Orissa High Court
M/S. Piyali Chakravarty vs The Revenue Divisional .... Opposite ... on 27 October, 2025
Author: Murahari Sri Raman
Bench: Murahari Sri Raman
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
RVWPET Nos.146, 147, 148 and 149 of 2023
M/s. Piyali Chakravarty .... Petitioner
-Versus-
The Revenue Divisional .... Opposite Parties
Commissioner (Northern Division),
Sambalpur and others
Advocates appeared in these cases:
For Petitioner : Mr. Surya Prasad Misra,
Senior Advocate assisted by
Ms. S. Rout, Advocate
For Opposite Parties : Mrs. Suman Pattanayak,
Additional Government
Advocate
CORAM:
HON' BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
AND
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MURAHARI SRI RAMAN
JUDGMENT
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Date of Hearing and Judgment : 27th October, 2025
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HARISH TANDON, CJ.
1. The instant applications for review are against the common
order dated 20th March, 2023 passed in W.P.(C) Nos.13399 of 2017,
13580 of 2017, 13582 of 2017 and 13583 of 2017, whereby and
whereunder the aforementioned writ petitions were dismissed
primarily on the ground of delay and laches having attributed to the
conduct of the review petitioner.
2. The undisputed facts so unfold would indicate that the
predecessor of the petitioner was settled with the nazrul land by
executing a lease deed in his favour which expired by efflux of time.
After the expiration of the period of the lease and the original lessee
having expired in the meantime, an application for renewal thereof
was taken out by the successor of the lessee.
2.1. Amidst the pendency thereof, a portion of the demised land
was carved out and vested with the Government and ultimately the
lease was granted to the surviving successor in respect of a
remaining portion. Settlement of the land and the execution of the
lease deed was challenged by opposite party Nos.4 and 5 (RVWPET
No.146 of 2023) by approaching the Revenue Divisional
Commissioner (Northern Division), Sambalpur (in short „the RDC‟)
with an additional prayer for settlement of the portion of the
demised land in their favour on the strength of being in settled
possession thereof. The RDC rejected the said application/appeal/
revision, which was challenged by the opposite party Nos.4 to 7
(RVWPET No.148 of 2023) in W.P.(C) No.10239 of 2012, which
was heard along with the other batch of writ petitions. The said writ
petition was disposed of on 13th September, 2012 in the following:
"Heard Mr. Mohapatra, learned counsel for the
petitioners and learned Additional Government
Advocate.
2. The claim of the petitioners to a portion of the
case land is by virtue of an unregistered document
executed in favour of the petitioners'predecessor-Ram
Shrestha Tiwari and by so-called original lessees, Sova
Chakravorty and Jyotsnanath Sen whose original Nazul
lease had been renewed. The renewal lease in favour of
Sova Chakravorty was disbelieved by the Revenue
Divisional Commissioner who cancelled such lease and
as such the sub-lease in favour of the petitioners'
predecessor. At the same time, the petitioners'
application for settlement of the land for residential
purpose has been rejected by the Revenue Divisional
commissioner.
3. The relevant portion of the order dated
23.05.2012 of the Revenue Divisional commissioner,
Northern Division, Sambalpur is quoted hereunder:
"23......As to the claims of the appellants,
it is construed that they have said to have
been in possession of the land long since.
The appellant in Case No.5/2001 has
produced an unregistered document, appears
to have been signed by Sova Chakravarty,
wherein she wanted to pass on an area of
Ac.0.08, Ac.0.05 and Ac.0.05 in favour of
Ramshresth Tiwari S/O late Kirtan Tiwari
(husband of appellant in appeal No.5/01),
Krushna Putel S/O late Raghunath Putel
(Father of appellant in Appeal No.3/2001)
and Muna Putel S/O late B. Putel (Father of
appellant in Appeal No.4/2001) if the land
would be renewed in her favour. This
document was not agitated at the time of
filing the appeal. The manner of the writing
of the document clearly indicates that it has
been manufactured afterwards, with a view
to strengthen their stand. However, since
Sova Chakraarty had not accrued her right,
title over the case land by the time of writing
the above mentioned document in the year
1982, there is no legal ground to accept it.
As such the claim of the appellant in the
appeal case Nos.3, 4 and 5/2001 become
infructuous."
With the aforesaid finding the Revenue
Divisional Commissioner, Northern Division,
Sambalpur rejected the appeal of the petitioners and at
the same time in para-24 rejected their petition for
settlement under the provisions of O.G.L.S. Act.
4. In our considered opinion, the appeal of the
petitioners has been rightly dismissed by the Revenue
Divisional Commissioner, Northern Division,
Sambalpur. But we feel that he should have
independently dealt with the claim of the petitioners for
settlement under the OGLS Act and passed necessary
orders. Accordingly, the order and observation in
respect of rejection of the petitioners' application for
settlement under the OGLS Act is set aside.
5. Let the Revenue Divisional Commissioner,
Northern Division, Sambalpur take a decision on the
claim of the petitioners for settlement. The application of
the petitioners pending before the Tahasildar,
Sambalpur be transferred to the Revenue Divisional
Commissioner, Northern Division, Sambalpur. The
Revenue Divisional Commissioner shall consider the
same within a period of three months from the date of
communication of this order and pass necessary orders.
The writ application is dismissed.
All interim orders stand vacated.
Issue urgent certified copy."
2.2. After the said order was passed and the matter was relegated
to the RDC, the review petitioner filed the writ petitions challenging
the order of the RDC which by the impugned order dated 20 th
March, 2023 was dismissed, primarily on the ground of delay and
laches. The review applications are filed on a premise that the said
order dated 20th March, 2023 contains an error apparent on the face
of the record and, therefore, comes within the purview of the Order-
XLVII, Rule-1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 ("CPC").
3. Mr. Surya Prasad Misra, learned Senior Counsel appearing
for the review petitioner(s) submits that the observation of the
Division Bench in dismissing the writ petition on the ground of
delay and laches is contrary to the settled proposition of law that the
Court should not take such plea after the matter has matured for
hearing and placed reliance upon a Constitution Bench decision of
the Apex Court in case on P.B. Roy v. Union of India reported in
(1972) 3 SCC 432.
3.1. Learned Senior Counsel would further submit that once the
explanation is offered in the writ petition constituting the sufficient
cause in not approaching the Court promptly, the Court ought not to
have dismissed the writ petition on the ground of delay and laches as
the technicalities cannot overweigh substantial justice and placed
reliance upon an unreported judgment of the apex Court rendered in
case of State of Jharkhand and others v. Azadul Haque and
Another (Special Leave Petition (Civil) Diary No.3916 of 2025
decided on 12th September, 2025.
3.2. He further submits that this Bench in case of Manjulata Bag
v. State of Odisha and others (W.A. No.539 of 2025 decided on 1st
May, 2025) held that it is not obligatory to explain the delay if the
writ petition has been filed within the normal period of limitation
and, therefore, the impugned order passed on 20th March, 2023 is
liable to be reviewed. He thus submits that the Division Bench has
misinterpreted the expression "disposed of" to be akin to
"dismissed" and, therefore, such misinterpretation leads to a patent
error inviting invocation of the review jurisdiction by the Court.
3.3. Though feebly, yet, it is submitted by learned Senior
Counsel that once the order of the RDC was set aside by the Court,
it would not have restricted the hearing of the revisional application
filed before the RDC to the extent of claim of the opposite party
Nos.4 and 5 but should have permitted the said application to be
decided de novo by providing the right of hearing to the review
petitioner to support the decision of the Collector passed in its
favour.
3.4. It is lastly submitted that there is an apparent error on the
face of the record and, therefore, the Court should not hesitate to
exercise the power of review vested upon it.
4. Per contra, learned counsel for the contesting opposite
parties submits that the review applications are intended to reopen
the issue which has already been decided in the order dated 20 th
March, 2023. It is further submitted that there cannot be any error
apparent on the face of the record as the Court clearly and explicitly
indicated in the said order that there is delay and laches on the part
of the review petitioner. It is, thus, submitted that there is no fetter
on the part of the writ Court to dismiss the writ petition, if the party
has approached the writ Court belatedly and once such decision is
taken, it is not amenable to be reviewed on the pretext of non-
consideration of the sufficiency of the cause.
5. On the conspectus of the aforesaid facts, the first and
foremost point emerged in the instant review applications is whether
the order dated 20th March, 2023 suffers from any infirmities, which
can be termed as an error apparent on the face of the record for
invocation of the powers of review conferred upon the Court.
6. Before we proceed to decide the case on the factual matrix
involved in the instant applications for review, it would be apposite
to recapitulate the nuances of the review jurisdiction exercised by
the Court. It is no longer res integra that the writ Court inheres the
power of review as a plenary jurisdiction and once it exercises such
power it has to pass the muster of the grounds conferred under
Order-XLVII, Rule 1 of the CPC. The order which contains an error
apparent on the face of the record is capable of being reviewed and,
therefore, it is an ardent duty of the Court to find out whether the
order sought to be reviewed contained such patent error. The error
which is to be deciphered from the logical inferences to be drawn
from the observation made in the impugned judgment/order or
requires a roving inquiry into voluminous papers cannot come
within the periphery of the error apparent on the face of the record.
6.1. A distinction is to be drawn between an erroneous order and
order containing an error apparent on the face of the record. In
former case, it is open to the litigant to approach the higher forum to
have such order set aside but in latter case, there is no quarrel to the
proposition of law that the Court which passed the order is capable
of reviewing the same on a perceived error apparent on the face of
the record. The distinction is real and apparent and, therefore, the
Court has to draw a line in between an erroneous order and an order
containing an error apparent on the face of the record. The review
jurisdiction is never intended to revisit or re-write the order. It has to
be exercised within the strict parameters set forth in this regard and
does not give a second chance to the litigant to reargue the matter
inviting the attention of the Court that the Court passing an order
which is a subject matter of challenge in the review jurisdiction
ought to have been decided in such way or a particular way.
7. Having taken into consideration the broad principles
touching upon the exercise of review jurisdiction, let us embark our
journey on the factual terrain in order to ascertain whether the order
dated 20th March, 2023 suffers from such patent infirmity or an error
amenable to be reviewed by the Court.
8. Indubitably, the land was settled in favour of the petitioner
on the strength of the order of the Collector and a lease deed was
also executed in her favour. The said settlement as well as the lease
deed was assailed by the opposite party Nos.4 and 5 along with
others before the RDC with an additional prayer for settlement of
the portion of the land in their favour. The order of the RDC can be
dissected into two parts; firstly, the claim of the opposite party Nos.
4 and 5 along with others to settle the portion of the demised land in
their favour, was rejected by the RDC and secondly, the order of the
Collector in settling the land in favour of the review petitioner was
set aside. A person can approach the Court provided he is an
aggrieved person. The opposite party Nos.4 and 5 along with others
challenged the order of the RDC and, therefore, it is the paramount
duty of the Court to ascertain as to whether the order of the RDC
was challenged in its entirety or was restricted to the portion, which
affects the right of the person, who filed the writ petition. Even if,
the pleadings do not indicate with clarity and the precision but one
can reasonably gather the intention that is manifested from the
portion of the order passed by the Court in disposing the said writ
petition. The order dated 13.09.2012 as quoted hereinabove is
indicative of the fact that the portion of the order by which the claim
of the opposite party Nos.4 and 5 along with others was rejected and
set aside was assailed in the writ petition. Any other interpretation
would frustrate the intent and the purport evident from the
expression "accordingly, the order and observation in respect of
rejection of the petitioner‟s application for settlement under the
OGLS Act is set aside". One can safely proceed on a bare reading of
the said expression and/or observation that the order of the RDC,
which contains two parts was interfered with, so far as the claim of
the opposite party Nos.4 and 5 and the others are concerned, the
remaining portion of the order of the RDC remained untouched. The
law does not put any fetter on the Court to set aside the portion of
the impugned order keeping the other portion intact and the
observations made by the Court should be construed to be restricted
to the portion which is interfered with and not on the remaining
portion. The person, who emerged successful in achieving the relief
in part cannot be said to be aggrieved person so far as such part is
concerned and, therefore, the Court while disposing of the writ
petition on 13.09.2012 was conscious of such facts and interfered
with the order of the RDC to the extent by which the claim of the
opposite party Nos.4 and 5 and others were rejected.
8.1. Law does not put any fetter on the person, who suffered the
other portion of the same order to challenge the same by taking out
an independent proceeding. In fact, the same is done by the review
petitioner by taking out any independent writ petition but the Court
refused to entertain the same on the ground of delay and laches. The
Constitution Bench in P.B. Roy (supra) held that there is no hard
and fast rule that the Court should reject the writ petition on the
ground of delay and the moment the explanation is offered, the
Court must decide the matter on merit in the following:
"8. The learned Judge who had initially heard the
petition had pointed out that the representation of the
Appellant was first rejected on July 29, 1960, and that it
did not matter that the petitioner had continued making
subsequent representations. The learned Judge had
noticed the explanation that the petitioner could not
approach the court as he was admitted to a Tuberculosis
Clinic in June 1961. The learned Judge, having found
that this was not sufficient to explain the delay between
July 29, 1960 and June 1961 was disposed to reject the
petition on the ground of laches. But, in view of the
decision of the majority of the Full Bench of the Punjab
High Court in S. Gurmej Singh v. Election Tribunal,
Gurdaspur [1964 PLR 589] the delay in filing the
petition was overlooked on the ground that, after the
admission of a writ petition and hearing of arguments,
the Rule that delay may defeat the rights of a party is
relaxed and need not be applied if his case is "positively
good"."
8.2. It admits no ambiguity that if a party approaching the Court
belatedly has offered an explanation, which satisfies the conscience
of the Court, it would not be proper on the part of the Court to reject
the writ petition on the ground of delay and laches. The Court
should not adopt the pedantic approach in dismissing the writ
petition after the parties were invited to exchange affidavits and the
matter matured at the stage of hearing as every litigation should be
decided on its merit which furthered the fundamental policy of the
country that a person should be heard before any adjudication is
made affecting the rights of the citizenry. The Constitution Bench in
the above report does not rule out the power of the writ Court to
dismiss the petition on the ground of delay and laches and, therefore,
has to be applied in a fact scenario, which is compatible to the facts
of the above report. Admittedly, the writ petition, being W.P.(C)
No.13399 of 2017, was disposed of at the stage of admission though
a notice was issued to the opposite parties therein. Mere issuance of
the notice does not ipso facto makes the writ petition admitted as at
times such notices are issued calling upon the opposite parties as to
why such writ petition should not be admitted. We do not find there
was any direction passed by the Court to exchange the affidavits and
the writ petition was disposed of at the admission stage.
8.3. While applying the ratio decidendi of a judgment, the first
and foremost duty is to find out in the context in which the same is
used. The observations made in the judgment should not be applied
treating the same as ratio thereof in isolation of the context in which
it is so used. The disparity in facts or an additional fact may invite a
different proposition of law and, therefore, the Court must be
conscious in applying the ratio in an adjunct manner but should find
the parity of facts or some similarity of facts. The Constitution
Bench was considering a case where the parties were directed to
exchange affidavits and several orders were passed in this regard but
the High Court dismissed the writ petition on the ground of delay
and laches. In the backdrop of the said facts, it was held that it is not
proper on the part of the Court to dismiss the writ petition on the
ground of delay and laches once the affidavits were exchanged. It
was further held that once the explanation, which constitutes the
expression "sufficient cause" is pleaded in the writ petition, it would
not be proper for the Court to dismiss petition/application on the
ground of delay and laches.
8.4. In the instant case, though the explanation appears to have
been offered but the moment the Court proceeded to dismiss the writ
petition on the ground of delay and laches, it necessarily implies that
the explanation so offered does not appear to be sufficient enough
for the purpose of condoning the conduct of the parties in
approaching the Court belatedly. The sufficiency of the cause is to
be judged in a subjective manner and once the Count finds that the
explanation is not convincing or put any fetter into the litigants to
approach the Court in a time bound manner, we do not find any
absolute proposition of law that the writ Court is denuded of its
power in not rejecting the writ petition on the ground of delay and
laches.
8.5. It is the satisfaction of the concerned Judge in treating the
explanation as a plausible one and it is also open to the Judge to take
a view that such explanation is not sufficient to discard the delay
attributed to the conduct of the litigant. There may be a possibility of
two views to be taken on the basis of such explanation and if one is
taken, even if the other appears to be more reasonable or plausible
does not invite the Court to exercise its review jurisdiction. Even if
the findings appears to be somewhat erroneous, it is open to the
litigant to move the higher forum to have the same adjudicated upon
but cannot come within the bracket of "error apparent on the face of
the record".
8.6. The subsequent unreported judgment of the apex Court in
Azadul Haque (supra), the Court was considering an application for
condonation of delay at the behest of the State and held that the
immobility in the Government department is not unknown as
"bureaucratic lethargy" which is ingrained and inhered in the system
and, therefore, the substantial justice, which is a crest on the head of
a serpent, should prevail in the following:
"6. Keeping the aforestated principles in mind when the
facts on hand are examined, we observe that the cause
shown for the delay has been explained as the officials
being involved in Special Summary Revision 2024 and
also in the programme of "Sarkar Aapke Dwaar".
Though the cause shown in the application for
condonation of delay is casual, this Court cannot lose
sight of the fact that the State being an impersonal
machinery moves at a snail's pace, there will be no
personal interest of the officials in withholding the file.
Even when there is bureaucratic lethargy, the
substantial justice cannot be sacrificed at the cost of
public good. Under similar circumstances, this Court in
the Case of State of Nagaland vs Lipok Ao & Ors., 2005
(3) SCC 752 has held:
"12. In O.P. Kathpalia v. Lakhmir Singh [(1984) 4 SCC
66] a Bench of three Judges had held that if the refusal
to condone the delay results in grave miscarriage of
justice, it would be a ground to condone the delay.
Delay was accordingly condoned. In Collector, Land
Acquisition v. Katiji [(1987) 2 SCC 107] a Bench of two
Judges considered the question of limitation in an
appeal filed by the State and held that Section 5 was
enacted in order to enable the court to do substantial
justice to the parties by disposing of matters on merits.
The expression "sufficient cause" is adequately elastic
to enable the court to apply the law in a meaningful
manner which subserves the ends of justice -- that being
the life purpose for the existence of the institution of
courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been
making a justifiably liberal approach in matters
instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear
to have percolated down to all the other courts in the
hierarchy. This Court reiterated that the expression
"every day's delay must be explained" does not mean
that a pedantic approach should be made. The doctrine
must be applied in a rational, common-sense, pragmatic
manner. When substantial justice and technical
considerations are pitted against each other, cause of
substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other
side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being
done because of a non-deliberate delay. There is no
presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on
account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala
fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to
delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. Judiciary is not
respected on account of its power to legalise injustice on
technical grounds but because it is capable of removing
injustice and is expected to do so. Making a justice-
oriented approach from this perspective, there was
sufficient cause for condoning the delay in the institution
of the appeal. The fact that it was the State which was
seeking condonation and not a private party was
altogether irrelevant. The doctrine of equality before
law demands that all litigants, including the State as a
litigant, are accorded the same treatment and the law is
administered in an even-handed manner. There is no
warrant for according a stepmotherly treatment when
the State is the applicant. The delay was accordingly
condoned."
7. In these circumstances, we are of the considered view
that certain amount of latitude requires to be extended
when administrative delay is pleaded. In the present
case the facts unfolded would indicate that the cause for
the delay has been explained namely it is contended that
concerned officials were deputed on other official
assignments. Thus, delay seems to be not intentional.
The writ applicant who had succeeded before the
learned Single Judge can be suitably compensated for
espousing his cause in the appellate Court and before
this Court by award of realistic cost of Rs.1,00,000/-
payable by the State. The payment of cost to the writ
applicant will be condition precedent for the appeal
being taken up on Board and disposed of its own merit.
It is made clear that we have not expressed any opinion
on the merits and subject to the observations made
hereinabove, the appeal is allowed. The impugned order
dated 28.10.2024 passed in I.A. No.9029/2024 in L.P.A.
(Filing) No.6893/2024 is set aside and the application
filed under Section 5 of Act in I.A. No.9029/2024 in
L.P.A. (Filing) No.6893/2024 stands allowed and intra-
Court appeal is returned to file of the High Court. The
aforestated cost imposed shall be paid to the writ
applicant within eight weeks from today and it is
needless to state that the State would be at liberty to
recover the cost from the officers responsible for the
delay, if they deem fit."
8.7. Even our judgment rendered in Manjulata Bag (supra) as
relied upon by the petitioner is a repository of the proposition of law
concerning the condonation of delay, wherein it is held that there is
no obligation on the part of the litigant to offer an explanation, if the
proceeding is initiated within the normal period of limitation
provided for institution of the suit. The aforementioned reports are
pointer to an issue that the Court must take a pragmatic approach as
opposed to a pedantic approach in dealing with the cause concerning
the delay in approaching the Court within the period of limitation
provided therefor.
8.8. We are conscious that the Limitation Act, 1963 does not
contain any provision relating to the filing of the writ petition under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India. However, it has been held
in a catena of decisions that if for the self-same cause of action, the
suit is to be filed within the period of limitation provided therefor,
then once the approach is made to a writ Court within such period of
limitation, the same cannot be defeated nor be dismissed on the
ground of delay and laches nor any explanation is required to be
offered in this regard. Once the approach is made with delay after a
considerable period, it is imperative on the litigant to offer an
explanation which constrained him in approaching the Court
promptly. The plea of infringement of fundamental right stands on a
different pedestal than the invocation of the statutory right or the
contractual right admissible to a litigant.
8.9. Ordinarily, the Court should not defeat the writ petition
founded upon the facts concerning the violation of the fundamental
rights enshrined under Part-III of the Constitution of India on the
ground of delay and laches as the infringement and/or violation is a
recurring cause of action and continues till the same is remedied. If a
person sat over his other rights for a considerable period, he cannot
approach the Court after a long hiatus and seek the blessings to
decide the case on merit instead of dismissing on the ground of
delay and laches. Law does not support the indolent.
8.10. The words „dismissal‟ and „disposal‟ are interchangeable at
times being used to convey the same message or to achieve the same
distinction. Mere using the expression "dismissal" instead of
"disposal" does not invite a patent error the moment the latent
intention becomes patent from the observations preceding the same.
The Court was conscious in this regard and had taken a decision that
the conduct of the petitioner does not instill confidence that he was
prevented by sufficient cause. Such satisfaction does not invite an
error having committed on the face of the record and, therefore, we
do not find that it is a fit case for exercising the powers and the
jurisdiction concerning the review of its own order.
9. These review applications, therefore, fail. No order as to
costs.
(M.S. Raman) (Harish Tandon)
Judge Chief Justice
S.K. Jena/Secy.
Sisira Ku Behera/Steno
Location: High Court of Orissa, Cuttack.
