Citation : 2026 Latest Caselaw 2164 Ori
Judgement Date : 10 March, 2026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
AFR W.P.(C) No.3625 of 2024
Anusaya Sahoo @ Sahu .... Petitioner
Mr. U.K. Samal, Advocate
-Versus-
Alaka Panda & another .... Opposite Parties
Mr. R. Behera, Advocate for O.P.No.1
Mr. P.K. Ray, AGA
CORAM:
JUSTICE R.K. PATTANAIK
DATE OF HEARING:03.12.2025
DATE OF JUDGMENT:10.03.2026
1.
Instant writ petition is filed by the petitioner assailing the correctness, legality and judicial propriety of the impugned judgment dated 7th February, 2024 as at Annexure-4 passed in connection with F.A.O. No.16 of 2023 by the learned Additional District Judge, Kamakhyanagar confirming the decision in Election Misc. Case No.07 of 2022 dated 30th November, 2023 of the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Kamakhyanagar as per Annexure-3, whereby, her election as Sarapanch of Kankadahad Gram Panchayat has been declared void in view of Section 25(1)(w) of the Odisha Grama Panchayats Act, 1964 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') on the grounds inter alia that such declaration is not legally tenable and hence, liable to be interfered with and set aside in the interest of justice.
2. In fact, opposite party No.1 filed the election petition for declaring the election of the petitioner as invalid in view of Section 25(1)(w) of the Act of filing a false affidavit along with the nomination paper thereby not disclosing the liabilities incurred by her inviting disqualification under the provisions of the Act in terms thereof and considering the same, the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Kamakhyanagar declared it as void vide Annexure-3. As against the above decision, the petitioner filed an appeal before the learned court below and it was disposed of confirming the disqualification by judgment (Annexure-4) dated 7th February, 2024 with a conclusion that such disqualification shall have to be in accordance with Section 39 of the Act. Being aggrieved of, the petitioner had approached this Court by filing the writ petition on the grounds, such as, non-disclosure does not vitiate the election, inasmuch as, declaration of liability incurred by way of a loan is not statutorily mandated and that apart, there is nothing on record to prove and establish that for not having disclosed such information, the result of the election has been materially affected and therefore, the conclusion of the learned courts below vide Annexure-3 & 4 is grossly erroneous and hence, liable to be quashed.
3. Heard Mr. Samal, learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Behera, learned counsel for opposite party No.1 and Mr. Ray, learned AGA for the State.
4. The State Election Commissioner issued notification for Panchayat election scheduled to be held in the month of February, 2022 and in that, the petitioner, opposite party No.1 and three other candidates filed nomination for the post of Sarpanch of the concerned GP before opposite party No.2. According to opposite party No.1, an objection was raised before opposite party No.2 at the time of scrutiny of the nomination papers on 22nd January, 2022 that the petitioner has outstanding loan dues payable and the same has not been disclosed, rather concealed, hence for such non-disclosure in the affidavit, she invites disqualification under Section 25(1)(w) of the Act and as such, it should not be accepted as a valid nomination.
5. As per the pleading on record, the petitioner secured 1660 votes, whereas, opposite party No.1 received 1579 votes and as per opposite party No.1, in view of the disqualification under Section 25(1)(w) of the Act, opposite party No.2 could not have notified the election of the petitioner as the returned candidate on 2nd March, 2022. Considering the challenge to the election of the petitioner, the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Kamakhyanagar received evidence from both the sides. The election petitioner, namely, opposite party No.1 examined three witnesses and proved five documents and on the other hand, the returned candidate, namely, the petitioner examined two witnesses including herself but led no documentary evidence. Considering the evidence of the parties, the learned Civil
Judge arrived at a conclusion that the petitioner's election as Sarpanch of the GP is invalid being violative of Section 25(1)(w) of the Act. The learned court below reappreciated the evidence and equally concluded that the petitioner's election suffers from disqualification and the same is liable to be declared invalid under Section 39 of the Act.
6. Mr. Samal, learned counsel for the petitioner cited the following decisions, such as, Smt. Bauri Dehuri Vrs. Smt. Kamala Pradhan & others 2001(II)OLR-128; Goreti Xess Vrs. Jyoti Xaxa & another 2016 (Supp.-II) OLR- 1109; Patuari Padhan Vrs. Haribandhu Padhan & others 2024(II) OLR-803; Mangani Lal Mandal Vrs. Bishnu Deo Bhandari (2012) 3 SCC 314; and Karikho Kri Vrs. Nuney Tayang & another (2024) 15 SCC 112 to contend that the learned courts below fell into gross error in declaring the election of the petitioner as void as it has not materially affected the election result.
7. On the contrary, Mr. Behera, learned counsel for opposite party No.1 would submit that for non-disclosure of the loan and outstanding dues payable by the petitioner and her husband, it has amounted to suppression of facts and filing a false affidavit at the time of nomination, which is a ground of disqualification and therefore, the learned courts below did not commit any illegality in declaring the election of the petitioner as void and hence, the impugned judgments at Annexure-3 & 4 are to be upheld.
8. Recorded the submission of Mr. Ray, learned AGA for the State.
9. Perused the LCRs of Election Misc. Case No.07 of 2022 and F.A.O. No.16 of 2023 received by this Court.
10. The delay in filing the election petition has been condoned in terms of Section 5 of the Limitation Act by the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Kamakhyanagar. The ground of disqualification claimed by opposite party No.1 is referable to Section 25(1)(w) of the Act. The election petition was filed for declaring the petitioner's election to the post of Sarpanch as void and opposite party No.1 as validly elected to that post in her place with such other reliefs sought for. The ground of disqualification is found to have been favoured with and it has resulted in the impugned judgment vide Annexure-3 and then in appeal by the learned court below. It has been the unanimous decision of the learned courts below that the petitioner stands disqualified under Section 25(1)(w) of the Act.
11. It has been pleaded on record that the disqualification under Section 25(1)(w) of the Act was introduced by way of an Ordinance. According to the petitioner, Odisha Ordinance No.2 of 2021 was introduced and it was by virtue of Odisha Panchayat Laws (Amendment) Ordinance, 2021, but was not ratified by the Legislative Assembly thereafter and upon expiry of six weeks, the same ceased to operate, the fact which was completely lost sight by the courts
below. However, such plea cannot stand scrutiny of the Court since after the Ordinance, it was followed by an amendment to the Act introduced through the Odisha Panchayat Laws (Amendment) Act, 2022 and with the insertion of Clause (w) in sub-section (1) of Section 25 of the Act, according to which, a candidate, who fails to file an affidavit containing the details of the antecedents, assets, liabilities etc. at the time of nomination, shall be a ground of disqualification. Along with the above amendment, sub- section (5) was added to Section 25 of the Act making the submission of false information or its concealment in the affidavit to be a punishable offence visited with substantive imprisonment. In other words, after the previously introduced Ordinance in 2021, necessary amendment was brought into the Act by way of Clause (w) in sub-section (1) of Section 25 of the Act as a ground of disqualification, if in case, a candidate to an election fails to furnish details of the assets, liabilities etc. at the time of nomination. So, the plea of the petitioner that there has been an Ordinance and that it has not been ratified by the Legislative Assembly, hence, the petitioner cannot be said to have invited disqualification under Section 25(1)(w) of the Act is misconceived for the fact that necessary amendment was carried out through the Odisha Panchayat Laws (Amendment) Act, 2022. Even otherwise, assuming for the sake of argument that the Ordinance lapsed and that it could not be ratified within six weeks by the Legislative Assembly, according to the Court, any such action in terms of such an Ordinance does not
become invalid. Normally, when an Ordinance does not remain valid after it has lapsed or ceased to operate, any such actions, rights and liabilities created during its active period may be considered valid under the doctrine of de facto validity, as they do not automatically become permanent. The Ordinance has the same force as a statute but only for a duration and rights and obligations created under it stays temporarily and hence, ceases to exist once it lapsed. But, whether rights, privileges, obligations and liabilities survive a lapsed Ordinance is a matter of juridical construction. The courts are to consider if the actions are reversible and whether its invalidation would cause public inconvenience and it has to be a case-by-case assessment. In the considered view, the Court actions that were concluded and irreversible might remain valid, however, any such action intending to create permanent right might not survive the lapse meaning thereby that the status quo ante may be restored. In the case at hand, any such declaration on account of disqualification having been invited, it stands as valid even though the Ordinance lapsed thereafter but having found the introduction of the Odisha Panchayat Laws (Amendment) Act, 2022, no such question remains for consideration as Section 25(1)(w) of the Act having been brought into the statute with the amendment, it invites disqualification when a candidate fails to file an affidavit revealing the details of the criminal antecedents, assets, liabilities etc. at the time of nomination.
12. The next question is whether non-disclosure of bank loans by the petitioner and her husband in the affidavit at the time of nomination invites a serious consequence of disqualification under Section 25(1)(w) of the Act. A candidate must have to disclose his assets and liabilities including loans, while filing the nomination paper. It is the settled law that concealment or suppression of information, such as, pending criminal cases or financial liabilities deprives voters to an informed choice and can be a ground for setting aside an election. It may even be a case of corrupt practice, if concealment or suppression of any such vital information has taken place. But it is equally a settled law that while not every non-disclosure automatically invalidates a nomination. A substantial non-disclosure, which is likely to affect the voter's perception of the candidate's integrity can be considered a defect of a substantial character rendering the nomination invalid. Any such decision on disqualification is, therefore, subject to 'substantial defect rule' and not that each and every non- disclosure is to nullify a nomination. In other words, if the undisclosed bank loan is substantial, the omission is likely to be considered a substantial defect under the Act justifying the rejection of nomination or setting aside the election, as it violates the voter's right to know about the candidate's financial standing. With the above view point of the Court, the case laws cited by Mr. Samal, learned counsel for the petitioner needs a reference.
13. In Smt. Bauri Dehuri (supra), it has been concluded by this Court that Section 39(2) of the Act makes it clear that even if there has been any irregularity on the part of the Election Officer responsible for carrying out the provisions of the Act and Rules framed thereunder, unless such mistake, error, irregularity or informality materially affected the result of the election, the same should not be declared void merely on the ground of any such mistake or irregularity. The votes cast in the names of dead persons, in absence of a definite pleading or proof as to in whose favour it was cast, the Apex Court therein the case held that even if there has been any such irregularity on the part of the Election Officer in complying the provisions of the Act and Rules, the election is not to be declared invalid in absence of any such proof of the result to have been materially affected as a consequence. A similar view has been expressed in Goreti Xess (supra) and therein, the decision in Sridhar Jena Vrs. Santosh Kumar Jena & others (2010) 1 OLR 486 was referred to, wherein, it was concluded that the returned candidate even though alleged to have suppressed pendency of criminal case against him in view of the State Election Commissioner's Notification No.1 dated 1 st January, 2024, such suppression cannot be a ground for rejecting the nomination paper and for that, he may be criminally prosecuted and it was also not amounting to corrupt practice and as such, his election cannot be declared void on such ground. Reference has been made to sub- section (2) of Section 39 of the Act in Goreti Xess (supra)
to reach at a conclusion that non-disclosure of pendency of criminal antecedent by the returned candidate must necessarily establish that the result of the election to have been materially affected. In Patuari Padhan (supra), this Court, more or less in an identical situation, concluded that the election of the returned candidate cannot be declared invalid. A reference of a decision of the Apex Court in Kisan Shankar Kathore Vrs. Arun Dattatray Sawant & others (2014) 14 SCC 162 has been made therein, where, it has been held and observed that non-disclosure of facts would not be a material lapse unless it is a substantial or suppression of information considered significant. One more decision is referred to therein of the Apex Court in Karikho Kri (supra) and therein, it has been observed that non- disclosure of each and every asset owned by a candidate could not amount to a defect, much less, a defect of substantial character and it is not necessary to declare every item or immovable property that he or his dependent family members owned, unless the same is of such value so as to constitute a sizeable asset in itself and required to be disclosed.
14. In Mangani Lal Mandal (supra), while dealing with a similar question on disqualification under the provisions of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, it has been held by the Apex Court that a mere non-compliance or breach of the Constitution or the statutory provisions by itself does not invalidate election of the returned candidate under Section
100(1)(d)(iv) thereof as the sine qua non for declaring the election of a returned candidate to be void on the ground as above needs further proof of the fact that such breach or non-observance materially affected the result of the election. In Karikho Kri (supra), the Apex Court further held that not every non-disclosure, irrespective of its impact and gravity, automatically amount to defect of substantial nature thereby materially affecting result of the election or amounting to undue influence so as to qualify as a corrupt practice.
15. Mr. Samal, learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the loan accounts of the petitioner and her husband even though not disclosed in the affidavit at the time of nomination, the same is unlikely to invalidate the election result in absence of any such pleading on record to the effect that such failure or suppression of facts has materially affected the outcome of the election. It is not in denial that no such information was shared by the petitioner in the affidavit while submitting her nomination paper before opposite party No.2. A copy of the original receipt of nomination filed by the petitioner has been marked as Ext.1. Furthermore, the RTI information was obtained by opposite party No.1 and proved as Ext.2 in support of the plea of disqualification vis-à-vis the petitioner. Insofar as the loans availed by the petitioner and her husband are concerned, there was a plain denial but it received corroboration with the examination of the Branch Manager of the concerned
Bank as P.W.2 and the Secretary of the Kankadahad Cooperative Society as P.W.3 with necessary documents proved as Exts.4 & 5. From the evidence on record, it cannot be denied that the petitioner and her husband had loan accounts and dues outstanding at the time of nomination filed on 22nd January, 2022, the date on which, it was subjected to scrutiny by opposite party No.2. As earlier stated, the affidavit filed by the petitioner regarding any such financial liability did not reveal anything, as the relevant column was shown as 'Nil'. The evidence led by opposite party No.1 through P.Ws.2 & 3 proved that the petitioner was having financial liability to the tune of Rs.40,554/- as on 15th April, 2021. It is claimed that the loan account of the husband of the petitioner was closed some time thereafter but fact remains, on the date of nomination, the petitioner and her husband have had financial liabilities by way of loans and it was not revealed in the affidavit. In such view of the matter, whether on account of the non- disclosure of the above information, the petitioner's election to the post of Sarpanch is to be declared invalid in terms of Section 25(1)(w) read with Section 39(1) of the Act.
16. On a reading of the election petition, it is pleaded by opposite party No.1 therein that the petitioner was having loan with outstanding dues for an amount of Rs.40,554/- against her as on 15th April, 2021 in the Bank of India, Kamakhyanagar Branch, Kamakhyanagar. It is also alleged that the husband of the petitioner is a loanee in Service
Cooperative Societies Ltd., Kankadahad under Angul United Central Bank, Angul, the fact, which was concealed by her in the affidavit vis-a-vis Government dues payable to the financial institutions shown as 'Nil' and hence, it has violated Section 25(1)(w) of the Act. Save and except the above, there is no pleading to the effect that the non- disclosure of the above information regarding the loan dues pending against the petitioner and her husband has in a way significantly affected the result of the election. As earlier discussed, each and every non-disclosure does not amount to substantial non-compliance thereby materially affecting the result of the election. If large extent of assets or huge loan outstanding dues if not revealed by a candidate, it would amount to suppression of facts and for such non- disclosure, it would invite disqualification. Such breach in observance of the provisions of the Act by not disclosing the assets of high value or financial liabilities for a huge amount could lead to a conclusion that there has been concealment of facts and it amounts to undue influence even to qualify as a corrupt practice adopted by the returned candidate.
17. In Karikho Kri (supra), it has been categorically held and observed that even though the voters who have a 'right to know', such right is not absolute but at the same time, a candidate contesting the election must have to be forthright about his disclosure vis-à-vis assets, liabilities etc. It has also been observed therein that there is no blanket proposition that a candidate is required to reveal everything
threadbare for examination of the electorates and has a right to privacy as regards matters, which are of no concern to the voter or totally irrelevant to his candidature for the public office. In a given circumstance, if a non-disclosure is a substantial defect, in the humble view of the Court, it amounts to suppression of material facts as it could likely to influence the decision of the voters at the time of election but each and every revelation would be of no relevance to them. A suppression of fact regarding loan dues payable by the petitioner and her husband at the relevant point of time when the nomination paper was submitted does not relate to any huge outstanding dues. Of course, it was for the petitioner to reveal such information, while filing the affidavit at the time of nomination but non-disclosure of such a fact for and in respect of the loan accounts, which is not too high an outstanding dues payable by her, this Court is of the considered view that in absence of any such pleading on record and evidence adduced by opposite party No.1 in the election proceeding to prove the fact that it has considerably affected the result of the election, the disqualification of any such non-observance of the satisfactory provision could not have been directed. Such is the conclusion of the Court in view of the decisions of the Apex Court discussed herein above. The Court is of the conclusion that suppression of fact must have to be of a substantial character and in the case at hand, the petitioner having not shared the information regarding the loan dues though duly proved by opposite party No.1, in absence of
any such pleading and evidence on record to show that it has influenced the voters and has materially affected the result of the election, her disqualification under Section 25(1)(w) of the Act and in terms of Section 39(1) thereof cannot be justified.
18. In fact, the decision on disqualification in accordance with Section 39(1) of the Act is subject to sub-section (2) thereof and declaring an election as void must have to be on the basis of any such mistake, error, illegality or informality which has led to a situation that materially affected the result of the election. By being alive to the settled position of law discussed earlier, even though there has been non- disclosure regarding loan account and dues outstanding against the petitioner and her husband in the affidavit filed at the time of nomination, in absence of any substantial defect and that such non-disclosure shown to have materially affected the election result by influencing the voters, any such decision by the learned courts below cannot be sustained in law.
19. Accordingly, it is ordered.
20. In the result, the writ petition stands allowed. As a necessary corollary, the decision in Election Misc. Case No.07 of 2022 dated 30th November, 2023 of the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Kamakhyanagar vide Annexure-3 and the impugned judgment dated 7th February, 2024 as at Annexure-4 in F.A.O. No.16 of 2023 by the
learned Additional District Judge, Kamakhyanagar are hereby set aside for the reasons stated hereinabove.
(R.K. Pattanaik) Judge Manoj
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