Orissa High Court
Ananta Prabha Mohanty vs State Of Odisha & Another .... Opposite ... on 11 September, 2025
Author: R.K. Pattanaik
Bench: R.K. Pattanaik
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
CRLREV No.570 of 2025
Ananta Prabha Mohanty .... Petitioner
Mr. B.K. Sahoo, Advocate
-Versus-
State of Odisha & another .... Opposite Parties
Mr. P.K. Ray, AGA
CORAM:
MR. JUSTICE R.K. PATTANAIK
ORDER
11.09.2025
Order No.
03. 1. Heard learned counsel for the respective parties.
2. Instant revision is filed by the petitioner assailing the
impugned judgment in Criminal Appeal No.4 of 2023 as at
Annexure-6 on the grounds stated.
3. It is submitted by Mr. Sahoo, learned counsel for the
petitioner that an application under Section 15(1) of the
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000
read with Rule 12 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection
of Children) Rules, 2007 was moved before the learned
Juvenile Justice Board, Cuttack (in short 'the JJB') for age
determination of the petitioner and it was at the behest of
opposite party No.2 and the same was disposed of vide
Annexure-3 and rejected, as against which, Criminal Appeal
No.04 of 2023 was filed leading to the passing of the impugned
order dated 21st July, 2025 i.e. Annexure-6. The submission is
that the petitioner having not committed any heinous offence as
defined under Section 2(33) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and
Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (hereinafter referred to as
'the Act'), no such enquiry or preliminary assessment in terms
of assessment as prescribed under the Rules framed thereunder
was necessary and, hence, it was rightly denied by the learned
JJB. It is contended that the learned Court below under the
impression that the offence is punishable for more than 7 years
directed such preliminary assessment to be held as per the rules
vide Annexure-6, which is, therefore, liable to be interfered
with. In support of such contention, a decision of the Apex
Court in Shilpa Mittal Vrs. State of NCT of Delhi in Criminal
Appeal No.34 of 2020 dated 9th January, 2020 is placed
reliance on Mr. Sahoo, learned counsel while challenging the
impugned decision of the Court in appeal.
4. On the contrary, Mr. Ray, learned AGA for the State
refers to Section 14(1) of the POCSO Act, 2012 to contend that
the petitioner having committed a heinous offence is punishable
in view of sub-section (2) thereof, hence, the learned Court
below rightly directed the age determination of the petitioner.
The further submission is that the petitioner having committed
offences involving a child used for pornography, in view of
Section 14(2) of the POCSO Act as such offence is punishable
with life imprisonment, it falls within the definition of Section
2(33) of the Act and therefore, no wrong or any illegality has
been committed by the learned Court below for determination
of age, hence, the impugned judgment at Annexure-6 is
perfectly justified.
5. Perused the FIR as at Annexure-1 and the allegations
therein are about the petitioner having circulated the naked
photographs of the victim, namely, opposite party No.2 and
hence, the report was lodged leading to the registration of the
case under Sections 292(2) (a) and (b) IPC, Sections 12 and 14
of the POCSO Act besides Sections 66(E) and 67 (B) of the I.T.
Act against him.
6. The submission Mr. Sahoo, learned counsel for the
petitioner is that the learned JJB entertained such an application
received from opposite party No.2 under the repealed Act. It is,
however, submitted that the age determination is permissible as
per the Act and the same shall have to be in terms of the Rules
prescribed. The contention is that the petitioner cannot be said
to have committed heinous offence as defined under Section
2(33) of the Act. Mr. Ray, learned AGA for the State reiterates
that in view of the Section 14(2) of the POCSO Act, the
petitioner is liable for punishment with imprisonment for life.
7. As far as the impugned judgment dated 21st July, 2025
i.e. Annexure-6 is concerned, the learned Court below
proceeded on the premise that the maximum sentence
prescribed in Section 14 of the POCSO Act is more than 7
years and hence, a heinous offence as per the definition of
Section 2(33) of the Act. But, in the considered view of the
Court, such a conclusion is clearly erroneous since Section
14(1) of the POCSO Act provides imprisonment for a term
which shall not be less than 5 years and fine and in the event of
second or subsequent conviction, the imprisonment shall not be
less than 7 years and also fine. So far as Section 2(33) of the
Act is concerned, it defines 'heinous offences' which includes
the offences for which the minimum punishment under the IPC
or any other law for the time being in force to be seven years or
more.
8. The Court perused the decision of the Apex Court in
Shilpa Mittal (supra), wherein, it has been held and observed
that an offence which does not provide a minimum sentence of
7 years cannot be treated to be heinous offence, however,
further proceeded to held that where maximum sentence is
more than 7 years imprisonment without any minimum
sentence of less than 7 years provided, it shall still be treated as
a serious offence within the meaning of the Act.
9. In such view of the matter, considering the definition of
the heinous offences as per 2(33) of the Act, the offence
committed by the petitioner under Section 14(1) of the POCSO
Act is not heinous offence as such and hence, the learned Court
below fell into serious error in concluding so and on the
premise that the imprisonment prescribed is for more than 7
years, which is apparently in respect of second and subsequent
conviction where the imprisonment to be not less than 7 years
and fine. On a bare reading of FIR., this Court does not find
any such sexual mischief committed by the petitioner involving
an offence under Sections 5, 7, 9 punishable under Sections 4, 6
& 8 besides Section 10 respectively. So therefore, the
conclusion of the Court is that the learned Court below could
not have treated the offence committed by the petitioner as
heinous offence defined in Section 2(33) of the Act to direct the
preliminary assessment vis-à-vis the age determination of the
petitioner overruling the decision of the learned JJB and
therefore, the same is liable to be interfered with and set at
naught.
10. Accordingly, it is ordered.
11. In the result, the revision petition is allowed. As a
necessary corollary, the impugned judgment vide Annexure-6
in Criminal Appeal No.04 of 2023 by the learned 3rd Additional
Sessions Judge, Cuttack is hereby set aside a the direction to
the learned JJB to proceed with JJC Case No.33 of 2022 for its
disposal as per and in accordance with law.
12. Issue urgent certified copy as per rules.
(R.K. Pattanaik)
Judge
Alok
