Patna High Court
Prakash Chandra Roy vs Union Bank Of India And Anr on 31 October, 2025
Author: Partha Sarthy
Bench: Partha Sarthy
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA
Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No.21059 of 2012
======================================================
Prakash Chandra Roy son of Sri B N Roy, Resident of Village Tarapur, Post
Chhathar, P.S. Tarlapur, District Banka
... ... Petitioner/s
Versus
1. Union Bank of India through its General Manager, HRD, General Manager,
Human Resources Department, Central Office, Union Bank of India, Bank
Bhawan, Nariman Point, Bombay 400021
2. The Deputy General Manager, Human Resources Department, having its
office at Central Office, Union Bank of India, Bank Bhawan, Nariman Point,
Bombay 400021
... ... Respondent/s
======================================================
Appearance :
For the Petitioner/s : Mr. Mukund Jee, Advocate
Mr. Shyamal Krishna Sinha, Advocate
For the Respondent/s : Mr. Prabhat Kumar Sharan, Advocate
Mr. Hemant Kumar Sharan, Advocate
======================================================
CORAM: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE PARTHA SARTHY
C.A.V. JUDGMENT
Date : 31-10-2025
Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned
counsel for the respondents.
2. The petitioner in the instant application has
prayed for quashing the article of charges contained in
memorandum dated 26.10.2005 (Annexure-1), the order of
dismissal of the petitioner dated 18.12.2006 (Annexure-2)
passed under the signature of the disciplinary authority ie the
Assistant General Manager (Industrial Relations), Union Bank
Patna High Court CWJC No.21059 of 2012 dt.31-10-2025
2/16
of India, the order of the appellate authority ie Deputy General
Manager (HRM) dated 27.2.2007 (Annexure-3) and the order of
the reviewing authority ie the General Manager (HRM) dated
3.7.2007
rejecting the review petition filed by the petitioner.
3. At the outset, learned counsel for the respondent-
Bank has raised the question of maintainability of the instant
writ application on account of this Court not having territorial
jurisdiction to hear the case, all the proceedings with respect to
the petitioner having taken place in the State of Maharashtra.
4. The relevant facts in brief are that the petitioner
joined the Union Bank of India on 22.10.2001. At the relevant
time, he was posted as the Assistant Manager at Mauganj
Branch of the Bank in Rewa in the State of Madhya Pradesh.
The petitioner was served with a show cause notice dated
18.2.2005 while working at Mauganj Branch. The order stated
that in view of serious acts of omission and commission,
pending investigation/departmental action in the matter, he was
being placed under suspension. The petitioner replied to the
show cause notice on 26.5.2005 but subsequently on
26.10.2005, was served with the chargesheet/statement of
allegations (Annexure-1) to which the petitioner replied. An
enquiry report dated 29.9.2006 was submitted finding all the
Patna High Court CWJC No.21059 of 2012 dt.31-10-2025
charges against the petitioner to be proved. By order dated
18.12.2006 passed by the disciplinary authority, the petitioner
was inflicted with the major penalty of dismissal from service
from the Bank with immediate effect. The appeal filed by the
petitioner was rejected on 27.2.2007 by the appellate authority
and the review petition filed on 1.6.2007 by the petitioner was
also rejected by the reviewing authority on 3.7.2007.
5. Learned counsel for the respondent-Bank submits
that the entire proceedings with respect to the omission and
commission committed by the petitioner at Mauganj Branch in
Rewa having taken place in the State of Madhya Pradesh, the
writ application should have been filed either at Madhya
Pradesh or in the State of Maharashtra where the petitioner was
posted on transfer. This Court does not have territorial
jurisdiction to hear the instant application. Reliance is placed by
learned counsel for the respondents on the judgments in the case
of Lt. Col. Khajoor Singh vs. Union of India and Anr.; AIR
1961 SC 532, National Textile Corporation Limited and Ors.
vs. Haribox Swalram and Ors.; (2004) 9 SCC 786, M/s Kusum
Ingots and Alloys Ltd. vs. Union of India and Anr.; AIR 2004
SC 2321, Alchemist Ltd. and another vs. State Bank of Sikkim
and others; (2007) 11 SCC 335 as also judgments dated
Patna High Court CWJC No.21059 of 2012 dt.31-10-2025
17.5.2016 of this Court in the case of Sunil Kumar Yadav vs.
The Union of India & Ors. (CWJC no.2998 of 2013) and dated
3.12.2008 in the case of Amar Kumar Choubey vs. The Union
of India & Ors. (LPA no.827 of 2007).
6. Heard learned counsel for the parties and
perused the material on record.
7. The facts of the case in brief are that the
petitioner was served with the statement of
allegations/chargesheet on 26.10.2005 when he was posted as an
Assistant Manager in the Personnel Administration Department
in Central Office of the Union Bank of India at Mumbai. The
charges related to his tenure as Assistant Manager at Mauganj
Branch, Rewa in the State of Madhya Pradesh. The proceedings
continued at Mumbai and the order of punishment dated
18.12.2006 passed by the disciplinary authority, the order of the
appellate authority dated 27.2.2007 as also the order of the
reviewing authority dated 3.7.2007, all were passed at Mumbai.
8. On perusal of the records, it transpires that the
petitioner moved the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in writ
petition bearing WP no.2249 of 2009 which was disposed of as
withdrawn by order dated 7.9.2011 with liberty to the petitioner
to approach the appropriate High Court for mitigation of his
Patna High Court CWJC No.21059 of 2012 dt.31-10-2025
grievance.
9. It may be observed here that with respect to the
period that the petitioner was posted at the Branch in the district
of Rewa, Madhya Pradesh, the proceedings were initiated when
the petitioner was an Assistant Manager in the Personnel
Administration Department in the Central Office at Mumbai.
The petitioner was put under suspension on 1.3.2005 pending
departmental action in the matter, in Mumbai. A perusal of the
records would show that the chargesheet/statement of
allegations was served and the departmental proceeding
conducted by the Enquiry Officer at Mumbai and the same
ended with the enquiry report being submitted in Mumbai
finding all the charges levelled against the petitioner to have
been proved.
10. On perusal of the contents of the writ petition,
it transpires that the petitioner does not state about the orders
impugned in the instant application having been served at his
residential address in Bihar. Neither any such statement is made
on behalf of the petitioner in the three supplementary affidavits
filed on behalf of the petitioner.
11. It transpires from the letter dated 18.2.2005 sent
by the disciplinary authority to the petitioner which has been
Patna High Court CWJC No.21059 of 2012 dt.31-10-2025
brought on record as Annexure-10 to the supplementary
affidavit filed on behalf of the petitioner that having been
relieved from Rewa on 25.1.2005, as advised, the petitioner did
not report to the Deputy General Manager (HRM), Central
Office at Mumbai and remained unauthorisedly absent. He was
thus called upon by the said letter to submit his explanation
within ten days. As a result of his unauthorised absence, the
communication was also marked to his native address but no
reply was received from the petitioner.
12. It is the contention of the petitioner that since
the order of punishment and other impugned orders were
communicated to the petitioner at his permanent address in the
district of Banka in Bihar, this Court would have jurisdiction to
decide the instant case.
13. Article 226 (2) of the Constitution of India
provides that the power conferred by Article 226 (1) to issue
direction, order or writs may be exercised by any High Court in
relation to territories within which the cause of action wholly or
in part arises.
14. At this stage, it would be relevant to take note
of certain decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court as also this
Court on the point of jurisdiction.
Patna High Court CWJC No.21059 of 2012 dt.31-10-2025
15. In the case of Lt. Col. Khajoor Singh (supra),
the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows :-
"14. The seat of a Government is
sometimes mentioned in the Constitutions of
various countries but many a time the seat is not
so mentioned. But whether the seat of a
Government is mentioned in the Constitution or
not, there is undoubtedly a seat from which the
Government as such functions as a fact. What
Art. 226 requires is residence or location as a
fact and if therefore there is a seat from which the
Government functions as a fact even though that
seat is not mentioned in the Constitution the High
Court within whose territories that seat is located
will be the High Court having jurisdiction under
Art. 226 so far as the orders of the Government
as such are concerned. Therefore, the view taken
1953 SCR 1144: (AIR 1953 SC 210) (supra) and
1954 SCR 738 (AIR 1954 SC 207) (supra) that
there is two-fold limitation on the power of the
High Court to issue writs etc. under Art. 226,
namely, (i) the power is to be exercised
'throughout the territories in relation to which it
exercises jurisdiction', that is to say, the writs
issued by the Court cannot run beyond the
territories subject to its jurisdiction, and (ii) the
person or authority to whom the High Court is
empowered to issue such writs must be "within
those territories" which clearly implies that they
must be amenable to its jurisdiction either by
Patna High Court CWJC No.21059 of 2012 dt.31-10-2025
residence or location within those territories, is
the correct one.
15. This brings us to the second point, namely,
whether it is possible to introduce the concept of
cause of action in Art. 226 so that the High Court
in whose jurisdiction the cause of action arose
would be the proper one to pass an order
thereunder. Reliance in this connection has been
placed on the judgment of the Privy Council in 70
Ind. App 129: (AIR 1943 P.C. 164). In that case
the Privy Council held that even though the
impugned order was passed by the Board of
Revenue which was located in Madras, the High
Court would have no jurisdiction to issue a writ
quashing that order, as it had no jurisdiction to
issue a writ beyond the limits of the city of
Madras except in certain cases, and that
particular matter was not within the exceptions.
This decision of the Privy Council does
apparently introduce an element of the place
where the cause of action arose in considering
the jurisdiction of the High Court, to issue a writ.
The basis of that decision, however, was the
peculiar history of the issue of writs by the three
Presidency High Courts as successors of the
Supreme Courts, though on the literal
construction of cl. 8 of the Charter of 1800
conferring jurisdiction on the Supreme Court of
Madras, there could be little doubt that the
Supreme Court would have the same jurisdiction
as the Justices of the Court of King's Bench
Patna High Court CWJC No.21059 of 2012 dt.31-10-2025
Division in England for the territories which then
were or thereafter might be subject to or depend
upon the Government of Madras. It will therefore
not be correct to put too much stress on the
decision in that case. The question whether the
concept of cause of action could be introduced in
Art. 226 was also considered in Saka Venkata
Subba Rao's case, 1953 SCR 1144: (AIR 1953 SC
210) and was repelled in these words:-
"The rule that cause of action attracts
jurisdiction in suits is based on statutory
enactment and cannot apply to writs issuable
under Art. 226 which makes no reference to any
cause of action or where it arises but insists on
the presence of the person or authority 'within
the territories' in relation to which the High
Court exercises jurisdiction."
16. Article 226 as it stands does not refer
anywhere to the accrual of cause of action and to
the jurisdiction of the High Court depending on
the place where the cause of action accrues being
within its territorial jurisdiction. Proceedings
under Art. 226 are not suits; they provide for
extraordinary remedies by a special procedure
and give powers of correction to the High Court
over persons and authorities and these special
powers have to be exercised within the limits set
for them. These two limitations have already been
indicated by us above and one of them is that the
person or authority concerned must be within the
territories over which the High Court exercises
Patna High Court CWJC No.21059 of 2012 dt.31-10-2025
jurisdiction. Is it possible then to overlook this
constitutional limitation and say that the High
Court can issue a writ against a person or
authority even though it may not be within its
territories simply because the cause of action has
arisen within those territories? It seems to us that
it would be going in the face of the express
provision in Art. 226 and doing away with an
express limitation contained therein if the concept
of cause of action were to be introduced in it. Nor
do we think that it is right to say that because Art.
300 specifically provides for suits by and against
the Government of India, the proceedings under
Art. 226 are also covered by Art. 300. It seems to
us that Art. 300 which is on the same line as S.
176 of the Government of India Act, 1935, dealt
with suits as such and proceedings analogous to
or consequent upon suits and has no reference to
the extraordinary remedies provided by Art. 226
of the Constitution. The concept of cause of
action cannot in our opinion be introduced in Art.
226, for by doing so we shall be doing away with
the express provision contained therein which
requires that the person or authority to whom the
writ is to be issued should be resident in or
located within the territories over which the High
Court has jurisdiction. It is true that this may
result in some inconvenience to persons residing
far away from Now Delhi who are aggrieved by
some order of the Government of India as such,
and that may be a reason for making a suitable
Patna High Court CWJC No.21059 of 2012 dt.31-10-2025
constitutional amendment in Art.226. But the
argument of inconvenience, in our opinion,
cannot affect the plain language of Art. 226, nor
can the concept of the place of cause of action be
introduced into it for that would do away with the
two limitations on the powers of the High Court
contained in it."
(Emphasis supplied)
16. In the case of State of Rajasthan and others vs.
M/s Swaika Properties and Another; (1985) 3 SCC 217, the
Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows :-
"8..........The mere service of notice
under Section 52(2) of the Act on the
respondents at their registered office at 18-B,
Brabourne Road, Calcutta ie within the
territorial limits of the State of West Bengal,
could not give rise to a cause of action within
that territory unless the service of such notice
was an integral part of the cause of action. The
entire cause of action culminating in the
acquisition of the land under Section 52(1) of
the Act arose within the State of Rajasthan ie.
within the territorial jurisdiction of the
Rajasthan High Court at the Jaipur Bench....."
17. In the case of National Textile Corporation
Limited (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows :-
"10. Under clause (2) of Article 226 of the
Constitution, the High Court is empowered to issue
writs, orders or directions to any Government,
Patna High Court CWJC No.21059 of 2012 dt.31-10-2025
authority or person exercising jurisdiction in
relation to the territories within which the cause of
action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of
such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such
Government or authority or the residence of such
person is not within those territories. Cause of
action as understood in the civil proceedings means
every fact which, if traversed, would be necessary
for the plaintiff to prove in order to support his
right to a judgment of the court. To put it in a
different way, it is the bundle of facts which taken
with the law applicable to them, gives the plaintiff a
right to relief against the defendant. In Union of
India v. Adani Exports Ltd. in the context of clause
(2) of Article 226 of the Constitution, it has been
explained that each and every fact pleaded in the
writ petition does not ipso facto lead to the
conclusion that those facts give rise to a cause of
action within the court's territorial jurisdiction
unless those facts pleaded are such which have a
nexus or relevance with the lis that is involved in
the case. Facts which have no bearing with the lis
or dispute involved in the case, do not give rise to a
cause of action so as to confer territorial
jurisdiction on the court concerned. A similar
question was examined in State of Rajasthan v.
Swaika Properties. Here certain properties
belonging to a company which had its registered
office in Calcutta were sought to be acquired in
Jaipur and a notice under Section 52 of the
Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act was served
Patna High Court CWJC No.21059 of 2012 dt.31-10-2025
upon the company at Calcutta. The question which
arose for consideration was whether the service of
notice at the head office of the company at Calcutta
could give rise to a cause of action within the State
of West Bengal to enable the Calcutta High Court
to exercise jurisdiction in a matter where challenge
to acquisition proceedings conducted in Jaipur was
made. It was held that the entire cause of action
culminating in the acquisition of the land under
Section 152 of the Rajasthan Act arose within the
territorial jurisdiction of the Rajasthan High Court
and it was not necessary for the company to plead
the service of notice upon them at Calcutta for
grant of appropriate writ, order or direction under
Article 226 of the Constitution for quashing the
notice issued by the Rajasthan Government under
Section 52 of the Act. It was thus held that the
Calcutta High Court had no jurisdiction to
entertain the writ petition.
12. .......As discussed earlier, the mere fact that the
writ petitioner carries on business at Calcutta or
that the reply to the correspondence made by it was
received at Calcutta is not an integral part of the
cause of action and, therefore, the Calcutta High
Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the writ
petition and the view to the contrary taken by the
Division Bench cannot be sustained. In view of the
above finding, the writ petition is liable to be
dismissed....."
18. In the case of M/s Kusum Ingots and Alloys
Ltd. (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows :-
Patna High Court CWJC No.21059 of 2012 dt.31-10-2025
"6. Cause of action implies a right
to sue. The material facts which are imperative for
the suitor to allege and prove constitutes the cause
of action. Cause of action is not defined in any
statute. It has, however, been judicially interpreted
inter alia to mean that every fact which would be
necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in
order to support his right to the judgment of the
Court. Negatively put, it would mean that
everything which, if not proved, gives the defendant
an immediate right to judgment, would be part of
cause of action. Its importance is beyond any
doubt. For every асtion, there has to be a cause of
action, if not, the plaint or the writ petition, as the
case may be, shall be rejected summarily."
19. In the case of Alchemist Ltd. (supra), the
Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows :-
"37. From the aforesaid discussion
and keeping in view the ratio laid down in a catena
of decisions by this Court, it is clear that for the
purpose of deciding whether facts averred by the
appellant-petitioner would or would not constitute
a part of cause of action, one has to consider
whether such fact constitutes a material, essential,
or integral part of the cause of action. It is no
doubt true that even if a small fraction of the cause
of action arises within the jurisdiction of the court,
the court would have territorial jurisdiction to
entertain the suit/petition. Nevertheless it must be a
"part of cause of action", nothing less than that."
20. So far as the facts of the instant case are concerned,
Patna High Court CWJC No.21059 of 2012 dt.31-10-2025
there is no dispute that the period for which the proceedings
were started against the petitioner related to the district of Rewa
in the State of Madhya Pradesh. There is also no dispute with
respect to the fact that proceedings were conducted in Mumbai.
There is no averment in the writ application with respect to the
fact that the charge memo or the orders impugned were
communicated to the petitioner at his native address in Bihar.
The only averment in the writ application is to the effect that on
an objection with respect to territorial jurisdiction having been
raised by the respondent-Bank in the Madhya Pradesh High
Court, it was submitted by the Bank that either the High Court
at Mumbai or at Patna would have the jurisdiction to entertain
the writ petition on which the application was withdrawn by the
petitioner. The said order of withdrawal as contained in
Annexure-5 does not reflect the said submission of the
petitioner.
21. Further, accepting the oral contention of learned
counsel for the petitioner that the order impugned was
communicated to the petitioner at his residential address in the
State of Bihar, still in the opinion of the Court, the same would
not constitute a 'material, essential or integral part of the cause
of action' and thus in view of the judgment in the case of
Patna High Court CWJC No.21059 of 2012 dt.31-10-2025
Alchemist Ltd. (supra), this Court will not have jurisdiction to
entertain the instant application.
22. In view of the facts and circumstances stated
herein above as rightly contended by learned counsel for the
respondents, the High Court at Patna does not have territorial
jurisdiction to entertain the instant writ application and the same
is not maintainable on this ground.
23. The writ application is dismissed as not
maintainable.
(Partha Sarthy, J)
Saurabh/-
AFR/NAFR NAFR
CAV DATE 16.09.2025
Uploading Date 31.10.2025
Transmission Date N/A
