[Cites 18, Cited by 0]
Patna High Court
Satya Prakash vs The Union Of India And Ors on 16 December, 2025
Author: Alok Kumar Sinha
Bench: Alok Kumar Sinha
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA
Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No.15379 of 2015
======================================================
Satya Prakash Son of late Mudrika Prasad resident of Flat No. 3/3, Yadubansh
Path, Boring Canal Road, Police Station - Budha Colony, District - Patna.
... ... Petitioner/s
Versus
1. The Union Of India through the Secretary, Department of Human Resource
Development, Govt. of India, New Delhi.
2. The Central University of South Bihar through its Vice Chancellor, BIT
Campus, P.O. B.V. College, P
3. The Vice Chancellor, Central University of South Bihar, BIT Campus, P.O.
B.V. College, Patna.
4. The Registrar, Central University of South Bihar, BIT Campus, P.O. B.V.
College, Patna.
5. C.L., Prabhavathi, the Registrar, Central University of South Bihar, BIT
Campus, P.O. B.V. College,
... ... Respondent/s
======================================================
Appearance :
For the Petitioner/s : Mr. Ansul, Sr. Adv
Mr. Rajesh Shukla, Adv
Mr. Ravi Bhardwaj, Adv
Mrs. Aditi Sharma, Adv
For the Respondent/s : Mr. S.D. Sanjay, Sr. Adv
Mr. Mohit Agarwal, Adv
Mr. Rahul Kumar, Adv
======================================================
CORAM: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ALOK KUMAR SINHA
CAV JUDGMENT
Date- 16-12-2025.
Heard the parties.
2. The petitioner in the present writ application has
prayed for issuance of a writ in the nature of certiorari for quashing
the office order no. 138/15 datd 18.09.2015 whereby, as per the
petitioner, the petitioner has been relieved of his duties without any
prior information; as the same is wholly without jurisdiction;
contrary to the provisions of the Act and the Statute and is, therefore,
Patna High Court CWJC No.15379 of 2015 dt.16-12-2025
2/46
arbitrary and illegal. Consequent upon the quashing of the office
order no. 138/15 dated 18/09/15, the petitioner further prays for
direction to treat the petitioner in continuous service without any
break of service with all admissible and consequential benefits.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner states that the
petitioner was appointed as Deputy Registrar in the Central
University of Bihar (now known as the Central University of
South Bihar), pursuant to Advertisement No. CUB/Advt./21/2013
dated 16.09.2013. It is submitted that the petitioner duly
participated in the selection process, was selected by the
competent Selection Committee, and thereafter appointed on a
substantive post by order dated 19.12.2013 (Annexure:1), issued
with the approval of the Executive Council, under Clause 23(2) of
the University Statute, in the pay band of Rs. 15,600-39,100 with
Grade Pay of Rs. 7,600/-. The petitioner joined his duties on
26.03.2014
and the joining report was duly notified.
4. Learned counsel further submits that the petitioner
discharged his duties diligently and to the satisfaction of all
concerned authorities. Except for one instance where he was asked
to explain his brief absence from office during an examination
period--an explanation which was accepted and the leave
regularized--there was never any allegation or show cause issued
Patna High Court CWJC No.15379 of 2015 dt.16-12-2025
against him at any point of time. It is asserted that during the entire
tenure of service, the petitioner maintained an unblemished record
and no misconduct was ever attributed to him.
5. It is further stated that, to the petitioner's shock, he
was abruptly served with a letter dated 18.09.2015 (Annexure:3)
issued by Respondent No. 4, intimating him that he stood relieved
from the post of Deputy Registrar with immediate effect and that
his dues would be released. Along with the said letter, Office
Order No. 138/15 dated 18.09.2015 (Annexure;4) was enclosed,
directing all departments to complete the "No Dues" formalities.
Learned counsel emphasizes that prior to issuance of the impugned
communication, the petitioner was never afforded any show cause
notice, nor was any assessment of his suitability undertaken, nor
was any reason disclosed for the termination of his services.
6. Learned counsel submits that the petitioner is an
"employee" within the meaning of Section 2(i) of the Central
Universities Act, and his conditions of service, including manner
of termination, are governed strictly by the Statute. Under Entry
12(2)(iv) read with Entry 25 of the Second Schedule, the
Executive Council alone is the competent appointing and
removing authority. It is urged that the Statute permits removal
only on grounds of misconduct or for good cause, and only after
Patna High Court CWJC No.15379 of 2015 dt.16-12-2025
affording reasonable opportunity of hearing and by giving three
months' notice or salary in lieu thereof. In the present case, neither
misconduct nor any good cause has been recorded, nor any
opportunity granted, and the impugned order is completely silent
on these mandatory statutory requirements.
7. It is further contended that the impugned action is
without jurisdiction, as no meeting of the Executive Council was
convened since July 2015 and upto the date of termination.
Learned counsel submits that essential disciplinary powers vested
in the Executive Council cannot be delegated to the Vice-
Chancellor or any other authority, and any such purported exercise
of power would be illegal tantamounting to colourable exercise of
power.
8. Learned counsel for the petitioner, adverting to the
supplementary affidavit, states that the respondents cannot rely
upon the plea of probation, as the governing Act and Statute do not
contemplate any probationary arrangement for employees of the
University. It is submitted that the petitioner's appointment order
itself stipulates that the terms and conditions of service shall be
governed strictly by the Act, Statutes, Ordinances and Regulations
of the University. However, none of these statutory instruments,
except a draft Ordinance, contain any provision relating to
Patna High Court CWJC No.15379 of 2015 dt.16-12-2025
probation. Learned counsel points out that even this Ordinance has
admittedly been published in the Official Gazette on 17/08/2016 in
terms of Section 43 of the governing act and therefore it was not
enforced on the date of appointment as well as on the date of
termination ." Therefore, reliance upon such an inoperative
Ordinance cannot be permitted, nor can clauses in the appointment
letter derived from an unpublished Ordinance override the Act and
Statutes.
9. Learned counsel further argues that even assuming,
without admitting, that the petitioner was on probation, the
concept of probation does not exist in the Act or the Statute and
could not have been imported through the appointment letter. It is
submitted that any such contractual clause contrary to the parent
statute is void, oppressive, and unenforceable. The impugned
order, even on the touchstone of probation, fails to disclose any
finding of unsuitability, objective (dis)satisfaction, or even a
whisper of reasons. Accordingly, the respondents' justification of
termination on the alleged ground of "probation period" is wholly
misconceived.
10. It is further stated in the Supplementary Affidavit
that even assuming, for argument's sake, that probation existed,
the order discloses no finding of unsuitability, no objective
Patna High Court CWJC No.15379 of 2015 dt.16-12-2025
(dis)satisfaction of the competent authority, and no material
demonstrating assessment of performance. The absence of any
such reasoning, it is urged, renders the action arbitrary. Learned
counsel further submits that the petitioner has an exemplary record
of service and had joined the University after resigning from
prestigious positions in CISF, NTPC, various banks, and even
foregoing a UPSC appointment, solely out of commitment to
contribute to the academic development of Bihar. The petitioner,
despite belonging to a humble background, has an outstanding
career profile. Copies of his bio-data and relevant appointment and
resignation letters have been brought on record to substantiate his
professional credibility.
11. It is lastly submitted that the impugned order is non-
speaking, arbitrary, violative of principles of natural justice and
Article 14 of the Constitution. The termination has been carried
out in a clandestine and abrupt manner, causing severe prejudice to
the petitioner. The petitioner therefore seeks interference of this
Court, having no other efficacious alternative remedy.
12. Learned counsel for the respondent no. 2 by way of
Counter Affidavit submits that the impugned order does not
amount to dismissal, removal or discharge, but is merely a
termination of probation in accordance with the terms of
Patna High Court CWJC No.15379 of 2015 dt.16-12-2025
appointment. It is further submitted that the petitioner's
appointment order clearly stipulated a probationary period of two
years and that, on his own showing, he was still on probation on
the date of termination. The University contends that a probationer
has no right to hold the post and that termination of probation does
not require a prior opportunity of hearing, nor does it attract
principles of natural justice. It is argued that a simple order of
termination, without reasons being recorded, is legally permissible,
as disclosure of unsuitabilityand unsatisfactory performance may
unnecessarily cast a stigma.
13. Learned Counsel for the respondent further asserts
by way of Supplementary Counter Affidavit that the Petitioner was
appointed on probation for two years, a condition expressly set out
in the Appointment Letter and in the Written Agreement executed
on 06.03.2014 in compliance with Section 33 of the Central
Universities Act, 2009. The Agreement, signed by the Petitioner
and the University authorities, was duly furnished to him and
forms the statutory basis of his service conditions. The Petitioner
never questioned the terms of probation or any clause of the
Agreement at any stage prior to filing the writ petition. Under
Statute 23(1), the service conditions of non-teaching employees
are governed by the terms of the contract, and only in absence of
Patna High Court CWJC No.15379 of 2015 dt.16-12-2025
such contract do the Statutes and Ordinances apply; in the present
case, both the Appointment Letter and the Written Agreement
contain identical provisions regarding probation.
14. It is further stated that the probation framework is
also supported by the University Ordinances framed under Section
28 of the Act. The Executive Council, through resolutions passed
in its meetings dated 22.05.2010, 20.05.2011 and 30.07.2011,
authorized and approved the formulation of administrative
ordinances, including provisions relating to probation,
confirmation and termination. Subsequent communications from
the Ministry of HRD, including letters dated 12.10.2012,
19.10.2012 and 11.06.2013, led to modifications in certain clauses;
however, the Ordinance provisions governing probation and
termination of non-teaching staff were never suspended. The final
communication of the Government of India dated 04.03.2015
resulted in the Ordinances taking their final shape, later published
in the Official Gazette on 17.08.2016. Under Statute 37(5), these
Ordinances became operational from the date of their approval by
the Executive Council.
15. In this background, the Respondent submits that on
the date of the Petitioner's termination on 18.09.2015, the
provisions relating to probation and termination during probation
Patna High Court CWJC No.15379 of 2015 dt.16-12-2025
were validly in force. The Petitioner, not having been confirmed,
continued as a temporary employee and was liable to removal
during probation in accordance with the terms of his contract and
the applicable Ordinances.
16. Learned counsel for the respondent further submits
that the provisions of Statute 25 or other statutory clauses relied
upon by the petitioner have no application to cases of probation. It
is contended that the impugned order was issued by the Vice-
Chancellor in exercise of powers conferred under Section 11(3) of
the Act and suffers from no jurisdictional error, arbitrariness or
malice. The University denies the petitioner's allegations of mala
fide and submits that many of the averments made in the writ
petition and supplementary affidavit do not require factual
response, lest any clarification be misconstrued as stigmatic. It is
stated that the probation clause in the petitioner's appointment was
neither arbitrary nor oppressive, and the petitioner, having held
senior positions earlier, fully understood the nature of probation
before accepting the terms of appointment.
17. Learned Counsel for the Respondent further submits
by way of 2nd Counter Affidavit that after being relieved from the
post of Deputy Registrar, the Petitioner secured employment in
other universities within Bihar and Jharkhand, but did not disclose
Patna High Court CWJC No.15379 of 2015 dt.16-12-2025
these subsequent appointments before this Court. It is stated that
the Petitioner's services in the Respondent University were not
confirmed as his performance during probation was found
unsuitable and unsatisfactory, leading to a termination simpliciter,
which was neither stigmatic nor prejudicial to his future
employment prospects. The Respondent further states that the
Petitioner thereafter joined JRS University, Ranchi as Finance
Officer and subsequently was appointed as Examination Controller
in the Bihar Health Sciences University, Patna, pursuant to
Notification No. 909(1) dated 10.10.2022 (Annexure-R/11). The
Respondent contends that the Petitioner's concealment of these
material facts amounts to suppression, which bears directly on the
merits of the case.
18. It is further contended by the learned counsel for the
respondents that the impugned order is a termination simpliciter,
passed in accordance with the Act and the appointment order, and
does not cause prejudice to the petitioner. The University asserts
that the petitioner's claims of violation of natural justice,
arbitrariness, lack of jurisdiction are wholly unfounded
and thus deserves to be dismissed with costs.
ISSUES IN QUESTION:
Patna High Court CWJC No.15379 of 2015 dt.16-12-2025
I. Whether the provisions for removal of a probationer as
stipulated in the Appointment Letter and the Written Agreement
dated 26.03.2014, not being in consonance with Entry 25(2) to
25(5) of the second schedule of the Statute of the University,
constitute valid and binding conditions of service, and whether the
Petitioner, having accepted and acted upon such terms, is
precluded from assailing their legality?
II. Whether, assuming arguendo that the probation
clause contained in the Appointment Letter is valid and
enforceable, the Respondent-University could have lawfully
terminated the Petitioner's services under Clause 4 or Clause 5 of
the Appointment Letter?
III. Whether the provisions relating to probation and
termination contained in the University Ordinances were validly in
force at the time of the Petitioner's termination, and whether such
Ordinances were operative notwithstanding the alleged absence of
formal approval or publication at the relevant time in terms of the
Central Universities Act?
IV. Whether the action of the Vice-Chancellor
terminating the Petitioner's services during probation was within
the scope of the powers conferred under Section 11(3) of the
Central Universities Act, 2009?
Patna High Court CWJC No.15379 of 2015 dt.16-12-2025
V. Whether the Petitioner can claim protection under
Article 14 or invoke principles of natural justice in a case of
termination during probation, where the order does not disclose
any stigma?
VI. Whether, in the event of termination order being
held to be illegal, the Petitioner is entitled to claim back wages
upon reinstatement, particularly when he has not placed any
material on record to establish that he was not gainfully employed
during the period of his termination?
FINDINGS:
Issue I: Whether the provisions for removal of a
probationer as stipulated in the Appointment Letter and the
Written Agreement dated 26.03.2014, not being in consonance
with Entry 25(2) to 25(5) of the second schedule of the Statute of
the University, constitute valid and binding conditions of service,
and whether the Petitioner, having accepted and acted upon
such terms, is precluded from assailing their legality?
19. At the outset, it is necessary to consider the statutory
position of the Petitioner under the Central Universities Act, 2009.
Section 2(i) of the Act defines an "employee" to mean "any person
appointed by the University and includes teachers and other staff
of the University." The Petitioner, having been appointed by the
Patna High Court CWJC No.15379 of 2015 dt.16-12-2025
University, clearly falls within this statutory definition and is
therefore governed by the provisions of the Act and the Statutes
framed thereunder. The conditions of service of such an employee
cannot be divorced from, or allowed to travel beyond, the statutory
protections embedded in the Act.
20. The Respondent-University seeks to justify the
Petitioner's termination by placing reliance on the probation clause
contained in the Appointment Letter and the Written Agreement
dated 26.03.2014. However, while the Act recognises that every
employee shall be appointed under a written contract, such
contractual terms cannot confer powers or impose liabilities
inconsistent with the statutory framework. It is undisputed that the
Act and the Statutes do not create a separate class of "probationer"
as distinct from "employee." The statutory scheme treats all
appointed persons as employees unless otherwise specified, and
the University cannot, by contractual terminology alone, introduce
a new category that carries diminished statutory protection.
21. Section 33 of the Act recognises that every employee
shall be appointed under a written contract and that a copy of the
contract shall be furnished to the employee. . That statutory
recognition of written contracts does not mean, however, that the
University may by contract override or negate other statutory
Patna High Court CWJC No.15379 of 2015 dt.16-12-2025
protections. A contract which is inconsistent with or repugnant to a
statutory provision must yield to the statute. The settled principle
of law is that a private contract cannot supersede a statutory
provision and that terms of a contract inconsistent with a statute
are unenforceable to the extent of such inconsistency.
22. The most crucial aspect concerns the statutory
procedure for removal contained in Entry 25(2) to 25(5) of the 2nd
schedule of the Statute of the University. These provisions govern
removal of employees and reads as under:
"25(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in the terms
of the contract of appointment or of any other terms and condition
of service of the employees, the Executive Council in respect of
teachers and other academic staff, and the appointing authority in
respect of other employees, shall have the power to remove a
teacher or a member of the academic staff or other employee, as
the case may be, on grounds of misconduct.
25(3) Save as aforesaid, the Executive Council, or as the
case may be, the appointing authority, shall not be entitled to
remove any teacher, member of the academic staff or other
employee except for a good cause and after giving three months'
notice or on payment of three months' salary in lieu thereof.
Patna High Court CWJC No.15379 of 2015 dt.16-12-2025
25(4) No teacher, member of the academic staff or other
employee shall be removed under clause (2) or clause (3) unless
he has been given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause
against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him.
25(5) The removal of a teacher, member of the academic
staff or other employee shall take effect from the date on which the
order of removal is made:
Provided that where the teacher, member of the
academic staff or other employee is under suspension at the time
of his removal, such removal shall take effect from the date on
which he was placed under suspension."
23. The contractual clauses enable termination without
adherence to the above mandatory requirements. This directly
contradicts the procedure mandated under Entry 25(2) to 25(5) of
the 2nd schedule of the Statute of the University. It is a settled
principle of service jurisprudence that where a statute prescribes a
particular mode for exercise of a power, it must be exercised only
in that manner or not at all.
24. The legal position is, therefore well-settled that if a
contractual term is contrary to a statutory provision, the statutory
provision shall prevail and the inconsistent contract clause shall be
rendered inoperative. Acceptance of an appointment letter or
Patna High Court CWJC No.15379 of 2015 dt.16-12-2025
execution of an agreement cannot estop an employee from
asserting rights conferred by statute. The doctrine of estoppel
cannot be invoked to defeat statutory protections, nor can consent
validate a clause that is ultra vires. Therefore, even though the
Petitioner signed the Agreement, he cannot be deemed to have
waived statutory safeguards provided under the Act and the
Statutes.
25. This view has been further reiterated in the case of
Kumar Pankaj Anand and Ors. Vs. Central University of
Jharkhand and Ors. 2016(2)JLJR387, relevant paragraph of
which is produced herein.
"(III) Section 2(i) of the Act defines 'employee' means
any person appointed by the University includes teachers and
other staffs of the University. The definition is comprehensive,
complete and clear leaving no room of ambiguity. There is no
separate definition of probationers in the Act, therefore, there is
absolutely no distinction between an officer or an employee or a
probationer. As per Statute 25 read with Section 26 (f) of the Act,
the services of the employees can only be terminated in the
manner prescribed at Ciause-2 to 5. Either in case of a
termination simplicitor or termination punitive as per the Statute
without giving reasonable opportunity of showing cause action
Patna High Court CWJC No.15379 of 2015 dt.16-12-2025
against proposed punishment to be taken, the services of the
employees can be terminated for good cause only after giving
three months' notice or on payment of three months' salary in lieu,
therefore, there has been violation of Statute 25 (3), (4) and (5) of
the University Act. Moreover, on perusal of the Statute 12, the
powers of Executive Council have been prescribed. Executive
Council has no power to discharge the probationer/employee
without following the procedure prescribed at Clause 2 to 5 of
Statute 25 since the powers of Executive Council being a creature
of the Act cannot travel beyond the limits prescribed by the Act."
[Emphasis Supplied]
26. Therefore it can be inferred that the petitioner being
a probationer is not precluded from the status of being an
employee and from challenging such action merely because he
acted upon the contractual terms, as statutory rights cannot be
waved or contracted out of.
Issue II: Whether, assuming arguendo that the
probation clause contained in the Appointment Letter is valid
and enforceable, the Respondent-University could have lawfully
terminated the Petitioner's services under Clause 4 or Clause 5
of the Appointment Letter?
Patna High Court CWJC No.15379 of 2015 dt.16-12-2025
27. For the purposes of a focused analysis, the Court
will assume, arguendo, that the probation clause in the
Appointment Letter is valid and enforceable. Even on that
premise, the legality of the termination must be tested against the
express terms and conditions of the Appointment Letter itself. A
contractual power of termination cannot be exercised arbitrarily;
the employer must demonstrate that the pre-conditions and
safeguards embedded in the relevant contractual clause have been
observed.
28. Even assuming that the Appointment Letter and the
Written Agreement dated 26.03.2014 constitute independently
valid contractual instruments--de hors the statutory protections
under the Act and the Statutes--the impugned termination must
still withstand scrutiny under the very clauses invoked by the
Respondent-University. The Appointment Letter contains two
possible routes for termination: Clause 4 and Clause 5. Even if the
statutory scheme is momentarily kept aside, the University's action
fails to meet the thresholds prescribed under either of these
contractual clauses.
29. Clause 4 of the Appointment Letter empowers the
University to terminate the services of the employee during
probation if he is "found unsuitable for holding the post or upto
Patna High Court CWJC No.15379 of 2015 dt.16-12-2025
the satisfaction of the competent authority." The power under
Clause 4 is not an unfettered administrative liberty; rather, the
finding of unsuitability and (dis)satisfaction must be based on
objective material and must reflect application of mind by the
competent authority. In the case of Krishnadevaraya Education
Trust and Another v. L.A. Balakrishna (2001 AIR SCW 253), the
Hon'ble Apex Court has clarified its stand on the issue of
assigning proper reasons while issuing an order of termination and
thus made the observations quoted herein:
"5. There can be no manner of doubt that the employer
is entitled to engage the services of a person on probation. During
the period of probation, the suitability of the recruit/appointee has
to be seen. If his services are not satisfactory which means that he
is not suitable for the job, then the employer has a right to
terminate the services as a reason thereof. If the termination
during probationary period is without any reason, perhaps such
an order would be sought to be challenged on the ground of being
arbitrary. Therefore, naturally services of an employee on
probation would be terminated, when he is found not to be suitable
for the job for which he was engaged, without assigning any
reason. If the order on the face of it states that his services are
being terminated because his performance is not satisfactory, the
Patna High Court CWJC No.15379 of 2015 dt.16-12-2025
employer runs the risk of the allegation being made that the order
itself casts a stigma. We do not say that such a contention will
succeed. Normally, therefore, it is preferred that the order itself
does not mention the reason why the services are being
terminated.
6. If such an order is challenged, the employer will have
to indicate the grounds on which the services of a probationer
were terminated. Mere fact that in response to the challenge the
employer states that the services were not satisfactory would not
ipso facto mean that the services of the probationer were being
terminated by way of punishment. The probationer is on test and if
the services are found not to be satisfactory, the employer has, in
terms of the letter of appointment, the right to terminate the
services."
[Emphasis Supplied]
30. Therefore, from the explanation quoted above, it can
be inferred that though the reason of unsuitability or dissatisfaction
need be elaborated in detail in the termination order, but a
mentioning of the same in the termination order would be a
requirement. In the present case, the impugned order does not even
whisper about the unsuitability or unsatisfactory work of the
petitioner being the raison d'etre for his termination. Equally, the
Patna High Court CWJC No.15379 of 2015 dt.16-12-2025
Counter Affidavit also fails to articulate any specific grounds
explaining the nature of unsuitability or (dis)satisfaction, thereby
not assigning any reason regarding his performance, conduct or
competence that rendered him unfit to hold the post. The bald
explanation offered by the Respondent that assigning reasons may
have rendered the order "stigmatic" cannot be accepted as a legally
sustainable justification. A vague apprehension of stigma cannot
be used to circumvent the requirement of forming, recording, or
disclosing a rational basis for termination under Clause 4. Thus,
even if Clause 4 were assumed to be valid, the Respondent has not
complied with its minimum requirements.
31. Clause 5 of the Appointment Letter contemplates
termination without assigning reasons but only upon issuance of
30 days' prior notice or payment of a sum equivalent to the pay
and allowances in lieu of such notice. In the present case, it is
undisputed that no 30 days' notice was issued to the Petitioner, nor
was any salary in lieu of notice was tendered to him at the time of
termination. There is no material on record to show that the
Respondent issued the prescribed thirty days' notice or
tendered/paid salary in lieu thereof at the time of termination. The
absence of such compliance is fatal to the Respondent's contention
that termination was effected under Clause 5. Reliance upon a
Patna High Court CWJC No.15379 of 2015 dt.16-12-2025
power to terminate simpliciter under Clause 5 without satisfying
its notice or payment requirement, as a precondition, cannot be
sustained. The University has not demonstrated fulfilment of any
precondition required under Clause 5. Consequently, even the
route of "termination simpliciter" provided by Clause 5 could only
have been resorted to if the respondent university had given 30
days prior notice or made/tendered payment in lieu thereof at the
time of termination. The argument of the respondent university
that payment in lieu of 30 days notice should not be construed as
condition precedent to termination, is fallacious and contrary to the
letter and spirit of Clause 5 of the appointment letter. If giving of
thirty days prior notice was/is a condition precedent, then payment
in lieu thereof also has to be necessarily construed as being a
condition precedent. It is brought to the notice of this court that
even till date, payment in lieu of 30 days notice has not been paid
to the petitioner.
32. Therefore, whether examined under Clause 4
(termination on ground of unsuitability) or under Clause 5
(termination without reason but with notice), the impugned action
fails to satisfy the contractual pre-requisites. The legal burden of
establishing that a contractual ground for termination has been
validly invoked rests upon the employer. Where the impugned
Patna High Court CWJC No.15379 of 2015 dt.16-12-2025
action is challenged, it was for the Respondent to demonstrate
compliance with the terms of Clause 4 (by producing materials
showing unsuitability/(dis)satisfactory work upon application of
mind) or Clause 5 (by providing service of notice or payment in
lieu thereof). On the materials produced before this Court, the
Respondent has not discharged that burden in relation to either of
the clauses. The University cannot rely upon the Appointment
Letter as a source of authority while simultaneously disregarding
the safeguards embedded therein. The unilateral termination,
unsupported by any finding of unsuitability/(dis)satisfactory work
and unaccompanied by statutory or contractual notice or payment
in lieu thereof, does not meet even the minimal standards of
fairness expected under a contract of employment--much less the
more rigorous standards mandated under the University Statutes.
33. Accordingly, even on the hypothetical assumption
that the statutory provisions are kept aside, the impugned
termination order cannot be sustained even under the contractual
regime invoked by the Respondent. In light of the above
discussion, this Court holds that the termination order is bad for
not having been passed in strict accordance of the requirements of
either Clause 4 or 5 of the appointment letter and thus it cannot be
sustained.
Patna High Court CWJC No.15379 of 2015 dt.16-12-2025
Issue III: Whether the provisions relating to probation
and termination contained in the University Ordinances were
validly in force at the time of the Petitioner's termination, and
whether such Ordinances were operative notwithstanding the
alleged absence of formal approval or publication at the relevant
time in terms of the Central Universities Act?
34. It must be recorded at the threshold that this Court
has found the impugned termination to be legally unsustainable on
the grounds already articulated above. Having arrived at the above
conclusion, now the controversy concerning the precise date on
which the Ordinances came into force becomes only of academic
interest, which is being kept open for consideration in an
appropriate case in future.
35. Notwithstanding the foregoing, it must be
emphasized that even on the hypothesis that the Ordinances were
validly in force on the date of termination, the Respondent's action
must still conform to the Statute and the principles of fairness
inherent in public employment. Hence the question of operative
date of the Ordinances is collateral to, and does not detract from,
the Court's finding that the termination was legally unsustainable
for the reasons already recorded herein above.
Patna High Court CWJC No.15379 of 2015 dt.16-12-2025
Issue IV: Whether the action of the Vice-Chancellor
terminating the Petitioner's services during probation was within
the scope of the powers conferred under Section 11(3) of the
Central Universities Act, 2009?
36. While considering the emergency powers of the
Vice-Chancellor, It is necessary to read Section 11(3) in its proper
statutory context. The provision confers on the Vice-Chancellor an
extraordinary, but qualified, power to take immediate action in
exceptional circumstances where the Vice-Chancellor is of the
opinion that such immediate action is necessary. The power is
therefore residuary and emergency in character; it is not intended
to supplant the normal statutory machinery for appointment,
confirmation or removal of employees which is set out elsewhere
in the Act and the Statutes. Any exercise of power under Section
11(3) must be justified by circumstances of immediacy and
exigency and must be confined strictly to the object and limits of
the power so conferred.
37. The textual requirement that the Vice-Chancellor
must be "of the opinion that immediate action is necessary" is not
a mere formalism; it carries an objective content. The exercise of
the power must be supported by facts warranting a conclusion that
immediate action was necessary to meet an unforeseen or urgent
Patna High Court CWJC No.15379 of 2015 dt.16-12-2025
situation affecting the administration or functioning of the
University. Where the Vice-Chancellor takes action under Section
11(3), the record should disclose the factual basis for the
satisfaction--either in the order itself, or in contemporaneous
administrative material or in clear averments in the counter-
affidavit--so that judicial scrutiny of the legality and propriety of
the exercise is possible.
38. On the material placed before this Court, the
Respondent has not furnished any adequate explanation of the
exigency said to have compelled immediate action. The counter-
affidavit does not set out facts which would indicate a situation of
immediate peril, emergency, or imperative administrative need
which could not have awaited the ordinary course of consideration
by the competent authority(Executive Council). Bare assertions of
unsatisfactory performance or an omnibus statement that the
employee was "unsuitable" do not meet the threshold required to
justify the extraordinary invocation of Section 11(3). In the
absence of such factual foundation, the purported satisfaction of
the Vice-Chancellor remains an ipse dixit, incapable of sustaining
an emergency exercise of power.
39. The consequence of such a lacuna is that the exercise
of Section 11(3) in the present case was beyond the statutory
Patna High Court CWJC No.15379 of 2015 dt.16-12-2025
power conferred on the Vice-Chancellor. Where a delegated or
emergency power is exercised without the factual predicate
required by the statute, the action is illegal and void ab initio. The
doctrine is well settled that subsequent ratification by the
Executive Council cannot validate an act which was originally
void for want of jurisdiction or which constitutes an arbitrary and
colourable exercise of power. If the initial act suffers from
jurisdictional defect or is vitiated by non-compliance of mandatory
preconditions, later approval by a statutory body cannot confer
legality upon that which was void ab initio.
40. The administrative guidance issued to Vice-
Chancellors of Central Universities further reinforces the limits
upon emergency powers. The Office Memorandum dated 11 June
2001 (Annexure 15 series of the main writ application), in
particular Clause 2(ii), stated herein "routine matters like creation
of teaching and academic posts, appointment to the said posts,
finalizing recruitment procedures, promotions under Merit
Promotion Schemes/ Career Advancement Schemes, upgradation
of posts making them personal to the incumbents should
invariably be placed before the authorities ordinarily empowered
to take decisions in such cases. Emergency powers should not be
exercised by the Vice-Chancellors in such cases" explicitly advises
Patna High Court CWJC No.15379 of 2015 dt.16-12-2025
that emergency powers ought not to be used in relation to the
creation of posts, appointments to such posts or finalising
recruitment procedures. By parity of reasoning, routine
terminations and regular personnel decisions are not matters for
emergency action as it would be personal to the person holding the
post. The Memorandum therefore underscores that the Vice-
Chancellor's emergency authority is not a licence to bypass
prescribed procedures for appointment or termination, and that
institutional practice and administrative propriety require restraint
in invoking Section 11(3) for personnel administration.
41. In the case of Dilip Kumar Sarkar Vs. The
University of North Bengal and Ors. W.P. No. 7892(W) OF
2010, the High Court of Kolkata held that:
"3. Section 10 of the Act deals with powers and duties of
the Vice-Chancellor and sub-section (6) of Section 10 vests in such
authority certain emergency powers. This provision stipulates:-
The Vice-Chancellor may take on behalf of the
University such action as he may deem expedient in any matter
which, in his opinion, is either urgent or cf an emergent nature
and shall report the same for confirmation at the next meeting of
the authority or body which in the ordinary course, would have
dealt with the matter:
Patna High Court CWJC No.15379 of 2015 dt.16-12-2025
provided that if the action taken by the Vice-Chancellor
is not approved by the authority or body concerned, the matter
shall immediately be referred to the Chancellor whose decision
thereon shall be final.
4. It has been contended on behalf of the petitioner that
there was no urgent or emergent situation which warranted
passing of the order of suspension by the respondent no. 3, as
under ordinary circumstances such power was to be exercised by
the Executive Council only. The case of the petitioner is that the
respondent no. 3 never applied his mind for the purpose of
formation of opinion as to whether any situation of urgent or
emergent nature was there warranting exercise of such emergency
power. The other main ground on which the impugned order has
been challenged is that instead of passing the order on application
of his own mind, the respondent no. 3 had passed the order on
external dictat. Argument of the petitioner on this ground has been
that instead of applying his own mind, the respondent no. 3 acted
as per the direction of the learned Chancellor in this matter."
[Emphasis Supplied]
42. Further in paragraph 23 of this case, a detailed
explanation on the emergency powers of the Vice-Chancellor has
been made which is quoted as under:
Patna High Court CWJC No.15379 of 2015 dt.16-12-2025
"23. In a case relating to exercise of similar power
under Section 9(6) of the Calcutta University Act, 1979, Sakila
Begum Vs. State of West Bengal (supra), an Hon'ble Single Judge
of this Court examined the condition precedent for exercise of
such power and held:-
"From a perusal of section 9(6) of the Act it is clear that
power has been conferred upon the Vice-Chancellor to take action
on behalf of the University another matter which in his opinion' is
either urgent or of an emergent nature calling for immediate
attention. However, powcr initiating such action there must be
appraisal of facts and on subjective satisfaction there should be
formation of belief for arriving on an opinion. Such exercise of
formation of opinion must be on the basis of facts so that, if called
for, it can be demonstrated or the records that there was a definite
application of mind to justify that there indeed was an emergent or
urgent has been necessitating action under Section 9(6) of the Act.
The approach in such a situation must be judicious. That, in my
view, is the purport of the words 'in his opinion' so that one may
know the reasons that had prompted the Vice- Chancellor to
initiate action in exercise of emergency powers conferred under
the Act. In the absence of any record of formation of opinion,
action in exercise of powers conferred under the said sub Section
Patna High Court CWJC No.15379 of 2015 dt.16-12-2025
can hardly be justified. In fact, the legislature had consciously
used the words 'in his opinion' to check possible misuse or abuse
of power"
43. Applying these principles to the facts of the present
case, the Vice-Chancellor's order terminating the Petitioner's
services during probation cannot be regarded as falling within the
lawful ambit of Section 11(3). There is no adequate factual
narration of exigent circumstances; the Office Memorandum
indicates that appointment and related decisions are precisely the
kinds of matters the Vice-Chancellor should not treat as emergency
business; and the statutory scheme vests removal powers in the
Executive Council or the appointing authority subject to
procedural safeguards. The Vice-Chancellor's truncated exercise
of power, therefore, exceeded the statutory limits and was an
improper use of Section 11(3).
44. Finally, it bears emphasising that where an
administrative action is void ab initio for want of jurisdiction,
subsequent endorsement--whether by internal memorandum, by a
committee, or by the Executive Council--cannot retrospectively
confer validity. The Executive Council's subsequent approval, if
any, cannot cure the vice of the original order which lacked the
statutorily required factual foundation and which transgressed the
Patna High Court CWJC No.15379 of 2015 dt.16-12-2025
limitations set out in the Act, the Statutes and the administrative
guidance. For these reasons the termination is vitiated and must be
treated as legally ineffectual.
45. Further in the case of MARATHWADA
UNIVERSITY VS. SESHRAO BALWANT RAO CHAVAN
(1989) 3 Supreme Court Cases 132, the issue of ratification is dealt
in detail, relevant paragraphs of which are produced herein:
"25. By this resolution, we are told that the Executive
Council has ratified the action taken by the Vice-Chancellor.
Ratification is generally an act of principal with regard to a
contract or an act done by his agent. In Friedman's Law of Agency
(5th Edn.) Chapter 5 at p. 73, the principle of ratification has been
explained:
"What the agent' does on behalf of the 'principal' is done
at a time when the relation of principal and agent does not exist:
(hence the use in this sentence, but not in subsequent ones, of
inverted commas). The agent, in fact, has no authority to do what
he does at the time he does it. Subsequently, however, the
principal, on whose behalf, though without whose authority, the
agent has acted, accepts the agent's act, and adopts it, just as if
there had been a prior authorisation by the principal to do exactly
what the agent has done. The interesting point, which has given
Patna High Court CWJC No.15379 of 2015 dt.16-12-2025
rise to considerable difficulty and dispute, is that ratification by
the principal does not merely give validity to the agent's
unauthorised act as from the date of the ratification: it is
antedated so as to take effect from the time of the agent's act.
Hence the agent is treated as having been authorised from the
outset to act as he did. Ratification is 'equivalent to an antecedent
authority'."
26. In Bowstead on Agency (14th Edn.) at p. 39 it is
stated:
"Every act whether lawful or unlawful, which is capable
of being done by means of an agent (except an act which is in its
inception void) is capable of ratification by the person in whose
name or on whose behalf it is done.... The words 'lawful or
unlawful', however, are included primarily to indicate that the
doctrine can apply to torts. From them it would follow that a
principal by ratification may retrospectively turn what was
previously an act wrongful against the principle, e.g. an
unauthorised sale, or against a third party, e.g. a wrongful
distress, into a legitimate one; or become liable for the tort of
another by ratifying."
27. These principles of ratification, apparently do not
have any application with regard to exercise of powers conferred
Patna High Court CWJC No.15379 of 2015 dt.16-12-2025
under statutory provisions. The statutory authority cannot travel
beyond the power conferred and any action without power has no
legal validity. It is ab initio void and cannot be ratified."
[Emphasis Supplied]
46. Therefore it can be concluded that the Vice-
Chancellor's action purporting to terminate the Petitioner's
services under Section 11(3) does not, on the material before this
Court, fall within the ambit of the emergency power conferred by
that provision. The exercise of power was without the requisite
factual basis, was contrary to administrative guidance limiting use
of emergency powers for personnel decisions, and therefore was
an illegal exercise of authority. The termination is accordingly
void ab initio and cannot be validated by subsequent approval of
the Executive Council.
Issue V: Whether the Petitioner can claim protection
under Article 14 or invoke principles of natural justice in a case
of termination during probation, where the order does not
disclose any stigma?
47. It is a settled principle of service jurisprudence that a
probationer does not enjoy the same security of tenure as a
confirmed employee. The employer retains the authority to assess
the suitability of a probationer during the prescribed period, and
Patna High Court CWJC No.15379 of 2015 dt.16-12-2025
where the termination is founded on overall unsuitability or
general dissatisfaction with performance, and the order does not
cast any stigma or make imputations of misconduct, the
termination is ordinarily regarded as termination simpliciter.
48. Jurisprudence of the Hon'ble Supreme Court
recognises that in cases of termination simpliciter during
probation, the requirement of a prior notice or opportunity of
hearing is not attracted, provided the action does not carry a
punitive flavour or is not founded on allegations which may visit
the probationer with civil consequences. In such cases, the
doctrine of natural justice does not automatically apply, as the
termination is conceptualised as a non-punitive cessation of a
probationary engagement.
49. In the present case, the termination order does not
set out any allegations, charges, or adverse findings against the
Petitioner. It merely records cessation of services during probation
without attributing misconduct. The counter affidavit filed by the
Respondent also refrains from alleging any specific act of
delinquency or misconduct; rather, it proceeds on the footing of
unsatisfactory performance, which, if accepted as the basis, still
falls within the domain of assessment of suitability during
probation.
Patna High Court CWJC No.15379 of 2015 dt.16-12-2025
50. In such circumstances, the Petitioner cannot
successfully invoke the protection of Article 14 or principles of
natural justice solely on the ground that no opportunity of hearing
was afforded. The law does not mandate a pre-decisional hearing
where the action is administrative in nature, non-punitive in
character and does not visit the employee with stigma.
51. However, while the absence of a hearing does not by
itself render such an order illegal, the action must still withstand
constitutional scrutiny under Article 14. The employer cannot act
capriciously, discriminatorily, or in a manner that amounts to
colourable exercise of power. If the foundation for termination is
irrelevant or extraneous, or if the exercise of power is outside the
statutory framework, the Court may still intervene. But the non-
grant of hearing, by itself, in a case of non-stigmatic termination of
a probationer, does not constitute a violation of natural justice.
Issue VI: Whether, in the event of termination order
being held to be illegal, the Petitioner is entitled to claim back
wages upon reinstatement, particularly when he has not placed
any material on record to establish that he was not gainfully
employed during the period of his termination?
52. It is well established that the grant of back wages
upon reinstatement is a discretionary equitable relief which hinges
Patna High Court CWJC No.15379 of 2015 dt.16-12-2025
on the facts of each case. Courts consider ,inter alia, whether the
termination was wrongful, whether the claimant mitigated his loss
by obtaining other employment, whether the public exchequer will
be unduly burdened, and whether the claimant has acted with clean
hands. The primary burden of proof to show entitlement to back
wages rests on the petitioner; conversely, where the respondent
pleads and proves that the petitioner was gainfully employed
during the relevant period, that fact is material and may reduce or
extinguish the claim for back wages. The principle of mitigation of
damages requires an injured party to take reasonable steps to
reduce his loss; earnings from alternative employment are taken
into account in fixing compensatory relief.
53. If a petitioner, during the period between unlawful
termination and reinstatement, has secured employment and
received remuneration, the courts normally take that into account.
Where the alternative employment is full-time and remunerative,
courts frequently deny back wages in full, or award only the
difference between the salary the petitioner would have drawn in
the original employment and the salary actually earned in the
alternative employment, depending on the equities. The rationale
is that back wages are compensatory for the loss actually suffered;
if the petitioner has been compensated by gainful employment, he
Patna High Court CWJC No.15379 of 2015 dt.16-12-2025
has not suffered the full wage-loss that back wages are designed to
redress.
54. In the present matter the petitioner has not produced
any record to demonstrate that he remained unemployed or
without income after he was relieved from the Respondent-
University. On the other hand, the Respondent has produced
material in the form of its counter affidavit and annexures
including Notification No. 20/2022-909(1) dated 10.10.2022
which indicate that the petitioner obtained employment as Finance
Officer at JRS University, Ranchi and subsequently as Controller
of Examinations at Bihar Health Sciences University, Patna. Once
the Respondent has placed credible material on record indicating
gainful employment, the evidentiary onus shifts to the petitioner to
controvert or explain those documents. The petitioner's failure to
rebut or clarify these factual averments is a significant factor in the
exercise of judicial discretion.
55. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of National
Gandhi Museum vs. Sudhir Sharma (2021) 12 SCC 439 has
made the following observations:
"In Talwara Coop. Credit & Service Society Ltd.7, this
Court has held that the fact whether an employee after dismissal
was gainfully employed is within his special knowledge and
Patna High Court CWJC No.15379 of 2015 dt.16-12-2025
therefore, considering the principles laid down in Section 106 of
the Evidence Act, 1872, the burden is on the employee to come out
with a case that he was not gainfully employed during the relevant
period. We must note that whether such burden is discharged or
not is an issue to be decided in the facts of each case. The issue
has to be decided by taking into consideration the entire material
on record."
[Emphasis Supplied]
56. Close on the heels of National Gandhi Museum
(Supra) came another seminal decision on reinstatement and
entitlement of back wages by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case
of Maharastra State Road Transport Corporation vs Mahadeo
Krishna Naik 2025 (2) PLJR 120 (SC), relevant paragraphs of
which are quoted herein:
"42. There have been decisions of this court rendered
thereafter where a shift in approach on awarding full back wages s
clearly discernible. However, a Coordinate Bench of this Court in
Deepali Gundu Surwase (supra) considered a dozen of
precedents on award of back wages upon reinstatement .
paragraphs 13 and 14). Speaking through Hon'ble G.S. Singhvi,
J. (as His Lordship then was), the legal position was neatly
summed up in the following words:
Patna High Court CWJC No.15379 of 2015 dt.16-12-2025
"22. The very idea of restoring an employee to the
position which he held before dismissal or or removal or
termination of service implies that the employee will be put in the
same position in which he would have been but for the illegal
action taken by the employer. The injury suffered by a person, who
is dismissed or removed or is otherwise terminated from service
cannot easily be measured in terms of money. With the passing of
an order which has the effect of severing the employer-employee
relationship, the latter's source of income gets dried up. Not only
the employee concerned, but his entire family suffers grave
adversities. They are deprived of the source of sustenance. The
children are deprived of nutritious food and all opportunities of
education and advancement in life. At times, the family has to
borrow from the relatives and other acquaintance to avoid
starvation. These sufferings continue till the competent
adjudicatory forum decides on the legality of the action taken by
the employer. The reinstatement of such an employee, which is
preceded by a finding of the competent judicial/quasi- judicial
body or court that the action taken by the employer is ultra vires
the relevant statutory provisions or the principles of natural
justice, entitles the employee to claim full back wages. If the
employer wants to deny back wages to the employee or contest his
Patna High Court CWJC No.15379 of 2015 dt.16-12-2025
entitlement to get consequential benefits, then it is for him/her to
specifically plead and prove that during the intervening period the
employee was gainfully employed and was getting the same
emoluments. The denial of back wages to an employee, who has
suffered due to an illegal act of the employer would amount to
indirectly punishing the employee concerned and rewarding the
employer by relieving him of the obligation to pay back wages
including the emoluments.
38. The propositions which can bepulled out from the
aforementioned judgments are:
38.1. In cases of wrongful termination of service,
reinstatement with continuity of service and back wages is the
normal rule.
38.2. The aforesaid rule is subject the rider that while
deciding the issue back wages, the adjudicating authority or the
court may take into consideration the length of service of the
employee/workman, the nature of misconduct, if any, found proved
against the employee/workman, the financial condition of the
employer and similar other factors.
38.3. Ordinarily, an employee or workman whose
services are terminated and who is desirous of getting back wages
Patna High Court CWJC No.15379 of 2015 dt.16-12-2025
is required to either plead or at least make a statement before the
adjudicating authority or the court of first instance that he/she
was not gainfully employed or was employed on lesser wages. If
the employer wants to avoid payment of full back wages, then it
has to plead and also lead cogent evidence to prove that the
employee/ workman was gainfully employed and was getting
wages equal to the wages he/she was drawing prior to the
termination of service. This is so because it is settled law that the
burden of proof of the existence of a particular fact lies on the
person who makes a positive averment about its existence. It is
always easier to prove a positive fact than to prove a negative
fact.Therefore, once the employee shows that he was not
employed, the onus lies on the employer to specifically plead and
prove that the employee was gainfully employed and was getting
the same or substantially similar emoluments."
[Emphasis Supplied]
57. The other aspect of this issue has also been dealt by
The Hon'ble Apex Court in the same case of Maharastra State
Road Transport Corporation (Supra), and the Court made the
following observations:
"44. There is one other aspect that would fall for
consideration of the court. In certain decisions, noticed in Deepali
Patna High Court CWJC No.15379 of 2015 dt.16-12-2025
Gundu Surwase (supra), it has been opined that whether or not an
employee has been gainfully employed is within his special
knowledge and having regard to Section 106 of the Evidence Act,
1872, the burden of proof is on him. What is required of an
employee in such a case? He has to plead in his statement of claim
or any subsequent pleading before the Industrial Tribunal/Labour
Court that he has not been gainfully employed and that the award
of reinstatement may also grant him back wages. If the employee
pleads that he was not gainfully employed, he cannot possibly
prove such negative fact by adducing positive evidence. In the
absence of any contra-material on record, his version has to be
accepted."
[Emphasis Supplied]
58. From the above discussions, it is clear that the basic
criteria for back wages has been been reiterated in a catena of
judgments by the Hon'ble Apex Court. In the present case, the
petitioner's omission to disclose details of subsequent employment
to this Court amounts to suppression of material facts bearing
directly on his claim for monetary relief. Courts will not ordinarily
reward a litigant who approaches the Court with incomplete or
misleading material. Where concealment of material facts that bear
on entitlement to relief is shown, this operates strongly against the
Patna High Court CWJC No.15379 of 2015 dt.16-12-2025
grant of back wages. The duty to make full and candid disclosure
is particularly weighty in employment litigation where the
respondent's financial liability is sought to be fixed. In view of the
settled principle that the burden to disclose and prove absence of
gainful employment rests upon the claimant, and further
considering the suppression of material facts by the Petitioner, this
Court finds no equitable basis to award back wages.
59. Considering that (a) the petitioner has failed to place
on record evidence of non-employment or of income shortfall, (b)
the respondent has produced documentary material of the
petitioner's subsequent appointments, and (c) the petitioner did not
explain or clarify these matters despite having the opportunity, it
would be inequitable to award back wages. At best, the petitioner
ought to have produced salary particulars from his intervening
employments to seek a differential award; he has not done so. The
balance of equities, therefore, disfavors an award of back wages in
his favour.
RELIEFS:
60. In view of the findings recorded on all the issues,
and for the reasons discussed hereinabove, this Court is of the
considered view that the impugned action of the Respondent-
Patna High Court CWJC No.15379 of 2015 dt.16-12-2025
University cannot be sustained in law. Accordingly, the following
reliefs are granted:
61. The impugned order of termination contained in the
office order no. 138/15 dated 18.09.2015 issued against the
Petitioner is hereby set aside and quashed as being unsustainable
in law, having been passed without authority, without compliance
with the statutory framework, and in derogation of Entry 25(2) to
25(5) of the 2nd schedule of the Statute of the University as well as
the mandate and limitations inherent under Section 11(3) of the
Central Universities Act, 2009.For the reasons discussed, the Court
finds that the impugned action suffers from arbitrariness, lack of
jurisdiction, and violation of the governing statutory framework.
62. The Respondent-University is directed to reinstate
the Petitioner forthwith to the same post which he was holding at
the time of the impugned termination if the said post is vacant, or
to an equivalent post, in terms of the admission made by the
Respondent in the Third Supplementary Counter Affidavit. Such
reinstatement shall be effected within four weeks from the date of
receipt/ communication of this judgment.
The Petitioner shall be entitled to continuity of service for all
consequential purposes, including seniority, pensionary and
Patna High Court CWJC No.15379 of 2015 dt.16-12-2025
notional service benefits, if admissible, to the petitioner, except
monetary arrears.
63. This Court is not inclined to grant back wages to the
Petitioner for the period between termination and reinstatement for
the reasons already discussed above.
64. It is clarified that although back wages are denied,
such denial shall not affect the Petitioner's continuity of service,
which is granted on the basis of the illegality of the termination
order and not on the basis of equitable considerations relating to
the Petitioner's subsequent employment. Any consequential
benefits accruing from reinstatement, save and except back wages,
shall be computed and extended to the Petitioner by the
Respondent-University within 4 weeks from the date of his
reinstatement.
65. The petition is accordingly allowed in the above
terms. All pending IAs, if any, shall stand disposed of. There shall
be no order as to costs.
(Alok Kumar Sinha, J)
kiran/-
AFR/NAFR AFR
CAV DATE 03.12.2025.
Uploading Date 16.12.2025.
Transmission Date N/A
