreasonable delay
or negligence in pursuing a claim involving an
equitable relief while causing prejudice to the
other party. It is neglect on the part of a party to
do an act which law requires while asserting a
right, and therefore, must stand in the way of
the party getting relief or remedy.
22. Two essential factors to be seen are the
length of the delay and the nature of acts done
during the interval. As stated, it would also
involve acquiescence on the part of the party
approaching the court apart from the change in
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position in the interregnum. Therefore, it would
be unjustifiable for a Court of Equity to confer a
remedy on a party who knocks its doors when
his acts would indicate a waiver of such a right.
By his conduct, he has put the other party in a
particular position, and therefore, it would be
unreasonable to facilitate a challenge before the
court. Thus, a man responsible for his conduct
on equity is not expected to be allowed to avail
a remedy."
5. In the absence of any plausible reason, this Court finds that
present petition suffers from delay and laches. Thus, the petition deserves
to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches.
6. Dismissed.
( JAGMOHAN BANSAL )
JUDGE
13.12.2023
Ali
Whether speaking/reasoned Yes/No
Whether Reportable Yes/No
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