M/S. Bridge & Roof Company (India) vs M/S. Adarsh Noble Corporation .... ...
2025 Latest Caselaw 9491 Ori

Orissa High Court

M/S. Bridge & Roof Company (India) vs M/S. Adarsh Noble Corporation .... ... on 29 October, 2025

Author: Murahari Sri Raman

Bench: Murahari Sri Raman

             IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
                          RVWPET No.186 of 2024

   M/s. Bridge & Roof Company (India)                 ....                 Petitioner
   Limited, Kolkata

                             -Versus-
   M/s. Adarsh Noble Corporation                      ....        Opposite Parties
   Limited, Bhubaneswar and others


  Advocates appeared in this case:
         For Petitioner          : Mr. Gautam Mukherji,
                                   Senior Advocate assisted by
                                   Mr. J.P. Behera, Advocate
         For Opposite Party No.1 : Mr. Gouri Mohan Rath,
                                   Advocate

                         CORAM:
               HON' BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
                           AND
         HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MURAHARI SRI RAMAN

                                JUDGMENT

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Date of Hearing and Judgment : 29th October, 2025

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- HARISH TANDON, CJ.

1. The review application is taken out by the unsuccessful

litigant challenging the judgment/order dated 18th June, 2024 passed

by the Division Bench in W.A. No.1124 of 2022 taking multiple

grounds, some of which were not argued at the time of the disposal

of the appeal though claimed to have been taken and some are taken

for the first time on the basis of discovery of new and important

document subsequently unearthed by the petitioner.

2. Though the review application is filed by the same Advocate

on record but by engaging different Senior Counsel, the review

application is sought to be argued. There appears to be confusion in

the mind of the review petitioner on assimilation of the facts and the

arguments advanced at the time of disposal of the writ appeal and,

therefore, we feel it prudent to adumbrate the arguments advanced in

the review application to ensure eradication of any such confusion

arose subsequent to this judgment.

3. The points argued in the review jurisdiction are summarized

as under:

Firstly, the Court while taking into consideration the fact

whether the appellant/opposite party No.1 in the instant application

can claim the status of Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises and a

vital provision of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017

("GST Act" for short) i.e., Section 2(119) thereof was never taken

into account.

Secondly, the factum of registration under the Micro, Small

and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 ("MSMED Act"

for short) was never communicated to the petitioner by the

appellant/opposite party No.1 herein and, therefore, it is not

obligatory on the part of the petitioner to comply with the provisions

of the MSMED Act by treating the petitioner in such capacity.

Thirdly, subsequent to the judgment having delivered, the

petitioner came to know of a Notification dated 24th January, 2024

by virtue whereof a scheme was framed, which postulates that

"works contract" is outside the purview of the MSMED Act.

Lastly, this court has delivered a judgment on 20th

September, 2025 in a writ petition being W.P.(C) No.30966 of 2024

in which the appellant was arrayed as opposite party, wherein it is

held that the provision of MSMED Act is not applicable. It is

submitted that the award passed in exercise of the jurisdiction

conferred under the said Act is without jurisdiction and, therefore, to

be set aside.

4. The aforementioned four points taken by Mr. Gautam

Mukherji, learned Senior Counsel needs scrutiny on the parameter

of the scope and the jurisdiction exercised by the Court while

dealing with an application for review. The points have been coined

and/or engineered at the time of argument and eloquently advanced

before this court in pursuit of seeking review as the judgment dated

18th June, 2024 contains a patent error and on the discovery of a new

and important document, the same cannot occupy the space in the

legal field.

4.1. The rhetoric and the legal jargon of the learned Senior

Counsel invited the Court to deeply ponder upon the aforesaid

aspects to find out whether any case is made out in the review

application or same being a pure question of law can be permitted to

be agitated in the review jurisdiction.

5. Before we embark our journey on the terrain of scope and

jurisdiction exercised by the Court in dealing with an application for

review, the broad principles are required to be recapitulated and/or

restated. So far as the writ Courts are concerned, though they are not

strictly guided by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure,

1908 ("CPC"), yet the principles akin thereto is ingrained and

inhered in invoking such jurisdiction and in that sense the parameter

concerning Order XLVII, Rule 1 of the CPC becomes applicable.

The power to review its own judgment is inhered and ingrained into

the writ Court provided the parameters set forth in this regard is

eminently and evidently manifest from the pleadings as well as the

documents annexed in the proceedings. The power of review is

primarily founded to eradicate any patent error and not for

rehearing, re-visitation and/or rewriting of the judgment.

5.1. In an adversarial system of adjudication, the importance of

pleading is inevitable as the other side cannot be put on surprise at

the time of argument, when a new point de hors the pleading is

taken before the Court. The importance of pleading the facts is

imbibed into the adversarial system of jurisdiction to advance the

justice oriented approach by providing adequate opportunity to the

adversary to meet the same and be not put on surprise at the time of

argument. Even while exercising the review jurisdiction, the

grounds for review must be explicitly, lucidly and with precision be

pleaded. It would invite an anomalous situation if the Court permits

the parties to argue a point de hors the pleading; in this regard, the

importance of pleading assumes a pivotal role in adjudicatory

process. The Court should not encourage the argument by making a

case at the Bar in absence of any foundation laid in the pleading.

5.2. The aforesaid observations become necessary for the reason

that the points urged before us is to be scrutinized and/or determined

on the score whether the same has been expressly and/or

categorically pleaded in an application for review. Reverting back to

the scope and the jurisdiction of review, it is to be remembered that

there is a vast distinction between the order suffers from patent error

and the order which may be termed as erroneous and/or infirm. In

former case, the Court may exercise the review jurisdiction as the

error apparent on the face of the record should not be permitted to

remain on record; on the other hand, in the latter case, such

judgment and order is susceptible to be challenged before the higher

forum where the entire issue shall remain writ at large.

5.3. The review can also be made on discovery of a new and

important document which despite due diligence was not within the

knowledge of the applicant provided such new and important

document has a material bearing on the issue so decided. Any fringe

material having no material bearing on the decision or may add

something into the judgment without disturbing the core fabric of

the ultimate decision, may not be permitted to be taken on record as

it would simply invite the Court to articulate the judgment with a

new get up.

5.4. Mere discovery of a new and important document does not

absolve the onerous duty cast upon the applicant to satisfy the Court

on the concept of due diligence; the duty cast upon the applicant

under Order XLVII, Rule 1 of the CPC. It is a fundamental policy of

the country that every litigation must attain finality to achieve such

principles not only the Limitation Act, 1963 is promulgated so that

the lethargic and dormant litigant should not be allowed to approach

the Court after a considerable period of time but various forms of

estoppel have also been imbibed within the legal parlance. If no

restriction is imposed in pursuing the remedy after a considerable

period of time, it would permeate the sense of uncertainty into the

citizenry and no litigation would be treated to have been finally

decided. Though the review is a statutory remedy, yet circumscribed

by the conditions so recognized in order to bring it within the

limited compass and to avoid rehearing and/or re-visitation of the

case. Such being the broader principle, let us examine the

aforementioned four points urged before us for the purpose of

reviewing the judgment impugned in the instant review application.

6. So far as the plea of discovery of a new and important

document is concerned, the reliance is placed upon the Notification

dated 24th January, 2024 published in the Odisha Gazette

Extraordinary on 1st February, 2024 as well as a subsequent Office

Memorandum dated 5th March, 2025 reaffirming and/or restating the

content of the Notification dated 24th January, 2024. By virtue of

such notification, a policy was framed by the Government which, in

unequivocal terms, excludes the works contract outside the purview

of the MSMED Act.

6.1. The consideration which needs in this regard is whether the

petitioner is able to satisfy by making adequate pleading on its

discovery despite due diligence. The review petition running in

several pages does not contain a single averment on the discovery of

those documents nor any whisper can be traced out touching upon

due diligence.

6.2. Reliance is placed upon a recent judgment of the apex Court

in the case of Malleeswari v. K. Suguna and Another, reported in

2025 INSC 1080, wherein the apex Court succinctly jotted down the

grounds which come within the ambit of the review in the following:

"17. Having noticed the distinction between the power of review and appellate power, we restate the power and scope of review jurisdiction. Review grounds are summed up as follows:

17.1 The ground of discovery of new and important matter or evidence is a ground available if it is demonstrated that, despite the exercise of due diligence, this evidence was not within their knowledge or could not be produced by the party at the time, the original decree or order was passed. 17.2 Mistake or error apparent on the face of the record may be invoked if there is something more than a mere error, and it must be the one which is manifest on the face of the record Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Syed Ahmad Ishaque, (1955) 1 SCR 1104. Such an error is a patent error and not a mere wrong decision T.C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa : AIR 1954 SC 440. An error which has to be established by a long-drawn process of reasoning on points where there may conceivably be two opinions can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record Satyanarayan Laxminarayan Hegde v. Mallikarjun Bhavanappa Tirumale, AIR 1960 SC 137.

17.3 Lastly, the phrase „for any other sufficient reason‟ means a reason that is sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified in the other two categories Chhajju Ram v. Neki, 1922 SCC OnLine PC 11 and approved in Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Mar Poulose Athanasius, (1954) 2 SCC 42."

6.3. There is no quarrel to the proposition of law laid down in the

aforesaid judgment with regard to the maintainability of a review

application and exercise of power by the Court. While the Court

considers the point must satisfy itself the grounds by way of which

the review is permissible and to be satisfied that pleading of the

party has discharged the onus cast upon him.

6.4. In paragraph-17.1 of the above judgment, the apex Court has

said that unless it is demonstrated by the applicant that despite due

diligence the new and important matter or the evidence could not be

discovered or within the knowledge or could not be produced at the

time when the final order was passed, the Court should not proceed

simplicitor on the ipse dixit of the said document. The expression

"despite the exercise of due diligence" has to be given a due regard

while considering a new and important piece of evidence and/or

material.

6.5. The legislators do not use any word or expression

unnecessarily nor superfluously as every word and expression used

in the statute is to be interpreted in the manner in which it is so used

keeping in mind the intent and the purport underlying incorporation

thereof. Omission or segregation of the word from a statutory

provision which would render the core value thereof redundant or

otiose should be eschewed. The Court while adopting the

interpretative tools as recognized must give importance to each word

and/or expression in order to decipher the legislative intent and

above all to make the said provision workable in the legal field.

Thus the exercise of due diligence having incorporated in relation to

the discovery of a new and important piece of document and/or

material the legislature has cast an onerous duty on the applicant not

only to plead but also satisfy the conscience of the Court. The Court

should not proceed to decide the matter or apply any document

subsequently brought by way of an application for review on the

eloquence of the Senior Counsel standing at the Bar, more

particularly, when the foundational facts are conspicuously lacking

in the pleading.

6.6. As indicated hereinabove, the content of the review

application narrated in several paragraphs does not contain a single

whisper on the due diligence and, therefore, we do not find that the

grounds taken by the applicant are acceptable. Taking a plea of an

error apparent on the face of the record, it reminded us of our

solemn duty to ascertain whether the "error" can come within the

four corners of the record. Every error is not capable of being

corrected while exercising the review jurisdiction but the error must

be of such magnitude which can be detected on the face of the

record. Any error required to be found after making a roving enquiry

into the voluminous documents cannot be termed as an error

apparent on the face of the record nor should the review jurisdiction

be exercised under such parameter, solely on the basis of what can

be logically deduced from the record.

6.7. The error is sought to be brought within the bracket of the

error apparent on the face of the record solely on the basis of the

points, which according to the Senior Counsel, are relevant and

germane from the record, which has not been taken into account

while disposing of the appeal. According to him, Section 2(119) of

the CGST Act has not been taken into account by the Court and,

therefore, if the relevant provision of the statute is not considered, it

comes within the four corners of the error apparent on the face of the

record.

7. It is further submitted that the Court has not taken into

consideration the other grounds of challenge and having not taken

so, it would be termed that the said judgment contains a patent error.

As indicated hereinabove, the learned Senior Counsel engaged in the

review application was not engaged to argue the appeal or the writ

petition. There is no fetter on the part of the counsel to argue on a

point which he feels would impinge the judgment and if such

restricted point is taken and decided by the Court, it is not proper

that the litigant by engaging another senior counsel termed the said

judgment containing an error apparent on the face of the record. A

litigant should not be permitted to prevaricate its stand at different

stages of the litigation. Once the argument is restricted to a point

which impliedly tantamount to abandonment of the other points, it is

not open for the said litigant by engaging a new counsel to contend

that other points which he took ought to have been decided by the

Court and there appears to be an error apparent on the face of the

record.

7.1. Any such latitude given to the litigant who at the different

tiers of the adjudicatory process involves different legal experts, it

would invite a chaotic situation and an unscrupulous litigant may

steal the march with its potential resources at its disposal. We do not

find that any such plea was taken nor any foundation could be

discerned before the division Bench which disposed of the appeal

and, therefore, if such points are allowed to be taken under the

purview of the error apparent on the face of the record, it will invite

a re-visitation of the case and a new judgment would be delivered,

which in our opinion, is not permissible under the review

jurisdiction.

8. A plea is also taken that the applicant cannot take the benefit

under the MSMED Act as the factum of registration was never made

known to the applicant/petitioner herein. It is arduously submitted

by Mr. Mukherji, learned Senior Counsel that unless the

applicant/petitioner was made aware by the appellant/opposite party

No.1 herein that he has subsequently got himself registered under

the said Act, it was not obligatory on the part of the petitioner to

treat him as an MSME for availing all the benefits and the remedies

provided under the said Act.

8.1. The aforesaid submission, in our opinion, does not hold

water from the fact deciphered from the judgment under review. In

paragraph-1 of the impugned judgment, which contains the

arguments advanced by the petitioner, we find the plea having taken

therein relates to the applicability of the MSMED Act from the

retrospective date when the agreement was entered into as

admittedly the appellant/opposite party No.1 herein was not

registered under the said Act on such date.

9. A further plea was taken on a coram non-judice so far as the

arbitration proceedings are concerned and apart from the same, we

do not find any other point to have been taken. In paragraph-2 of the

impugned judgment, the Court framed the question on the crucial

date for determination of the applicability or otherwise of the

provisions under Section 18 of the MSMED Act in case of a

supplier coming within the meaning of Section 2(n) of the said Act

whether to apply from the date of the contract or from the date of an

actual supply.

9.1. In pursuit of determining the aforesaid points, it is expressly

recorded that the appellant/opposite party No.1 filed a Memorandum

on 13th December, 2015 with the authority and such memorandum

conveys a laudable message that he has been subsequently registered

under the MSMED Act. In paragraph-22.1, the Court also records

the same and held that the petitioner is entitled to all the benefits

under the said Act subsequent to the filing of the memorandum

dated 13th December, 2015. What can be logically deduced

therefrom that any supply or transaction made prior thereto was not

claimed as a beneficiary under the said Act but if such benefit was

claimed only after the supply was made subsequent to the said

memorandum dated 13th December, 2015, it is inconceivable that the

applicant was not aware that the appellant/opposite party No.1 has

not registered himself within the provisions of the said Act and the

moment the point has been taken and decided by the Court, we do

not think that such point can be re-agitated in the garb of review.

10. In view of the findings made hereinabove, we do not think

that it is a fit case to review the judgment and order dated 18 th June,

2024 passed in W.A. No.1124 of 2022.

11. Accordingly, the review petition is dismissed. Pending

Interlocutory Application, if any, stands disposed of.

                                 (M.S. Raman)                       (Harish Tandon)
                                   Judge                              Chief Justice




S. Behera/
Sisira






       Signed by: SISIRA KUMAR BEHERA
       Designation: Junior Stenographer
       Reason: Authentication
       Location: High Court of Orissa, Cuttack
       Date: 07-Nov-2025 15:44:44