Governing Body Of Ispat vs State Of Odisha & Others
2026 Latest Caselaw 904 Ori

Orissa High Court

Governing Body Of Ispat vs State Of Odisha & Others on 3 February, 2026

Author: Chittaranjan Dash

Bench: Chittaranjan Dash

          IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
                       W.A. No.788 of 2025
                             &
                       W.A. No.791 of 2025

     Governing Body of Ispat                      ....                      Appellant
     College, Rourkela

                                          -versus-
     State of Odisha & Others                  ....                      Respondents

                        Advocates Appeared in this case

         For Appellant                -           Mr. S. K. Das, Advocate

          For Respondents             -           Mr. S. K. Jee, AGA

                                            ---
     CORAM :
     MR. JUSTICE DIXIT KRISHNA SHRIPAD
     MR. JUSTICE CHITTARANJAN DASH
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                  Date of Hearing & Judgment: 03.02.2026
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chittaranjan Dash, J.

1. This intra-court appeal is filed by the Appellant i.e.

Governing Body of Ispat College, Rourkela, assailing the judgment

dated 19.07.2024 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.(C) No.

19898 of 2011, whereby the writ petition filed by Respondent No.3

was allowed and the action of the College management in

disengaging him was interfered with, coupled with a direction

which, according to the appellant, virtually amounts to treating the

respondent No.3 as a regular appointee. The present appeal also

takes exception to the consequential dismissal of the review

petition, being RVWPET No. 198 of 2024, by order dated 19.03.2025

These intra-court appeals, being W.A. No. 788 of 2025 and the

connected W.A. No. 791 of 2025, are filed by the Appellant-

Governing Body of Ispat College, Rourkela. W.A. No. 788 of 2025

assails the judgment dated 19.07.2024 passed by the learned Single

Judge in W.P.(C) No. 19898 of 2011, whereby the writ petition filed

by Respondent No.3 was allowed and the action of the College

management in disengaging him was interfered with, coupled with

directions which, according to the Appellant, have the effect of

treating Respondent No.3 as a regular appointee. W.A. No. 791 of

2025, arising out of the same lis, calls in question the order dated

19.03.2025 passed in RVWPET No. 198 of 2024, whereby the review

petition preferred by the Appellant against the aforesaid judgment

was dismissed. Both the appeals, involving common questions of

fact and law, are being heard and disposed of by this common

judgment.

2. The factual backdrop, shorn of unnecessary details, reveals

that Respondent No.3 was initially engaged as a part-time Lecturer

in Physics in Ispat College, Rourkela, by order dated 12.11.1994 for

a fixed academic term. Such engagement was purely temporary

and continued on similar terms by a subsequent order dated

31.08.1995, pursuant to which Respondent No.3 submitted his

joining report on 07.09.1995. Upon completion of the academic

session 1995-96 and reduction of workload, the services of

Respondent No.3, along with other part-time lecturers, were

disengaged by order dated 10.02.1996, an order which was not

assailed by him at the relevant point of time.

Subsequently, when a substantive post of Lecturer in Physics

became available, the Governing Body issued an advertisement on

21.04.1997. Respondent No.3 participated in the selection process

held on 27.06.1997 but was not selected, as another candidate

secured higher merit and was appointed on regular basis.

Aggrieved, Respondent No.3 initiated litigation by filing OJC No.

9966 of 1997, wherein interim protection was granted to keep one

post vacant. Ultimately, the said writ petition was disposed of on

12.05.2005 with a direction to the Director, Higher Education,

Odisha, to consider the representation of Respondent No.3 in the

light of earlier decisions concerning similarly placed part-time

lecturers. In compliance with the aforesaid direction, the Director,

Higher Education, passed an order dated 19.06.2006 directing

reinstatement of Respondent No.3 as a Lecturer in Physics "without

prejudice to the claim of others." This order itself became the

subject matter of further litigation between the parties. While the

Governing Body challenged the said direction in W.P.(C) No. 9601

of 2006, Respondent No.3 sought its implementation by filing

W.P.(C) No. 11663 of 2008. Both writ petitions were disposed of by

a common judgment dated 01.07.2009, wherein this Court upheld

the Director's order and directed its implementation, while

clarifying that such reinstatement would not prejudice the services

of the regularly appointed Lecturer.

During the course of review proceedings arising therefrom,

the Director was directed to submit a factual report regarding

workload and sanctioned strength. The report indicated that there

was no sanctioned vacant post available to accommodate

Respondent No.3 on regular basis, though he could be engaged as a

part-time lecturer. In the light of such report, the review petition

was dismissed on 11.01.2011. Thereafter, to give effect to the

Director's order dated 19.06.2006, the Governing Body issued an

engagement order dated 11.03.2011 appointing Respondent No.3 as

a part-time Lecturer in Physics on fixed remuneration for a limited

term. Respondent No.3 eventually joined pursuant to this order on

11.04.2011. With the closure of the academic session 2010-11 and

reduction of workload, the engagement of Respondent No.3 came

to an end, and this was communicated to him by office order dated

21.04.2011, followed by a corrigendum dated 23.04.2011.

Challenging only this order of disengagement, Respondent No.3

approached this Court by filing W.P.(C) No. 19898 of 2011, without

assailing the engagement order dated 11.03.2011 or seeking any

explicit relief for regularisation.

The learned Single Judge, by judgment dated 19.07.2024,

allowed the writ petition, quashed the disengagement order and

issued directions which, according to the appellant, effectively

treated the part-time engagement of Respondent No.3 as a regular

appointment. The appellant-Governing Body sought review of the

said judgment by filing RVWPET No. 198 of 2024, which, however,

came to be dismissed on 19.03.2025. It is in these circumstances,

being aggrieved by both the original judgment in the writ petition

and the dismissal of the review petition, that the appellant has

invoked the intra-court appellate jurisdiction of this Court by filing

the present writ appeal.

3. Mr. Das, learned counsel for the Appellant submits that the

learned Single Judge committed a manifest error in law and on

facts in treating the engagement of Respondent No.3, which was

admittedly part-time and purely contractual in nature, as a regular

appointment, despite there being no sanctioned post available in

the college. He contends that the entire service history of

Respondent No.3, beginning from 1994 till his last engagement in

2011, demonstrates that he was never appointed on a substantive

basis and that every disengagement was strictly in terms of the

conditions of appointment and academic requirement. He further

submits that the writ petition itself was not maintainable in view of

the statutory remedy available under Section 10-A of the Odisha

Education Act, 1969 since the impugned order related to

disengagement from an aided educational institution. According to

learned counsel, this jurisdictional issue goes to the root of the

matter and ought to have been considered by the learned Single

Judge even in the absence of a counter affidavit. It is also urged that

Respondent No.3 deliberately suppressed the engagement order

dated 11.03.2011 and never challenged the same, having accepted it

by submitting his joining report on 11.04.2011. Having complied to

the terms of engagement, Respondent No.3 was estopped from

questioning the consequential disengagement effected upon closure

of the academic session. Mr. Das further submits that the directions

issued in the impugned judgment travel far beyond the relief

sought in the writ petition, inasmuch as Respondent No.3 never

prayed for regularisation or permanent absorption. He contends

that the Court, in exercise of writ jurisdiction, could not have

directed appointment or altered the nature of employment,

particularly when the Director, Higher Education had categorically

reported non-availability of any sanctioned post. Lastly, learned

counsel argues that the dismissal of the review petition overlooks

glaring errors apparent on the face of the record, including

misreading of the Director's order and the statutory scheme

governing appointments in aided colleges. On these premises, he

submits that the impugned judgment and the consequential order

in review are unsustainable and call for interference by this Court.

4. Before proceeding to test the sustainability of the impugned

judgment, it is necessary to examine the factual and legal landscape

as it emerges from the record of W.P.(C) No. 19898 of 2011 and the

preceding rounds of litigation. The learned Single Judge has not

approached the issue as a simpliciter service dispute but has

carefully traced the manner in which Respondent No.3 was

subjected to prolonged uncertainty of service despite repeated

administrative and judicial interventions in his favour.

5. The materials placed on record clearly establish that

Respondent No.3's engagement was not episodic or casual, but

extended over a considerable length of time, during which he

discharged teaching functions integral to the academic functioning

of the institution. The Single Judge has specifically noted that the

Director, Higher Education, acting pursuant to earlier orders of this

Court, had already found fault with the discontinuance of

Respondent No.3 and had directed his reinstatement. That

direction was upheld by this Court in subsequent writ proceedings

and thereby attained finality. What followed thereafter was not a

genuine implementation of the said directions, but a series of

actions by the management which preserved the form of

compliance while defeating its substance, by repeatedly relegating

Respondent No.3 to a precarious and uncertain status.

6. The order dated 11.03.2011, though tailored as an engagement

of a part-time Lecturer, must be read in the context of the binding

directions which preceded it. The learned Single Judge has rightly

observed that the management could not have reduced compliance

with judicial and administrative orders to a ritualistic exercise,

particularly when Respondent No.3 had already been litigating for

over a decade to secure continuity of service. The abrupt

disengagement immediately thereafter was thus rightly held to be

arbitrary and reflective of a colourable exercise of power.

7. It is in this backdrop that reliance on the decision of the

Hon'ble Supreme Court in Jaggo vs. Union of India, 2024 SCC

OnLine SC 3826 assumes relevance. The said decision does not

merely address the legality of temporary employment in the

abstract but condemns the systemic misuse of temporary and

contractual arrangements by public institutions to evade long-term

obligations towards workers whose services are essential and

continuous. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, while analysing the

broader implications of such practices, observed as under:

"22. The pervasive misuse of temporary employment contracts, as exemplified in this case, reflects a broader systemic issue that adversely affects workers' rights and job security. In the private sector, the rise of the gig economy has led to an increase in precarious employment arrangements, often characterized by lack of benefits, job security, and fair treatment. Such practices have been criticized for exploiting workers and undermining labour standards. Government institutions, entrusted with upholding the principles of fairness and justice, bear an even greater responsibility to avoid such exploitative employment practices. When public sector entities engage in misuse of temporary contracts, it not only mirrors the detrimental trends observed in the gig economy but also sets a concerning precedent that can erode public trust in governmental operations.

.........

25. It is a disconcerting reality that temporary employees, particularly in government institutions, often face multifaceted forms of exploitation. While the foundational purpose of temporary contracts may have been to address short-term or seasonal needs, they have increasingly become a mechanism to evade long- term obligations owed to employees. These practices manifest in several ways:

• Misuse of "Temporary" Labels: Employees engaged for work that is essential, recurring, and integral to the functioning of an institution are often labelled as "temporary" or "contractual," even when their roles mirror those of regular employees. Such misclassification deprives workers of the dignity, security, and benefits that regular employees are entitled to, despite performing identical tasks. • Arbitrary Termination: Temporary employees are frequently dismissed without cause or notice, as seen in the present case. This practice undermines the principles of natural justice and subjects workers to a state of constant insecurity, regardless of the quality or duration of their service.

• Lack of Career Progression: Temporary employees often find themselves excluded from opportunities for skill development, promotions, or incremental pay raises. They remain stagnant in their roles, creating a systemic disparity between them and their regular counterparts, despite their contributions being equally significant.

• Using Outsourcing as a Shield: Institutions increasingly resort to outsourcing roles performed by temporary employees, effectively replacing one set of exploited workers with another. This practice not only perpetuates exploitation but also demonstrates a deliberate effort to bypass the obligation to offer regular employment.

• Denial of Basic Rights and Benefits: Temporary employees are often denied fundamental benefits such as pension, provident fund, health insurance, and paid leave, even when their tenure spans decades. This lack of social security subjects them and their families to

undue hardship, especially in cases of illness, retirement, or unforeseen circumstances."

8. The emphasis laid by the Hon'ble Supreme Court is

unmistakable: when government and public sector institutions

repeatedly engage individuals for work that is recurring, essential,

and central to their functioning, yet continue to cloak such

engagement under the garb of temporariness, the resulting

insecurity and exploitation cannot be countenanced in law.

Compliance that perpetuates uncertainty is no compliance at all.

9. The present case squarely falls within that analytical

framework. Respondent No.3 was subjected to misclassification of

his role, arbitrary disengagement despite repeated orders, denial of

progression, and a sustained pattern of uncertainty that was neither

incidental nor inevitable, but institutionally induced. The learned

Single Judge has, therefore, correctly lifted the veil of nomenclature

and examined the substance of the relationship between the parties,

consistent with the principles repeatedly affirmed by the Supreme

Court.

10. This Court is also conscious that government and aided

educational institutions are expected to act as model employers.

Persistent engagement of teaching staff on temporary

arrangements, despite demonstrated and continuing necessity, not

only undermines the standards but also erodes public confidence.

The learned Single Judge's intervention, viewed in this light, was

aimed at arresting a cycle of avoidable litigation and restoring

fairness and stability in public employment.

11. As a result, the view undertaken by the learned Single Judge

is firmly anchored in the factual record, the prior binding orders of

this Court, and the settled position of law. The impugned judgment

reflects a balanced, humane, and legally sound exercise of writ

jurisdiction, and this Court finds no reason to take a different view.

Conversely, the institution being a mighty employer constantly

making endeavour to thwart all the effort of the Respondent No.3

to get his legitimate right is amenable to an exemplary cost.

Accordingly, while dismissing the Appeal, the Appellant

institution is directed to pay cost of Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lakh

only) to the Respondent No. 3 The direction passed by the learned

Single Judge shall be implemented within a period of four weeks.

Failure to implement the order within the period stipulated shall

not only be viewed seriously but may entail order for contempt in

its next journey.

12. In view of the foregoing analysis and having found no

infirmity in the judgment dated 19.07.2024 passed in W.P.(C) No.

19898 of 2011, it necessarily follows that the order dated 19.03.2025

passed in RVWPET No. 198 of 2024, which declined to review the

said judgment, does not warrant independent interference. The

grounds urged in W.A. No. 791 of 2025 being co-extensive with

those advanced in W.A. No. 788 of 2025 and having been duly

considered hereinabove, the connected appeal is also liable to be

disposed of in terms of the present judgment.

Both the Writ Appeals are hence dismissed with cost as

above.

(Chittaranjan Dash) Judge

(Dixit Krishna Shripad) Judge

A.K.Pradhan/Bijay/Sarbani

Signed by: ANANTA KUMAR PRADHAN Designation: Senior Stenographer Reason: Authentication Location: HIGH COURT OF ORISSA Date: 13-Feb-2026 16:25:40