Punjab-Haryana High Court
Harpal Singh And Others vs State Of Punjab And Others on 5 January, 2022
CRM-M No. 49002 of 2021 --1--
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
CRM-M-49002-2021
Reserved on : 22.12.2021
Pronounced on: 05.01.2022
Harpal Singh and others ......Petitioners
Vs.
State of Punjab and others ......Respondents
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANOOP CHITKARA
Present: Mr. G.S. Simble, Advocate for the petitioners.
Mr. Sidakmeet Singh Sandhu, AAG, Punjab.
Mr. Tarun Singla, Advocate for respondent No.2.
***
ANOOP CHITKARA J.
FIR No. Dated Police Station Sections
14 16.02.2021 Ghanie Ke Bangar, 452, 307, 324, 323, 427, 148 &
Police District Batala, 149 and Sections 25/57 of Arms
District Gurdaspur Act
The petitioners, who have arraigned as accused in the above captioned FIR,
have come up before this Court under Section 482 CrPC to quash the FIR and all
consequential proceedings based on the compromise with the victims.
2. The gist of the allegations against the petitioner(s) is that on 13.02.2021, the police
recorded the statement of complainant (respondent No.2 herein) under Section 154
Cr.P.C., in the following terms:-
"Statement of Vijay Kumar son of Kartar Chand resident of Ghanie Ke
Bangar aged about 42 years mobile number 9779057580 stated that I am
resident of above said address and I am laborer. On 12.02.2021 at about 8
pm, I was watching TV after taking dinner, bulbs were blowing in the house.
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Then I heard some quarrelling noise from the street. I tried to go to upstairs
through stairs then Gurpinder Singh @ armed with kirpan, Inderjit Singh
armed with iron rod, Supan son of Daljit Singh armed with iron rod, Harpal
Singh @ Palu son of Ranjit Singh armed with iron rod, Jaggu son of
Tarlochan Singh armed with 12 bore gun residents of Ghanie Ke Bangar
and 5/6 unknown persons entered in the house of my cousin Kasturi Lal son
of Shingara Mal. Gurvinder Singh raised lalkara that catch them and teach
them a lesson for fighting with us. Gurpinder Singh gave kirpan blow to
Prince son of Kasturi Lal resident of Ghanie Ke Bangar which hit on his
head. He fell down on the ground, then Inderjit Singh, Supan, Harpal Singh
alias Paly and unknown persons gave blows with their weapons two Kasturi
Lal. That Jaggu fired from his 12 bore gun on me with the intention to kill
me, pallets of the bullet hit me on my arms and legs, I fell down on the
ground. They were abusing and broke the house of Prince; they also broke
the car of Prince which was parked in the street and they ran away from the
spot. That Mulkh Raj son of Haveli Ram resident of Ghanie Ke Bangar
arranged the vehicle to get me and Kasturi Lal in Civil Hospital Fatehgarh
Churian but doctor referred us to Gurunanak Hospital Amritsar due to
serious injuries. That on dated 13.2.21 we again got admitted in Civil
Hospital Fatehgarh Churian to get medical report. Prince was taken to
Guru Nanak Hospital Amritsar at the same day due to injuries. We both are
under treatment. Reason behind grudge is that on 12.2.21 at the day time
Gurvinder Singh and Kasturi Lal had altercation in the market but made
them understand to send them to their houses. Due to this grudge above
said accused person in connivance with each other have inflicted injuries to
us. Action may kindly be taken against them SD/ Vijay Kumar SD/Kasturi
Lal attested by Amolak deep Singh SI SHO PS Ghanie Ke Bangar."
3. After that the investigation was conducted and other procedures were followed.
During the pendency of the petition, the accused and the injured have compromised the
matter, and its copy is annexed with this petition as Annexure P-2. After that, the
petitioners have come up before this Court to quash the FIR, and in the quashing
petition, the injured have been impleaded as respondent(s).
4. On the prayer of the parties in the present petition, the Court had permitted the
parties to appear before the concerned Court to record their statements. As per the
concerned Sessions Court's report, the victim(s), without any threat, consented to the
quashing of FIR and consequent proceedings.
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ANALYSIS & REASONING:
5. Undoubtedly, the offences are under Section 307 IPC and one of the accused even
used firearm but question for this Court is that when the villagers have compromised the
matter with the intervention of the respectable and assurance was given to live in peace
and harmony, should the criminal prosecution be disrupted in the larger interest of
Society or not.
6. The following aspects would be relevant to conclude this petition: -
a) The accused and the private respondent(s) have amicably settled the
matter between them in terms of the compromise deed and the statements
recorded before the concerned Court;
b) A perusal of the documents reveal that the settlement has not been
secured through coercion, threats, social boycotts, bribes, or other dubious
means;
c) The victims have willingly consented to the nullification of criminal
proceedings;
d) There is no objection from the private respondents in case present FIR
and consequent proceedings are quashed;
e) In the given facts, the occurrence does not affect public peace or
tranquillity, moral turpitude or harm the social and moral fabric of the society
or involve matters concerning public policy;
f) The rejection of compromise may also lead to ill will. The pendency of
trial affects career and happiness;
g) There is nothing on the record to prima facie consider the accused as an
unscrupulous, habitual, or professional offender;
h) The purpose of criminal jurisprudence is reformatory in nature and to
work to bring peace to family and society;
i) The ends of justice would justify the exercise of the inherent power by
quashing the FIR and the consequent proceedings.
7. In the present case, the offence under sections 307, 324, 148 of Indian Penal Code,
1860, (IPC) and that under Arms Act are not compoundable under Section 320 of Code
of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC).
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8. It shall be appropriate to refer to the relevant portions of compromise deed, which
is extracted as follows:
"2. That both the parties in this compromise belong to same village and
fight took place between them due to some mis-understanding and due to this
FIR whole village was divided into two parts and there was tense situation in
the village.
3. That in order to unite the village again and to finish ill will between
both the parties of the village, now with the intervention of relatives of both
the parties and respectable person of the village, compromise has been
affected between above said parties and according to compromise both the
parties have accepted that no party will take any legal action against each
other."
9. The injured appeared before the Court of JMIC, Batala, and on 13.12.2021,
made the following statement on oath:-
"Stated that the present FIR No.14 dated 16.02.2021 under Sections 452,
307, 324, 323, 427, 148 & 149 IPC and Section 25 & 27 of Arms Act, Police
Station Ghanie ke Bangar, was registered against the accused namely
Harpal Singh son of Ranjit Singh, Gurpinderjit Singh son of Kulwant Singh,
Inderjeet Singh son of Kulwant Singh, Supanbir Singh @ Supan son of
Daljeet Singh and Jagjit Singh @ Jaggu son of Tarlochan Singh, all
residents of Village Ghanie ke Banger, Tehsil Batala, District Gurdaspur on
my statement. Now I have compromised the matter with accused with the
intervention of the respectable. I have no objection if FIR No.14 dated
16.02.2021 under Sections 452, 307, 324, 323, 427, 148, 149 IPC & Section
25 and 27 of Arms Act, Police Station Ghanie ke Banger, be quashed qua
the above said persons. I have given my statement with my free will and
without any coercion and any pressure. Copy of my Aadhar card is Ex.C1.
Further, compromise effected between him and accused persons is not
having any adverse effect on the rights of any third party."
10. The other injured also testified in the similar terms vide their statements recorded
on oath on 13-12-2021.
11. JUDICIAL PRECEDENTS ON QUASHING UNDER SECTION 307 IPC:
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a). In Ram Prasad v State of Uttar Pradesh, (1982) 2 SCC 149, Supreme
Court holds,
The appellants, who are the accused and the complainant, Shri Ram,
who was the person injured as a result of firing, have appeared before
us and stated that they wish to compound the offence. The offence for
which both the appellants have been convicted is one under Section
307 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, but having regard
to the nature of the injury sustained by Shri Ram, we think that the
proper offence for which the appellants should have been convicted
was under Section 324 read with Section 34. Shri Ram received only
one injury on the shoulder and that was also in the nature of simple
hurt. We would, therefore, convert the conviction of the appellants to
one under Section 324 read with Section 34. Since the parties belong
to the same village and desire to compound the offence, we think, in
the larger interest of peace and harmony between the parties and
having regard to the nature of the injury, that it would be proper to
allow the parties to compound the offence.
b). In Mahesh Chand v State of Rajasthan, 1990 SCC 781, Hon'ble Supreme
Court holds as under:
[2]. The accused were acquitted by the trial court, but they were
convicted by the High Court for the offence under section 307 Indian
Penal Code This offence is not compoundable under law. The parties,
however. want to treat it a special case, in view of the peculiar
circumstances of the case. It is said and indeed not disputed that one
of the accused is a lawyer practising in the lower court. There was a
counter case arising out of the same transaction. It is said that this case
has already been compromised. The decision of this Court in Suresh
Babu v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 1987(2) JT 361, has been also
referred to in support of the plea for permission to compound the
offence.
c). In Dimpey Gujraj v Union Territory, (2013) 11 SCC 497, Supreme Court
holds,
[5]. In light of the above observations of this court in Gian Singh v.
State of Punjab and another, 2012(4) R.C.R.(Criminal) 543 : 2012(4)
Recent Apex Judgments (R.A.J.) 549 : 2012(5) CTC 526 (SC) we feel
that this is a case where the continuation of criminal proceedings
would tantamount to abuse of process of law because the alleged
offences are not heinous offences showing extreme depravity nor are
they against the society. They are offences of a personal nature and
burying them would bring about peace and amity between the two
sides. In the circumstances of the case, FIR No. 163 dated 26/10/2006
registered under Section 147, 148, 149, 323, 307, 452 and 506 of the
Indian Penal Code at Police Station Sector 3, Chandigarh and all
consequential proceedings arising therefrom including the final report
presented under Section 173 of the Code and charges framed by the
trial court are hereby quashed.
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d). In State of Rajasthan v. Shambhu Kewat, (2014) 4 SCC 149, Hon'ble Supreme
Court holds,
[14] We notice that the gravity of the injuries was taken note of by the
Sessions Court and it had awarded the sentence of 10 years rigorous
imprisonment for the offence punishable under Section 307 IPC, but
not by the High Court. The High Court has completely overlooked the
various principles laid down by this Court in Gian Singh , and has
committed a mistake in taking the view that, the injuries were caused
on the body of Abdul Rashid in a fight occurred at the spur and the
heat of the moment. It has been categorically held by this Court in
Gian Singh that the Court, while exercising the power under Section
482, must have "due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime" and
"the societal impact". Both these aspects were completely overlooked
by the High Court. The High Court in a cursory manner, without
application of mind, blindly accepted the statement of the parties that
they had settled their disputes and differences and took the view that it
was a crime against "an individual", rather than against "the society at
large".
[15] We are not prepared to say that the crime alleged to have been
committed by the accused persons was a crime against an individual,
on the other hand it was a crime against the society at large. Criminal
law is designed as a mechanism for achieving social control and its
purpose is the regulation of conduct and activities within the society.
Why Section 307 IPC is held to be non-compoundable, because the
Code has identified which conduct should be brought within the ambit
of non-compoundable offences.
Such provisions are not meant, just to protect the individual, but the
society as a whole. High Court was not right in thinking that it was
only an injury to the person and since the accused persons had
received the monetary compensation and settled the matter, the crime
as against them was wiped off. Criminal justice system has a larger
objective to achieve, that is safety and protection of the people at large
and it would be a lesson not only to the offender, but to the individuals
at large so that such crimes would not be committed by any one and
money would not be a substitute for the crime committed against the
society. Taking a lenient view on a serious offence like the present,
will leave a wrong impression about the criminal justice system and
will encourage further criminal acts, which will endanger the peaceful
co-existence and welfare of the society at large.
[16] We are, therefore, inclined to allow this appeal and set aside the
judgment of the High Court. The High Court was carried away by the
settlement and has not examined the matter on merits, hence, we are
inclined to direct the High Court to take back the appeal to its file and
decide the appeal on merits.
e). In Yogendra Yadav v State of Jharkhand, 21.7.2014, Supreme Court holds,
[4]. Now, the question before this Court is whether this Court can
compound the offences under Sections 326 and 307 of the IPC which
are non-compoundable. Needless to say that offences which are non-
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compoundable cannot be compounded by the court. Courts draw the
power of compounding offences from Section 320 of the Code. The
said provision has to be strictly followed (Gian Singh v. State of
Punjab, 2012(4) R.C.R.(Criminal) 543 : 2012(4) Recent Apex
Judgments (R.A.J.) 549 : (2012)10 SCC 303). However, in a given
case, the High Court can quash a criminal proceeding in exercise of its
power under section 482 of the Code having regard to the fact that the
parties have amicably settled their disputes and the victim has no
objection, even though the offences are non-compoundable. In which
cases the High Court can exercise its discretion to quash the
proceedings will depend on facts and circumstances of each case.
Offences which involve moral turpitude, grave offences like rape,
murder etc. cannot be effaced by quashing the proceedings because
that will have harmful effect on the society. Such offences cannot be
said to be restricted to two individuals or two groups. If such offences
are quashed, it may send wrong signal to the society. However, when
the High Court is convinced that the offences are entirely personal in
nature and, therefore, do not affect public peace or tranquillity and
where it feels that quashing of such proceedings on account of
compromise would bring about peace and would secure ends of
justice, it should not hesitate to quash them. In such cases, the
prosecution becomes a lame prosecution. Pursuing such a lame
prosecution would be waste of time and energy. That will also unsettle
the compromise and obstruct restoration of peace.
f). In State of Madhya Pradesh v. Dhruv Gurjar, (2019) 5 SCC 570, the FIR was
registered under S 307, 294 and 34 IPC based on the allegations that Dhruv Gurjar
(accused) armed with a 12-bore gun, and his gang, visited the house of the
complainant with a view to take revenge with his nephew. When the complainant
told them that his nephew was not present at home, on this Dhruv Gurjar fired, and
the pellets struck on his forehead, left shoulder and left ear. Disagreeing with the
order of High Court quashing the FIR, Hon'ble Supreme Court held,
[16.1] However, the High Court has not at all considered the fact that
the offences alleged were non-compoundable offences as per Section
320 of the Cr.P.C. From the impugned judgments and orders, it
appears that the High Court has not at all considered the relevant facts
and circumstances of the case, more particularly the seriousness of the
offences and its social impact. From the impugned judgments and
orders passed by the High Court, it appears that the High Court has
mechanically quashed the respective FIRs, in exercise of its powers
under Section 482 Cr.P.C. The High Court has not at all considered the
distinction between a personal or private wrong and a social wrong
and the social impact. As observed by this Court in the case of State of
Maharashtra vs. Vikram Anantrai Doshi, 2014 15 SCC 29, the Court's
principal duty, while exercising the powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
to quash the criminal proceedings, should be to scan the entire facts to
find out the thrust of the allegations and the crux of the settlement. As
observed, it is the experience of the Judge that comes to his aid and
the said experience should be used with care, caution, circumspection
and courageous prudence.
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12. The contents of compromise deed and its objectives point towards its acceptance,
in the light of the Judicial precedents mentioned above
13. In Parbatbhai Aahir v State of Gujarat, (2017) 9 SCC 641, a three Judges Bench
of Hon'ble Supreme Court, laid down the broad principles for quashing of FIR, which
are reproduced as follows:-
[16]. The broad principles which emerge from the precedents on the
subject, may be summarised in the following propositions:
16 (i) Section 482 preserves the inherent powers of the High Court to
prevent an abuse of the process of any court or to secure the ends of
justice. The provision does not confer new powers. It only recognises
and preserves powers which inhere in the High Court;
16 (ii) The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Court to quash a
First Information Report or a criminal proceeding on the ground that a
settlement has been arrived at between the offender and the victim is
not the same as the invocation of jurisdiction for the purpose of
compounding an offence. While compounding an offence, the power of
the court is governed by the provisions of section 320 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973. The power to quash under Section 482 is
attracted even if the offence is non-compoundable.
16 (iii) In forming an opinion whether a criminal proceeding or
complaint should be quashed in exercise of its jurisdiction under
Section 482, the High Court must evaluate whether the ends of justice
would justify the exercise of the inherent power;
16 (iv) While the inherent power of the High Court has a wide ambit
and plenitude it has to be exercised; (i) to secure the ends of justice or
(ii) to prevent an abuse of the process of any court;
16 (v) The decision as to whether a complaint or First Information
Report should be quashed on the ground that the offender and victim
have settled the dispute, revolves ultimately on the facts and
circumstances of each case and no exhaustive elaboration of principles
can be formulated;
16 (vi) In the exercise of the power under Section 482 and while
dealing with a plea that the dispute has been settled, the High Court
must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the offence. Heinous
and serious offences involving mental depravity or offences such as
murder, rape and dacoity cannot appropriately be quashed though the
victim or the family of the victim have settled the dispute. Such
offences are, truly speaking, not private in nature but have a serious
impact upon society. The decision to continue with the trial in such
cases is founded on the overriding element of public interest in
punishing persons for serious offences;
16 (vii) As distinguished from serious offences, there may be criminal
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cases which have an overwhelming or predominant element of a civil
dispute. They stand on a distinct footing in so far as the exercise of the
inherent power to quash is concerned;
16 (viii) Criminal cases involving offences which arise from
commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or similar transactions
with an essentially civil flavour may in appropriate situations fall for
quashing where parties have settled the dispute;
16 (ix) In such a case, the High Court may quash the criminal
proceeding if in view of the compromise between the disputants, the
possibility of a conviction is remote and the continuation of a criminal
proceeding would cause oppression and prejudice; and
16 (x) There is yet an exception to the principle set out in propositions
(viii) and (ix) above. Economic offences involving the financial and
economic well-being of the state have implications which lie beyond
the domain of a mere dispute between private disputants. The High
Court would be justified in declining to quash where the offender is
involved in an activity akin to a financial or economic fraud or
misdemeanour. The consequences of the act complained of upon the
financial or economic system will weigh in the balance.
14. In Ramgopal v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, Cr.A 1489 of 2012, decided on
29.09.2021, Hon'ble Supreme Court holds,
[11]. True it is that offences which are 'non-compoundable' cannot be
compounded by a criminal court in purported exercise of its powers
under Section 320 Cr.P.C. Any such attempt by the court would amount
to alteration, addition and modification of Section 320 Cr.P.C, which is
the exclusive domain of Legislature. There is no patent or latent
ambiguity in the language of Section 320 Cr.P.C., which may justify its
wider interpretation and include such offences in the docket of
'compoundable' offences which have been consciously kept out as non-
compoundable. Nevertheless, the limited jurisdiction to compound an
offence within the framework of Section 320 Cr.P.C. is not an embargo
against invoking inherent powers by the High Court vested in it under
Section 482 Cr.P.C. The High Court, keeping in view the peculiar facts
and circumstances of a case and for justifiable reasons can press
Section 482 Cr.P.C. in aid to prevent abuse of the process of any Court
and/or to secure the ends of justice.
[12]. The High Court, therefore, having regard to the nature of the
offence and the fact that parties have amicably settled their dispute and
the victim has willingly consented to the nullification of criminal
proceedings, can quash such proceedings in exercise of its inherent
powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C., even if the offences are non-
compoundable. The High Court can indubitably evaluate the
consequential effects of the offence beyond the body of an individual
and thereafter adopt a pragmatic approach, to ensure that the felony,
even if goes unpunished, does not tinker with or paralyze the very
object of the administration of criminal justice system.
[13]. It appears to us those criminal proceedings involving non-heinous
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offences or where the offences are predominantly of aprivate nature,
can be annulled irrespective of the fact that trial has already been
concluded or appeal stands dismissed against conviction. Handing out
punishment is not the sole form of delivering justice. Societal method
of applying laws evenly is always subject to lawful exceptions. It goes
without saying, that the cases where compromise is struck
postconviction, the High Court ought to exercise such discretion with
rectitude, keeping in view the circumstances surrounding the incident,
the fashion in which the compromise has been arrived at, and with due
regard to the nature and seriousness of the offence, besides the conduct
of the accused, before and after the incidence. The touchstone for
exercising the extraordinary power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. would be
to secure the ends of justice. There can be no hard and fast line
constricting the power of the High Court to do substantial justice. A
restrictive construction of inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
may lead to rigid or specious justice, which in the given facts and
circumstances of a case, may rather lead to grave injustice. On the
other hand, in cases where heinous offences have been proved against
perpetrators, no such benefit ought to be extended, as cautiously
observed by this Court in Narinder Singh &Ors. vs. State of Punjab
&Ors. [(2014) 6 SCC 466, ¶ 29], and Laxmi Narayan [(2019) 5 SCC
688, ¶ 15].
[14]. In other words, grave or serious offences or offences which
involve moral turpitude or have a harmful effect on the social and
moral fabric of the society or involve matters concerning public policy,
cannot be construed between two individuals or groups only, for such
offences have the potential to impact the society at large. Effacing
abominable offences through quashing process would not only send a
wrong signal to the community but may also accord an undue benefit to
unscrupulous habitual or professional offenders, who can secure a
'settlement' through duress, threats, social boycotts, bribes or other
dubious means. It is well said that "let no guilty man escape, if it can
be avoided."
15. This Court has inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure to interfere in this kind of matter. Given the entirety of the case and judicial
precedents, I am of the considered opinion that the continuation of these proceedings
will not suffice any fruitful purpose whatsoever. The Court is inclined to invoke the
inherent jurisdiction under section 482 Cr.P.C to quash the FIR and all subsequent
proceedings in the peculiar facts and circumstances.
16. In Shakuntala Sawhney v Kaushalya Sawhney, (1979) 3 SCR 639, at P 642,
Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that the finest hour of Justice arises propitiously when
parties, who fell apart, bury the hatchet and weave a sense of fellowship or reunion.
17. Given the nature of allegations and the other circumstances peculiar to this case,
the petitioners shall surrender all weapons, firearms, ammunition, if any, along with the
arms license to the concerned authority within 30 days from today and inform the
Investigator about the compliance. They shall never be entitled to any Arms licence.
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18. In Himachal Pradesh Cricket Association v State of Himachal Pradesh, 2018 (4)
Crimes 324, Hon'ble Supreme Court holds "[47]. As far as Writ Petition (Criminal) No.
135 of 2017 is concerned, the appellants came to this Court challenging the order of
cognizance only because of the reason that matter was already pending as the appellants
had filed the Special Leave Petitions against the order of the High Court rejecting their
petition for quashing of the FIR/Chargesheet. Having regard to these peculiar facts, writ
petition has also been entertained. In any case, once we hold that FIR needs to be
quashed, order of cognizance would automatically stands vitiated."
19. Given above, because of the compromise, this is a fit case where the inherent
jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is
invoked to quash the proceedings mentioned above. In the facts and circumstances
peculiar to this case, the petition is allowed in the aforementioned terms. The FIR and
other proceedings captioned above, with all consequential proceedings arising
therefrom, are hereby quashed qua the present petitioners. The bail bonds of the
petitioners are accordingly discharged. All pending application(s), if any, stand closed.
Petition allowed.
(ANOOP CHITKARA)
JUDGE
05.01.2022
anju rani
Whether speaking/reasoned: Yes
Whether reportable: No
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