[Cites 7, Cited by 0]
Orissa High Court
Anil Kumar Sutar vs Hindustan Petroleum Corporation .... ... on 17 April, 2026
Author: Sanjeeb K Panigrahi
Bench: Sanjeeb K Panigrahi
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR
Reason: Authentication
Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT,
CUTTACK
Date: 23-Apr-2026 13:29:14
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
W.P.(C) No.6063 of 2025
(In the matter of an application under Articles 226 and 227 of the
Constitution of India, 1950).
Anil Kumar Sutar .... Petitioner(s)
-versus-
Hindustan Petroleum Corporation .... Opposite Party (s)
Ltd. and Ors.
Advocates appeared in the case through Hybrid Mode:
For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Manoj Kumar Mohanty, Advocate
For Opposite Party (s) : Ms. Gayatri Patra,
ASC for O.P No.3
Mr. Srinivas Patnaik,
Advocate for O.P Nos. 1 & 2
Mr. Basudeb Pujari,
Advocate for O.P No.4
CORAM:
DR. JUSTICE SANJEEB K PANIGRAHI
DATE OF HEARING:-08.04.2026
DATE OF JUDGMENT:-17.04.2026
Dr. Sanjeeb K Panigrahi, J.
1. In this writ petition, the petitioner seeks a direction from this Court to
quash the letter dated 13.01.2025 issued by Hindustan Petroleum
Corporation Ltd. rejecting his complaint, and to declare Opposite Party
No. 4 ineligible for the dealership on account of non-fulfilment of
prescribed land criteria.
Page 1
I. FACTUAL MATRIX OF THE CASE:
2. The brief facts of the case are as follows:
(i) Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. issued an advertisement on
28.06.2023 for appointment of dealers for Rural Retail Outlet
dealerships. In the list of advertised locations, at Serial No. 348, one
outlet was notified for the location "within 5 km from Madanpur
College Chowk towards Pattamundai on Rajnagar-Pattamundai
Road." The outlet was reserved for OBC candidates. The
advertisement prescribed the minimum land requirement for the
proposed retail outlet as 30 metres frontage, 30 metres depth, and
total area of 900 square metres.
(ii) The petitioner and Opposite Party No. 4 were both aspirants for the
said dealership and both submitted applications within time.
Opposite Party No. 4 offered two plots of land in Mouza Madanpur,
namely Plot No. 1215/1709 under Khata No. 252/575 and Plot No.
1215/1708 under Khata No. 252/577, each measuring Ac. 0.1600
decimals, for establishment of the outlet.
(iii) A dispute thereafter arose regarding the eligibility of the land
offered by Opposite Party No. 4. The petitioner asserted that the
frontage of the two plots, when taken together, was only 28.5 metres
and therefore below the minimum requirement of 30 metres
prescribed in the advertisement. The petitioner also alleged that
there existed an intervening Government land, namely Plot No. 1410
recorded as Gochar land, between the Rajnagar-Pattamundai Road
and the offered plots, thereby violating the brochure condition that
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no other land, including Government land, should lie between the
Right of Way and the offered land.
(iv) The materials placed before the Court show that at one stage a
measurement report of the Amin of Pattamundai Tahasil was relied
upon by the petitioner to contend that the frontage of the two plots
was 14 metres and 14.5 metres respectively. Subsequently, official
demarcation proceedings were also undertaken in Demarcation
Case Nos. 25 of 2024 and 26 of 2024, in which the frontage of the two
plots was stated to be 70 Kadi and 80 Kadi respectively, totaling 150
Kadi, equivalent to about 30.18 metres.
(v) The petitioner submitted a complaint before HPCL objecting to the
selection of Opposite Party No. 4 on the grounds of deficiency in
frontage and the existence of Gochar land between the road and the
offered plots. HPCL sought clarification from the Tahasildar,
Pattamundai. On the basis of such clarification, including the report
that there was a gap of about 9 metres from the road to the offered
land and that road connectivity existed to the proposed site, HPCL
rejected the petitioner's complaint by letter dated 13.01.2025.
(vi) Thereafter the present writ petition was filed challenging the said
letter dated 13.01.2025 and seeking consequential directions to reject
the candidature of Opposite Party No. 4 for the retail outlet
dealership. Counter affidavits and written notes of submission were
filed by HPCL, the Tahasildar, Pattamundai, and Opposite Party
No. 4 defending the rejection of the complaint and the selection
process.
Page 3
II. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER:
3. Learned counsel for the Petitioner earnestly made the following
submissions in support of his contentions:
(i) The petitioner contends that Opposite Party No. 4 did not satisfy the
basic eligibility condition regarding frontage of land. According to
the petitioner, before the selection process was finalized, the Amin
of Pattamundai Tahasil had measured the frontage of the two plots
offered by Opposite Party No. 4 and found them to be 14 metres and
14.5 metres respectively, making the total frontage only 28.5 metres.
Since the advertisement specifically required a minimum frontage of
30 metres, the petitioner argues that Opposite Party No. 4 was
ineligible from the outset and could not have been included in the
draw of lots or selected for the dealership.
(ii) The petitioner further contends that the later demarcation report
showing the frontage as 150 Kadi or 30.18 metres cannot be accepted
at face value. It is argued that this later exercise was undertaken
only after objection had been raised by the petitioner, and that
Opposite Party No. 4 managed to obtain a favourable report
through a subsequent physical measurement. The petitioner's case is
that if the plots are measured on the village map and revenue
records, the frontage remains only 28.5 metres and there was no
necessity for a later physical measurement designed to alter the
position.
Page 4
(iii) The petitioner also places strong reliance on Clause 4(vi)(o)(iv) of
the Brochure governing selection of dealers. According to him, the
clause clearly requires that there should be no other land, including
Government land, between the Right of Way and the offered plot. In
the present case, Plot No. 1410 admittedly stands between the
Rajnagar-Pattamundai Road and the plots offered by Opposite Party
No. 4. Since this plot is recorded as Government Gochar land in the
Hal Record of Rights, the petitioner contends that the very existence
of this strip of land disqualifies Opposite Party No. 4 irrespective of
any alleged road connectivity through it.
(iv) The petitioner submits that the plea of the opposite parties that Plot
No. 1410 was acquired long ago for road improvement has not been
substantiated by conclusive materials showing completed
acquisition and lawful change in status. According to the petitioner,
though a Gazette Notification dated 25.02.1983 was relied on to
show that part of Sabik Plot No. 925 was proposed to be acquired
for improvement of Pattamundai-Rajnagar Road, no final material
has been produced to show that the relevant portion was in fact
acquired and vested so as to cease being Gochar land. The petitioner
emphasizes that in the Hal Record of Rights, Plot No. 1410 continues
to stand recorded under Government Rakhit Khata with kisam as
Gochar, which shows that the land has not lost its character.
(v) The petitioner also argues that even the official stand of the
Tahasildar and HPCL supports his case to the extent that there is a
9-metre gap of Gochar land between the main road and the offered
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plots. He contends that mere assertion of "road connectivity" cannot
override the brochure condition. According to him, unless the
intervening land is lawfully recorded as road or forms part of the
Right of Way in revenue records, the existence of such Gochar land
remains a fatal defect in eligibility.
(vi) Another significant submission of the petitioner is that Opposite
Party No. 4 himself has admitted encroachment over Plot No. 1410.
The petitioner points out that Opposite Party No. 4 faced
encroachment proceedings under the OPLE Act in respect of the
said Gochar land and paid fines on more than one occasion. This,
according to the petitioner, is a clear admission that the plot is
Government land lying between the road and the offered private
plots. Therefore, the petitioner asserts that Opposite Party No. 4
cannot rely on his own encroachment over Government land to
claim road access or eligibility for dealership.
(vii) On the basis of the above, the petitioner contends that HPCL acted
illegally and arbitrarily in rejecting his complaint and in proceeding
with the selection of Opposite Party No. 4. It is submitted that the
decision suffers from non-consideration of the brochure conditions
and the undisputed revenue position of the land. The petitioner
therefore seeks quashing of the rejection letter dated 13.01.2025 and
consequential rejection of the candidature of Opposite Party No. 4.
III. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE OPPOSITE PARTIES:
4. The Learned Counsel for the Opposite Parties earnestly made the
following submissions in support of his contentions:
Page 6
(i) HPCL, namely Opposite Parties No. 1 and 2, contend that the writ
petition is without merit and that the complaint of the petitioner was
rejected only after due inquiry and consideration of relevant records.
Their case is that the dealership selection process was conducted
fairly, transparently, and strictly in accordance with the Brochure for
Selection of Dealers for Regular and Rural Retail Outlets, June 2023.
They maintain that both the petitioner and Opposite Party No. 4
applied for the same location, that Opposite Party No. 4 was selected
through draw of lots, and that before issuance of the Letter of Intent
the complaint raised by the petitioner was duly examined on the
basis of reports and clarifications from the competent revenue
authority.
(ii) HPCL specifically contends that the land offered by Opposite Party
No. 4 does satisfy the requirement of minimum frontage. Reliance is
placed on the official demarcation conducted by the revenue
authorities in Demarcation Case Nos. 25 and 26 of 2024, in which
Plot No. 1215/1708 was found to have frontage of 70 Kadi and Plot
No. 1215/1709 frontage of 80 Kadi, totalling 150 Kadi or about 30.18
metres. HPCL argues that this official demarcation overrides the
petitioner's private and self-serving measurement and that the
frontage requirement in the advertisement stands fully met.
(iii) On the issue of Plot No. 1410, HPCL contends that the petitioner's
objection is misconceived. According to them, though the Hal Record
may still show the land as Gochar, the said plot was part of Sabik
Plot No. 925 and had already been acquired by the Government for
Page 7
improvement of Pattamundai-Rajnagar Road under old acquisition
proceedings. They rely on the Tahasildar's report and supporting
communications from the Collector's office to submit that the land
forms part of the road infrastructure or its immediate periphery and
provides access to the offered plots. Therefore, according to HPCL,
Plot No. 1410 cannot be treated as an independent barrier or
disqualifying strip of Government land within the meaning of the
brochure.
(iv) HPCL further submits that the Tahasildar, Pattamundai, by letter
dated 02.11.2024, clearly reported that there is a 9-metre gap from the
Odisha District Road to the offered land and that road connectivity
exists to the proposed plots. The Corporation argues that it was
justified in relying on this clarification from the competent revenue
authority. It is also their case that the Land Evaluation Committee
physically and objectively examined the land on the basis of official
records, demarcation reports, and field verification before
concluding that the land offered by Opposite Party No. 4 meets the
corporation's norms.
(v) Opposite Party No. 3, the Tahasildar, Pattamundai, takes the stand
that his role in the matter is limited and factual. The Tahasildar
further contends that he is not the selecting authority for the
dealership and had merely furnished factual information from
official revenue records when sought by HPCL. According to him, on
verification of the relevant records and demarcation proceedings, the
plots offered by Opposite Party No. 4 stood in his name and the
Page 8
official measurement showed compliance with the required frontage.
The Tahasildar also states that Plot No. 1410 is part of land that had
been acquired for improvement of the road, and that the persistence
of the "Gochar" entry in the Hal ROR is only a matter of record
correction and does not negate the fact of acquisition or the
availability of lawful connectivity.
(vi) Opposite Party No. 3 further contends that the petitioner has
wrongly attempted to make the Tahasildar a party to what is
essentially a commercial and contractual dispute between rival
dealership applicants and HPCL. According to the Tahasildar, no
adverse order was passed by him against the petitioner and no writ
relief lies against him merely because he supplied clarifications on
the basis of official records. He also maintains that the Tahasildar has
no unilateral power to alter the kisam in the Record of Rights except
through due legal process, and therefore the continuance of the
Gochar entry in the Hal record does not affect the legal position
flowing from acquisition.
(vii) Opposite Party No. 4, the selected candidate, supports the stand
of HPCL and the Tahasildar and contends that his land fully satisfies
the eligibility conditions. He submits that he had approached the
Tahasildar for demarcation of his plots and that in the demarcation
proceedings, after notice to concerned parties, the official Amin
found the combined width of the two plots to be 150 Kadi. He
therefore argues that the mandatory 30 metres frontage condition is
satisfied.
Page 9
(viii) Opposite Party No. 4 also contends that the Government had
already acquired the relevant Gochar land for road improvement
and that the offered land is adjacent to the road through the said
acquired strip. He submits that the existence of Plot No. 1410 does
not create any legal impediment, particularly when the Tahasildar
has reported road connectivity and the HPCL authorities have
accepted the land as compliant. He additionally takes the position
that the petitioner has failed to rebut the official records and reports
produced by the authorities.
(ix) The opposite parties, collectively, emphasize the presumption
attaching to official acts and official records. They submit that the
reports of the Tahasildar and Amin are public acts done in discharge
of statutory duties and carry a presumption of correctness. Since,
according to them, the petitioner has not produced cogent material to
displace those official records, the Court ought not interfere with
HPCL's decision rejecting the complaint and proceeding with
selection of Opposite Party No. 4.
IV. JUDGMENT AND ANALYSIS:
5. Heard Learned Counsel for the parties and perused the documents
placed before this Court.
6. The writ petition arises out of a selection process initiated by Hindustan
Petroleum Corporation Limited for appointment of dealers for regular
and rural retail outlets in Odisha. One of the advertised locations is at or
around Madanpur College Chowk towards Pattamundai, with the
Page 10
dealership reserved for OBC candidates and the mode of selection being
draw of lots among eligible applicants. The advertised minimum land
dimensions for this location are frontage 30 metres, depth 30 metres,
and an area of 900 square metres.
7. Both the petitioner and the selected candidate applied for the said
location within time. The dispute is confined to whether the land
offered by the selected candidate satisfies the eligibility conditions,
particularly the minimum frontage, and whether there exists any
intervening Government land between the road right of way and the
offered plot. The petitioner's complaint was rejected by the corporation,
prompting the present writ petition.
8. At the outset, it is relevant to notice that the governing selection
brochure places the responsibility on the applicant to ensure that, as on
the date of application, the offered land meets the advertised
dimensions after leaving the right of way line, is situated abutting the
right of way, and that there is no other land including Government land
between the right of way and the offered plot.
9. The controversy in the writ petition raises two principal issues:
a) First, whether the decision of the corporation in accepting the
selected candidate's offered land as meeting the minimum
frontage requirement is so arbitrary, irrational, or perverse as to
warrant interference in exercise of writ jurisdiction.
b) Second, whether the allegation of the existence of an intervening
strip of Government Gochar land between the road right of way
and the offered plot constitutes a clear and undisputed violation
Page 11
of the brochure condition, or whether it involves disputed
questions of fact not amenable to adjudication in a writ petition.
10. In deciding these issues, the Court is guided by the settled limits of
judicial review in contractual and selection matters concerning State
instrumentalities and the self imposed restraint against embarking upon
fact finding exercises that require detailed evidence.
11. The precedents in such matters have repeatedly emphasized that
judicial review in such matters is directed at the lawfulness of the
decision-making process, not a re-appraisal on merits. In Tata Cellular
v. Union of India1, the Court while explaining the extent of judicial
review, held as follows:
"Judicial review is concerned with reviewing not the merits
of the decision in support of which the application for
judicial review is made, but the decision-making process
itself."
12. Similarly, in Jagdish Mandal v State of Orissa2 the Supreme Court
cautioned that tender and contract decisions are essentially commercial
and that judicial review is meant to check whether choice or decision is
made lawfully and not to check whether choice or decision is sound.
The relevant excerpts are produced below:
22. Judicial review of administrative action is intended to
prevent arbitrariness, irrationality, unreasonableness, bias
and mala fides. Its purpose is to check whether choice or
decision is made "lawfully" and not to check whether choice
or decision is "sound". When the power of judicial review is
invoked in matters relating to tenders or award of contracts,
certain special features should be borne in mind. A contract
1994 6 SCC 651.
2007 14 SCC 517.
Page 12
is a commercial transaction. Evaluating tenders and
awarding contracts are essentially commercial functions.
Principles of equity and natural justice stay at a distance. If
the decision relating to award of contract is bona fide and is
in public interest, courts will not, in exercise of power of
judicial review, interfere even if a procedural aberration or
error in assessment or prejudice to a tenderer, is made out.
The power of judicial review will not be permitted to be
invoked to protect private interest at the cost of public
interest, or to decide contractual disputes. The tenderer or
contractor with a grievance can always seek damages in a
civil court. Attempts by unsuccessful tenderers with
imaginary grievances, wounded pride and business rivalry,
to make mountains out of molehills of some
technical/procedural violation or some prejudice to self, and
persuade courts to interfere by exercising power of judicial
review, should be resisted. Such interferences, either interim
or final, may hold up public works for years, or delay relief
and succour to thousands and millions and may increase the
project cost manifold."
13. More recently, the Supreme Court in N G Projects Ltd v Vinod Kumar
Jain3 reiterated that the tendering or selecting authority is the best judge
of its requirements and that courts should not substitute their view for
expert evaluation, particularly in technical matters, unless arbitrariness,
mala fides, bias, or perversity is clearly shown.
14. The petitioner's case on frontage rests on two competing sets of
measurements. One is an earlier measurement report referred to as
being made by the local Amin, recording frontages of 14 metres and
14.5 metres for the two plots and, thus, a combined frontage of 28.5
metres. The other is a later official demarcation in demarcation case
2022 6 SCC 127.
Page 13
numbers 25 of 2024 and 26 of 2024, recording the frontages in local
measurement units as 70 kadi and 80 kadi, totalling 150 kadi, which is
stated to be about 30.18 metres.
15. On the material described on record, the later demarcation is an official
act undertaken in demarcation proceedings. The petitioner does not
bring before this Court any independent material demonstrating that
the demarcation was conducted without jurisdiction, without notice, or
in violation of mandatory procedure, nor is there a specific pleading of
mala fides against any identified officer involved in the demarcation.
16. In the absence of a demonstrated procedural illegality or perversity, and
keeping in view that the writ court is not equipped to resolve a contest
of measurements by re measuring land or by undertaking a factual
adjudication requiring evidence and cross examination, this Court
would be slow to discard an official demarcation in favour of an earlier
measurement report, particularly when the corporation has relied on
the competent revenue authority's demarcation in the course of
scrutiny. The restraint is consistent with Tata Cellular, which limits
judicial review to the legality of process, not a substitution of the
Court's view on technical or factual determinations.
17. Accordingly, on the frontage issue alone, no case of manifest illegality
or irrationality is made out which would justify setting aside the
corporation's decision in writ jurisdiction. The dispute remains, at
highest, a factual contest as to measurement, for which the writ remedy
is ill suited.
Page 14
18. The petitioner's more substantial objection rests on the brochure
condition relating to right of way. The brochure clearly stipulates that
the offered land should be situated abutting the right of way line, that
the land owner should be in possession from the beginning or edge of
the right of way line, and that there should be no other land including
Government land between the right of way and the offered plot.
19. The petitioner relies on the entry in the Hal Record of Rights showing
Plot No. 1410 as Government Gochar land and asserts that this plot lies
between the road and the offered plots. He further contends that the
selected candidate has faced encroachment proceedings under the
applicable land encroachment law, which, according to the petitioner, is
an admission that the strip is Government land and not part of the right
of way.
20. The corporation and the revenue authority, on the other hand, contend
that though the record continues to show the land as Gochar, it was
acquired long ago for improvement of the road and that road
connectivity exists, with a reported gap of about 9 metres from the road
to the offered land. On that basis, the objection was rejected.
21. Two features are material for the writ court. First, the brochure
condition turns crucially on what constitutes the right of way line and
whether the intervening strip is within the right of way of the road or
remains an independent parcel of Government land separating the
offered plots from the right of way. That question ordinarily depends
upon acquisition records, road right of way boundaries, and
Page 15
demarcation of the road corridor vis a vis revenue plots. Those are
matters of evidence.
22. Second, it is equally well settled that an entry in revenue records is not
conclusive of title. In Suraj Bhan v Financial Commissioner4, the
Supreme Court held that entries in revenue records serve fiscal
purposes and do not confer ownership, and that questions of title are
for the competent civil court to decide.
23. While the present dispute is not a title suit, the principle cautions this
Court against treating a single revenue entry as conclusively deciding
the legal character of the land for all purposes, particularly where the
respondents assert acquisition for road improvement and the
contention raises a mixed question of record, vesting, and ground
reality. The writ court cannot, on affidavits alone, conclusively decide
whether the alleged Gochar strip is legally part of the road right of way
or remains a separate Government land parcel falling between the right
of way and the offered plot.
24. The decision making is also not mala fide, arbitrary, or contrary to
norms as the records make it clear that the corporation has sought
clarification from the competent revenue authority and has acted upon
that clarification in deciding the complaint. This Court cannot hold, in
writ jurisdiction, that such reliance is per se irrational or perverse,
especially when the petitioner seeks this Court to undertake a factual
adjudication on the exact status and location of the strip and the right of
way boundary. This is nothing but crossing the limit of writ jurisdiction.
2007 6 SCC 186
Page 16
25. Therefore, the right of way objection, though based on an important
brochure requirement, cannot be adjudicated as a clean legal issue on
undisputed facts. It turns on disputed factual premises and documents
that require fuller evidentiary examination.
V. CONCLUSION:
26. For the reasons recorded, this Court finds no ground to interfere with
the impugned decision rejecting the petitioner's complaint.
27. The Writ Petition is, accordingly, dismissed.
28. Interim order, if any, passed earlier stands vacated.
(Dr. Sanjeeb K Panigrahi)
Judge
Orissa High Court, Cuttack,
Dated 17th April, 2026/
Page 17
