Orissa High Court
Saubhagya Kumar Muduli vs State Of Odisha & Another .... Opposite ... on 10 September, 2025
Author: Chittaranjan Dash
Bench: Chittaranjan Dash
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
CRLMC No. 114 of 2022
Saubhagya Kumar Muduli .... Petitioner
Mr. M. Kanungo,
Kanungo
Senior Advocate
-versus-
State of Odisha & Another .... Opposite Parties
Mr. A.K. Apat, Addl. P.P
Mr. M. K. Chand,, Advocate
for O.P. No.2
CRLMC No. 501 of 2022
.... Petitioner
Pankaj Kumar Muduli &
Another
Mr.
r. M. Kanungo,
Senior Advocate
-versus-
State of Odisha & Another .... Opposite Parties
Mr. A.K. Apat, Addl. P.P
Mr. M. K. Chand, Advocate
for O.P. No.2
CORAM:
THE HON'BLE
BLE MR. JUSTICE CHITTARANJAN DASH
Date of Judgment: 10.09.2025
Chittaranjan Dash, J.
1. Heard learned counsels for both the parties.
2. By means of these applications, the Petitioners have assailed the
order dated 27.06.2017, whereby the learned J.M.F.C., Jajpur Road took
cognizance of the offences in connection with the charge-sheet
charge sheet submitted
pursuant to Kalinga Nagar P.S. Case No.29 of 2017. The Petitioners in
both the applications are the accused persons in I.C.C. Case No.36 of
2017 pending before the learned J.M.F.C., Jajpur Road.
3. Since both CRLMC No.114 of 2022
2022 arise out of the same proceeding and involve common questions of
fact and law, they were heard analogously and are being disposed of
together by this common order.
4. The background
background facts, in brief, are that the Petitioners along with
others were allegedly running a company in the name and style of M/s.
Master Capital Services Limited, engaged in share market and trading
activities, alluring members of the public to invest money with
wi them by
assuring monthly returns of 4% to 5%. In the process, huge amounts
were collected from the investors, but neither the capital amount nor the
promised interest was repaid. Verification by the investors revealed that
M/s. Master Capital Services Limited
Limited was neither registered under the
SEBI Act, 1992 nor authorized to raise funds from the public through
issuance of securities or any other scheme. Since the Petitioners, being at
the helm of affairs of the said company, allegedly misappropriated the
investors' money and failed to refund despite repeated demands, a
written complaint was lodged before Kalinga Nagar P.S. Based on the
said complaint, FIR No.79(2) of 2016 was registered under Sections
420/406/506/34 of IPC. Upon completion of investigation,
investigation charge-sheet
was submitted only against one Sarita Kumar Muduli, keeping
investigation open under Section 173(8) Cr.P.C.
5. While the matter so stood, another investor, namely Basanta
Kumar Behera, filed a complaint before the learned J.M.F.C., Jajpur
Road, alleging that the Petitioners along with others, being officials of
M/s. Master Capital Services Limited, had opened offices at Duburi
Chowk and Bangla Chowk, Kalinga Nagar, collected money from him
and several others on the assurance of monthly returns of
of 2% to 3%, and
even issued post-dated
dated cheques to gain their confidence, but ultimately
cheated the investors of more than Rs.8 Crores. The said complaint was
registered as I.C.C. Case No.36 of 2017. The learned J.M.F.C., Jajpur
Road referred the matter under
under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. to the IIC,
Kalinga Nagar P.S. for registration of FIR and investigation, pursuant to
which Kalinga Nagar P.S. Case No.29 of 2017 was registered. On
completion of investigation, Final Form was submitted against the
Petitioners andd others, holding them prima facie guilty of offences under
Sections 420/468/406/120-B
420/468/406/120 B of IPC. Consequent thereto, G.R. Case
No.228 of 2017 was registered, and cognizance of the offences was
taken by order dated 27.06.2017. As the Petitioners failed to appear
app
despite process, NBW was issued against them by order dated
24.09.2021.
6. Mr. Milan Kanungo,
K learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the
Petitioners, assailed the impugned order on the ground that while an
earlier FIR, i.e., Kalinga Nagar P.S. Case No.79 of 2016, on the self-
self
same allegations was pending investigation, the subsequent complaint
lodged by Basanta Kumar Behera and registration of FIR No.29 of 2017
on identical allegations is legally unsustainable. He submitted that since
Basanta Kumar Behera himself
himself was a signatory to the earlier complaint
which led to registration of FIR No.79 of 2016, he could not have lodged
a fresh complaint on the same cause of action. In support of his
contention, he placed reliance upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme
Suprem
Court in T.T. Antony vs.
v State of Kerala & Others,, reported in (2001) 6
SCC 181¸ as well as the judgment rendered by a Co-ordinate
Co ordinate Bench of
this Court in CRLMC No.312 of 2016,
2016, in the matter of Krushna Ch.
Debata vs. State of Odisha reported in MANU/OR/0673/2021,
MANU/OR/0673/2021 to argue
that a second FIR on the same set of facts is impermissible in law.
Learned Senior Counsel further reiterated the principles laid down in
v Bhajan Lal reported in AIR 1992 SC
State of Haryana & Others vs.
604, and urged that this Court, in exercise of its plenary powers under
Section 482 Cr.P.C., ought to quash the impugned proceeding, as its
continuance would serve no purpose and amount to abuse of the process
of law, being manifestly tainted with mala fide intention.
7. Mr. Apat, learned
learned counsel for the State, on the other hand,
vehemently opposed the contentions advanced on behalf of the
Petitioners. He submitted that the complaint lodged by Basanta Kumar
Behera before the learned J.M.F.C., Jajpur Road discloses a wider
canvas of allegations
legations involving a larger number of victims and
transactions, in contrast to those forming the subject matter of Kalinga
Nagar P.S. Case No.79 of 2016. Mr. Apat further contended that when
the matter is examined on the touchstone of the 'test of sameness',
samenes the
subsequent FIR registered pursuant to the direction of the learned court
in I.C.C. Case No.36 of 2017 cannot be said to be a verbatim repetition
of the earlier FIR. Rather, it reveals a broader scope of investigation,
encompassing additional persons,
persons, investors, and a larger quantum of
fraud. Accordingly, he argued that there is no illegality in the learned
court below taking cognizance of the offences pursuant to the said FIR.
8. Upon hearing the learned counsel for the parties and on perusal
of the materials
terials on record, particularly the allegations in the complaint
lodged initially by one Bitun Kumar Jena and others which was
registered as Kalinga Nagar P.S. Case No.79 of 2016, and the subsequent
complaint lodged by Basanta Kumar Behera culminating in Kalinga
K
Nagar P.S. Case No.29 of 2017, it appears that both complaints arise out
of a broadly similar incident. However, the complaint lodged at the first
instance was rather cryptic, involving only a few persons allegedly
engaged in share trading under the banner of M/s. Master Capital
Services Limited. It is the contention of the Petitioners that for the self-
self
same cause of action, a criminal prosecution had already been initiated
and a charge-sheet
sheet submitted in connection with the earlier FIR, though
investigation
tigation in the subsequent FIR proceeded independently and also
culminated in submission of charge-sheet.
charge It is further argued that the
learned court below, without proper application of judicial mind and
without duly considering the materials on record, proceeded with G.R.
Case No.228 of 2017, thereby permitting multiplicity of proceedings on
the same cause of action. According to the Petitioners, such parallel
prosecution is impermissible and this Court, in exercise of its inherent
jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C., ought to quash the impugned
order of cognizance.
9. The First Information Report is indeed the initial record of a
cognizable offence, serving as the foundation for initiating investigation
into a crime and marking the commencement of the criminal case. In
T.T. Antony vs. State of Kerala (supra),, the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid
down the general principle that a second
second FIR for the same offence is not
maintainable. However, in subsequent decisions such as Anju
Chaudhary vs. State of U.P. reported in (2013) 6 SCC 384,
384 Kari
Chaudhary vs. Sita Devi reported in (2002) 1 SCC 714, Upkar Singh vs.
Ved Prakash, reported in (2004) 13 SCC 292, Babubhai vs. State of
Gujarat & Others, reported in 2010 (12) SCC 254 and Nirmal Singh
Punjab reported in (2009) 1 SCC 441,
Kahlon vs. State of Punjab, 441 the Hon'ble
Court emphasised and modified the principle by recognising that a
straitjacket formula cannot be applied to reject a second FIR in all
circumstances. The later precedents emphasise that where new facts and
circumstances emerge, disclosing a broader scope of culpability or
revealing involvement of additional persons
persons and transactions, a
subsequent FIR may be entertained notwithstanding its origin from the
same incident.
10. The moot question, therefore, is whether the subsequent criminal
prosecution initiated pursuant to Kalinga Nagar P.S. Case No.29 of 2017
is liable too be quashed on the ground that, for the same occurrence and
cause of action, an earlier FIR had already been lodged and investigation
commenced in connection with Kalinga Nagar P.S. Case No.79 of 2016,
thereby attracting the inherent jurisdiction of this Court under Section
482 Cr.P.C. The position of law regarding maintainability of a second
FIR has been authoritatively considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court
in Upkar Singh vs. Ved Prakash, reported in (2004) 13 SCC 292,
292 as
follows -
"21.
21. From the above itit is clear that even in regard to a
complaint arising out of a complaint on further
investigation if it was found that there was a larger
conspiracy than the one referred to in the previous
complaint then a further investigation under the court
culminating in another complaint is permissible.
22. A perusal of the judgment of this Court in Ram Lal
Narang v. State (Delhi Admn.) [(1979) 2 SCC 322: 1979
SCC (Cri) 479] also shows that even in cases where a
prior complaint is already registered, a counter-complai
counter complaint
is permissible but it goes further and holds that even in
cases where a first complaint is registered and
investigation initiated, it is possible to file a further
complaint by the same complainant based on the material
gathered during the course of investigation.
investigation. Of course,
this larger proposition of law laid down in Ram Lal
Narang case [(1979) 2 SCC 322: 1979 SCC (Cri) 479] is
not necessary to be relied on by us in the present case.
Suffice it to say that the discussion in Ram Lal Narang
case [(1979) 2 SCC 322: 1979 SCC (Cri) 479] is in the
same line as found in the judgments in Kari Choudhary
[(2002) 1 SCC 714: 2002 SCC (Cri) 269] and State of
Bihar v. J.A.C. Saldanha [(1980) 1 SCC 554: 1980 SCC
(Cri) 272: AIR 1980 SC 326] . However, it must be
noticed that in T.T. Antony case (2001) 6 SCC 181: 2001
SCC (Cri) 1048] Ram Lal Narang case [(1979) 2 SCC
322: 1979 SCC (Cri) 479] was noticed but the Court did
not express any opinion either way.
23. Be that as it may, if the law laid down by this Court
in T.T. Antony case [(2001) 6 SCC 181: 2001 SCC (Cri)
1048] is to be accepted as holding that a second
complaint in regard to the same incident filed as a
counter-complaint
complaint is prohibited under the Code then, in
our opinion, such conclusion would lead to serious
consequences
nsequences.. This will be clear from the hypothetical
example given hereinbelow i.e. if in regard to a crime
committed by the real accused he takes the first
opportunity to lodge a false complaint and the same is
registered by the jurisdictional police then the aggrieved
victim of such crime will be recluded from lodging a
complaint giving his version of the incident in question,
consequently he will be deprived of his legitimated right
to bring the real accused to book. This cannot be the
purport of the Code.
Cod
24. We have already noticed that in T.T. Antony case
[(2001) 6 SCC 181:2001 SCC (Cri) 1048] this Court did
not consider the legal right of an aggrieved person to file
counterclaim, on the contrary from the observations
found in the said judgment it clearly indicates that filing
a counter-complaint
complaint is permissible."
permissible.
11. While dealing with a similar matter in connection with the
second FIR, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Anju
Chaudhary Vs. State of U.P. reported in (2013) 6 SCC 384 has held as
follows -
"14.
14. On the plain construction of the language and
scheme of Sections 154, 156 and 190 of the Code, it
cannot be construed or suggested that there can be more
than one FIR about an occurrence. However, the opening
words of Section 154 suggest that that every information
relating to commission of a cognizable offence shall be
reduced into writing by the officer-in-charge
officer charge of a police
station. This implies that there has to be the first
information report about an incident which constitutes a
cognizable offence. The purpose of registering an FIR is
to set the machinery of criminal investigation into
motion, which culminates with filing of the police report
in terms of Section 173(2) of the Code. It will, thus, be
appropriate to follow the settled principle
principle that there
cannot be two FIRs registered for the same offence.
However, where the incident is separate; offences are
similar or different, or even where the subsequent crime
is of such magnitude that it does not fall within the ambit
and scope of the FIR recorded first, then a second FIR
could be registered. The most important aspect is to
examine the inbuilt safeguards provided by the
legislature in the very language of Section 154 of the
Code. These safeguards can be safely deduced from the
principle akinakin to double jeopardy, rule of fair
investigation and further to prevent abuse of power by
the investigating authority of the police. Therefore,
second FIR for the same incident cannot be registered.
Of course, the investigating agency has no determinative
right. It is only a right to investigate in accordance with
the provisions of the Code. The filing of report upon
completion of investigation, either for cancellation or
alleging commission of an offence, is a matter which
once filed before the court of competent
competent jurisdiction
attains a kind of finality as far as police is concerned,
may be in a given case, subject to the right of further
investigation but wherever the investigation has been
completed and a person is found to be prima facie guilty
of committingting an offence or otherwise, re-examination
re examination
by the investigating agency on its own should not be
permitted merely by registering another FIR with regard
to the same offence. If such protection is not given to a
suspect, then possibility of abuse of investigating
investigating powers
by the police cannot be ruled out. It is with this intention
in mind that such interpretation should be given to
Section 154 of the Code, as it would not only further the
object of law but even that of just and fair investigation.
More so, inn the backdrop of the settled canons of
criminal de novo jurisprudence, reinvestigation or
investigation is beyond the competence of not only the
investigating agency but even that of the learned
Magistrate. The courts have taken this view primarily for
thee reason that it would be opposed to the scheme of the
Code and more particularly Section 167(2) of the Code.
(Ref. Reeta Nag v. State of W.B. [(2009) 9 SCC 129:
(2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 1051] and Vinay Tyagi v. Irshad Ali
[(2013) 5 SCC 762] of the same date.)"
date.)
12. In T.T. Antony Vs. State of Kerala
K reported in (2001) 6 SCC
181,, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as follows:-
follows:
"27.
27. A just balance between the fundamental rights of the
citizens under Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution and
the expansive power of the police to investigate a
cognizable offence has to be struck by the court. There
cannot be any controversy that sub-section
sub section (8) of Section
173 CrPC empowers the police to make further
investigation, obtain further evidence (both oral and
documentary) and forward
forward a further report or reports to
the Magistrate. In Narang case [(1979) 2 SCC 322: 1979
SCC (Cri) 479] it was, however, observed that it would
be appropriate to conduct further investigation with the
permission of the court. However, the sweeping power of
investigation does not warrant subjecting a citizen each
time to fresh investigation by the police in respect of the
same incident, giving rise to one or more cognizable
offences, consequent upon filing of successive FIRs
whether before or after filing the final report under
Section 173(2) CrPC. It would clearly be beyond the
purview of Sections 154 and 156 CrPC, nay, a case of
abuse of the statutory power of investigation in a given
case. In our view a case of fresh investigation based on
the second or successive FIRs, not being a counter-case,
case,
filed in connection with the same or connected
cognizable offence alleged to have been committed in the
course of the same transaction and in respect of which
pursuant to the first FIR either investigation is under.
und
way or final report under Section 173(2) has been
forwarded to the Magistrate, may be a fit case for
exercise of power under Section 482 CrPC or under
Articles 226/227 of the Constitution."
Constitution
13. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the matter of State of Rajasthan Vs.
Surendra Singh Rathore reported in 2025 INSC 248, held as follows:-
follows:
"8.5. In Nirmal Singh Kahlon v. State of Punjab this
Court held, in the following terms that when a new
discovery is made, the second FIR would be
maintainable. It was said as follows:
""67.
67. The second FIR, in our opinion, would
be maintainable not only because there were different
versions but when new discovery is made on factual
foundations. Discoveries may be made by the police
authorities at a subsequent stage. Discovery about a
larger
er conspiracy can also surface in another proceeding,
as for example, in a case of this nature. If the police
authorities did not make a fair investigation and left out
conspiracy aspect of the matter from the purview of its
investigation, in our opinion, as and when the same
surfaced, it was open to the State and/or the High Court
to direct investigation in respect of an offence which is
distinct and separate from the one for which the FIR had
already been lodged."
lodged.
8.6. Apart from these judgments, reference
reference can also be
made to Ram Lal Narang v. State (Delhi Admn.);Admn.)
U.P. and P. Sreekumar
Surender Kaushik v. State of U.P.;
v. State of Kerala.
Kerala
9. From the above conspectus of judgments, inter alia,
the following principles emerge regarding the
permissibility of the registration of a second FIR:
9.1 When the second FIR is counter-complaint
counter complaint or
presents a rival version of a set of facts, in reference to
which an earlier FIR already stands registered.
9.2 When the ambit of the two FIRs is different even
though they may arise from the same set of
circumstances.
9.3 When investigation and/or other avenues reveal the
earlier FIR or set of facts to be part of a larger
conspiracy.
9.4 When investigation and/or persons related to the
incident bring to the light hitherto unknown
unknown facts or
circumstances.
9.5 Where the incident is separate; offences are similar or
different.
10. As recorded supra, the High Court found that the
two FIRs were indeed in regard to the same offence and,
therefore, not maintainable, however, in our view the
scope of the two FIRs, as already referred to in para 3
supra, are distinct. The FIR prior in point of time refers
to a particular incident and the action taken therein is
limited. The second FIR pertains to the larger issue of
widespread corruption inin the concerned department and,
therefore, is much larger in its scope than the previous
FIR.
11. Quashing of the FIR would nip the investigation
into such corruption, in the bud. The same would be
against the interest of society.
12. In the attending facts and circumstances, the
judgment referred to in para 1, impugned herein is set
aside and FIR No.131 of 2022 stands restored on the file
of the Anti-Corruption
Corruption Bureau, Jaipur. We direct the
completion of the investigation at the earliest.
earliest. Director
General of Police, Rajasthan, to ensure compliance with
the directions."
directions.
14. From the outline of the aforesaid decisions, it emerges that the
principle against registration of a second FIR, as enunciated in T.T.
Antony (supra), is not an absolute rule of prohibition. The Hon'ble
Supreme Court in Upkar Singh (supra), Anju Chaudhary (supra),
Nirmal Singh Kahlon (supra), and most recently in State of Rajasthan
vs. Surendra Singh Rathore (supra), has consistently clarified that while
multiplicity of FIRs
IRs on the same cause of action is impermissible, a
subsequent FIR may be justified where the allegations disclose a rival
version of the incident, a broader conspiracy, wider involvement of
accused persons, discovery of new facts or circumstances, or a scope
sc of
crime not covered within the first FIR. Thus, the test is not merely one of
chronology but of sameness; if the subsequent FIR traverses a distinct
field of inquiry, either in terms of persons involved, nature of
allegations, or magnitude of offence, its maintainability cannot be
denied.
15. Turning now to the factual matrix of the instant case in the light
of the aforesaid principles, learned counsel for the State has also
produced the written instruction of the I.I.C., Kalinga Nagar P.S., which
indicatess that in Kalinga Nagar P.S. Case No.29 of 2017, many more
witnesses have been examined as compared to Case No.79 of 2016. The
investigation therein has been carried out extensively, collecting a larger
body of material, involving a greater number of accused
accused persons, and
disclosing offences different from those alleged in Case No.79 of 2016.
From the case record it is revealed that about 97 witnesses had invested
their money with the establishment belonging to the accused persons,
and the number of accused arrayed is also significantly higher than in the
earlier case. On a close scrutiny of the allegations made in the complaint
lodged by Basanta Kumar Behera, as against the initial complaint lodged
by Bitun Kumar Jena (in which Behera himself was a signatory),
signatory though
relatable to the same broad transaction, the scope of investigation
concerning the Petitioners in offences under Sections 420/468/406/120-B
420/468/406/120
IPC is materially distinct.
16. In the earlier complaint, the Petitioners were not even shown as
accused, whereas
eas the subsequent investigation has brought to light their
active involvement in fraudulent activities. As held in State of Rajasthan
(supra),, when the earlier action is found to be limited, a second FIR
covering the larger canvas of the fraudulent acts allegedly
allegedly committed by
the Petitioners cannot be treated as identical or repetitive. The second
FIR, therefore, is not only broader in scope but has also culminated in an
elaborate investigation implicating the Petitioners. Hence, the
cognizance taken by the
the learned court below pursuant to the charge-sheet
charge
in Kalinga Nagar P.S. Case No.29 of 2017 cannot be equated with, or
treated as, the same as that in Case No.79 of 2016.
17. It is also borne out from the materials that the Petitioners, from
the very inception,, allured the public into depositing their money with
the dishonest intention of defrauding them. The offences subsequently
revealed thus give rise to a case that necessarily warrants a fair trial, both
in order to secure justice for the victims and to uphold
uphold the confidence of
Digitally Signed
Signed by: BIJAY KETAN SAHOO
society in the rule of law.
Reason: Authentication
Location: HIGH COURT OF ORISSA
Date: 11-Sep-2025 19:09:51
18. This Court, therefore, finds no illegality in the cognizance taken
by the learned court below; and the present Petitions, being devoid of
merit, stand dismissed.
(Chittaranjan Dash)
Judge
Bijay
