[Cites 15, Cited by 0]

Orissa High Court

K. Prutviraj Singh vs Chief General .... Opposite Parties on 5 February, 2026

Author: V. Narasingh

Bench: V. Narasingh

                     IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK

                             W.P.(C) No.18260 of 2015

              In the matter of an application under Article 226 and 227 of
              the Constitution of India.


                  K. Prutviraj Singh        ....           Petitioner

                                            Mr. H.M. Dhal, Advocate

                                       -versus-

                   1. Chief General         ....    Opposite Parties
                      Manager, State
                      Bank of India,
                      Local Head Office,
                      IDCO Tower,
                      Janpath, BBSR,
                      Khurda
                   2. General Manager
                      (Operations) &
                      Disciplinary
                      Authority, State
                      Bank of India
                      Local Head Office,
                      IDCO Tower,
                      Janpath, BBSR,
                      Khurda
                   3. Deputy Managing
                      Director & C.D.O.-
                      cum-Appellate
                      Authority, State
                      Bank of India
                      Appeals & Review
                      Department,
                      Corporate Centre,
                      8th Floor, State


                                                                  Page 1 of 27
W.P.(C) No.18260 of 2015
                            Bank Bhawan,
                           Madame Cama
                           Road, Mumbai-
                           400021
                                              Mr. A.K. Mishra, Advocate

                           CORAM: JUSTICE V. NARASINGH

                           DATE OF FINAL HEARING : 27.10.2025
                           DATE OF JUDGMENT      : 05.02.2026


        V. Narasingh, J.

1. Heard Mr. Dhal, learned counsel for the

Petitioner and Mr. Mishra, learned counsel for the

Opposite Parties.

2. The Petitioner, who was working as a Field

Officer in the State Bank of India, Purusottampur

Branch, Dist-Ganjam, has preferred this Writ Petition

assailing the order passed by the Disciplinary

Authority as well as the Appellate Authority at

Annexure-6 and 12 respectively imposing penalty of

removal from service in terms of Rule 67(g) of State

Bank of India Officers Service Rules1. The relief

sought for is extracted hereunder;

"Under these circumstances the petitioner most humbly prays that this Hon'ble Court be graciously pleased to issue a Rule NISI calling upon the opposite parties to show cause as to why;

i. the order under Annexure-6 as well as the order under Annexure-12 Series shall not be quashed ii. the opposite parties shall not be directed to grant all consequential service benefits;

If the opposite parties fail to show cause or show insufficient cause the Rule be made absolute.

xxx xxx xxx"

3. Brief facts germane for just adjudication is

indicated hereunder;

While the Petitioner was serving as a Field

Officer, On the basis of the statement of imputation,

the following charges were communicated:

67. Without prejudice to any other provisions contained in these rules, any one or more of the following penalties may be imposed on an officer, for an act of misconduct or for any other good and sufficient reason to be recorded in writing:-

(a) to (f)

(g) reduction to a lower grade or post;

(i) Sri K.P. Singh, OJM, was caught red-handed

by the State Vigilance Department during a

trap laid by them on 11.08.1989, while

accepting Rs.1,000/- as bribe from one Shri

Laxmikanta Panda, a SEPUP borrower, for

sanction of a loan of Rs.5,000/- to him, and

G.C. notes worth Rs.1,000/- tainted with

phenolphthalein powder were recovered from

his shirt pocket.

(ii) Shri Singh disbursed Rs.1,000/- on

10.08.1989 from Loan Account No. CIL 6/22 to

Sri Laxmikanta Panda, a SEPUP borrower,

unauthorisedly, without the loan being

sanctioned by the Branch Manager.

(iii) Sri Singh recommended the loan proposal of

Sri Laxmikanta Panda, who was already

established in business. As such, Shri Panda

was not eligible for finance under the SEPUP

Scheme, which was primarily meant for new

entrepreneurs.

(iv) The loan application of Sri Laxmikanta Panda,

whose loan was recommended by Sri K.P.

Singh, was not properly filled in. The amount

of required block capital and working capital

were not mentioned separately.

3-B. In response to the memorandum of charges,

the Petitioner submitted his explanation denying the

same.

3-C. Negating such explanation, the Enquiry Officer

was appointed to enquire into the charges extracted

hereinabove. And, one Inspector of CBI was

appointed as the Presenting Officer. During the

enquiry, witnesses were cited on behalf of the Bank

as well as the Petitioner-delinquent and several

documents were also relied upon.

3-D. On conclusion of the enquiry, the Enquiry

Officer submitted his report on 22.08.1992, by which

he held that Charge No. (iii) was not proved, Charge

Nos. (ii) and (iv) were partly proved, and Charge No.

(i) was held to be proved.

3.E. Copy of the report of the Enquiry Officer was

given to the Petitioner to submit his representation,

and the Petitioner submitted his representation vis-à-

vis the enquiry report stating that the same was not

based on cogent materials and ought not to be acted

upon.

3-F. The Disciplinary Authority, taking into account

the enquiry report, proposed to impose punishment

of removal from service against the Petitioner, but

submitted such recommendation to the Appointing

Authority, who concurred with the views of the

Disciplinary Authority imposing the punishment of

removal. Assailing the same, the Petitioner preferred

an appeal.

3-G. Such appeal was rejected by order dated

23.05.1994 (Annexure-9).

4. Assailing such rejection, the Petitioner preferred

O.J.C. No. 7895 of 1994, wherein the order of the

Appellate Authority was annexed as Annexure-17. This

Court, by judgment dated 17.03.2015, remanded the

matter for fresh consideration by the Appellate

Authority, inter alia, on the ground that, on the

materials available, the acceptance of Final Report by

the competent criminal Court on 28.01.1994 inter alia

on account of lack of evidence was not brought to the

notice of the Appellate Authority.

5. Before adverting to the earlier judgment passed

by this Court, it is apposite to note that, in respect of

the allegation, CBI, Bhubaneswar had investigated into

the matter and after investigation, submitted a Final

Report which was accepted by the learned Court.

6. While considering the challenge of the

Petitioner to the order of the Appellate Authority in

O.J.C. No. 7895 of 1994, this Court, in its earlier

judgment, noted that the submission of Final Report

and acceptance of the same by the competent

criminal Court was evidently not brought to the notice

of the Appellate Authority. This Court took note of the

sequence of events that, by the time the competent

criminal Court passed an order on 28.01.1994

accepting the Final Report, the penalty of removal

had already been imposed by the Disciplinary

Authority on 14.03.1993, and while passing the final

order dated 24.09.1994 (Annexure-9 in this W.P.(C)

and Annexure-17 in O.J.C. No. 7895 of 1994), the

Appellate Authority had not considered the effect

thereof. In such factual backdrop, this Court set aside

the appellate order and remitted the matter back to

the Appellate Authority.

Paragraph-16 of the judgment of this Court

dated 17.03.2015 in O.J.C. No.7895 of 1994 is

extracted hereunder for convenience of reference;

"16. In view of the aforesaid fact and circumstances, the order passed by the appellate authority in Annexure-17 confirming the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority is hereby set aside and the matter is remitted back to the appellate authority to reconsider the same taking into account the factum of closure of criminal case filed against the petitioner Pursuant to order passed on 28.01.1994 in Annexufe-20 and if the appellate authority comes to conclusion that the allegation made against the petitioner in the statement of imputation is same as that of the initiation of criminal case against him in

that case, he may take a decision taking into account law laid down as discussed (supra) and pass an order in accordance with law by affording opportunity of hearing to the parties within a period of four months from the date of communication of this order."

7. On such remand, the Appellate Authority

passed the impugned order dated 12.08.2015

(Annexure-12 series), affirming the order of removal.

Hence, this writ application.

8. It is the submission of the learned counsel for

the Petitioner, Mr. Dhal, that Charge No. (iii) was not

proved and Charge Nos. (ii) and (iv) are mere

irregularities. The basis of imposition of penalty is on

account of Charge No. (i).

In this context, reliance is also placed on the

counter affidavit filed by the Bank authorities.

9. It is the further submission of the learned

counsel for the Petitioner, Mr. Dhal, that Charge No.

(i) is absolutely vague and not definite. The said

charge relates to the acceptance of alleged bribe of

Rs.1,000/- from one Mr. Laxmikanta Panda, a SEPUP

borrower and in the absence of any allegation of

demand of bribe in the said charge, the money

allegedly accepted and recovered from the possession

of the Petitioner can never be characterized as bribe

money.

10. It is also asserted that the imputations qua

Charge No. (i) had to be viewed in the light of the

submission of Final Report by the CBI, which was

duly accepted by the Court in seisin, as already

noted. It is stated that, taking into account the

nature of charge and the final report as submitted,

the Appellate Authority has failed to appreciate the

materials on record in their proper perspective,

notwithstanding the judgment of remand passed by

this Court dated 17.03.2015 in O.J.C. No.7895 of

1994. Hence, the order of removal is liable to be set

aside and the Petitioner is entitled to the

consequential benefits.

11. To fortify his submission, learned counsel for

the Petitioner relied upon the decisions of the Apex

Court in the cases of Union of India and others vs.

Gyan Chand Chattar2 and Anil Gilurker vs.

Bilaspur Raipur Kshetriya Gramin Bank and

another3.

12. Per contra, learned counsel for the Bank, Mr.

Mishra, submits that there is no illegality in the order

passed by the Appellate Authority. Mere submission

of Final Report does not absolve the Petitioner and he

reiterated the difference of approach in a criminal

case and a departmental proceeding. In as much as,

it was submitted that in a departmental proceeding

the standard of proof is based on preponderance of

probabilities, as opposed to proof beyond reasonable

doubt in a criminal case.

13. He also places reliance on the judgment of the

Apex Court defining the contours of this Court in

interfering with orders passed in a departmental

proceeding and submits that the sum and substance

of the submission of the learned counsel for the

Union of India and others v. Gyan Chand Chattar, (2009) 12 SCC 78

Anil Gilurker v. Bilaspur Raipur Kshetriya Gramin Bank, (2011) 14 SCC 379

Petitioner is to call upon this Court to act as a super

Appellate Authority, which is against the tenet of law.

It is his further submission that it ought not to

be forgotten that the allegation against an incumbent

like the Petitioner working in a financial institution

ought to be viewed with utmost seriousness and the

same does not admit of any leniency and thereby

sought dismissal of the writ petition.

14. The Petitioner filed rejoinder controverting the

assertions made in the counter affidavit.

15. During the course of hearing, in order to arrive

at a just conclusion, this Court, by order dated

10.10.2025, granted leave to the Petitioner to place

on record the deposition of the complainant examined

on behalf of the management as PW/MW-4.

Accordingly, the same was submitted by way of

additional affidavit vide Annexure-13.

16. The allegation against the present Petitioner,

which was at the instance of PW/MW-4, a SEPUP

borrower and that for sanction of a loan of Rs.5,000/-

, the Petitioner had demanded bribe of Rs.1,000/-. It

is on record that the Petitioner was caught red-

handed by the State Vigilance Officials while

accepting bribe of Rs.1,000/- from the SEPUP

borrower on 11.08.1989. After investigation, the CBI

has submitted a Final Report, inter alia stating thus;

"xxx xxx xxx However, it is a true case U/s.13(2) R/W 13(1)(d) and Section 7 of P.C. Act, 1988 against the accused Sri K. Prithiraj Singh, field Officer of S.B.I. Purushottampur Branch. But there is insufficient evidence as discussed above for prosecution of the accused under the said sanctions of law.

                           xxx                xxx               xxx"
                                                          (Emphasised)

17. In this context, it would be appropriate to

refer to the evidence of PW/MW.4 in the

Departmental Proceeding.

"DR to PW-4 - From dt.1.11.88 to 27.7.89 how many times you had come to the Bank and whom you were meeting and what was there reply for this delay.

P.W.4 - Nearly ten times I come to the Bank. I met twice to the Branch Manager who directed to me to meet the Field Officer and I

met him. Always the F.O. told that the loan could not be sanctioned.

DR to P.W.4 - When did the F.O indicated that you should given him bribe.

P.W.4 - On dt. 10.08.89 when I went to F.O to meet he told me to pay Rs.1000/- by way of bribe so that my loan could be sanctioned."

It is apt to note that the Petitioner was the

F.O.

18. The judgments cited by the learned counsel

for the Petitioner have to be evaluated on the basis of

materials on record.

In the case of Gyan Chand Chattar(supra)2,

in paragraph-21 dealing with Charge No. 6 in the said

case of asking for 1% commission for making the

payment of allowances, the Apex Court observed that

the same is a serious charge and "requires to be

proved to the hilt" and, taking into account the

consequences, it was stated that it cannot be proved

on mere probabilities.

In order to substantiate his submission,

learned counsel for the Petitioner has heavily relied

on such observation of the Apex Court and states that

"charge should be specific, definite and giving details

of the incident which formed the basis of charges"

and it is asserted that the charge more particularly

Charge No.1 in the present case is vague.

19. Charge No. (i), which is of seminal importance

in the case at hand, being the gravamen of the

charges, is extracted hereunder at the cost of

repetition:

"(i) Sri K.P. Singh, OJM was caught red handed by the State Vigilance Department, during a trap laid by them on 11.08.1989 while accepting Rs.1,000/- as bribe from one Shri Laxmikanta Panda, a SEPUP borrower for sanction of a loan of Rs.5,000/- to him and G.C. Notes worth Rs.1,000/- tainted with phanolpthale-in power were recovered from his shirt pocket."

20. On a bare perusal of the same, it can be seen

that it relates to acceptance of bribe from one SEPUP

borrower (PW/MW-4). In its Final Report submitted,

extracted hereinabove, the investigating agency has

indicated that though it is a true case under Section

13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d)4 and Section 75 of

the P.C. Act, 1988 against the Petitioner, Field Officer

of SBI, Purusottampur, but because of insufficiency of

evidence final report was submitted.

(Emphasized)

21. In the considered view of this Court, non-

mentioning of demand of bribe in Charge No. (i), in

13. Criminal misconduct by a public servant.- (1) A public servant is said to commit the offence of criminal misconduct,(a) to (c)xxx xxx xxx

(d) if he,-

(i) by corrupt or illegal means, obtains for himself or for any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage; or

(ii) by abusing his position as a public servant, obtains for himself or for any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage; or

(iii) while holding office as a public servant, obtains for any person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage without any public interest; or xxx xxx xxx (2) Any public servant who commits criminal misconduct shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall be not less than[four years] but which may extend to [ten years] and shall also be liable to fine.

7. Public servant taking gratification other than legal remuneration in respect of an official act.-Whoever, being, or expecting to be a public servant, accepts or obtains or agrees to accept or attempts to obtain from any person, for himself or for any other person, any gratification whatever, other than legal remuneration, as a motive or reward for doing or forbearing to do any official act or for showing or forbearing to show, in the exercise of his official functions, favour or disfavour to any person or for rendering or attempting to render any service or disservice to any person, with the Central Government or any State Government or Parliament or the Legislature of any State or with any local authority, corporation or Government company referred to in clause (c) of Section 2, or with any public servant, whether named or otherwise, shall be punishable with imprisonment which shall be not less than three years but which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine.

(b) "Gratification." The word "gratification" is not restricted to pecuniary gratifications or to gratifications estimable in money.

(c) "Legal remuneration." The words "legal remuneration" are not restricted to remuneration which a public servant can lawfully demand, but include all remuneration which he is permitted by the Government or the organisation, which he serves, to accept.

(d) "A motive or reward for doing." A person who receives a gratification as a motive or reward for doing what he does not intend or is not in a position to do, or has not done, comes within this expression.

(e) Where a public servant induces a person erroneously to believe that his influence with the Government has obtained a title for that person and thus induces that person to give the public servant, money or any other gratification as a reward for this service, the public servant has committed an offence under this section.

the present context, cannot absolve the Petitioner of

the accusation in the light of the evidence of

PW/M.W.4, Mr. Laxmikanta Panda, whose statement

has already been adverted to hereinbefore.

So far as interference in a finding in a

departmental proceeding is no longer res integra. It is

the settled position of law that it is not permissible for

this Court to re-examine the evidence unless the

approach of the departmental authorities is patently

perverse. In this context reference can be respectfully

made to the judgment of the Apex Court in the cases

of Deputy General Manager (Appellate

Authority) and Others vs. Ajai Kumar

Srivastava6, Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran7

and State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur v. Nemi

Chand Nalwaya8.

The relevant portions of the following

judgments are extracted hereunder for reference;

Deputy General Manager (Appellate Authority) v. Ajai Kumar Srivastava, (2021) 2 SCC 612

Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran, (2015) 2 SCC 610

State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur v. Nemi Chand Nalwaya, (2011) 4 SCC 584

The Apex Court in the case of Ajai Kumar

Srivastava(Supra)6 observed thus;

"xxx xxx xxx

24. It is thus settled that the power of judicial review, of the constitutional courts, is an evaluation of the decision-making process and not the merits of the decision itself. It is to ensure fairness in treatment and not to ensure fairness of conclusion. The court/tribunal may interfere in the proceedings held against the delinquent if it is, in any manner, inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached or where the conclusions upon consideration of the evidence reached by the disciplinary authority are perverse or suffer from patent erroron the face of record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued. To sum up, the scope of judicial review cannot be extended to the examination of correctness or reasonableness of a decision of authority as a matter of fact.

25. When the disciplinary enquiry is conducted for the alleged misconduct against the public servant, the court is to examine and determine:

(i) whether the enquiry was held by the competent authority;

(ii) whether rules of natural justice are complied with;

(iii) whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence and authority has power and jurisdiction to reach finding of fact or conclusion.

xxx xxx xxx"

In the case of P. Gunasekaran(supra)7, the

Apex Court held thus;

"xxx xxx xxx

12............ The High Court, in exercise of its powers Under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture into reappreciation of the evidence. The High Court can only see whether:

(a) the enquiry is held by a competent authority;

(b) the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf;

(c) there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the proceedings;

(d) the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case;

(e) the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations;

(f) the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no

reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion;

(g) the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence;

(h) the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding;

(i) the finding of fact is based on no evidence.

13. Under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not:

(i) reappreciate the evidence;

(ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law;

(iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence;

(iv) go into the reliability of the evidence;

(v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based.

(vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be;

(vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience.

                            xxx                     xxx                 xxx"

                           Further   in   the   case   of   Nemi     Chand

Nalwaya(Supra)8, the Apex Court held thus;

"xxx xxx xxx

7. It is now well settled that the courts will not act as an appellate court and reassess the evidence led in the domestic enquiry, nor interfere on the ground that another view is

possible on the material on record. If the enquiry has been fairly and properly held and the findings are based on evidence, the question of adequacy of the evidence or the reliable nature of the evidence will not be grounds for interfering with the findings in departmental enquiries. Therefore, courts will not interfere with findings of fact recorded in departmental enquiries, except where such findings are based on no evidence or where they are clearly perverse. The test to find out perversity is to see whether a tribunal acting reasonably could have arrived at such conclusion or finding, on the material on record. The courts will however interfere with the findings in disciplinary matters, if principles of natural justice or statutory Regulations have been violated or if the order is found to be arbitrary, capricious, mala fide or based on extraneous considerations. (Vide B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, Union of India v. G. Ganayutham, Bank of India v.

Degala Suryanarayana and High Court of Judicature at Bombay v. Shashikant S. Patil.

8. When a court is considering whether the punishment of "termination from service"

imposed upon a bank employee is shockingly excessive or disproportionate to the gravity of the proved misconduct, the loss of confidence in the employee will be an important and relevant factor. When an unknown person comes to the bank and claims to be the account-holder of a long inoperative account, and a bank employee, who does not know

such person, instructs his colleague to transfer the account from "dormant" to "operative"

category (contrary to the instructions regulating dormant accounts) without any kind of verification, and accepts the money withdrawal form from such person, gets a token and collects the amount on behalf of such person for the purpose of handing it over to such person, he in effect enables such unknown person to withdraw the amount contrary to the banking procedures; and ultimately, if it transpires that the person who claimed to be the account-holder was an impostor, the bank cannot be found fault with if it says that it has lost confidence in the employee concerned. A bank is justified in contending that not only the employees who are dishonest, but those who are guilty of gross negligence, are not fit to continue in its service.

                             xxx                   xxx                  xxx"
                                                               (Emphasised)

                22.        Assessing   the   order    of   the   Disciplinary

Authority as well as the Appellate Authority on

remand in terms of the earlier judgment of this Court

dated 17.03.2015 in O.J.C No.7895 of 1994, this

Court is not persuaded to hold that the Petitioner can

be absolved of the accusation. Hence, the finding of

guilt of the Petitioner by the Disciplinary Authority

which was accepted by the appointing authority and

confirmed by the Appellate Authority does not merit

interference.

23. Next question that comes up for consideration

is proportionality of the punishment imposed.

24. The principle governing proportionality of

punishment has been succinctly stated by the Apex

Court in the case of P. Gunasekaran(supra)7,

wherein the Apex Court held thus;

"xxx xxx xxx

19. Equally, it was not open to the High Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction Under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, to go into the proportionality of punishment so long as the punishment does not shock the conscience of the court. In the instant case, the disciplinary authority has come to the conclusion that the Respondent lacked integrity. No doubt, there are no measurable standards as to what is integrity in service jurisprudence but certainly there are indicators for such assessment. Integrity according to Oxford dictionary is "moral uprightness; honesty". It takes in its sweep, probity, innocence, trustfulness, openness, sincerity, blamelessness, immaculacy, rectitude, uprightness, virtuousness, righteousness, goodness, cleanness, decency,

honour, reputation, nobility, irreproachability, purity, respectability, genuineness, moral excellence etc. In short, it depicts sterling character with firm adherence to a code of moral values.

                              xxx                 xxx                  xxx"

                            Reliance,        in    this     context,     for   considering

alteration of the punishment, can be respectfully

placed on the judgment of the Apex Court in B.C.

Chaturvedi v. Union of India and Ors.9

Relevant portions of the judgment is extracted

hereunder for reference;

"xxx xxx xxx

25. No doubt, while exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Courts have to bear in mind the restraints inherent in exercising power of judicial review. It is because of this that substitution of High Court's view regarding appropriate punishment is not permissible. But for this constraint, I would have thought that the law makers do desire application of judicial mind to the question of even proportionality of punishment/penalty...

xxx xxx xxx"

B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, AIR 1996 SC 484

25. The punishment imposed and the adequacy

thereof has to be assessed on the touchstone of the

judgments of the Apex Court in this regard referred

to hereinabove.

25-A. Admittedly, the Petitioner is governed by the

State Bank of India Officers Service Rules, 1992. The

punishments that can be imposed are stated in Rule

No.67 of the said Rules.

The major Penalties1 which can be imposed

run thus;

                           "xxx                  xxx                 xxx
                           Major penalties

(f) save as provided for in (e) above reduction to a lower stage in the time-scale of pay for a specified period, with further directions as to whether or not the officer will earn increments to pay during the period of such reduction and whether on the expiry of such period the reduction will or will not have the effect of postponing the future increments of his pay:

(g) reduction to a lower grade or post;

(h) compulsory retirement:

(i) removal from service;

(j) dismissal.

xxx xxx xxx"

26. It is not disputed at the Bar that, save and

except the allegations in the present case, the

Petitioner had an unblemished record. Taking into

account the nature of the allegation and in the light of

the submission of the Final Report by the CBI, this

Court is of the considered view that while the claim of

the Petitioner for reinstatement with consequential

benefits does not merit consideration,

altering/substituting the punishment of removal by

compulsory retirement, in the considered view of this

Court, would meet the ends of justice.

This Court is conscious of its power under

Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India and

that ordinarily it should not effect change in the

punishment imposed and should normally relegate

the matter to the Disciplinary Authority. However,

such course is adopted in the case at hand since the

Petitioner has retired since long.

Accordingly, W.P.(C) stands disposed of and

as discussed above the punishment of removal is

altered to one of compulsory retirement.

In view of the disposal of the W.P.(C), pending

I.As stand disposed of.