Punjab-Haryana High Court
Jagjit Alias Lovely And Another vs State Of Punjab And Another on 18 July, 2022
CRM-M-15236-2022 -1-
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH.
290
CRM-M-15236-2022
Date of decision: 18.07.2022
JAGJIT ALIAS LOVELY AND ANOTHER .....Petitioners
Versus
STATE OF PUNJAB AND ANOTHER .....Respondents
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SURESHWAR THAKUR
Present : Mr. Deepak Jindal, Advocate
for the petitioners.
Mr. Bhupender Beniwal, AAG, Punjab
for respondent No. 1- State.
Mr. Pankaj Nanda, Advocate
for respondent No. 2.
****
SURESHWAR THAKUR, J. (ORAL)
1. Through the instant petition filed under Section 482
Cr.P.C., the petitioners are seeking the quashing of FIR No. 387 of
05.12.2021 (Annexure P-1), which was registered against them at
Police Station City Kharar, District Mohali, constituting therein,
offences under Sections 379-B, 323, 506, 148, 149 of the IPC, also of
all the subsequent proceedings, as, arise therefroms, on the basis of
compromise (Annexure P-2).
2. When the instant petition came up for hearing on
08.04.2022, this Court made directions upon, the Illaqa Magistrate
concerned, to make a report with respect to the veracity of the
compromise. The learned Illaqa Magistrate was also directed to disclose
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in his report, whether after completion of investigation, report under
Section 173 Cr.P.C. has been filed, whether charge has been drawn
against the accused; and whether the prosecution evidence has
commenced. The afore order makes it apparent that the petitioners had
depended, upon, a compromise/settlement, arrived at, in respect of the
FIR (supra) with the complainant-respondent No. 2.
3. The afore made orders on 08.04.2022 by this Court, has
been complied with by the learned Illaqa Magistrate concerned, and, the
elicited report has been placed on record. A perusal of the report,
transmitted to this Court, by the learned Magistrate concerned, reveals
that the settlement /compromise, arrived at inter se the petitioners, and,
respondent No. 2, is a sequel of both, being ad idem qua it, besides the
compromise / settlement being a sequel of no pressure or coercion,
being exercised upon each other. Therefore, the learned Magistrate has
reported that the settlement /compromise, depended upon by the
petitioners, for seeking the quashing of the FIR (supra), is both
voluntary, and, genuine.
4. The learned counsel for the parties stated at the Bar, before
this Court, that all the concerned have signed the compromise deed.
5. Furthermore, the learned State Counsel, on instructions,
meted to him, by the Investigating Officer concerned, submits that the
challan has not been filed as yet.
6.. However, the learned counsel appearing for the State, has
contended before this Court, that the relief, as claimed by the
petitioners, in the petition, cannot be granted, as some of the offences
constituted against the accused-petitioners, inasmuch as, those under
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Sections 148 and 149 of the IPC, are non-compoundable.
7. However, for the reasons to be assigned hereinafter, the
afore prayer, as made by the learned State counsel, cannot be accepted
by this Court. The further pre-eminent reason for dispelling the vigour
of afore made argument, is rested, upon the factum of also a statement,
being made before this Court by the learned counsel for the petitioners,
that the challan has not been filed so far.
8. The effect of the afore statement, as made with extreme
vehemence by the learned counsel for the petitioners, and, also the
effect of the statement made by the learned counsel appearing for the
State, is that the relevant parameters as encapsulated in a verdict of the
Hon'ble Apex Court, rendered in case titled as, Gian Singh versus
State of Punjab and another 2012(4) RCR (Criminal) 543, inasmuch
as a postulate/occurring therein, that the inherent power under Section
482 Cr.P.C., as vested in the High Court, for quashing of criminal
proceedings, as/of FIR or complaint, through recourse being made to
the provisions of Section 482 Cr.P.C., rather being distinct and different
from the power given to a criminal Court, hence for compounding the
relevant offence, being enjoined to become tested viz-a-viz the facts in
hand, for apposite application thereon. However, it has also been held
therein, the afore power vested in the High Court, is of the widest
plenitude, with no statutory limitation, being placed thereon, yet it has
to be exercised to secure the ends of justice, and, to prevent the abuse
of process of any Court. Though no straightjacket formula, has been
contemplated therein, for recourse being made to the mandate of
Section 482 Cr.P.C., hence for quashing of an FIR, or criminal
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proceedings or complaint, yet the essential rubric viz-a-viz its valid
exercising, is comprised in the principle, that if the accused and the
complainant rather enter into a valid ad idem settlement, and, when
thereupon the conviction of the accused becomes remote and bleak.
Consequently, it has been mandated, that unless the offence sought to
be quashed, through the exercising of the power vested under Section
482 Cr.P.C., are not serious and heinous, inasmuch as the afore, do not
embody offences appertaining to murder, rape, dacoity etc., and, or
when the offences are in relation to special statutes like Prevention of
Corruption Act or offences committed by public servants, while
working in that capacity, thereupon it can be permissibly exercised.
However, upon evident existences of embargos (supra), spelt in the
verdict (supra), thereupon, the High Courts are barred, through
recoursing the mandate of Section 482 Cr.P.C., hence, to quash the FIR
or quash the criminal proceedings appertaining to serious/heinous
offences (supra).
9. It is apt to extract the relevant paragraph of the verdict
made by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Gian Singh's case (supra).
" The position that emerges from the above discussion can be
summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a
criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its
inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power
given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under
Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude
with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord
with the guideline engrafted in such power viz; (i) to secure the
ends of justice or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any
Court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or
complaint or F.I.R may be exercised where the offender and
victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and
circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed.
However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must
have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous
and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like
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murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even
though the victim or victim's family and the offender have
settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and
have serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise
between the victim and offender in relation to the offences
under special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or the
offences committed by public servants while working in that
capacity etc; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal
proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases
having overwhelmingly and predominatingly civil flavour stand
on different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly
the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile,
civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences
arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family
disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in
nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this
category of cases, High Court may quash criminal proceedings
if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender
and victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and
continuation of criminal case would put accused to great
oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be
caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and
complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other
words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair
or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the
criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding
would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement
and compromise between the victim and wrongdoer and
whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that
criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above
question(s) is in affirmative, the High Court shall be well within
its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding."
10. Since the offences, under Sections 148/149 of the IPC, do
not, for reasons (supra) prima facie, appear to be so grave, and, nor so
heinous, so as to attract the rigour of the embargo (supra) foisted upon
the High Court in verdict (supra). Therefore, the
settlement/compromise, as validly entered into, enjoins its being
revered. Consequently, even if the afore offences are non
compoundable, this Court does not deem it fit to accept the
contention(s) of the learned State counsel, that this Court, may not
through recoursing the mandate of Section 482 Cr.P.C., quash the FIR,
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especially when the challan is yet to be filed. In aftermath when rather
thereupons, the chances of the petitioners being convicted are remote as
well as bleak. In sequel, the ordering for the trial of the accused, would
result in harassment and humiliation, being caused to the accused,
besides would defeat the ends of justice.
11. Furthermore, an immense support to the afore made view,
is also derived from the judgment rendered by this Court in case titled
as Vinod @ Boda and others versus State of Haryana and another
2017(1) R.C.R. (Criminal) 571, wherein also, the above view has been
reiterated.
12. There is merit in the petition, and, the same is allowed.
Consequently, after accepting the report of the learned Magistrate
concerned, this Court proceeds to quash the FIR (supra).
13. Accordingly, the FIR (supra), and, also all the
consequential proceedings, hence arising therefrom, are quashed qua
the petitioners.
(SURESHWAR THAKUR)
18.07.2022 JUDGE
kavneet singh
Whether speaking/reasoned : Yes/No
Whether reportable : Yes/No
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