Orissa High Court
Badrinaryan Mishra vs State Of Odisha on 12 September, 2025
Author: B.P. Routray
Bench: B.P. Routray
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
Signed by: MANAS KUMAR PANDA
Designation: Personal Assistant
Reason: Authentication
Location: OHC, Cuttack
Date: 16-Sep-2025 11:28:24
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
WP(C) No.1462 of 2024
(In the matter of an application under Article 226 and 227 of the
Constitution of India)
Badrinaryan Mishra .... Petitioner
-versus-
State of Odisha, represented
through its Principal Secretary,
Home Department and Others ... Opposite Parties
Advocate(s) appeared in this case:-
For Petitioner : Mr. P.K. Nanda, Advocate
For Opp. Parties : Mr. S.K. Rout, ASC
CORAM: JUSTICE B.P. ROUTRAY
JUDGMENT
th
12 September, 2025
B.P. Routray, J.
1. Heard Mr. P.K. Nanda, learned counsel for the Petitioner and Mr.
S.K. Rout, learned ASC for State - Opposite Parties.
2. The Petitioner, who was holding Arms Licence No. 257/2002/
Cuttack, has approached this court against the order of the authority
dated 3rd September, 2020 under Annexure-4 thereby suspending his
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arms licence with direction to surrender the arms. The said order of the
authority under Annexure-4 having been challenged before the appellate
authority, has been confirmed vide order dated 8th January, 2024 under
Annexure-8. Both the orders are challenged in the present writ petition.
3. The facts of the case are that the Petitioner was the holder of Arms
Licence No.257/2002/Cuttack granted by the Collector and Arms
Magistrate, Cuttack vide order dated 22nd October, 2001. The Petitioner
by profession is a businessman and after availing arms licence in his
favour he possessed two fire arms, one a .32 bore revolver along with
ammunitions and another a .32 bore NPB pistol along with ammunitions.
4. Before grant of licence in the year 2002, the Petitioner was
involved in Kharavelanagar P.S. Case No.250 dated 1st October, 2001
registered under Section 47(a) of the Bihar and Odisha Excise Act for
illegal possession of huge quantity of IMFL liquor. Subsequently he was
also involved in Bhubaneswar EOW P.S. Case No.22 dated 31st October,
2018 registered for commission of offences under Section
420/467/468/471/406 of I.P.C. on the report lodged by the Bank
authority.
5. After coming to know about involvement of the Petitioner in
criminal cases and considering the report of the Deputy Commissioner of
Designation: Personal Assistant
Police, the Commissioner of Police, Bhubaneswar-Cuttack vide his order
dated 3rd September, 2020 suspended the arms licence of the Petitioner in
exercise of his power under Section 17(3) of the Arms Act after
considering the show cause reply submitted by the Petitioner. Being
aggrieved by the same, the Petitioner preferred appeal which was also
rejected under Annexure-8.
6. It is submitted on behalf of the Petitioner that though his
involvement in two criminal cases, as stated above, are not disputed but
the fact remains that none of such cases alleges misuse of fire arms in
committing those offences. It is further submitted that the Petitioner is
having a licensed IMFL shop at Bhubaneswar and therefore, his
involvement for alleged commission of offence under the Bihar and
Odisha Excise Act would have no connection with possession of the fire
arm. Secondly, the case of fraud as alleged by the Bank authority in
EOW P.S. Case No.22/2018 has also no connection with possession of
the fire arm with the Petitioner and in fact said case has been negotiated
with the Bank authorities in the meantime. Therefore the apprehension
raised by the authority to suspend his arms license is without any basis
and unsupported by substantial material.
Designation: Personal Assistant
7. As seen from the impugned order under Annexure-4, the
competent authority in exercise of his discretion under Section 17(3) of
the Arms Act has suspended the license of the Petitioner as the same was
considered essential in public interest. Clause (b) of sub-Section (3) of
Section 17 authorizes the licensing authority to suspend the arms license
for such period or to revoke the license, if the licensing authority deems
it necessary for the security of public peace or for public safety. For
better appreciation Section 17(3) is reproduced bellow:-
"17. Xx .. xx ....
(3) The licensing authority may by order in writing
suspend a licence for such period as it thinks fit or revoke a
licence-
(a) if the licensing authority is satisfied that the holder of
the licence is prohibited by this Act or by any other law for the
time being in force, from acquiring, having in his possession or
carrying any arms or ammunition, or is of unsound mind, or is
for any reason unfit for a licence under this Act; or
(b) if the licensing authority deems it necessary for the
security of the public peace or for public safety to suspend or
revoke the licence; or
(c) if the licence was obtained by the suppression of
material information or on the basis of wrong information
provided by the holder of the licence or any other person on his
behalf at the time of applying for it; or
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(d) if any of the conditions of the licence has been
contravened; or
(e) if the holder of the licence has failed to comply with a
notice under sub-section (1) requiring him to deliver-up the
licence."
8. A plain reading of the provisions contained in clause (b) of Sub-
Section (3), as stated above, shows the discretion of the licensing
authority about his subjective satisfaction regarding public peace,
security and safety. In Barium Chemicals Ltd vs- Company Law Board,
AIR 1967 SC 295, it is held that the expressions 'is satisfied', 'is of the
opinion', or 'has reasons to believe' are indicative of subjective
satisfaction, though it is true that the nature of power has to be
determined on a totality of consideration of all relevant provisions.
9. In State of Maharashtra v. Bhaurao Punjabrao Gawande, (2008)
3 SCC 613, it has been observed as follows:-
"38. Subjective satisfaction being a condition precedent for the
exercise of the power of preventive detention conferred on the
executive, the court can always examine whether the requisite
satisfaction is arrived at by the authority; if it is not, the
condition precedent to the exercise of the power would not be
fulfilled and the exercise of the power would be bad.
39. A court cannot go into correctness or otherwise of the facts
stated or allegations levelled in the grounds in support of
detention. A court of law is "the last appropriate tribunal to
investigate into circumstances of suspicion on which such
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anticipatory action must be largely based". That, however,
does not mean that the subjective satisfaction of the detaining
authority is wholly immune from judicial reviewability. By
judicial decisions, courts have carved out areas, though
limited, within which the validity of subjective satisfaction can
be tested judicially."
10. Further, in CIT v. Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd., (1983) 4
SCC 392, Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that;
"11. By now, the parameters of the Court's power of
judicial review of administrative or executive action or
decision and the grounds on which the Court can interfere with
the same are well settled and it would be redundant to
recapitulate the whole catena of decisions of this Court
commencing from Barium Chemicals case [Barium Chemicals
Ltd. v. Company Law Board, AIR 1967 SC 295 : 1966 Supp.
SCR 311 : (1966) 36 Com Cas 639] on the point. Indisputably,
it is a settled position that if the action or decision is perverse
or is such that no reasonable body of persons, properly
informed, could come to or has been arrived at by the authority
misdirecting itself by adopting a wrong approach or has been
influenced by irrelevant or extraneous matters the Court would
be justified in interfering with the same. This Court in one of
its later decisions in Shalini Soni v. Union of India [(1980) 4
SCC 544 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 38 : AIR 1981 SC 431 : (1981) 1
SCR 962] has observed thus: "It is an unwritten rule of the
law, constitutional and administrative, that whenever a
decision-making function is entrusted to the subjective
satisfaction of a statutory functionary, there is an implicit
obligation to apply his mind to pertinent and proximate matters
only, eschewing the irrelevant and the remote". Suffice it to
say that the following passage appearing at pp. 285-86 in Prof.
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de Smith's treatise Judicial Review of Administrative
Action (4th Edn.) succinctly summarises the several principles
formulated by the Courts in that behalf thus:
"The authority in which a discretion is vested can be
compelled to exercise that discretion, but not to exercise it
in any particular manner. In general, a discretion must be
exercised only by the authority to which it is committed.
That authority must genuinely address itself to the matter
before it: it must not act under the dictation of another
body or disable itself from exercising a discretion in each
individual case. In the purported exercise of its discretion it
must not do what it has been forbidden to do, nor must it
do what it has not been authorised to do. It must act in
good faith, must have regard to all relevant considerations
and must not be swayed by irrelevant considerations, must
not seek to promote purposes alien to the letter or to the
spirit of the legislation that gives it power to act, and must
not act arbitrarily or capriciously. Nor where a judgment
must be made that certain facts exist can a discretion be
validly exercised on the basis of an erroneous assumption
about those facts. These several principles can
conveniently be grouped in two main categories; failure to
exercise a discretion, and excess or abuse of discretionary
power. The two classes are not, however, mutually
exclusive. Thus, discretion may be improperly fettered
because irrelevant considerations have been taken into
account; and where an authority hands over its discretion
to another body it acts ultra vires. Nor, is it possible to
differentiate with precision the grounds of invalidity
contained within each category."
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11. In the case at hand, the impugned order under Annexure-4 speaks
that before getting his satisfaction for a direction to suspend the licence
the authority had called for a show cause reply from the Petitioner and
after going through the same and considering all such materials on record
regarding the profession of the Petitioner and his necessity to possess the
fire arm, has found it appropriate to revoke the arms licence of the
Petitioner in the interest of public safety. When an statutory authority is
exercising his power after his satisfaction on the subject considering the
materials brought on record thereof, this court has the limited scope to
interfere with the same.
12. The fact of involvement of the Petitioner in two criminal cases
having not been disputed, his reasons assigned for challenging the
impugned order that none of the offences do allege involvement or use of
any fire arm could not be a satisfactory answer in reply to the satisfaction
on the part of the authority.
13. In the instant case when the criminal cases are still pending
against the Petitioner the assertions made on his part that it would no
way affect the use of fire arms to disturb public safety is not found
convincing. At the same time it needs to be mentioned here that when
the licensing authority having considered all such materials on record
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has satisfied about the threat posed by the Petitioner for possessing the
fire arms to the public peace and safety it would not be wise on the
part of this court to interfere with the same on the facts that the
conduct of the Petitioner is not justifying such action on the part of the
licensing authority. Therefore the impugned order under Annexure-4
and confirmation of the same by the appellate authority under
Annexure-8 does not warrant any interference. The writ petition is
dismissed. However, as prayed by the petitioner he is at liberty to
apply for renewal of licence before the authority after disposal of the
criminal cases pending against him.
( B.P. Routray)
Judge
M.K. Panda/P.A
