Santibala Mishra vs State Of Orissa
2026 Latest Caselaw 3504 Ori

Orissa High Court

Santibala Mishra vs State Of Orissa on 16 April, 2026

      IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK

                          CRA No.59 of 2000

(In the matter of an application under Section 374 (2) of the Criminal
Procedure Code, 1973)

Santibala Mishra                      .......            Appellant
                                  -Versus-
State of Orissa                   .......               Respondent

For the Appellant : Mrs. Shuvra Mohapatra, Advocate

For the Respondent : Mr. M.S. Rizvi, Additional Standing Counsel for Vigilance Department

CORAM:

THE HONOURABLE SHRI JUSTICE SIBO SANKAR MISHRA Date of Hearing: 09.04.2026 : Date of Judgment: 16.04.2026

S.S. Mishra, J. It is alleged that the appellant-Santilata Mishra while

working as I.C.D.S. Supervisor, Khurda had demanded and accepted

bribe of Rs.250/- from P.W.1, who was working under her as

Anganwadi worker. A trap was laid down and the appellant was

apprehended while accepting the alleged bribe.

2. The prosecution filed the charge sheet making such allegation.

Therefore, the learned trial Court by relying upon the prosecution

case, framed the charge against the appellant for alleged commission of the offence under Section 7 and 13(2) of the Prevention of

Corruption Act, 1988 read with Section 13(1) (d) of the said Act for

having obtained pecuniary advantage by accepting bribe of Rs.250/-.

3. The learned Special Judge, Vigilance, Bhubaneswar vide his

judgment dated 03.03.2000 found the appellant guilty of the offences

as mentioned above and sentenced her to undergo R.I. for six months

under Section 7 and R.I. for one year for the offence under Section 13

(2) of the P.C. Act, 1988 besides imposing fine of Rs.500/- and

default sentence of one month R.I. in T.R. Case No.17 of 1997.

4. Heard Mrs. Shuvra Mohapatra, learned counsel appearing for

the appellant and Mr. M.S. Rizvi, learned Additional Standing

Counsel appearing for the Vigilance Department.

5. The prosecution case is that the accused was working as

Supervisor, I.C.D.S., Khurda and the complainant Smt. Namita

Mangaraj was working under her as an Anganwadi worker. It was the

duty of the complainant to distribute nutritious food to the pregnant

women and children and the accused was to supervise her work to

ensure proper distribution. Prior to detection of the case, the accused

visited the complainant's house several times and demanded bribe on

monthly basis. On 25.08.1993, the complainant received a

consignment of C.S.P. powder and soyabin oil from the C.D.P.O.,

Khurda. On 30.08.1993, the accused visited her house and demanded

gratification of Rs.250/-. When the complainant expressed her

inability to meet the demand, the accused threatened her with adverse

remarks against her. Finding no other way, the complainant

approached the Superintendent of Police, Vigilance and submitted a

written report before him. As advised by the S.P., Vigilance, the

complainant met the Inspector, Vigilance, Khurda, the next morning.

It was decided to lay a trap to detect the offence. Accordingly, the

complainant with her husband produced five 50 rupees currency notes

in the Vigilance Office in presence of the over-hearing witnesses, a

lady Magistrate, some lady constables and the Vigilance Officers

including the I.O. Phenolphthalein powder was smeared on the

currency notes and a demonstration of the chemical reaction of

phenolphthalein powder with sodium carbonate solution was made to

the over-hearing witness, the lady Magistrate and other members of

the trap party including the complainant (decoy). The coloured

solution of sodium carbonate after the chemical reaction was

preserved in a dry bottle. Preparation report was typed out in the

Vigilance Office and the numbers of the tainted currency notes were

noted therein.

6. The prosecution, in order to establish its case, examined 8

witnesses in support of its case. P.W.1 was the complainant herself.

P.W.2 was the lady Magistrate, who was said to have seen the

recovery of the tainted currency notes from the accused. P.W.3 was

the over-hearing witness. P.W.4 was the Collector, Khurda, who

accorded sanction of prosecution against the accused. P.W.5 was the

lady Vigilance Constable, who took part in the raid. P.Ws. 6 to 8 were

the Officers of the Vigilance Department, who took part in the said

raid. P.Ws.7 and 8 were the Investigating Officers in the present case.

7. With the help of learned counsels appearing for the appellant

and the respondent, I have gone through the entire evidence

meticulously. P.W.1, in her evidence has deposed that she was

working under the appellant as an Anganwadi worker. The appellant

visited her house in the month of January, 1993 and demanded bribe

of Rs.100/- per month, but she expressed her inability to pay the

same. The appellant allegedly threatened her to write adverse report

against her and threatened to damage her career. Again, in the month

of May, 1993, the appellant visited her house and demanded illegal

gratification. She paid Rs.200/- apprehending that she may be put to

trouble. She further deposed that the appellant visited her house on

12.07.1993 and started demanding Rs.250/-, which she paid. Again on

30.08.1993, the accused visited her house to make a demand of

Rs.250/- to be paid by 02.09.1993. She declined to pay the same at

the cost of being threatened. Disturbed by the said repeated demand,

on 01.09.1993, she along with her husband went to the Office of the

Superintendent of Police, Vigilance, Cuttack and reported the entire

matter. Her written report was exhibited as Ext.1. At the Office of the

Superintendent of Police, Vigilance, Cuttack, she disclosed that the

accused demanded illegal gratification of Rs.250/-. She narrated as to

how the pre-raid preparation was made in the Office of the S.P.,

Vigilance. On the date of raid, how the raid was conducted she has

described in her evidence, which reads thus:

"10. It was a meeting day for Anganwadi workers. I went to the meeting hall and attended the meeting. At about 1 P.M. the accused called me to her office room. In the office room she asked me as to whether I had brought the money as demanded by her. She asked me to deliver the amount to her. I brought out the tainted money from my hand-bag and handed over to the accused. She kept the tainted money inside her blouse. Soon thereafter the Vigilance Dy. S.P. and his team raided the office room of the accused.

11. The Lady Constables caught hold the hands of the accused. The Lady Magistrate accompanying the raiding party asked the accused to produce the tainted money received. The

accused denied to have received any such amount but subsequently produced the tainted money from her blouse and handed over to the Dy. S.P."

She further deposed that the Lady Magistrate verified the

numbers in the currency notes recovered from the appellant with the

numbers of the tainted currency notes and matched them and recorded

in the preparation report. This witness was extensively cross-

examined by the defence, but nothing substantial could be elucidated

to dent her version.

8. Mrs. Mohapatra, learned counsel for the appellant submitted

that except for the oral testimony of P.W.1, no other evidence has

been brought on record by the prosecution to prove the demand. It is

true that the prosecution has not been able to bring anything on record

to establish the "Demand of bribe" made by the appellant except the

solitary evidence of P.W.1-the decoy. At the same time, the over-

hearing witness P.W.3 in paragraph-11 of his testimony has stated as

under:

"By the time I had taken position at the verandah of the office room. On their way to the office the accused was telling something regarding money to the P.W.1 which I could not clearly hear."

On the face of the evidence as discussed above regarding the

demand of gratification, the plea taken by the appellant to justify the

acceptance of tainted currency of Rs.250/- assumes importance.

9. In the present case, the defence has not challenged the evidence

regarding the acceptance of the bribe money except taking a stand in

the statement recorded under Section 313 of the Cr. P.C. that the

decoy P.W.1 had taken loan of Rs.450/- and she had returned part

payment of Rs.250/- on that day. The appellant has apparently taken

the defence that she had accepted the tainted amount from P.W.1

thinking that P.W.1 was returning the loan amount she had taken from

her. However, a contradiction visibly creates doubt in the defence

plea taken by the appellant. The appellant in her statement recorded

under Section 313 of the Cr. P.C. has taken a stand that P.W.1 had

taken loan of Rs.450/- from her. She had returned Rs.250/- (the

tainted money) towards the partial discharge of her liability. At the

same time, the appellant stated that the remaining amount of Rs.150/-

has not yet been paid by the appellant. On her demand for return of

the same, P.W.1 has falsely implicated her. The same stand taken by

her was sought to be established through the evidence of D.W.2, who

has deposed as under:-

"The complainant gave some currency notes to the accused saying that she would pay the balance amount of Rs.150/- subsequently. The complainant paid the amount towards repayment of loan she had taken from the accused."

This witness (D.W.2) has also deposed that the complainant

P.W.1 had taken Rs.450/- loan from the appellant. However, he

deposed that he had not personally seen the appellant giving loan to

the complainant. If Rs.450/- was given on loan to the complainant and

out of which Rs.250/- is paid back, the remaining amount should have

been Rs.200/-. However, both in the statement of the appellant-

accused recorded under Section 313 of the Cr. P.C. and the evidence

of D.W.2, it is stated that the balance remaining amount to be paid by

the complainant to the appellant was Rs.150/-. That really creates a

serious doubt regarding the defence version.

10. The learned trial Court has disbelieved the defence version

because of the apparent contradictions in the evidence and stand taken

by the accused. In paragraph-8 of the impugned judgment, the learned

trial Court deals with the defence plea, inter alia, returning the

following finding:

"8. The defence has explained that the complainant had taken loan of Rs.400/- from the accused and on the alleged date of detection, she only refunded a sum of Rs.250/- out of the said amount. D.Ws. 2 and 3 supported this plea of the defence. D.W.2 is a colleague of the accused. She stated that

on 2.9.93 around 1.00 P.M. the accused came to her office room closely followed by the complainant. D.W.2 claimed that in her presence, the complainant gave some currency notes to the accused saying that she would pay the balance amount of Rs.150/- subsequently. D.W.3 stated that the complainant on 2.9.93 requested her for a loan of Rs.150/-, so that she would repay her entire earlier loan amount of Rs.400/- to the accused. The evidence of D.Ws.2 and 3 taken together if considered along with the F.I.R. renders the defence plea improbable. The F.I.R. was lodged on 1.9.93. In the F.I.R. the complainant clearly claimed that she was going to give Rs.250/- to the accused on 2.9.93, as gratification. There was, therefore, no necessity for the complainant to request D.W.3 for a loan of Rs.150/-. Since it was earlier planned to pay Rs.250/- to the accused, the complainant was not required to pay Rs.400/- to the accused. The F.I.R. was filed earlier to the detection and therefore, cannot be discarded as an afterthought. In this view of the matter, the evidence of D.Ws.2 and 3 does not inspire confidence."

11. A careful analysis of the evidence of all the witnesses makes it

abundantly clear that the appellant although admitted to have received

the tainted amount, but could not satisfactorily explain the reason for

such acceptance. Therefore, the submission made by Mr. Rizvi,

learned Counsel for the Vigilance Department that even if the demand

is not established on record once the accused accepted the tainted

amount and failed to explain the reasons for such acceptance, the

presumption under Section 20 operates against the accused.

Therefore, the accused cannot escape from the liability of the offence

for which she has been charged.

12. Mrs. Mohapatra, learned counsel for the appellant further raised

a crucial point regarding the sanction. She submitted that in the year

1993, at the relevant time, when the alleged raid had taken place, the

Collector had refused to grant sanction. Therefore, the prosecution

tactfully waited for about three years and after the change of the

guard, they applied for the fresh sanction. In the year 1996, P.W.4

granted the sanction in favour of the prosecution to prosecute the

appellant. She has relied upon two judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme

Court in the case of State of Punjab and another vs. Mohammed

Iqbal Bhatti, reported in (2009) 17 SCC 92 and Gopikant Choudhary

vs. State of Bihar and others, reported in (2009) 9 SCC 53. Relying

upon the said judgments, she has submitted that once the sanction is

rejected by a competent authority, the same power stands exhausted

and cannot be exercised by the subsequent competent officer. Because

once the sanction is refused to be granted, no appeal lies against them.

The view of the Punjab and Haryana High Court has been upheld by

the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the judgment of Mohammed Iqbal

Bhatti (supra). The High Court gave the following finding regarding

sanction, which finds a mention in Paragraph-9 of the judgment,

which reads thus:

"9. In the aforementioned situation, the High Court, opined:

"Once the Government passes the order under Section 19 of the Act or under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, declining the sanction to prosecute the official concerned, reviewing such an order on the basis of the same material, which already stood considered, would not be appropriate or permissible. The Government is expected to act consciously and cautiously while taking such serious decisions. The perusal of the record shows that pointed queries had been raised to be answered by the Vigilance Bureau but no answer was forthcoming nor any had been submitted subsequently which culminated into passing of the later order dated 30-9-2004. We refrain ourselves from mentioning the queries which had been raised but it would suffice to say that the queries were never answered at the relevant time when the order dated 15-12-2003 had been passed nor was the same ever commented upon as no answers were placed before the competent authority for passing the impugned order dated 30-9-2004."

13. To counter the aforementioned submission made by Mrs.

Mohapatra, learned counsel, Mr. Rizvi, learned counsel for the

Vigilance Department relied upon sub-section (3) of Section-19 of the

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, which reads as under:

"(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974)7,--

(a) no finding, sentence or order passed by a Special Judge shall be reversed or altered by a Court in appeal, confirmation or revision on the

ground of the absence of, or any error, omission or irregularity in, the sanction required under sub-

section (1), unless in the opinion of that court, a failure of justice has in fact been occasioned thereby;

(b) no court shall stay the proceedings under this Act on the ground of any error, omission or irregularity in the sanction granted by the authority, unless it is satisfied that such error, omission or irregularity has resulted in a failure of justice;

(c) no court shall stay the proceedings under this Act on any other ground and no court shall exercise the powers of revision in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any inquiry, trial, appeal or other proceedings."

14. Mr. Rizvi, learned counsel for the Vigilance Department,

submitted that even if there is defective sanction, the conviction or

sentence recorded by the learned trial Court cannot be altered on the

basis of error, omission or irregularity of the grant of sanction.

15. Mrs. Mohapatra, learned counsel submitted that, if failure of

justice is caused either for error, omission or irregularity in the grant

of sanction, the Court can definitely give indulgence and alter the

conviction. She has vehemently argued that in the present case, a

failure of justice has occurred particularly because of the reason that

the prosecution has miserably failed to prove on record regarding the

"demand of bribe" besides the fact that the earlier Collector having

carefully gone through the record, found the case to be false and

declined to grant of sanction. This aspect of the matter has also been

dealt with by the learned trial Court in paragraphs- 11 and 12 of the

impugned judgment. For convenience of ready reference, paragraphs-

11 and 12 of the impugned judgment read thus:

"11. The defence called for the confidential file regarding sanction of prosecution from the office of the Collector, Khurda to show that the Collector was initially hesitant to accord sanction and had moved the Government for reinstatement of the accused in service. In this connection, the letter addressed by the Collector, Khurda to the Additional Secretary to Government of Odissa, Women & Child Welfare Department (Ext.A) was relied on by the defence. The learned counsel for the defence argued that once the Collector refused to accord sanction, it was not within the competence of the subsequent Collector to accord sanction. There is no such law to restrict the power of successor Collector. The Collector, Khurda, who sanctioned the prosecution in this case, was examined as P.W.4. He stated that he perused the investigation report and all relevant papers in connection with this case for sanction of prosecution. P.W.4 categorically stated that he had applied his judicial mind to the papers and files placed before him before sanctioning prosecution. He stoutly denied the suggestion that he mechanically sanctioned the prosecution without application of mind. On the other hand, there is nothing on record to show as to what documents were perused by the earlier Collector. The sanction order (Ext.14) passed by P.W.4 is no way defective. No cross-examination was made to P.W.4 to show that he did not apply his mind or that he sanctioned the prosecution on extraneous consideration. The learned counsel for the defence relied on a decision of Bombay High Court in the case of Dhirajlal Chaturbhuj Ratnagrahi vrs. State of Maharastra reported in 1993 Crl. Law Journal 666, wherein His Lordship held that where the subsequent sanction order is found to be defective, the prosecution case cannot stand. I have already held that the subsequent sanction order in this case (Ext.14) is not defective. Therefore, this decision is of no help to the defence. The other decision relied on by the defence, in the case of D. Venkat Swamy vrs. State reported in 1997 Criminal Law

Journal 1287 is not also helpful to the defence. In the said case, the sanction order was passed mechanically without application of mind. But in the instant case, there was proper application of mind and the sanction order is not defective. For the self same reason the decision in the case of B. Kameswar Rao vrs. State of Orissa reported in 1989 Criminal Law Journal 224 also provides no protection to the defence.

12. In the case of Superintendent of Police, C.B.I. vrs. Dipak Chaudhury reported in 1996 Crl. Law Journal 405, their Lordships of the Apex Court held that sanction of prosecution is an administrative function and the accused need not be given an opportunity of being heard before according sanction. The same view was also expressed by the Apex Court in the case of State Anti Corruption Bureau, Hyderabad & another vrs. P. Surya Prakasan reported in (1999) 17 O.C.R. (S.C.) 200. In the case of Jagjit Singh vrs. State of Punjab reported in 1996 Crl. Law Journal 2962, their Lordships of Punjab & Haryana High Court held that the Authority to sanction prosecution has no jurisdiction to hold a parallel investigation to judge the truth of the allegations made against the accused. But in the instant case, the competent Authority on the earlier occasion refused sanction on the ground that the evidence collected was not sufficient to establish the charge against the accused. It also appears from the evidence of D.W.3 that the earlier Authority refusing sanction came to the office of the accused and made an enquiry by taking the statements of the witnesses, which he is not authorized to do. It is thus seen that the previous Collector exceeded his jurisdiction in refusing sanction and taking into consideration extraneous matters, such as, sufficiency of evidence. The subsequent sanction order was, therefore, valid and cannot be questioned."

16. The findings recorded by the learned trial Court on the analysis

of the evidence brought on record by the prosecution and by

appreciating the defence plea in right prospective cannot be faulted

with, rather the same is justified. The prosecution could successfully

bring on record enough evidence to prove prior demand of illegal

gratification by appellant through the evidence of P.Ws.2, 3, 4 and 5.

Similarly, the prosecution witnesses have in unequivocal terms

deposed before the Court that they have witnessed the appellant

accepting the bribe money. The scientific evidence too established

this aspect. In the absence of plausible explanation by the defence by

discharging the statutory burden offering explanation the

circumstance of such acceptance, the presumption under Section 20 of

the Prevention of Corruption Act operates against the accused-

appellant. The appellant could not discharge the burden by proving

the presumption contrary that he accepted the illegal gratification for

a consideration.

17. In view of the foregoing discussions, the unimpeachable,

cogent and trustworthy evidence on record by the prosecution, I have

no other option rather to affirm the judgment of conviction and order

of sentence awarded by the learned trial Court.

18. Hence, the Criminal Appeal fails and stands dismissed.

(S.S. Mishra) Judge

Digitally Signed The High Court of Orissa, Cuttack. Signed by: SUBHASIS MOHANTY Dated the 16th Day of April, 2026/ Subhasis Mohanty Designation: Personal Assistant Reason: Authentication Location: High Court of Orissa, Cuttack.

Date: 21-Apr-2026 20:16:18