[Cites 8, Cited by 0]
Orissa High Court
Jitendra Kumar Ransingh vs State Of Odisha And Anr. .... Opposite ... on 17 April, 2026
Author: Sanjeeb K Panigrahi
Bench: Sanjeeb K Panigrahi
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR
Reason: Authentication
Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT,
CUTTACK
Date: 22-Apr-2026 16:18:49
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
CRLMC No. 2457 of 2025
(In the matter of an application under Section 528 of B.N.S.S., 2023
read with Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.)
Jitendra Kumar Ransingh .... Petitioner(s)
-versus-
State of Odisha and Anr. .... Opposite Party (s)
Advocates appeared in the case through Hybrid Mode:
For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Devasish Panda, Advocate
For Opposite Party (s) : Mr. Tej Kumar, ASC
Mr. Somanath Padhan, Adv.
Mr. Amitav Tripathy, Adv.
(for O.P.2)
CORAM:
DR. JUSTICE SANJEEB K PANIGRAHI
DATE OF HEARING:-09.04.2026
DATE OF JUDGMENT:-17.04.2026
Dr. Sanjeeb K Panigrahi, J.
1. In this petition, the petitioner seeks a direction to set aside the order
dated 27.06.2022 passed in S.T. Case No.138 of 2012, whereby the
learned trial court, in exercise of power under Section 319 CrPC,
arraigned the petitioner as an additional accused and directed fresh
trial proceedings.
I. FACTUAL MATRIX OF THE CASE:
2. The brief facts of the case are as follows:
Page 1
(i) The case arises out of Fategarh P.S. Case No. 71 dated 13.06.2012,
registered on the basis of the report lodged by Rajendra Khirabdhi
Tanaya Kanta regarding the murder of his father, Gurubari Kanhar,
and the injuries caused to one Rama Swain. In the FIR, it was alleged
that while the deceased and Rama Swain were returning on
motorcycles after attending a proceeding under Section 107 CrPC at
Bhapur Tahasil Office, they were attacked by a group of named
persons.
(ii) The FIR named several persons, including Gayadhar Parida,
Jyotiranjan Panda and Dasarathi Das, and alleged that the occurrence
was the result of prior conspiracy. The prosecution version was that
the deceased had raised objections to corruption in Bhapur Block and
had also opposed Gayadhar Parida's candidature for the post of
Chairman of Bhapur Block.
(iii) Upon completion of investigation, the police submitted charge sheet
against only nine accused persons and did not send up Gayadhar
Parida, Jyotiranjan Panda and certain others for trial. The case was
thereafter committed to the Court of Sessions, where charges were
framed against the charge-sheeted accused and trial proceeded.
(iv) The record further discloses that, in the course of trial, the prosecution
examined as many as thirty-five witnesses in support of its case. After
the closure of the prosecution evidence, and at a stage immediately
preceding the examination of the accused under Section 313 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, an application dated 21.04.2022
was filed invoking the jurisdiction of the learned trial court under
Page 2
Section 319 CrPC. By way of the said application, it was prayed that
Gayadhar Parida, Jyotiranjan Panda and Dasarathi Das be summoned
and arrayed as additional accused persons, on the premise that
evidence had surfaced during trial indicating their involvement in the
alleged occurrence. The application under Section 319 CrPC was
moved on the basis of the evidence that had surfaced during trial,
particularly the depositions of PW-7, PW-8, PW-11, PW-18 and PW-25,
which allegedly disclosed prior meetings, threats, conspiracy, and the
presence and participation of the proposed accused in the events
leading to the murder.
(v) By order dated 27.06.2022 passed in S.T. Case No. 138 of 2012, the
learned Additional Sessions Judge, Nayagarh, allowed the application
preferred under Section 319 CrPC and consequently directed that
Gayadhar Parida, Jyotiranjan Panda and Dasarathi Das be impleaded
as additional accused persons and summoned to face trial. The
learned court further ordered that, in conformity with the mandate of
Section 319(4) CrPC, a de novo trial be conducted qua the newly
arraigned accused.
II. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER:
3. The Learned Counsel for the Petitioner earnestly made the following
submissions in support of his contentions:
(i) The petitioner's case is that Gayadhar Parida was specifically
named in the FIR as one of the principal conspirators behind the
murder of Gurubari Kanhar, but despite serious allegations and
Page 3
material collected during investigation, he was deliberately left
out of the charge sheet owing to his political influence and clout.
(ii) It is contended that the deceased had been vocal against
corruption in Bhapur Block, especially in relation to NREGS and
flood relief matters, and had also opposed Gayadhar Parida in
the local political sphere. According to the petitioner, this
provided the motive for the conspiracy.
(iii) The petitioner contends that, during the course of trial, cogent
and consistent evidence emerged through the testimonies of
several prosecution witnesses indicating that Gayadhar Parida
was actively involved in the pre-occurrence conspiracy. It is
asserted that such evidence discloses his participation in prior
meetings where the alleged plan was hatched, his role in issuing
threats to the deceased and his continued association with the
other accused persons on and prior to the date of occurrence,
thereby prima facie pointing to his complicity in the alleged
offence.
(iv) To buttress the argument the Petitioner has relied in the
Supreme Court Judgment in Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab1,
the Constitution Bench held that the power is extraordinary and
discretionary, to be exercised sparingly, and only where strong
and cogent evidence emerges from the evidence led before the
Court. The degree of satisfaction is higher than the on applied at
the stage of framing charge, though short of a conclusive finding
(2014) 3 SCC 92
Page 4
of guilt the Court also made it clear that the trial court need not
wait for cross examination if the examination in itself yields the
requisite level of satisfaction.
(v) Moreover, in Sukhpal Singh Khaira v. State of Punjab2, the
Constitution Bench reaffirmed the stage and procedure for
exercise of such power and made it clear that once the power is
exercised, the law itself contemplates a fresh commencement of
proceedings against the newly summoned accused.
(vi) The petitioner places particular reliance on the depositions of
PW-7, PW-11, PW-18 and PW-25 to contend that the role
attributed to Gayadhar Parida is neither vague nor merely
inferential, but specific, direct and supported by consistent
ocular testimony. It is further submitted that these witnesses
collectively disclose a coherent pattern of conduct comprising
prior meeting of mind, active instigation, issuance of threats,
and concerted action in furtherance of the alleged occurrence,
thereby demonstrates a strong prima facie basis for invoking the
power under Section 319 CrPC. It is the petitioner's stand that
the application under Section 319 CrPC was therefore justified,
since the evidence recorded during trial was sufficient to
summon Gayadhar Parida and others for being tried together
with the already arraigned accused. The petitioner maintains
that the learned trial court rightly exercised its jurisdiction
under Section 319 CrPC by passing the order dated 27.06.2022.
(2023) 1 SCC 289
Page 5
(vii) In the broader challenge now raised by the petitioner is that
although Gayadhar Parida was later summoned under Section
319 CrPC on the basis of strong trial evidence and despite the
summoning order being upheld up to the Supreme Court, he
was granted bail on 24.05.2023 in a mechanical manner on the
same day of surrender, without proper consideration of the
gravity of the offence, the evidentiary material against him, or
the distinct footing on which an accused summoned under
Section 319 CrPC stands.
III. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE OPPOSITE PARTIES:
4. Per contra, the learned counsel for the Opposite Parties earnestly made
the submission that the present CRLMC is not maintainable before
this Court and deserves to be rejected in limine.
(i) The Opposite Party was enlarged on bail pursuant to the liberty
granted by this Court. The learned Trial Court, while allowing
the bail application, duly considered the attendant
circumstances, including the fact that all the co-accused had
already been granted bail, and accordingly exercised its judicial
discretion in a fair, judicious, and reasoned manner.
(ii) He further submitted that there is neither any perversity nor any
unwarranted consideration, nor any non-consideration of
material facts, so as to warrant inference with the just and
proper exercise of judicial discretion by the learned Trial Court.
It is further to submit that the order dated 17.05.2023 passed by
Page 6
this Court has remained unchallenged, thereby lending further
sanctity and finality to the impugned order.
(iii) The Opp. Party placed reliance in the Supreme Court judgment
in Narendra K. Amin v. State of Gujarat3, and the same was
reiterated in Himanshu Shrama v. Sate of Madhya Pradesh4,
wherein it was held that:
"18. As it is evident from the rival stands one thing
is clear that the parameters for grant of bail and
cancellation of bail are different. There is no dispute to
this position. But the question is if the Trial Court
while acting bail acts on irrelevant materials or takes
into account irrelevant materials whether bail can be
cancelled. Though it was urged by learned counsel for
the appellant that aspects to be dealt with while
considering the application for cancellation of bail and
on appeal against the grant of bail, it was fairly
accepted that there is no scope of filing an appeal
against the order of grant of bail. Under the scheme of
the Code the application for cancellation of bail can be
filed before the Court granting the bail of t is a Court
of Sessions, or the High Court".
(iv) It is further submitted that all the co-accused, against whom
specific allegations of having committed the actual assault have
been made, have already been enlarged on bail either by this
Court or pursuant to directions to surrender and seek regular
bail before the learned Trial Court.
(v) The orders granting such bail have not been challenged before
any higher forum and have thus attained finality. In such
2008 (13) SCC 584
2024 (4) SCC 222
Page 7
circumstances, the principle of parity squarely governs the
present case. The Opp. Party further contends that the bail
orders passed in favour of the other co-accused, who were
summoned as accused under Section 319 of Cr.P.C. along with
the present petitioner, were also not challenged before the
higher forum. This clearly indicates a selective approach on the
part of the prosecution, suggesting that the present Opp. Party
has been singled out and subjected to proceedings with mala-
fide and politically motivated intent.
(vi) He further contends that the order granting bail was passed by
the learned Sessions Court on 24.05.2023, whereas the present
challenge has been instituted only in April, 2025 which is after
an inordinate and unexplained delay of nearly two years, with
almost three years having been elapsed till date. Such belated
invocation of jurisdiction, in the absence of any cogent
justification, disentitles the Petitioner from seeking interference
with a well-reasoned order that has, over time, attained a degree
of finality.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT:
5. The Learned Trial Court made the following observations:
(i) The learned trial court approached the issue on the settled
premise that the power under Section 319 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure is an extraordinary and discretionary
jurisdiction, to be exercised sparingly and with circumspection.
At the same time, it recognised that such power may be invoked
Page 8
where the evidence adduced during trial, if left unrebutted,
discloses the involvement of a person not already arrayed as an
accused.
(ii) The impugned order demonstrates a conscious application of
mind to the statutory framework under Section 319 CrPC and
stands reinforced by reliance on authoritative pronouncements
of the Hon'ble Supreme Court as well as this Court, which
delineate the scope, limitations, and preconditions for the
exercise of such power.
(iii) The learned Court, upon a meticulous scrutiny of the
testimonies of the principal prosecution witnesses, recorded a
categorical finding that the names of Gayadhar Parida,
Jyotiranjan Panda and Dasarathi Das not only find place in the
First Information Report but also emerge consistently and with
specificity in both the examination-in-chief and cross-
examination of the material witnesses. It has further been
observed that such witnesses have attributed to the said persons
definite and distinct roles, including their participation in prior
meetings, issuance of threats to the deceased, involvement in
pre-occurrence planning, and their presence in the vicinity of the
scene of occurrence on the relevant date. These circumstances,
taken cumulatively, prima facie disclose their involvement so as
to justify their arraignment under Section 319 Crocethia
(iv) learned trial court appears to have assessed the matter on the
cumulative strength of the evidence tendered by PW-7, PW-8,
Page 9
PW-11, PW-18 and PW-25, and found the same to be sufficient
for the limited purpose of invoking jurisdiction under Section
319 CrPC. Significantly, the court did not rest its satisfaction on
mere suspicion or on materials gathered during investigation in
isolation, but rather, it reached to its conclusion on the basis of
substantive evidence that had surfaced before the court in the
course of trial, thereby adhering to the settled legal requirement
that the power under Section 319 CrPC must be based on
evidence adduced in court. The order also addressed the
objection that the proposed accused had not been charge-
sheeted by the police. In doing so, the court relied on the settled
principle that a person named in the FIR but omitted from the
charge sheet can nonetheless be summoned under Section 319
CrPC if evidence recorded during trial reveals involvement in
the offence.
(v) The learned court further took note of the stage of the
proceeding and acknowledged that the prosecution evidence
had already been closed. Even so, it held that this did not bar the
exercise of power under Section 319, since the statute itself
contemplates that once such power is exercised, proceedings
against the newly added accused must commence afresh and
the witnesses must be reheard.
(vi) The reasoning of the order shows that the trial court was
conscious both of the seriousness of invoking Section 319 CrPC
and of the consequence that a fresh trial would follow against
Page 10
the newly added accused. On that basis, it allowed the
application and directed splitting up of the record, issuance of
summons, filing of witness lists and simultaneous disposal of
both matters.
V. JUDGMENT AND ANALYSIS:
6. Heard Learned Counsel for the parties and perused the documents
placed before this Court.
7. The present proceeding is directed against the order dated 24.05.2023
by which opposite party no. 2, who had earlier been summoned to
face trial under Section 319 of the CrPC in S.T. Case No. 138 of 2012A,
was enlarged on bail. The order dated 27.06.2022 summoning him
under Section 319 is not the immediate subject matter of challenge in
this proceeding. Even so, the strength and character of the material on
the basis of which he came to be arrayed as an accused furnish the
necessary backdrop for examining the legality of the subsequent order
granting bail.
8. In a proceeding of this nature, the High Court does not sit as a regular
court of appeal over every order granting bail. At the same time, a bail
order can be interdicted where it is unjustified, perverse, arbitrary, or
founded on non-application of mind to material considerations. The
distinction between cancellation of bail on account of later conduct
and setting aside an order of bail which is itself legally infirm has long
been settled by the Supreme Court in the case of Neeru Yadav v. State
Page 11
of Uttar Pradesh5. The relevant excerpts of the judgment are
produced below:
"..It is well settled in law that cancellation of bail after it
is granted because the accused has misconducted himself
or of some supervening circumstances warranting such
cancellation have occurred is in a different compartment
altogether than an order granting bail which is
unjustified, illegal and perverse. If in a case, the relevant
factors which should have been taken into consideration
while dealing with the application for bail and have not
been taken note of bail or it is founded on irrelevant
considerations, indisputably the superior court can set
aside the order of such a grant of bail. Such a case belongs
to a different category and is in a separate realm. While
dealing with a case of second nature, the Court does not
dwell upon the violation of conditions by the accused or
the supervening circumstances that have happened
subsequently. It, on the contrary, delves into the
justifiability and the soundness of the order passed by the
Court."
9. The abovementioned precedent makes it clear that even a brief order
granting bail in a grave offence must disclose intelligible reasons. In
the present case, the Petitioner does not merely assail the cancellation
of bail simplicter, but also calls in question the legality, propriety, and
regularity of the impugned order. However, the principal issue which
arises for consideration is that the Petitioner has approached this
Court after an inordinate delay of almost two years, and as on date,
nearly three years have lapsed since the passing of the impugned
order. Such prolonged and unexplained delay in invoking the
jurisdiction of the Court is certainly a relevant circumstance, which
2001 6 SCC 338
Page 12
reflects upon the conduct of the Petitioner and raises serious doubt as
to the bona fides and diligence in prosecuting the present challenge.
10. The Supreme Court in Md. Imran @ D.C. Guddu v. State of
Jharkhand,6, wherein it has been held that:
"14. When a person is added as an accused under Section
319 Cr.P.C. and that person is ultimately arrested and
prays for bail, the relevant consideration at the end of the
court while conserving his plea for bail should be the
strong and cogent evidence than mere probability of his
complicity. The test that has to be applied is one which is
more than prima facie case as exercised at the time of
framing of charges, but short of satisfaction to an extent
that the evidence, if goes unrebutted would lead to
conviction. The Court weigh factors like the nature of the
offence, the quality of the evidence against the new accused
and the likelihood of the person absconding or tampering
with the evidence. In other words, the Court must be
satisfied that there is strong and cogent evidence of the
person's complicity at the threshold i.e. much higher that
that required for framing charges against the original
accused.
15. the other two co-accused namely MD Samsher and
MD Arshad respectively are already on anticipatory bail
since 02.07.2025. we are informed that they have been
appearing before the trial court on all dates.
16. Since the matter is at large before the trial court, we
need observe anything further.
17. It is ordered that MD Imran @ D.C. Guddu shall be
released on bail subject to terms and conditions that the
trial court may deem fit on impose.
18. so far as the other two accused are concerned, they are
already on anticipatory bail. No case is made out by the
State for cancellation of anticipatory bail.
2026 SCC Online 31
Page 13
19. in the result, the appeal filed by MD Imran @ D.C.
Guddu stands allowed and the appeal filed. By the State of
Jharkhand stands dismissed."
11. In this case, the Opp. Party No.2 was enlarged on bail pursuant to the
liberty granted by this Court. The learned Trial Court, while
exercising its judicial discretion, duly considered the surrounding
circumstances, including the fact that all the co-accused persons, who
were originally arraigned in the same crime, had already been
released on bail. Taking into account the parity of consideration and
the attending facts and circumstances of the case, the learned Trial
Court was pleased to extend the benefit of bail in favour of the present
Opp. Party.
12. Thus, this Court finds that there is no perversity or unwarranted
consideration, nor any omission of material facts, so as to warrant
interference with the just and proper exercise of discretion by the
learned Trial Court. This court is of the considered view that the
impugned order does not suffer from any illegality or infirmity
warranting interference in exercise of its supervisory or appellate
jurisdiction.
13. The materials collected during the course of investigation, when taken
at their face value, disclose a prima facie case warranting adjudication
of trial. The allegations levelled against the Petitioner cannot be said
to be so inherently improbable, absurd, or devoid of substance so as to
justify interference by this Court in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction
under Section 482 Cr.P.C./ Section 528 BNSS.
Page 14
VI. CONCLUSION:
14. In view of the foregoing analysis, and upon a careful appraisal of the
material facts and attendant circumstances, this Court is of the
considered opinion that the allegations, even if accepted at their face
value, do not disclose any ground warranting cancellation of bail. The
contentions advanced by the Petitioner essentially traverse into the
realm of defence, which cannot be examined in the limited jurisdiction
exercised under Section 482 of the CrPC / Section 528 of the BNSS.
15. Accordingly, the present petition is dismissed and this Court does not
find any ground to interfere with the criminal proceedings in exercise
of its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C/ Section 528 of
BNSS.
16. Interim order, if any, passed earlier stands vacated.
(Dr. Sanjeeb K Panigrahi)
Judge
Orissa High Court, Cuttack,
Dated 17th April, 2026/
Page 15
