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Jitu Sahoo & Ors vs State Of Odisha & Anr. .... Opposite ...
2026 Latest Caselaw 3172 Ori

Citation : 2026 Latest Caselaw 3172 Ori
Judgement Date : 7 April, 2026

[Cites 7, Cited by 0]

Orissa High Court

Jitu Sahoo & Ors vs State Of Odisha & Anr. .... Opposite ... on 7 April, 2026

Author: Sanjeeb K Panigrahi
Bench: Sanjeeb K Panigrahi
                                            IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK

                                                         CRLMC No.802 of 2026

                                    Jitu Sahoo & Ors.                ....                     Petitioner(s)

                                                                      Mr. Ramesh Chandra Behera, Adv.
                                                                  -versus-
                                    State of Odisha & Anr.           ....           Opposite Party(s)

                                                                                Ms. Gayatri Patra, ASC
                                                             Mr. Dilip Kumar Misra, Adv. (for O.P. No.2)

                                              CORAM:
                                              HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE SANJEEB K PANIGRAHI

                                                                  ORDER

Order No. 07.04.2026

04.

1. This matter is taken up through hybrid arrangement.

2. Heard learned counsel for the parties.

3. By filing the present CRLMC, the Petitioners have prayed for

quashing the entire criminal proceedings initiated against them vide

Parjanga P.S. Case No.224 of 2019, corresponding to G.R. Case No.212

of 2019, pending before the learned J.M.F.C., Parjang.

4. Learned counsel for the respective parties submit that, in the

interregnum, the dispute between the parties has been amicably

Designation: Senior Stenographer

settled. In support thereof, a joint affidavit dated 23.03.2026 has been

filed, which is on record.

5. The relevant portion of the joint affidavit filed by both the parties

is extracted hereunder:

"xxx xxx xxx "3. That, in the meantime, the matter has been compromised between us and because Jitu Sahoo is my

own material aunt's son, Bharati Sahoo is my maternal aunt, Lokanath Sahoo is my maternal uncle and Reetanjali Biswal is my maternal sister and the case has be foisted due to misunderstanding between us and subsequently due to intervention of the well-wishers of both the parties, the matter has been settled outside the court for betterment of both the families.

4. That, in the meantime, myself (informant) has already been married and blessed with a female child, and living happy conjugal life with my husband and residing in my in laws house at Surapratappur, P.S. Bhuban, Dist. Dhenkanal.

5. That, as the matter has already been settled between us, I don't want to persuade the same as against Jitu Sahoo (Petitioner no.1), Bharati Sahoo (Petitioner no.2), Lokanath Sahoo (Petitioner no.3) & Reetanjali Biswal (Petitioner no.4).

6. That, in view of the compromise between ourselves, now we are living happily without any dissention between us and the ill-feeling and dissention due to the said criminal case, now the relationship became revived and both the families are in good terms.

7. That, under the above facts and circumstances, I (informant) don't want to prolong the litigation as against the petitioners. Hence, we have filed this joint affidavit for the purpose of withdrawal/drop the G.R. Case bearing no.212/2019 pending in the Court of JMFC, Parjang."

6. This Court has considered the joint affidavit filed by both parties

and is conscious of the settled legal position that the inherent

jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is distinct

from the power of compounding under Section 320 Cr.P.C., and may

be invoked to secure the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the

process of Court. At the same time, such power is not to be exercised

mechanically merely because the parties have arrived at a settlement;

the Court is required to examine the nature and gravity of the

allegations, the real genesis of the dispute, the stage of the

proceeding, and whether, in view of the stand now taken by the

victim, the possibility of conviction has become remote and

continuation of the prosecution would amount to futility or

oppression.

7. In the present case, Opposite Party No.2 has joined the Petitioners

in filing a sworn affidavit and has categorically stated that the matter

has been compromised between themselves and they are living

happily without any dissention between them and she does not wish

to proceed further with the criminal case. Thus, the Court is not

proceeding on the basis of a bare compromise alone, but on the

subsequent stand of the complainant herself, which substantially

erodes the factual substratum of the prosecution. Having regard to

the materials on record, the stage of the case, and the unequivocal

position taken by the complainant, this Court is satisfied that the

possibility of a successful conviction is remote and bleak and that

continuation of the impugned proceeding would serve no useful

purpose but would instead amount to abuse of the process of law.

8. In light of the aforesaid, and applying the same to the facts of the

present case, this Court is of the considered view that the continuance

of the impugned criminal proceeding would amount to an abuse of

the process of Court and would not subserve the ends of justice.

9. In fact, in the case of Shiji @ Pappu v. Radhika1, the Supreme

Court has held that even where an offence is non-compoundable,

quashing may still be justified if there is no realistic chance of

conviction and continuance is an empty formality. The Court held as

follows:

"It is manifest that simply because an offence is not compoundable under Section 320 IPC is by itself no reason for the High Court to refuse exercise of its power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. That power can in our opinion be exercised in cases where there is no chance of recording a conviction against the accused and the entire exercise of a trial is destined to be an exercise in futility. There is a subtle distinction between compounding of offences by the parties before the trial Court or in appeal on one hand and the exercise of power by the High Court to quash the prosecution under Section 482 Cr.P.C. on the other."

10. Similarly, in Narinder Singh & Ors. v. State of Punjab & Anr.2

where the Supreme Court held as follows:-

"31. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and lay down the following principles by which the High Court would be guided in giving adequate treatment to the settlement between the parties and exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code while accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to accept the settlement with direction to continue with the criminal proceedings:

(i) Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to be distinguished from the power which lies in the

AIR 2012 SUPREME COURT 499

Decided in Criminal Appeal No.686 of 2014 on 27.03.2014

Court to compound the offences under Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings even in those cases which are not compoundable, where the parties have settled the matter between themselves. However, this power is to be exercised sparingly and with caution.

(ii) When the parties have reached the settlement and on that basis petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in such cases would be to secure:

(i) ends of justice, or

(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court.

While exercising the power the High Court is to form an opinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives.

(iii) Such a power is not be exercised in those prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, for offences alleged to have been committed under special statute like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by Public Servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender.

(iv) On the other, those criminal cases having overwhelmingly and pre-dominantly civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes should be quashed when the parties have resolved their entire disputes among themselves.

(v) While exercising its powers, the High Court is to examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal cases would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal cases.

(vi) Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore is to be generally treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to proving the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of weapons used etc. Medical report in respect of injuries suffered by the victim can generally be the guiding factor. On the basis of this prima facie analysis, the High Court can examine as to whether there is a strong possibility of conviction or the chances of conviction are remote and bleak. In the former case it can refuse to accept the settlement and quash the criminal proceedings whereas in the later case it would be permissible for the High Court to accept the plea compounding the offence based on complete settlement between the parties. At this stage, the Court can also be swayed by the fact that the settlement between the

parties is going to result in harmony between them which may improve their future relationship.

(vii) While deciding whether to exercise its power under Section 482 of the Code or not, timings of settlement play a crucial role. Those cases where the settlement is arrived at immediately after the alleged commission of offence and the matter is still under investigation, the High Court may be liberal in accepting the settlement to quash the criminal proceedings/investigation. It is because of the reason that at this stage the investigation is still on and even the charge sheet has not been filed. Likewise, those cases where the charge is framed but the evidence is yet to start or the evidence is still at infancy stage, the High Court can show benevolence in exercising its powers favourably, but after prima facie assessment of the circumstances/material mentioned above. On the other hand, where the prosecution evidence is almost complete or after the conclusion of the evidence the matter is at the stage of argument, normally the High Court should refrain from exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code, as in such cases the trial court would be in a position to decide the case finally on merits and to come a conclusion as to whether the offence under Section 307 IPC is committed or not. Similarly, in those cases where the conviction is already recorded by the trial court and the matter is at the appellate stage before the High Court, mere compromise between the parties would not be a ground to accept the same resulting in acquittal of the offender who has already been convicted by the trial court. Here charge is proved under Section 307 IPC and conviction is already recorded of a heinous crime and, therefore, there is no

question of sparing a convict found guilty of such a crime."

11. Tested against the aforesaid principles and the facts of the

present case, this Court finds that allowing the prosecution to

continue would be futile and would amount to an abuse of the

process of law.

12. In view of the foregoing discussions, this Court is the considered

opinion that these matters deserve to be given a quietus at this stage

itself since the parties concerned have settled the matter amongst

themselves and are no longer inclined to proceed further in the case,

thereby diminishing the chances of its success.

13. Accordingly, the CRLMC is allowed. As a result, the F.I.R. vide

Parjanga P.S. Case No.224 of 2019 corresponding to G.R. Case No.212

of 2019 pending before the learned J.M.F.C., Parjang and all the

consequential proceedings are hereby quashed.

14. Pending application (s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

15. Interim order, if any, passed earlier shall stand vacated.

16. Issue urgent certified copy of this order as per Rules.

17. A copy of this order be communicated to the learned trial Court

for information.

( Dr. Sanjeeb K Panigrahi) Judge

Sipun

 
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