[Cites 35, Cited by 0]
Patna High Court
Pramod Kumar And Anr vs The Chancellor Of Universities Of Bihar ... on 8 December, 2025
Author: Alok Kumar Sinha
Bench: Alok Kumar Sinha
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA
Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No.1543 of 2018
======================================================
1. Pankaj Kumar, Son of Shri Awadh Kishore Prasad, Resident of House No.
A/183, P.C. Colony, Kankerbagh, District- Patna.
2. Md. Sabir, Son of Late Mohammad Shaikh Nayeemuddin, Resident of
Sahamat Hussain Lane, Islam Nagar, Bhikanpur, Gumti No.3, District-
Bhagalpur.
... ... Petitioner/s
Versus
1. The Chancellor Of Universities Of Bihar, Raj Bhawan, Patna.
2. Tilka Manjhi Bhagalpur University, Bhagalpur through its Registrar.
3. Vice Chancellor, Tilka Manjhi Bhagalpur University, Bhagalpur.
4. Registrar, Tilka Manjhi Bhagalpur University, Bhagalpur.
... ... Respondent/s
======================================================
with
Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No. 1891 of 2018
======================================================
Harsh Vardhan Dixit Son of Shri Nand Kishore Dixit Resident of Baghuwa
tola, Olapur, Pirpainti, P.S. Pirpainti, District Bhagalpur.
... ... Petitioner/s
Versus
1. The Chancellor Of University Of Bihar, Raj Bhawan, Patna.
2. Tilka Manjhi Bhagalpur University, Bhagalpur, through its Registrar.
3. The Vice-Chancellor, Tilka Manjhi Bhagalpur University, Bhagalpur.
4. The Registrar, Tilka Manjhi Bhagalpur University, Bhagalpur.
... ... Respondent/s
======================================================
with
Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No. 1896 of 2018
======================================================
1. Pramod Kumar, Son of Shri. S.N. Sharma Resident of Quarter No. T.H 23,
Asanandpur, Professor's Colony, P.O. City Post Office, District- Bhagalpur.
2. Prabhakar Dutta Son of Shri Abhay Kumar Dutta Resident of Near Gangotri
Apartment, Jhauwa Kothi Campus, Choti Khanjarpur, P.S. Barari, District
Bhagalpur.
... ... Petitioner/s
Versus
1. The Chancellor Of Universities Of Bihar , Raj Bhawan, Patna.
Patna High Court CWJC No.1543 of 2018 dt.09-12-2025
2/55
2. Tilka Manjhi Bhagalpur University, Bhagalpur, through its Registrar.
3. The Vice-Chancellor, Tilka Manjhi Bhagalpur University, Bhagalpur.
4. The Registrar, Tilka Manjhi Bhagalpur University, Bhagalpur.
... ... Respondent/s
======================================================
with
Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No. 1906 of 2018
======================================================
1. Md. Quamar Ahsan, son of late Md. Ahsan resident of Sahebganj, P.O.
Champanagar, P.S. - University, District - Bhagalpur.
2. Shayamashish Kumar son of late Suresh Prasad Kumar resident of At P.O. -
Tulsipur, P.S. - Kharik, District - Bhagalpur.
... ... Petitioner/s
Versus
1. The Chancellor Of Universities Of Bihar, Raj Bhawan, Patna.
2. Tilka Manjhi Bhagalpur University, Bhagalpur through its Registrar.
3. Vice Chancellor, Tilka Manjhi Bhagalpur University, Bhagalpur.
4. Registrar, Tilka Manjhi Bhagalpur University, Bhagalpur.
... ... Respondent/s
======================================================
with
Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No. 2047 of 2018
======================================================
Dr. Mithilesh Kumar Yadav Son of Late Ramdhani Yadav, Resident of at-
Parbatti, P.S.- University, District- Bhagalpur.
... ... Petitioner/s
Versus
1. The Chancellor of Universities Of Bihar, Raj Bhawan, Patna.
2. Tilka Manjhi Bhagalpur University, Bhagalpur through its Registrar.
3. Vice Chancellor, Tilka Manjhi Bhagalpur University, Bhagalpur.
4. Registrar, Tilka Manjhi Bhagalpur University, Bhagalpur.
... ... Respondent/s
======================================================
Appearance :
(In Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No. 1543 of 2018)
For the Petitioner/s : Mr. Abhinav Srivastava, Sr. Adv.
Md. Tauseef Waquar, Adv.
Mr. Pushkar Bhardwaj, Adv.
For the Respondent/s : Mr. Rajendra Kumar Giri, Adv.
(In Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No. 1891 of 2018)
For the Petitioner/s : Mr. Abhinav Srivastava, Sr. Adv.
Md. Tauseef Waquar, Adv.
Patna High Court CWJC No.1543 of 2018 dt.09-12-2025
3/55
Mr. Pushkar Bhardwaj, Adv.
For the Respondent/s : Mr. Rajendra Kumar Giri, Adv.
(In Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No. 1896 of 2018)
For the Petitioner/s : Mr.Abhinav Srivastava, Sr. Adv.
Md. Tauseef Waquar, Adv.
Mr. Pushkar Bhardwaj, Adv.
For the Respondent/s : Mr.Rajendra Kumar Giri, Adv.
(In Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No. 1906 of 2018)
For the Petitioner/s : Mr.Abhinav Srivastava, Sr. Adv.
Md. Tauseef Waquar, Adv.
Mr. Pushkar Bhardwaj, Adv.
For the Respondent/s : Mr.Rajendra Kumar Giri, Adv.
(In Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No. 2047 of 2018)
For the Petitioner/s : Mr.Abhinav Srivastava, Sr. Adv.
Md. Tauseef Waquar, Adv.
Mr. Pushkar Bhardwaj, Adv.
For the Respondent/s : Mr.Rajendra Kumar Giri, Adv.
======================================================
CORAM: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ALOK KUMAR SINHA
CAV JUDGMENT
Date: 09-12-2025
Heard learned counsel for the petitioners and learned
counsel for the respondents in all the writ applications.
2. In all the writ applications, the petitioners have
prayed for quashing office order 508/2017, dated 12-12-2017,
issued by the Registrar of the University, by which, previous office
orders appointing/absorbing the different petitioners against
different posts in the services of the University has been
withdrawn.
3. Since common question of law is involved in all writ
applications, therefore, they are heard together and are being
disposed of by this common judgment. For the sake of
convenience and brevity, the facts of CWJC No. 1543 of 2018 are
only being noticed, unless otherwise indicated.
Patna High Court CWJC No.1543 of 2018 dt.09-12-2025
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FACTS OF THE CASE
4. The case of the petitioners inter alia is as follows:
(i) The petitioners in CWJC No.
1543 of 2018 (Pankaj Kumar & Anr.) state that
pursuant to an advertisement dated 14.08.2006
(Annexure 1) issued by the University inviting
applications for the post of Junior Engineer on
contractual basis, they applied, participated in
the selection process and were duly selected.
Appointment letters were issued to them vide
Office Order No. 220/2006 dated 28.10.2006
placing them as Junior Engineers on a fixed
consolidated remuneration for a period of 11
months. A copy of the composite appointment
order has been brought on record as Annexure-
2 to the writ application. The petitioners joined
their respective posts and continued to work
(Annexure 3). Their contractual engagement
was extended from time to time by the
competent authorities of the University
(Annexure 4).
Patna High Court CWJC No.1543 of 2018 dt.09-12-2025
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(ii) During the currency of their
contractual service, the petitioners submitted
representations before the University
authorities as well as before the Hon'ble
Chancellor for their absorption/regularisation
against sanctioned vacant posts of Junior
Engineer (Annexure 5). It is pleaded that in
respect of several similarly situated employees,
the Hon'ble Chancellor had earlier issued
directions for regularisation, and those
directions had been acted upon by the
University (Annexure 6).
(iii) In so far as the present
petitioners are concerned, it is stated that the
Registrar of the University, taking note of their
continuous satisfactory service and availability
of sanctioned posts, sent a proposal
recommending their absorption in regular
service (Annexure 9). Thereafter, by Office
Order No. 332/2013 dated 20.12.2013, the
petitioners were absorbed in the regular
establishment of the University on the posts of
Patna High Court CWJC No.1543 of 2018 dt.09-12-2025
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Junior Engineer. The said absorption order has
been brought on record as Annexure-10 to the
writ petition. In pursuance thereof, their pay
was fixed, they were brought on the regular
pay-roll and they continued to function as
Junior Engineers in the regular cadre.
(iv) The petitioners assert that they
discharged their duties without any complaint
or blemish until the impugned Office Order
No. 508/2017 dated 12.12. 2017 suddenly
came to be issued by the University, whereby
the earlier orders of absorption/regularization
of the petitioners and several other employees
(petitioners of other writ applications) were
cancelled. The impugned order refers to an
enquiry ordered by the Hon'ble Chancellor
into the actions of the then In-charge/Acting
Vice-Chancellor of the University for the
period 26.04.2013 to 28.02.2014, and to letters
dated 21.8.2017 and 06.09.2017 issued from
the Governor's Secretariat. The common
impugned order dated 12.12.2017 has been
Patna High Court CWJC No.1543 of 2018 dt.09-12-2025
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brought on record and challenged by the
petitioners."
5. It is the categorical case of the petitioners that no
notice, no show-cause and no opportunity of hearing was afforded
to any of them before passing the impugned order dated
12.12.2017
. The petitioners state that the report of the Enquiry
Committee headed by the Hon'ble Justice (Retd.) Sri Akhilesh
Chandra and another member, Dr. Prema Jha, was also never
supplied to them. The letters bearing no. TMBU-15/2017-
2024/GS(I) dated 21.8.2017 and letter no. TMBU-15/2017-
2545/GS(I) dated 06.09.2017 issued by the office of Governor's
Secretariat, Bihar although have been brought on record as
Annexure-C series to counter affidavit but even these letters which
have formed the basis for issuance of the impugned order were
never supplied to the petitioners.
6. The petitioners further plead that they had no notice
of the terms of reference of the said Committee, were not
associated with the enquiry in any manner and were never called
upon to explain or justify either their initial engagement or their
subsequent absorption. According to them, the impugned order has
been passed entirely behind their back and in complete disregard
to the principles of natural justice.
Patna High Court CWJC No.1543 of 2018 dt.09-12-2025
7. In the connected writ applications, the basic factual
narrative is similar, save and except the dates and nature of initial
engagement. In CWJC No. 1891 of 2018, the petitioner was
appointed in the self-financing scheme of T.N.B. College,
Bhagalpur on 02.06.2003, and his services were subsequently
regularized by Office Order dated 15.06.2013. In CWJC No. 1896
of 2018, the petitioners were engaged on contractual basis on
18.01.2005 and in 1999 respectively, and though their services
were discontinued at one stage, they were later regularized vide
Office Order dated 12.09.2013. In CWJC No. 1906 of 2018, the
petitioners were engaged on temporary basis on 06.09.2001, and
were regularized by Office Order dated 24.12.2013,
notwithstanding that their services had earlier been terminated on
06.10.2010. In CWJC No. 2047 of 2018, the petitioner was
directed to work as Library Assistant on 29.06.1998 and was later
absorbed as Assistant in the Post-Graduate Department of
Sociology by Office Order dated 10.12.2013. The respective
orders of regularization/absorption in those cases have similarly
been brought on record as annexures to the respective writ
applications and are also covered by the impugned Office Order
No. 508/2017 dated 12.12.2017 (Annexure-11 in CWJC
no.1543/2018).
Patna High Court CWJC No.1543 of 2018 dt.09-12-2025
PETITIONERS' SUBMISSIONS
8. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the
impugned order dated 12.12.2017 has been passed in gross
violation of the principles of natural justice. It is submitted that:
• no show-cause notice was issued to
any of the petitioners before recalling their
absorption orders;
• no opportunity of hearing, oral or
written, was granted;
• the enquiry report and the
communications from the Governor's
Secretariat (Annexure-C series) were never
supplied to them; and
• the petitioners were never
confronted with any allegation of illegality in
their initial engagement or subsequent
absorption.
9. It is urged that the petitioners first came to know of
the alleged grounds of "illegality" only from the pleadings and
written submissions of the respondents in these writ proceedings.
On the date when their absorption orders were cancelled, they had
no means of knowing why such drastic action was being proposed
Patna High Court CWJC No.1543 of 2018 dt.09-12-2025
or taken against them. It is contended that the very foundation of
the impugned order was withheld from them, thereby rendering it
void.
10. Learned counsel further submits that the impugned
order is wholly non-speaking so far as the petitioners are
concerned. The order merely makes a general reference to the
enquiry and to the letters of the Governor's Secretariat but does
not record any specific finding against any of the petitioners, does
not analyze their individual cases; and also does not disclose any
reason as to why the absorptions made under Office Orders dated
20.12.2013 was being treated as illegal. In the absence of reasons,
it is argued, the impugned order is arbitrary and violative of
Article 14 and Article 21 of the Constitution of India.
11. It is further submitted that this is not a case of fraud,
forgery, false documents or any misrepresentation on the part of
the petitioners. Their initial engagements, even if irregular in the
perception of the University, were based on actual work performed
for long periods; their absorption orders were issued by the
competent authority of the University and acted upon for several
years; and there is not even an allegation that the petitioners
themselves procured their absorption orders by any fraudulent act.
In such circumstances, the respondents could not have invoked any
Patna High Court CWJC No.1543 of 2018 dt.09-12-2025
so-called "exception" to the principles of natural justice on the
plea that the appointments were "illegal ab initio".
12. Learned counsel places heavy reliance upon the
recent judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Basudev Dutta
v. State of West Bengal & Ors. (Civil Appeal No. 13919 of 2024,
decided on 05.12.2024) Paragraph no. 12.1 to 12.6 - requirement
to supply reasons in administrative and quasi-judicial order and the
requirement of providing personal hearing before order of
termination.
13. Learned counsel also relies upon K. Prabhakar
Hegde v. Bank of Baroda, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1736,
(Paragraphs 1-5 and 44), the Supreme Court reaffirmed the
mandatory requirement of observance of the principles of natural
justice, including the right to be heard, holding that violation of
such principles renders the action void, and no separate proof of
prejudice is required. In S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan & Ors., 1980
(4) SCC 379 (Paragraphs 17-24) lays down that observance of
natural justice is necessary without showing any prejudice, as
deprivation of principles of natural justice is itself a prejudice; a
writ may not be issued to compel observance of natural justice
only where, on admitted and indisputable facts, only one
conclusion is possible and only one penalty is permissible.
Patna High Court CWJC No.1543 of 2018 dt.09-12-2025
14. On the strength of these decisions, it is contended
that the University's attempt to justify the impugned action by
relying on the alleged illegality of the absorptions cannot cure the
jurisdictional defect arising from complete breach of natural
justice and absence of reasons.
15. On merits, the petitioners submit that in CWJC No.
1543 of 2018 there was a proper advertisement and a selection
process for contractual engagement as Junior Engineer; that
sanctioned posts were available; that the Vice-Chancellor was the
competent authority under the Bihar State Universities Act; and
that the petitioners had put in long, unblemished service. They
contend that, in any event, their absorptions cannot be treated as
void ab initio so as to deprive them even of the basic procedural
safeguards.
16. However, learned counsel for the petitioners
submits that without going into the complexities of facts involved
in all the writ applications, these writ applications can be disposed
of on the limited grounds of:
(i) violation of principles of natural justice, and
(ii) non-speaking character of the impugned
order, leaving the larger issue relating to the validity of the
Patna High Court CWJC No.1543 of 2018 dt.09-12-2025
absorptions open for fresh consideration by competent
authority.
It is, therefore, urged that this Court need not
pronounce upon the correctness of the Enquiry Committee's
conclusions or upon the legality of the absorptions on
merits.
RESPONDENTS' SUBMISSIONS (TMBU)
17. Per Contra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of
the University and its officials, while relying upon the counter
affidavits filed on their behalf, submits that in all these cases the
petitioners' initial engagements and subsequent absorptions are
wholly illegal and void ab initio.
18. Summarizing the stand as articulated, it is
contended that:
• in CWJC No. 1543 of 2018, the
petitioners were initially appointed on contractual
basis on 28.10.2006 and were regularized by Office
Order dated 20.12.2013 without following due
process of law and without approval of the State
Government under Section 35 of the Bihar State
Universities Act, 1976;
Patna High Court CWJC No.1543 of 2018 dt.09-12-2025
• in CWJC No. 1891 of 2018, the petitioner
was appointed in a self-finance BCA course on
02.06.2003 and regularised by order dated
15.06.2013, again without following any statutory
procedure and without approval under Section 35 of
the Bihar State Universities Act, 1976;
• in CWJC No. 1896 of 2018, the
petitioners were engaged on contractual basis without
advertisement or selection and were regularised on
12.09.2013 though the then Vice-Chancellor was
only an In-charge Vice-Chancellor and not competent
to take policy decisions, and there was no approval of
the State Government or the Chancellor;
• in CWJC No. 1906 of 2018, the
petitioners were engaged temporarily on 06.09.2001
without advertisement, their services were terminated
on 06.10.2010 and there was thus no subsisting
relationship of master and servant when they were
purportedly regularised on 24.12.2013;
• in CWJC No. 2047 of 2018, the petitioner
was asked to work as Library Assistant without any
sanctioned post or pay and was suddenly absorbed as
Patna High Court CWJC No.1543 of 2018 dt.09-12-2025
Assistant w.e.f. 01.04.2005 by order dated
10.12.2013 without advertisement, without post and
without approval under Section 35 of the Bihar State
Universities Act, 1976.
19. It is argued that all the above absorptions were
ordered by the then In-charge Vice-Chancellor during the period
26.04.2013 to 28.02.2014, when he was neither substantively
appointed nor competent to take far-reaching policy decisions. The
University contends that he misused his position and regularised
dozens of employees "in haste", in complete disregard of Section
35 of the Bihar State Universities Act, 1976, which mandates prior
approval of the State Government for creation of posts and
appointments against them.
20. Learned counsel submits that on the orders of the
Hon'ble Chancellor, an Enquiry Committee headed by a retired
Judge of this Court and Dr. Prema Jha as Member was constituted
to enquire into the alleged illegalities and irregularities committed
by the said In-charge Vice-Chancellor during the relevant period.
The Committee, after a thorough enquiry, submitted its report on
16.12.2016, holding, inter alia, that the absorptions/regularisations
of the present petitioners were made without advertisement,
without open selection, without sanctioned posts and without
Patna High Court CWJC No.1543 of 2018 dt.09-12-2025
mandatory statutory approvals, and were therefore illegal. On the
basis of this report and the letters dated 09.05.2017 and 06.09.2017
issued from the Governor's Secretariat (Annexure-C series of
counter affidavit), the University issued the impugned Office
Order No. 508/2017 dated 12.12.2017 (Annexure-11), cancelling
all such absorptions.
21. On the legal plane, reliance is placed upon Section
35 of the Bihar State Universities Act, 1976, the Full Bench
decision of this Court in Braj Kishore Singh & Ors. v. State of
Bihar & Ors.1997 (1) PLJR 509, the decision of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in State of Bihar v. Bihar Rajya M.S.E.S.K.K.
Mahasangh, 2005 (1) PLJR 464 (SC), the Division Bench
judgment in Nand Lal Bhagat & Ors. v. State of Bihar & Ors.,
LPA No. 586 of 2013, the Division Bench in State of Karnataka v.
M.L Keshri, 2010(9) SCC 247, the Constitutional Bench in
Secretary, State of Karnataka v. Umadevi 2006(1) SCC 1 and the
Supreme Court's decision in Upendra Singh v. State of Bihar,
2018 (2) PLJR 91 (SC). It is contended that these authorities
clearly hold that appointments made in violation of Section 35,
without sanctioned posts and without Government approval, are
invalid and confer no right of regularization.
Patna High Court CWJC No.1543 of 2018 dt.09-12-2025
22. Learned counsel further submits that the petitioners'
appointments being ex facie illegal and void ab initio, there was no
requirement in law to follow the principles of natural justice before
cancelling the absorptions. For this proposition, reliance is placed
on Union of India & Anr. v. Raghuvar Pal Singh, 2018 (2) PLJR
211 (SC), the Full Bench decision of this Court in Rita Mishra v.
Director, Primary Education, Bihar, AIR 1988 Pat 26, and a
recent Single Judge decision reported in 2023 (1) PLJR 112,
where it has been held that in cases of illegal appointments,
adherence to natural justice is not mandatory.
23. As regards the omission to supply the enquiry
report, learned counsel submits that the impugned order amounts
to a termination simpliciter of appointments which were void and
illegal from inception. Placing reliance on M.C. Mehta v. Union
of India, (1999) 6 SCC 237 and Aligarh Muslim University v.
Mansoor Ali Khan, (2000) 7 SCC 529, it is argued that even if
there is a technical infraction of natural justice, the Court need not
set aside the order if the quashing would result in the revival of
another illegal order and the ultimate result would not change.
24. On these premises, it is urged that the impugned
Office Order No. 508/2017 dated 12.12.2017 does not warrant
interference and that the writ applications are liable to be
Patna High Court CWJC No.1543 of 2018 dt.09-12-2025
dismissed as no enforceable right flows from an appointment or
absorption which is itself contrary to law and void ab initio.
ISSUES IN QUESTION
25. On the pleadings and rival submissions, the
following issues arise for consideration:
(i) Whether the impugned Office Order No. 508/2017
dated 12.12.2017 cancelling the petitioners' absorption /
regularization has been passed in violation of the principles of
natural justice, inasmuch as no notice, show-cause or
opportunity of hearing was afforded to the petitioners and the
enquiry report as well as letters bearing no. TMBU-15/2017-
2024/GS(I) dated 21.8.2017 and letter no. TMBU-15/2017-
2545/GS(I) dated 06.09.2017 issued by the office of Governor's
Secretariat, Bihar relied upon was not supplied to them?
(ii) Whether the impugned Office Order No. 508/2017
dated 12.12.2017 is vitiated for being a non-speaking and
unreasoned order, passed without recording specific findings as
against the petitioners and without independent application of
mind?
(iii) Whether, having regard to the manner of their
initial engagement and subsequent service, the petitioners'
absorption/regularisation under Office Order No. 332/2013
Patna High Court CWJC No.1543 of 2018 dt.09-12-2025
dated 20.12.2013 and other analogous orders could, in law, be
withdrawn and cancelled in the manner done, and whether the
said absorptions can be treated as illegal or void ab initio?
(iv) Whether, in the facts and circumstances of the
case and in view of the enquiry conducted into the actions of the
then In-charge/Acting Vice-Chancellor, the University was
justified in annulling the petitioners' absorption/regularisation
solely on the basis of the said enquiry and communications from
the Governor's Secretariat, without any independent
consideration of the petitioners' individual cases?
FINDINGS
Issue (i): Whether the impugned Office Order No.
508/2017 dated 12.12.2017 cancelling the petitioners'
absorption/regularisation has been passed in violation of the
principles of natural justice, inasmuch as no notice, show-cause
or opportunity of hearing was afforded to the petitioners and the
enquiry report as well as letters bearing no. TMBU-15/2017-
2024/GS(I) dated 21.8.2017 and letter no. TMBU-15/2017-
2545/GS(I) dated 06.09.2017 issued by the office of Governor's
Secretariat, Bihar relied upon was not supplied to them?
26. The admitted position on record is that prior to the
issuance of the impugned Office Order No. 508/2017 dated
Patna High Court CWJC No.1543 of 2018 dt.09-12-2025
12.12.2017 (Annexure-11), no individual notice or show-cause
was issued to any of the petitioners, no copy of the Enquiry
Committee report dated 16.12.2016 and letters bearing no. TMBU-
15/2017-2024/GS(I) dated 21.8.2017 and letter no. TMBU-
15/2017-2545/GS(I) dated 06.09.2017 issued by the office of
Governor's Secretariat, Bihar were supplied to them, and they
were never called upon to explain the alleged illegality in their
initial engagement or absorption. This is conceded by the
University, which proceeds on the premise that in cases of illegal
appointments, natural justice need not be followed.
27. The Enquiry Committee was constituted to examine
the conduct and decisions of the then In-charge Vice-Chancellor.
The petitioners were not parties before the Committee; they were
not examined as witnesses; nor were they afforded any opportunity
to rebut the material placed before the Committee. Yet, the
consequences of the Committee's report have fallen most severely
upon them, resulting in the cancellation of their absorptions and
the loss of their livelihood.
28. The law on the requirement of notice, supply of
material and opportunity of hearing before taking such adverse
action is no longer res integra. In Basudev Dutta v. State of West
Patna High Court CWJC No.1543 of 2018 dt.09-12-2025
Bengal & Ors. (C.A. No. 13919 of 2024), in para 12.2 to 12.6 it
has been held and observed as follows:
"12.2. It is settled law that every
administrative or quasi-judicial order must contain
the reasons. Such reasons go a long way in not only
ensuring that the authority has applied his mind to
the facts and the law but also provide the grounds for
the aggrieved party to assail the order in the manner
known to law. In the absence of any reasons, it also
possesses a difficulty for the judicial authorities to
test the correctness of the order or in other words,
exercise its power of judicial review. In this context,
it will be useful to refer to the judgment of this Court
in Kranti Associates (P) Ltd. v. Masood Ahmed
Khan, wherein after a detailed analysis of various
judgments, it was held as follows:
"27. In Rama Varma Bharathan
Thampuram v. State of Kerala [(1979) 4 SCC 782 :
AIR 1979 SC 1918] V.R. Krishna Iyer, J. speaking
for a three-Judge Bench held that the functioning of
the Board was quasi-judicial in character. One of the
attributes of quasi-judicial functioning is the
Patna High Court CWJC No.1543 of 2018 dt.09-12-2025
recording of reasons in support of decisions taken
and the other requirement is following the principles
of natural justice. The learned Judge held that
natural justice requires reasons to be written for the
conclusions made (see SCC p. 788, para 14 : AIR p.
1922, para 14)."
28. In Gurdial Singh Fijji v. State of
Punjab [(1979) 2 SCC 368: 1979 SCC (L&S) 197]
this Court, dealing with a service matter, relying on
the ratio in Capoor [(1973) 2 SCC 836 : 1974 SCC
(L&S) 5 : AIR 1974 SC 87], held that "rubber-stamp
reason" is not enough and virtually quoted the
observation in Capoor (supra), SCC p. 854, para 28,
to the extent that:
"28.... Reasons are the links between the
materials on which certain conclusions are based
and the actual conclusions." (See AIR p. 377, para
18.)
29. In a Constitution Bench decision of this
Court in H.H. Shri Swamiji of Shri Amar Mutt v.
Commr., Hindu Religious and Charitable
Endowments Deptt. [(1979) 4 SCC 642: 1980 SCC
Patna High Court CWJC No.1543 of 2018 dt.09-12-2025
(Tax) 16 : AIR 1980 SC 1] while giving the majority
judgment Y.V. Chandrachud, C.J. referred to (SCC p.
658, para 29) Broom's Legal Maxims (1939 Edn., p.
97) where the principle in Latin runs-- "Cessante
ratione legis cessat ipsa lex."
30.The English version of the said
principle given by the Chief Justice is that:
(H.H. Shri Swamiji case [(1979) 4 SCC
642 : 1980 SCC (Tax) 16 : AIR 1980 SC 1], SCC p.
658, para 29)
"29. ... 'reason is the soul of the law, and
when the reason of any particular law ceases, so
does the law itself'." (See AIR p. 11, para 29.)
33. In Star Enterprises v. City and
Industrial Development Corpn. of Maharashtra
Ltd. [(1990) 3 SCC 280] a three-Judge Bench of this
Court held that in the present day set-up judicial
review of administrative action has become
expansive and is becoming wider day by day and the
State has to justify its action in various fields of
public law. All these necessitate recording of reason
for executive actions including the rejection of the
Patna High Court CWJC No.1543 of 2018 dt.09-12-2025
highest offer. This Court held that disclosure of
reasons in matters of such rejection provides an
opportunity for an objective review both by superior
administrative heads and for judicial process and
opined that such reasons should be communicated
unless there are specific justifications for not doing
so (see SCC pp. 284-85, para 10).
46. The position in the United States has
been indicated by this Court in S.N. Mukherjee
[(1990) 4 SCC 594 : 1990 SCC (Cri) 669 : 1991
SCC (L&S) 242 : (1991) 16 ATC 445 : AIR 1990 SC
1984] in SCC p. 602, para 11 : AIR para 11 at p.
1988 of the judgment. This Court held that in the
United States the courts have always insisted on the
recording of reasons by administrative authorities in
exercise of their powers. It was further held that such
recording of reasons is required as "the courts
cannot exercise their duty of review unless they are
advised of the considerations underlying the action
under review". In S.N. Mukherjee [(1990) 4 SCC
594 : 1990 SCC (Cri) 669 : 1991 SCC (L&S) 242 :
(1991) 16 ATC 445 : AIR 1990 SC 1984] this Court
Patna High Court CWJC No.1543 of 2018 dt.09-12-2025
relied on the decisions of the US Court in Securities
and Exchange Commission v. Chenery Corpn. [87
L Ed 626 : 318 US 80 (1942)] and Dunlop v.
Bachowski [44 L Ed 2d 377 : 421 US 560 (1974)] in
support of its opinion discussed above.
47. Summarizing the above discussion, this
Court holds:
(a) In India the judicial trend has always
been to record reasons, even in administrative
decisions, if such decisions affect anyone
prejudicially.
(b) A quasi-judicial authority must record
reasons in support of its conclusions.
(c) Insistence on recording of reasons is
meant to serve the wider principle of justice that
justice must not only be done it must also appear to
be done as well.
(d) Recording of reasons also operates as a
valid restraint on any possible arbitrary exercise of
judicial and quasi-judicial or even administrative
power.
Patna High Court CWJC No.1543 of 2018 dt.09-12-2025
(e) Reasons reassure that discretion has
been exercised by the decision-maker on relevant
grounds and by disregarding extraneous
considerations.
(f) Reasons have virtually become as
indispensable a component of a decision- making
process as observing principles of natural justice by
judicial, quasi-judicial and even by administrative
bodies.
(g) Reasons facilitate the process of
judicial review by superior courts.
(h) The ongoing judicial trend in all
countries committed to rule of law and constitutional
governance is in favour of reasoned decisions based
on relevant facts. This is virtually the lifeblood of
judicial decision-making justifying the principle that
reason is the soul of justice.
(i) Judicial or even quasi-judicial opinions
these days can be as different as the judges and
authorities who deliver them. All these decisions
serve one common purpose which is to demonstrate
by reason that the relevant factors have been
Patna High Court CWJC No.1543 of 2018 dt.09-12-2025
objectively considered. This is important for
sustaining the litigants' faith in the justice delivery
system.
(j) Insistence on reason is a requirement
for both judicial accountability and transparency.
(k) If a judge or a quasi-judicial authority
is not candid enough about his/her decision-making
process then it is impossible to know whether the
person deciding is faithful to the doctrine of
precedent or to principles of incrementalism.
(l) Reasons in support of decisions must be
cogent, clear and succinct. A pretence of reasons or
"rubber-stamp reasons" is not to be equated with a
valid decision-making process.
(m) It cannot be doubted that transparency
is the sine qua non of restraint on abuse of judicial
powers. Transparency in decision-making not only
makes the judges and decision-makers less prone to
errors but also makes them subject to broader
scrutiny. (See David Shapiro in Defence of Judicial
Candor [(1987) 100 Harvard Law Review 731-37]).
Patna High Court CWJC No.1543 of 2018 dt.09-12-2025
(n) Since the requirement to record reasons
emanates from the broad doctrine of fairness in
decision-making, the said requirement is now
virtually a component of human rights and was
considered part of Strasbourg Jurisprudence. See
Ruiz Torija v. Spain [(1994) 19 EHRR 553] EHRR,
at 562 para 29 and Anya v. University of Oxford
[2001 EWCA Civ 405 (CA)], wherein the Court
referred to Article 6 of the European Convention of
Human Rights which requires, "adequate and
intelligent reasons must be given for judicial
decisions".
(o) In all common law jurisdictions
judgments play a vital role in setting up precedents
for the future. Therefore, for development of law,
requirement of giving reasons for the decision is of
the essence and is virtually a part of "due process"."
12.3. That apart, before passing the
termination order, no opportunity of personal
hearing was provided to the appellant to defend his
stand effectively.
Patna High Court CWJC No.1543 of 2018 dt.09-12-2025
Islam Hashmi v. State of U.P, it was
categorically held by this Court that 'personal
hearing should be given, before termination of
employee from service'.
The relevant paragraph of the same is
quoted below for ready reference:
"25. It was observed in that case that it is
a fundamental rule of law that no decision must be
taken which will affect the rights of any person
without first giving him an opportunity of putting
forward his case. The main requirements of a fair
hearing, as pointed out by this Court earlier, are: (i)
A person must know the case that he is to meet; and
(ii) he must have an adequate opportunity of meeting
that case. These rules of natural justice, however,
operate in voids of a statute. Their application can
be expressly or implicitly excluded by the legislature.
But, such is not the case here. On the contrary, the
two circulars issued by the State Government, to
which a reference has been made earlier, expressly
imported these principles of natural justice and
required that in all cases in which the services of an
Patna High Court CWJC No.1543 of 2018 dt.09-12-2025
officer or servant were to be determined on the
ground of his unsuitability, they must be given an
opportunity of personal hearing by the Committee.
The whole purpose of the personal interview was
that, when it was proposed to declare an official
unsuitable for absorption, the Committee had to
afford him an opportunity to appear before it and
clear up his position. Since it is nobody's case that
such an opportunity was afforded to the appellant,
we would hold that the order dated August 26, 1967
(of termination of his services passed by the State)
suffers from a serious legal infirmity and must be
quashed. He will, therefore, have to be treated as
having continued in service till the age of
superannuation and entitled to all the benefits
incidental to such a declaration."
12.4. In S. Govindaraju v. Karnataka
State Road Transport Corporation again, this Court
held thus:
"7. ..... There is no dispute that the
appellant's services were terminated on the ground of
his being found unsuitable for the appointment and
Patna High Court CWJC No.1543 of 2018 dt.09-12-2025
as a result of which his name was deleted from the
select list, and he forfeited his chance for
appointment. Once a candidate is selected and his
name is included in the select list for appointment in
accordance with the Regulations, he gets a right to
be considered for appointment as and when vacancy
arises. On the removal of his name from the select
list serious consequences entail as he forfeits his
right to employment in future. In such a situation
even though the Regulations do not stipulate for
affording any opportunity to the employee, the
principles of natural justice would be attracted and
the employee would be entitled to an opportunity of
explanation, though no elaborate enquiry would be
necessary. Giving an opportunity of explanation
would meet the bare minimal requirement of natural"
"justice. Before the services of an employee are
terminated, resulting in forfeiture of his right to be
considered for employment, opportunity of
explanation must be afforded to the employee
concerned. The appellant was not afforded any
opportunity of explanation before the issue of the
Patna High Court CWJC No.1543 of 2018 dt.09-12-2025
impugned order; consequently the order is rendered
null and void being inconsistent with the principles
of natural justice..."
12.5. This Court in Aureliano
Fernandes v. State of Goa, in an unequivocal terms
observed as follows:
"73. ... This Court has repeatedly
observed that even when the rules are silent,
principles of natural justice must be read into them.
74. In its keen anxiety of being fair to the
victim/complainants and wrap up the complaints
expeditiously, the Committee has ended up being
grossly unfair to the appellant. It has completely
overlooked the cardinal principle that justice must
not only be done, but should manifestly be seen to be
done. The principles of audi alteram partem could
not have been thrown to the winds in this cavalier
manner."
12.6. It is manifestly clear from the above
judgments that reasons are heartbeat of every order
and every notice must specify the grounds on which
the administrative or quasi-judicial authority intends
Patna High Court CWJC No.1543 of 2018 dt.09-12-2025
to proceed; if any document is relied upon to form
the basis of enquiry, such document must be
furnished to the employee; it is only then a
meaningful reply can be furnished; and the failure to
furnish the documents referred and relied in the
notice would vitiate the entire proceedings as being
arbitrary and in violation of the principles of natural
justice; and before taking any adverse decision, the
aggrieved person must be given an opportunity of
personal hearing. In the light of the same, we have
no hesitation to hold that the order of termination
passed against the appellant is arbitrary, illegal and
violative of the principles of natural justice and it
cannot be sustained."
29. After surveying a long line of authorities, the Court
summarized the legal position, to the effect that:
• every administrative or quasi-
judicial order which has civil consequences
must contain reasons;
• any document relied upon to form
the basis of the action must be furnished to the
person concerned;
Patna High Court CWJC No.1543 of 2018 dt.09-12-2025
• only then can a meaningful reply
be submitted; and
• failure to supply such documents
and to afford a real opportunity of defence
vitiates the entire proceedings as arbitrary and
violative of the principles of natural justice.
30. In S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan 1980(4) SCC 379,
para 17 to 24 states that:
"17. Linked with this question is the
question whether the failure to observe natural
justice would have made no difference, the
admitted or indisputable facts speaking for
themselves. Where on the admitted or
indisputable facts only one conclusion is
possible and under the law only one penalty is
permissible, the court may not issue its writ to
compel the observance of natural justice, not
because it approves the non-observance of
natural justice but because courts do not issue
futile writs. But it will be a pernicious
principle to apply in other situations where
Patna High Court CWJC No.1543 of 2018 dt.09-12-2025
conclusions are controversial, however,
slightly, and penalties are discretionary.
18. In Ridge v. Baldwin one of the
arguments was that even if the appellant had
been heard by watch committee nothing that
he could have said could have made any
difference. The House of Lords observed (at p.
68):
"It may be convenient at this point
to deal with an argument, that, even if as a
general rule watch committee must hear a
constable in his own defence before dismissing
him, this case was so clear that nothing that
the appellant could have said could have made
any difference. It is a reason frequently
submitted that could be accepted as an excuse.
But, even if it could, the watch committee
would, in my view, fail on the facts. It may well
be that no reasonable body of men could have
denied the appellant. But as between the other
two courses open to the watch committee the
case is not so clear. Certainly, on the facts, as
Patna High Court CWJC No.1543 of 2018 dt.09-12-2025
we know them, the watch committee could
reasonably have decided to forfeit the
appellant's pension rights, but I could not hold
that they would have acted wrongly or wholly
unreasonably if they had in the exercise of
their discretion decided to take a more lenient
course."
19. Megarry, J., discussed the
question in John v. Rees, he said (at p. 402):
"It may be that there are some who
would decry the importance which the courts
attach to the observance of the rules of natural
justice. 'When something is obvious', they may
say, 'why force everybody to go through the
tiresome waste of time involved in framing
charges and giving an opportunity to be
heard? The result is obvious from the start'.
Those who take this view do not, I think, do
themselves justice. As everybody who has
anything to do with the law well knows, the
law is strewn with examples of open and shut
cases which, somehow, were not; of
Patna High Court CWJC No.1543 of 2018 dt.09-12-2025
unanswerable charges which, in the event,
were completely answered; of inexplicable
conduct which was fully explained; of fixed
and unalterable determinations that, by
discussion, suffered a change. Nor are those
with any knowledge of human nature who
pause to think for a moment likely to
underestimate the feelings of resentment of
those who find that a decision against them
has been made without their being afforded
any opportunity to influence the course of
events."
20. In Annamunthodo v. Oilfields Workers'
Trade Union Lord Denning, in his speech said (at p. 625):
"Counsel for the respondent Union
did suggest that a man could not complain of a
failure of natural justice unless he could show
that he had been prejudiced by it. Their
Lordships cannot accept this suggestion. If a
domestic tribunal fails to act in accordance
with natural justice, the person affected by
their decision can always seek redress in the
Patna High Court CWJC No.1543 of 2018 dt.09-12-2025
courts. It is a prejudice to any man to be
denied justice."
21. In Margarita Fuentes v. Tobert L. Shevin it
was said (at p. 574):
"But even assuming that the
appellants had fallen behind in their
installment payments, and that they had no
other valid defenses; that is immaterial here.
The right to be heard does not depend upon an
advance showing that one will surely prevail at
the hearing. To one who protests against the
taking of his property without due process of
law, it is no answer to say that in his particular
case due process of law would have led to the
same result because he had no adequate
defense upon the merits."
22. In Chintapalli Agency Taluk Arrack Sales
Cooperative Society Ltd. v. Secretary (Food &
Agriculture), Govt. of A.P., there was a non-compliance
with Section 77(2) of the Cooperative Societies Act which
provided that no order prejudicial to any person shall be
passed unless such person has been given an opportunity of
Patna High Court CWJC No.1543 of 2018 dt.09-12-2025
making his representation. The argument was that since the
facts were clear the non-compliance did not matter. It was
also said that the appellant had of his own motion made
some representation in the matter. This Court rejected the
arguments observing (at pp. 567, 569-50; (SCC pp. 341 &
343-44, paras 11 & 21-22)):
"... It is submitted that the
government did not afford any opportunity to
the appellant for making representation before
it. The High Court rejected this plea on the
ground that from a perusal of the voluntary
applications filed by the appellant it was clear
that the appellant had answered many of the
points urged by the respondents in their
revision petition before the government. We
are, however, unable to accept the view of the
High Court as correct....
As mentioned earlier in the judgment the government
did not give any notice communicating to the appellant about
entertainment of the application in revision preferred by the
respondents. Even though the appellant had filed some
representations in respect of the matter, it would not absolve the
Patna High Court CWJC No.1543 of 2018 dt.09-12-2025
government from giving notice to the appellant to make the
representation against the claim of the respondents."
"It is admitted that no notice
whatever had been given by the government to
the appellant. There is, therefore, clear
violation of Section 77(2) which is a
mandatory provision. We do not agree with the
High Court that this provision can be by-
passed by resort to delivering into
correspondence between the appellant and the
government. Such non-compliance with a
mandatory provision gives rise to unnecessary
litigation which must be avoided at all costs."
23. The observations of this Court in Chintapalli
Agency Taluk Arrack Sales Cooperative Society are
clearly against the submissions of the learned Attorney-
General.
24. The matter has also been treated as an
application of the general principle that justice should not
only be done but should be seen to be done. Jackson's
Natural Justice (1980 Edn.) contains a very interesting
discussion of the subject. He says:
Patna High Court CWJC No.1543 of 2018 dt.09-12-2025
"The distinction between justice being
done and being seen to be done has been emphasised
in many cases. ...
The requirement that justice should be seen
to be done may be regarded as a general principle
which in some cases can be satisfied only by the
observance of the rules of natural justice or as itself
forming one of those rules. Both explanations of the
significance of the maxim are found in R. v. Home
Secretary, ex p. Hosenball, where after saying that
'the principles of natural justice are those
fundamental rules, the breach of which will prevent
justice from being seen to be done' he went on to
describe the maxim as 'one of the rules generally
accepted in the bundle of the rules making up natural
justice'."
31. In Krishnadatt Awasthy v. State of M.P. & Ors.,
(2025) 7 SCC 545, para 38, 43, 44 and 45 reads as:
"38. This brings us to the second limb of
the principle of natural justice i.e. audi alteram
partem and whether the demonstration of prejudice
is mandatory for raising a claim of violation of right
Patna High Court CWJC No.1543 of 2018 dt.09-12-2025
of hearing. The principle of audi alteram partem lies
at the very heart of procedural fairness, ensuring
that no one is condemned or adversely affected
without being given an opportunity to present their
case. The decision in Ridge v. Baldwin is regarded
as a significant landmark decision in British
administrative law and is often referred to as a
magna carta of natural justice. This decision has
resonated deeply in the Indian legal context where
natural justice principles are firmly entrenched with
constitutional guarantees.
43.The opportunity of hearing is
considered so fundamental to any civilised legal
system that the courts have read the principles of
natural justice into an enactment to save it from
being declared unconstitutional on procedural
grounds.
44.It has been argued before us that if the
failure to provide hearing does not cause prejudice,
observing the principle of natural justice may not be
necessary. In this context, a three-Judge Bench of
this Court in S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan speaking
Patna High Court CWJC No.1543 of 2018 dt.09-12-2025
through Chinappa Reddy, J. considered such
arguments to be "pernicious" and held that "[t]he
non-observance of natural justice is itself prejudice
to any man and proof of prejudice independently of
proof of denial of natural justice is unnecessary".
The Supreme Court, however, has drawn out an
exception where "on the admitted or indisputable
facts only one conclusion is possible, and under the
law only one penalty is permissible, then the Court
may not compel the observance of natural justice".
45.Professor I.P. Massey has commented on this
shift as under:
"Before the decision of the highest Court
in S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan, the rule was that the
principles of natural justice shall apply only when an
administrative action has caused some prejudice to
the person, meaning thereby that he must have
suffered some "civil consequences". Therefore, the
person had to show something extra in order to prove
"prejudice" or civil consequences. This approach
had stultified the growth of administrative law within
an area of highly practical significance. It is
Patna High Court CWJC No.1543 of 2018 dt.09-12-2025
gratifying that in Jagmohan, the Court took a bold
step in holding that a separate showing of prejudice
is not necessary. The non-observance of natural
justice is in itself prejudice caused. However, merely
because facts are admitted or are indisputable it does
not follow that the principles of natural justice need
not be observed."
32. The Court further emphasized that the opportunity
of hearing is a valued human interaction which has inherent worth,
independent of the outcome, and that an unfair proceeding at the
initial stage cannot generally be cured at the appellate stage.
33. In K. Prabhakar Hegde v. Bank of Baroda, 2025
SCC OnLine SC 1736, para 1 to 5 and para 44 further states as:
"1. S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan 1980(4) SCC 379
is a landmark decision of this Court, delivered more than
half a century back, delineating the contours of the
principles of natural justice, more particularly the right to
be heard before one is condemned. The supersession of the
New Delhi Municipal Committee was challenged on the
ground that it was in violation of the principles of natural
justice, since no show cause notice was issued before the
order of supersession was passed. Linked with that question
Patna High Court CWJC No.1543 of 2018 dt.09-12-2025
was the question whether the failure to observe the
principles of natural justice matters at all, if such
observance would have made no difference, the admitted or
indisputable facts speaking for themselves.
The golden words of Hon'ble O. Chinappa Reddy, J.,
speaking for the three-Judge Bench, rings in our ears:
"24. ... In our view the principles of natural
justice know of no exclusionary rule dependent on
whether it would have made any difference if
natural justice had been observed. The non-
observance of natural justice is itself prejudice to
any man and proof of prejudice independently of
proof of denial of natural justice is unnecessary. It
ill comes from a person who has denied justice
that the person who has been denied justice is not
prejudiced. ..."
(emphasis ours)
2. The above passage from S.L. Kapoor (supra) came to
be noticed in the Constitution Bench decision of this Court in Olga
Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation and met with an
unconditional approval. Hon'ble Y.V. Chandrachud, CJI.,
speaking for the Bench (which incidentally included Hon'ble O.
Chinappa Reddy, J.) ruled that the said observations sum up the
Patna High Court CWJC No.1543 of 2018 dt.09-12-2025
true legal position regarding the purport and implications of the
right of hearing.
3. Close on the heels of Olga Tellis (supra), another
Constitution Bench upon a survey of precedents on the point of
fair and impartial hearing observed in Union of India v. Tulsiram
Patel as follows:
"95. The principles of natural justice have
thus come to be recognized as being a part of the
guarantee contained in Article 14 because of the new
and dynamic interpretation given by this Court to the
concept of equality which is the subject-matter of
that article. Shortly put, the syllogism runs thus:
violation of a rule of natural justice results in
arbitrariness which is the same as discrimination:
where discrimination is the result of State action, it is
a violation of Article 14: therefore, a violation of a
principle of natural justice by a State action is a
violation of Article 14. Article 14, however, is not the
sole repository of the principles of natural justice.
What it does is to guarantee that any law or State
action violating them will be struck down. The
principles of natural justice, however, apply not only
Patna High Court CWJC No.1543 of 2018 dt.09-12-2025
to legislation and State action but also where any
tribunal, authority or body of men, not coming within
the definition of State in Article 12, is charged with
the duty of deciding a matter. In such a case, the
principles of natural justice require that it must
decide such matter fairly and impartially."
(emphasis ours)
4. In another seminal decision, i.e., A.R.
Antulay v. R. S. Nayak, a seven-Judge Constitution
Bench while acknowledging that it had committed an
error earlier which needed rectification, went on to
assert that:
"55. ... No prejudice need be proved for
enforcing the fundamental rights. Violation of a
fundamental right itself renders the impugned action
void. So also the violation of the principles of natural
justice renders the act a nullity. ..."
5. It has recently been held by us in State
of Uttar Pradesh v. Ram Prakash Singh that just as
Articles 14, 19 and 21 constitute a triumvirate of
rights of citizens conceived as charters on equality,
freedom and liberty, the trio of the Constitution
Patna High Court CWJC No.1543 of 2018 dt.09-12-2025
Bench decisions in Olga Tellis (supra), Tulsiram
Patel (supra) and A.R. Antulay (supra) form the
bedrock of natural justice principles being regarded
as part of Article 14 and, thereby, obviating the need
to demonstrate prejudice if a challenge were thrown
on the ground of violation of Article 14.
44. In normal circumstances, there could
be little reason not to accept such a contention being
bounded by the precedent of a larger bench.
However, the vast and expansive development of law
in the field of administrative law in our country since
the time Sunil Kumar Banerjee (supra) was decided
(almost four and half decades back), especially on
the rule of fairness in administrative action which is
now acknowledged in the Indian context as the third
limb of natural justice, cannot be overlooked. None
other than Hon'ble O. Chinappa Reddy, J. himself
and the subsequent trio of Constitution Bench
decisions in Olga Tellis (supra), Tulsiram Patel
(supra) and A.R. Antulay (supra) upheld that
violation of a mandatory provision of law relating to
fair hearing is, in itself prejudice to the person
Patna High Court CWJC No.1543 of 2018 dt.09-12-2025
proceeded against and no need to demonstrate
prejudice would arise. It is of particular importance
when His Lordship frowned that "It ill comes from a
person who has denied justice that the person who
has been denied justice is not prejudiced." (emphasis
ours). It is indeed paradoxical for someone who was
denied justice, is not prejudiced."
34. Tested on the touchstone of the above principles, it
is evident that in the present case there has been a wholesale
breach of the principles of natural justice. The petitioners were
never put on notice; the enquiry report was not furnished to them;
the letters from the Governor's Secretariat (Annexure-C series)
were not supplied; and there was no opportunity, either oral or
written, to meet the allegations. The University has, in effect, used
an ex parte enquiry into the conduct of the Vice-Chancellor as the
sole foundation to cancel the petitioners' absorptions, without ever
hearing them.
35. The argument that in cases of "illegal appointment"
adherence to natural justice is unnecessary cannot be accepted in
the broad terms suggested by the University. Even assuming that
the petitioners' absorptions are open to challenge on the ground of
non-compliance of Section 35 of the Act or other statutory
Patna High Court CWJC No.1543 of 2018 dt.09-12-2025
provisions, the alleged illegality is neither self-evident nor
admitted by the petitioners. There are factual disputes as to
advertisement, existence of sanctioned posts, nature of the Vice-
Chancellor's powers, and past practice. In such circumstances, to
dispense with notice and hearing on the ipse dixit of the employer
would be to reduce the principles of natural justice to a dead letter.
36. The decisions relied upon by the University, such as
Raghuvar Pal Singh, the Full Bench in Rita Mishra, and certain
other cases where appointments were plainly contrary to statutory
provisions and the facts were either admitted or incontrovertible,
turned on their own facts. They do not lay down a blanket rule that
whenever an employer labels an appointment as "illegal", natural
justice can be dispensed with. As explained in the later decisions
in Basudev Dutta, Krishnadatt Awasthy and K. Prabhakar
Hegde, the core of audi alteram partem remains inviolable save in
very exceptional situations, which are not attracted here.
37. This Court, therefore, has no hesitation in holding
that the impugned Office Order No. 508/2017 dated 12.12.2017
has been passed in flagrant violation of the principles of natural
justice. Issue (i) is answered in favour of the petitioners.
Issue (ii): Whether the impugned Office Order No.
508/2017 dated 12.12. 2017 is vitiated for being a non-speaking
Patna High Court CWJC No.1543 of 2018 dt.09-12-2025
and unreasoned order, passed without recording specific
findings as against the petitioners and without independent
application of mind?
38. The impugned Office Order No. 508/2017 dated
12.12.2017 is a brief communication making a general reference to
the enquiry report and the communications from the Governor's
Secretariat and then, in one stroke, cancelling the
absorptions/regularisations of all the petitioners and several others.
The order does not:
• record any individual finding as to the
mode of appointment or absorption of any particular
petitioner;
• discuss their length of service;
• analyse whether there were sanctioned
posts or whether Section 35 was in fact violated in
each case; or
• assign any reasons as to why cancellation,
as opposed to any lesser corrective measure, was
warranted.
39. The law as to the requirement of reasons in quasi-
judicial and administrative orders has been authoritatively
summarised by the Supreme Court in Kranti Associates (P) Ltd. v.
Patna High Court CWJC No.1543 of 2018 dt.09-12-2025
Masood Ahmed Khan, (2010) 9 SCC 496, which has been quoted
with approval in Basudev Dutta (supra). It has been held that:
• recording of reasons is an integral part of the concept
of justice;
• reasons are the "links between the
materials on which certain conclusions are based and
the actual conclusions";
• reasons operate as a restraint on arbitrary
exercise of power;
• they facilitate judicial review; and
• a mere "rubber-stamp" order without
reasons is not a valid decision-making process.
40. In Basudev Dutta, the Supreme Court applied these
principles to set aside a termination order which did not disclose
the reasons or the basis of the alleged "unsuitability". Similarly, in
Krishnadatt Awasthy, the Court emphasised that fair procedure
comes first, and only after hearing and disclosure of reasons can
the merits be properly examined.
41. In the present case, the impugned order (Annexure-
11) is completely bereft of individualized reasons. It does not even
briefly summarize the findings of the Enquiry Committee as they
relate to the petitioners, nor does it indicate any application of
Patna High Court CWJC No.1543 of 2018 dt.09-12-2025
mind to their individual cases. The University appears to have
treated the Committee's report and the Governor's Secretariat
letters as gospel and conclusive and has mechanically cancelled
the absorptions without independent consideration.
42. Such an order, which visits the petitioners with
grave civil consequences--loss of service, stoppage of salary,
cannot be sustained in the absence of recorded reasons. The
requirement of reasons is not an empty formality; it is a
constitutional necessity flowing from Article 14 and Article 21 of
the Constitution of India. This Court, therefore, holds that the
impugned order is vitiated on the additional ground of being a
non-speaking and unreasoned order. Issue (ii) is, accordingly, also
answered in favour of the petitioners.
Issue (iii): Whether, having regard to the manner of
their initial engagement and subsequent service, the
petitioners' absorption/regularisation under Office Order No.
332/2013 dated 20.12.2013 and other analogous orders could,
in law, be withdrawn and cancelled in the manner done, and
whether the said absorptions can be treated as illegal or void
ab initio?
Issue (iv): Whether, in the facts and circumstances of
the case and in view of the enquiry conducted into the actions
Patna High Court CWJC No.1543 of 2018 dt.09-12-2025
of the then In-charge/Acting Vice-Chancellor, the University
was justified in annulling the petitioners'
absorption/regularisation solely on the basis of the said
enquiry and communications from the Governor's Secretariat,
without any independent consideration of the petitioners'
individual cases?
43. Having found and held that the impugned office
order no. 508/2017 dated 12.12.2017 has been passed in violation
of principle of natural justice and also that it is bad in law for not
assigning any reason, there is no need to decide the above issue no.
(iii) and issue no. (iv).
44. In view of the findings on Issues (i) and (ii), the
impugned Office Order No. 508/2017 dated 12.12.2017
(Annexure-11) cannot be sustained and is liable to be quashed. It is
accordingly set aside/quashed. However, keeping in view the
University's consistent stand that Section 35 of the Act and other
statutory requirements were violated while absorbing/regularizing
the services of the petitioners, the respondent University would be
first obliged to reinstate the petitioners in service on the same
position on which they were at the time of their termination from
service, and thereafter would be at liberty to initiate proper
proceedings against them following the due process of law, as
Patna High Court CWJC No.1543 of 2018 dt.09-12-2025
discussed and explained above. Upon reinstatement in service, the
petitioners would be entitled to full back wages/ salaries with all
consequential benefits, which must be paid to the petitioners
within three months from the date of this order.
45. It is made clear that this Court has not expressed
any opinion on the substantive legality or illegality of the
petitioners' absorptions on merits. All such questions are left open
to be decided by the competent authority.
46. The writ applications are, accordingly, allowed to
the extent indicated above. There shall be no order as to costs.
(Alok Kumar Sinha, J)
Prakash Narayan
AFR/NAFR AFR
CAV DATE 01.12.2025
Uploading Date 09.12.2025
Transmission Date NA
