Orissa High Court
Satyavan K. Panda vs State Of Odisha & Others .... Opp. ... on 10 September, 2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
W.P.(C) NO. 10837 OF 2018,
W.P.(C) NO. 6239 OF 2015
W.P.(C) NO. 6240 OF 2015
&
W.P.(C) NO. 62 OF 2018
In the matter of applications under Articles 226 & 227 of the
Constitution of India.
In W.P.(C) NO. 10837 OF 2018
Satyavan K. Panda .... Petitioner
-Versus-
State of Odisha & others .... Opp. Parties
Advocates appeared in this case:
For Petitioner : M/s. D.R. Nanda, B.B. Mohapatra &
B.N. Bhol, Advocates
For Opp. Parties: Mr. J.K. Ray,
Addl. Standing Counsel
[OP Nos.1, 3 & 4]
Mr. P.K. Rath, Sr. Advocate
with M/s. S.P. Panda, I.A. Acharya &
C.K. Rout, Advocates
[OP No.2]
In W.P.(C) NO. 6239 OF 2015
Dr. Laxmikanta Mishra .... Petitioner
Page 1 of 19
-Versus-
State of Odisha & others .... Opp. Parties
Advocates appeared in this case:
For Petitioner : M/s. S.K. Dash, M.K. Mishra, S.P.
Dash & P.C. Mohanty, Advocates
For Opp. Parties: Mr. J.K. Ray,
Addl. Standing Counsel
[OP Nos.1 & 7]
Mr. P.K. Rath, Sr. Advocate
with M/s. S.P. Panda, I.A. Acharya &
J.K. Naik, Advocates
[OP Nos.2 to 6]
In W.P.(C) NO. 6240 OF 2015
Dr. Swapna Kabiraj .... Petitioner
-Versus-
State of Odisha & others .... Opp. Parties
Advocates appeared in this case:
For Petitioner : M/s. S.K. Dash, M.K. Mishra, S.P.
Dash & P.C. Mohanty, Advocates
For Opp. Parties: Mr. J.K. Ray,
Addl. Standing Counsel
[OP Nos.1 & 7]
Page 2 of 19
Mr. P.K. Rath, Sr. Advocate
with M/s. S.P. Panda & J.K. Naik,
Advocates
[OP Nos.2 to 6]
In W.P.(C) NO. 62 OF 2018
Saktidhar Das .... Petitioner
-Versus-
Life Insurance Corporation of .... Opp. Parties
India (LIC) & anr.
Advocates appeared in this case:
For Petitioner : M/s. M.M. Swain, S. Biswal, H.K.
Behera, H. Mohanty & J.S. Samal,
Advocates
For Opp. Parties: Mr. P.K. Rath, Sr. Advocate
with M/s. S.P. Panda, C.K. Rout & I.A.
Acharya, Advocates
CORAM:
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DIXIT KRISHNA SHRIPAD
JUDGMENT
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Date of hearing: 09.09.2025 :: Date of judgment: 10.09.2025
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PER DIXIT KRISHNA SHRIPAD,J.
The essential grievance of all these petitioners is against the
decision of Life Insurance Corporation of India in refusing to follow the
lottery procedure for allotment of flats/apartments, as was assured & done
earlier. The LIC claims to have changed the policy decision to the effect
that the allotment shall be on the basis of public auction.
2. FOUNDATIONAL FACTS OF THE CASE:
(a) LIC of India is a statutory Corporation having been established
under the provisions of Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. It is a
Parliamentary statute, is obvious. The State Government, vide order
dated 25.08.1992, allotted a big chunk of land to the LIC. The lease
deed came to be executed on 17.06.2014. The LIC formulated a Scheme
called "Policy Holders‟ Housing Scheme (Jeevan Bima Nagar) at
Chandrasekharpur, Bhubaneswar. There were 192 flats comprised in the
Phase-I and they were allotted and occupancy was granted during the
year 2000. Subsequently, in Phase-II, 228 flats were constructed in the
remaining area available and they were ready for occupation. Of them,
153 were already allotted leaving the 75 in balance. These were offered
for allotment "on lease basis on prescribed prices as is where is basis".
That is what was held out by the LIC to the Policy Holders by way of
published Broacher in January, 2014, a copy whereof is produced as
annexure.
(b) It is specifically averred in the petitions that there were 420 flats
in all in Phase-I, of which 345, having been allotted to the applicants on
lottery basis, the conveyances also have been executed by way of lease,
and that they are occupied. Remaining 75 flats are stated to be
comprised in Phase-II. All these petitioners had applied for allotment of
these flats, by complying with conditions prescribed in the brochure. A
draw of lottery was held on 26.03.2014 and admittedly allotment letters
have been issued to all these petitioners, who have remitted a sum of
Rs.1,00,000/- way back in 2014 itself. All they were pressing for due
execution of conveyance by way of lease, as was held out in the
broachers issued by LIC.
(c) In the meanwhile, the extant law relating to registration of
documents was amended under Section 22 of the Registration Act, 1908
making the production of updated Record of Rights a sine qua non for
registration with effect from 24.04.2014. In the absence of ROR,
registration of document was stopped. Therefore, the LIC had applied to
the State Government for generating ROR, vide letter dated 29.05.2014,
reflecting its name as the lessee. The Government, vide letter dated
06.06.2014, instructed the Inspector General of Registration and Stamps
to facilitate the registration of subleases in favour of the allottees.
However, the Government, having discovered that the land leased to the
LIC was part of a reserve forest and therefore could not accomplish the
generation of ROR in the light of the bar enacted in the Forest
Conservation Act, 1980.
(d) The LIC, in view of the legal bar, issued individual letters to the
allottees stating that it was not possible to execute the sublease deed of
the flats or give possession until its name was entered in the ROR. It also
informed them that the last date for making payment of balance of the
consideration would be intimated after the formality of updating ROR
was completed. However, petitioners sent letters to the effect that they
would await ROR updation, since they were interested in the allotment
and not its revocation. The LIC came up with plea in its letter dated
19.12.2014 that the State Government, being the lessor, has advised it for
diversion of the land comprised in its lease deed dated 25.06.1993, and
that allotments be cancelled. The allottees did not agree for cancellation
of allotments.
(e) In the meanwhile, the LIC had addressed a letter dated 03.07.2014
to the State Government specifically stating that the allottees were
facing hardship since they had remitted the amounts borrowed from the
banks and therefore, immediate arrangements should be made for
registration of conveyances in their favour in terms of housing project.
It sent another letter dated 13.02.2017 requesting the State Government to
instruct the Inspector General of Registration for allowing registration of
75 flats without insisting on the production of ROR, as a special case. It
had also mentioned such instances relating to State Housing Board, BDA
& CDA, giving full particulars. Yet another letter was sent on 23.11.2017
to the Director of Estates & Ex-officio Additional Secretary to
Government.
(f) After long last, the ROR imbroglio came to an end and the name of
LIC came to be entered in the ROR in terms of formal lease after the
issue of reserve forest, was resolved. Despite all this, the LIC stuck to its
decision to cancel the allotment that was taken in 2014 and therefore,
these petitioners are knocking at the doors of Writ Court essentially
seeking a direction to the LIC to formalize the allotment of flats on
accepting balance of the consideration and execute & register a formal
sublease in their favour. After service of notice the State is represented by
the AGA and LIC is represented by its Panel Counsel. Counter affidavit
also has been filed in WP(C) No. 10837 of 2018 resisting the petition
prayers.
3. SUBMISSIONS AT THE BAR:
(i) Learned advocates appearing for the petitioners argued that their
clients have remitted a sum of Rs.1,00,000/- each acting on the promise
of the LIC of allotting the flats in question by way of sublease on
payment of remainder of consideration; to many such allottees it has
executed & registered conveyances and further delivered possession as
well. They further submit that what came in the way of registration of
conveyances was the absence of LIC‟s name in the ROR; in fact, LIC
having sent several letters to the Government had specifically sought for
instructions to the IGR to relax the condition of producing ROR and
facilitate registration; now, the ROR issue having been resolved, the LIC
cannot turn around and go for auctioning of the flats, which is contrary
to policy content of the Scheme; even otherwise, estoppel and
promissory estoppel come to the aid of petitioners, they having suffered
detriment. Therefore, they say, a direction be issued to the LIC to
complete the formalities allotment & conveyance on receiving balance
of the consideration forthwith.
(ii) Learned Senior Advocate appearing for the LIC vehemently
resists these writ petitions making submission in justification of the
stand of LIC that the allotments are cancelled and that instead of lottery,
it would go for auctioning of flats in question, in which petitioners also
can participate; LIC had offered to refund the amount received with
interest in writing; in the changed circumstances, LIC also has changed
its policy of disposing the subject flats by auctioning and that would
fetch good market price to the advantage of statutory corporation; the
estoppel & promissory estoppel would not avail against law; even
otherwise, in the guise of these petitions, petitioners cannot seek specific
performance, essential facts being in dispute. Lastly, in identical fact
matrix, a Coordinate Bench of this Court has dismissed WP(C) No.
9180 of 2025 along with connected cases vide order dated 16.05.2025,
although the same is put in challenge in Writ Appeal and therefore,
these petitions too meet the same fate, no interest in the flats having
been created by mere allotment.
(iii) Both the sides, in support of their contentions, have cited certain
rulings and relevant of them are adverted to in the course of this
judgment.
4. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and having perused
the petitions papers and also having considered relevant of the rulings
cited at the Bar, this Court is inclined to grant indulgence in the matter
as under and for the following reasons.
4.1. AS TO MAINTAINABILITY OF WRIT PETITIONS:
(i) The vehement submission of learned Senior Advocate Mr. P.K. Rath
that disputed fact matrix is involved in the writ petitions and therefore, the
parties may be relegated alternate remedy of suit, does not impress this
Court. The doctrine of alternate remedy obtaining in the realm of writ
jurisdiction is „neither a thumb rule nor a drug of choice‟ to defeat
legitimate claims of citizens, some of whom have been before this Court
since a decade. Ordinarily, when disputed fact matrix is involved, the
litigants are relegated to normal remedy, i.e., civil suits, is true. However,
when the facts disputed in the case can be ascertained easily from the
record, a genuine litigant cannot be sent back empty handed. An argument
to the contrary would defeat the very purpose for which wide writ
jurisdiction is conferred on constitutional courts.
(ii) Secondly, contention of the above kind cannot be entertained by this
Court years having lapsed, the case papers lying in the court cupboards
sans sunlight. The only short question involved is as to legality of selective
cancellation of allotment of flats; this can be adjudged with fair degree of
certainty & swiftness on the basis of pleadings of the parties and the
material available on record. That would do at least delayed justice, which
the petitioners have to take at the hands of this Court, for no fault of theirs.
At this length of time, if they are relegated to ordinary remedy of civil suit,
that would only elongate the waiting period of the litigants. The Court, as
an institution, has to preserve the faith of right thinking section of the
society in the judicial process. Further, one has to keep in mind that human
life is too short to be little, said Thomas Carlyle. At least, as a concession
to shortness of human life, litigation period has to be cut short. Otherwise,
people may start eying extrajudicial remedies and that would not augur
well to the Rule of Law. After all, the doctrine of alternate remedy is not a
constitutional prescription. It is only judicial invention to save time &
energy of constitutional courts. Therefore, the said doctrine cannot be
treated as the Great Wall of China to keep worthy litigants away from
access to writ remedies. It was Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, who in
DAVIS v. MILLS,1 observed as under:
"Constitutions are intended to preserve practical and substantial
rights, not to maintain theories..."
4.2. The land belongs to the State Government; it leased the same in
favour of LIC way back in August, 1992 for the purpose of Housing
Scheme for the LIC Policy Holders and not for others. The LIC in
194 US 451 (1904)
January, 2014 had given advertisement inviting applications from its
Policy Holders for the allotment of 75 flats in Phase-II; already it has
allotted similar hundreds of flats to other Policy Holders in Phase-I by
lottery procedure. That prompted these petitioners to apply for
allotment, which they did after remitting a sum of Rs.1,00,000/- each in
terms of advertisement brochure. This was years ago. Lottery was
drawn way back a decade ago and allotments of specific flats were made
in favour of the petitioners. After all, all these allotments are not on the
basis of outright sale, but by way of sublease.
4.3. WHETHERING OF LEGAL IMPEDIMENT:
(i) The act of LIC in not formalizing the allotment by executing
required conveyances was only on the ground that its name was not
reflected in the ROR, inasmuch as the land, on which these structures
are put up, was stated to be a part of reserve forest, then. In fact, LIC
had filed WP(C) No. 20307 of 2015 making the State Government a
party when the Government officials, despite repeated requests, did not
arrange for updation of ROR and for facilitating execution &
registration of conveyances. However, subsequently it withdrew the
said petition, vide order dated 04.01.2017, inasmuch as the issue of
forest was resolved and LIC‟s name came to be entered in the ROR.
Thus, whatever impediment it had, withered away and therefore, the
substratum on which cancellation of allotment was made, collapsed.
That being the position, the LIC is bound to formalize the allotments by
executing & registering the required conveyances, of course, subject to
allottees making the remittance of remainder of consideration.
(ii) The only ground for the cancellation of allotment was the legal
bar of transfer of forest land for alien purposes contrary to the provisions
of the Forest Conservation Act, 1980 and requirement of updated ROR,
as prescribed by State amendment to Section 22 of the Registration Act,
1908. LIC had addressed a slew of letters to the Government to remove
the impediment and to instruct IGR to facilitate registration of
conveyances in favour of the allottees, at the earliest. At long last, the
Government did some appreciable job by removing the impediment and
as a consequence the name of LIC came to be reflected in the ROR.
Petitioners did not agree for the cancellation, but had represented to the
LIC that they would wait till the impediment was removed for
registration. LIC had specifically written to the State Government about
the difficulty of allottees, who had remitted a huge lump sum
Rs.1,00,000/- each, that too having made housing loan arrangements.
That being the position, the doctrine of estoppel would come to the aid
of petitioners. The illustration to Section 115 of the Evidence Act, 1872
is worth mentioning.
"A intentionally and falsely leads B to believe that certain land
belongs to A and thereby induces B to buy and pay for it. The
land afterwards becomes the property of A, and A seeks to set
aside the sale on the ground that, at the time of the sale, he had
no title. He must not be allowed to prove his want of title."
4.4. Even the Executive Decisions to allot sites by lottery draw would
attract the doctrine of promissory estoppel vide Union of India v. M/s
Indo-Afghan Agencies,2 and therefore that would come to the aid of
petitioner-allottees. It is relevant to extract the affidavit of a great jurist of
yester decades Mr. N.A. Palkhivala, which the Union Government had got
filed in relation to Bhopal Gas Tragedy case in the District Court of New
York for repelling the contention of Union Carbide Company, i.e.,
tortfeasor that the Indian Judiciary was inadequate to treat cases of the
kind. Relevant part of the said affidavit makes interesting reading and it
lends support to the case of petitioners:
"In Motilal Padampat Sagar Mills v. Uttar Pradesh
(AIR 1979 SC 621) the Supreme Court took the doctrine
of Promissory estoppel (which estops the government
from pleading executive necessity and going back on its
earlier promise) an important step further, and held that
it was not merely available as a defence but could
supply a cause of action for institution of legal
proceedings....
I have seen the Memoranda and Affidavits filed in
opposition to Union Carbide's Motion regarding Forum
Non Conveniens. In those papers it has been stated that
the Indian legal system is "deficient: and "inadequate".
I am constrained to say that it is gratuitous denigration
to call the Indian system deficient or inadequate."
Justice Felix Frankfurter of U.S. Supreme Court long ago observed as
under:
1968 SCR (2) 366
"An executive agency must be rigorously held to the
standards by which it professes its action to be
judged. Accordingly, if dismissal from employment
is based on a defined procedure, even though
generous beyond the requirement that bind such
agency, that procedure must be scrupulously
observed. This judicially evolved rule of
administrative law is now firmly established and, if I
may add, rightly so. He that takes the procedural
sword shall perish with the sword.
These observations have been accepted by the Apex Court as a Rule in
Ramana Dayarama Sehetty v. The International Airport Authority of
India,3.
4.5. The vehement submission of Mr. Rath that the principle of
estoppel does not avail against law, is true, vide M/s Jit Ram Shiv
Kumar v. State of Haryana,4. "No estoppel against law" is as old as
mountains. However, it has many shades of meanings & reflections. The
impugned decision of the LIC to terminate the allotments already made
after accepting Rs.1,00,000/- from each of the petitioners a decade ago
and to go for auction mode of disposal, would attract the principle of
promissory estoppel, inasmuch as it is only an Executive Decision of the
LIC in its commercial interest and no statutory provision to the contrary
is cited. His further contention that the principles of estoppel will not
apply to the instrumentalities of State, is misconceived. There is
difference between the doctrine of estoppel and the principle of
promissory estoppel, although they are not poles asunder. The latter is
(1979) 3 SCC 489
(1981) 1 SCC 11
essentially applicable to State under Article 12 of the Constitution and its
instrumentalities, like LIC.
4.6. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners is right in telling the
Court that the Government granted lease of the subject land only for the
purpose of Housing Scheme for the benefit of LIC Policy Holders.
Already most of the flats have been allotted by the lottery draw and
subleases having been registered, the allottees have been put into
possession also. Those registrations were effected without ROR, as the
law then was. However, the registration of conveyances to others like
petitioners was deferred because of statutory amendment. Mr. Rath is
right that LIC could not be compelled to perform what is impossible,
vide MD Army Welfare Housing Organization v. Sumangal Services
(Pvt.) Ltd.,5. However, that impossibility no longer continues and
therefore, there is no impediment for formalizing the allotments by
executing & registering necessary conveyances. Therefore, the plea of
impossibility has to fall to the ground.
4.7. AS TO CHANGE OF POLICY BY THE LIC:
(i) The vehement submission of Mr. Rath that the decision to cancel
the allotments already made and to go for auction mode is taken in the
changed circumstances to fetch more money to the public body like LIC,
is difficult to accept. The LIC got lease of the land from the Government
for affordable Housing Scheme to benefit Policy Holders. The
(2004) 9 SCC 619
Government has not given the land on lease to the LIC for doing real
estate business and therefore, it cannot conduct itself as a hardcore
Estate Agent. Its actions should not generate doubt in the mind of its
Policy Holders about the bona fide, even in its usual insurance business.
When hundreds of flats have been allotted in Phase-I by adopting lottery
procedure and registration of conveyances has also been accomplished, it
is grossly unjust and discriminatory to deprive the petitioners of the same
benefit, only on the alleged ground of change of circumstances
eventually leading to so called change of policy of the Scheme.
(ii) After all, such a right to change the policy or mode of allotment
was not retained by the LIC, while issuing the advertisement or making
the allotment. Secondly, no provision of law is brought to my notice
which enables it to evolve a new policy to the detriment of petitioner-
allottees, who had altered their position by remitting a sum of
Rs.1,00,000/- each a decade ago. Added, such an alteration could not
have been unilaterally done, its implications being explicit. That apart, a
policy which has been implemented half a through and which has been
acted upon by the persons interested, cannot be given a go bye
whimsically. Therefore, the decision in Bareilly Development Authority
v. Ajai Pal Singh,6 would came to the rescue of the OP-LIC. In the said
decision, such a right was specifically retained by the statutory authority
mentioning it in the advertisement. It is not that LIC cannot undertake
(1989) 2 SCC 116
commercial activities. It can, vide Life Insurance Corporation of India
v. Escorts Limited,7 but not in matters of the kind, inasmuch as that is
not the business of insurance. LIC ought to have kept in view that right
to residence is also guaranteed under Article 19(1)(e) of the Constitution
of India, and that humans have innate urge to have their own shelter.
Keeping this in view, the Government presumably granted the land in a
preferential way, and not for making unconscionable way.
4.8. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners is right in telling this
Court that the fact matrix of Coordinate Bench decision in WP(C)
No.9180 of 2025 & connected cases between Nihar Ranjan Biswal v.
LIC of India Ltd. disposed of on 16.05.2025 does not come to the rescue
of answering OPs. At para-9 of the said judgment, the Bench observed
that the litigants in the said case had paid only a token application fee.
What the petitioners herein have paid is Rs.1,00,000/- each and by no
stretch of imagination that can be said to be token application fee.
Added, the consistent stand taken by the LIC before the Government that
the registration of conveyances should be permitted sans ROR, since all
the allottees are pressing, was not brought to the notice of the Bench.
Even the LIC‟s writ petition against the Government was not mentioned.
Several relevant factors thus were left unurged there. Even the cause of
action & prayers are not similar. The decision to go for auction was not
the subject-matter of consideration. This apart, it is informed that
(1986) 1 SCC 264
challenge to the said decision is pending in Writ Appeal. Therefore, that
judgment does not come in the way of disposal of these cases, on their
independent merits. It needs no reiteration that a decision is an authority
for the proposition that is laid down in a given fact matrix and not for all
that, that would logically follow from what has been so laid down vide
Lord Halsbury in Quinn v. Leathem,8.
4.9. All the above being said, the real estate prices have skyrocketed is
a stark reality. Some equities have to be worked out keeping in view
competing interests of the LIC and its allottees. There is some force in
the submission of Mr. Rath that more than a decade having lapsed, for no
fault of LIC, the allotments could not fructify, and that the allottees
cannot expect to have the flats at a price lesser than contemporary
market‟s. There is also force in the counter submission of learned
counsel appearing for the petitioners that absolutely no fault can be
attributed to their clients, either. Be that as it may; justice of the case
warrants balancing of competing equities. In my considered view, the
allottee-petitioners have to pay an additional sum quantified at the rate of
10% of what is payable by them under the original arrangement towards
the stipulated price of flats/apartments. That would be an additional
benefit to the LIC.
In the above circumstances, these writ petitions are allowed; a
Writ of Certiorari issues quashing the termination of allotments coupled
[1901] UKHL 2
with a Writ of Mandamus to the LIC to formalize subject allotments by
executing & registering required conveyances in favour of petitioners
within eight (8) weeks after accepting petitioners‟ remittance of all
amounts, including the additional levy of 10%. Petitioners shall make
the remittance within four (6) weeks.
Costs, reluctantly made easy.
Web copy of this judgment to be acted upon by all concerned.
Dixit Krishna Shripad
Judge
Orissa High Court, Cuttack
The 10th September, 2025/GDS/Prasant
Designation: JOINT REGISTRAR-CUM-PRINCIPAL
Location: HIGH COURT OF ORISSA : CUTTACK
Date: 12-Sep-2025 12:00:17
