Orissa High Court
Sahina Bano And Others vs Wasim Akhter Warsi .... Opp. Party on 22 October, 2025
Author: Chittaranjan Dash
Bench: Chittaranjan Dash
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
CRLMC No.928 of 2022
Sahina Bano and Others .... Petitioners
Mr. B. K. Sharma, Senior Advocate
-versus-
Wasim Akhter Warsi .... Opp. Party
Mr. Mohammed Mustak, Advocate
CORAM:
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE CHITTARANJAN DASH
Date of Judgment: 22.10.2025
Chittaranjan Dash, J.
1. By means of this application, the Petitioners seek to quash
the order dated 18.12.2021 passed by the learned SDJM,
Sambalpur, in I.C.C. Case No. 256 of 2021, whereby the learned
court took cognizance of the offences alleged against the Petitioners
pursuant to a complaint filed by the Opposite Party under Sections
384/506/34 of the IPC.
2. The background facts of the case are that the Petitioners and
the Opposite Party are related to each other. Petitioner No.1, a
widow, is the biological sister of the Opposite Party, while
Petitioner Nos. 2 and 3 are her sons. As the Petitioners had no
residence of their own, they were permitted to occupy a house
belonging to the Opposite Party on rent in the year 2013-14. At that
time, the Opposite Party was residing abroad in the United
Kingdom.
With the passage of time, the Opposite Party got married
and continued to reside abroad, while his family remained at
Rajgangpur in the district of Sundargarh, Odisha. During one of his
visits to India, the Opposite Party required the said house at
Sambalpur, which was in the occupation of the Petitioners, for his
own use and requested Petitioner No.1 to vacate the same so that he
could stay there with his family. This request allegedly created a
sense of insecurity in the minds of the Petitioners. Consequently,
despite repeated requests from the Opposite Party to vacate the
premises, Petitioner No.1 did not comply. On the contrary,
Petitioner No.1, along with her two sons, allegedly resorted to
unethical means to avoid vacating the house.
It is alleged that in December 2020, when the Opposite
Party warned Petitioner No.1 and called for a family meeting, she
reacted aggressively and demanded a sum of ₹3,00,000 from him as
a precondition for vacating the house. She is further stated to have
challenged the Opposite Party's right and title over the said
property. The Opposite Party, in order to regain possession of his
house, allegedly succumbed to this unlawful demand and paid
₹3,00,000 in cash to the Petitioners. Upon receipt of the said
amount, the Petitioners vacated the premises, enabling the Opposite
Party and his family to take possession thereof. The Opposite Party
claims that, in order to meet the said demand, he had to obtain a
loan, and that he was dishonestly induced by the Petitioners, who
extorted the money by putting him under immense fear of injury.
According to the Opposite Party, the Petitioners
intentionally put him and his family in fear of dispossession from
their residential house and thereby dishonestly induced him to
deliver ₹3,00,000 to them, thereby committing extortion. It is
further alleged that, despite timely steps taken by the Opposite
Party, the investigating agency failed to secure the ends of justice
and acted in a mala fide manner with an ulterior motive by not
taking appropriate action against the serious and heinous offences
allegedly committed by the accused persons.
The allegations made by the Opposite Party culminated in a
complaint case registered as I.C.C. Case No. 256 of 2021, in which
the learned court took cognizance of the offences alleged.
Aggrieved thereby, the Petitioners have approached this Court by
filing the present application seeking quashing of the impugned
order.
3. Mr. B. K. Sharma, learned Senior Advocate appearing for
the Petitioners, during the course of hearing, strenuously argued
that none of the ingredients of the offences under Sections
384/506/34 of the IPC are satisfied from the averments made in the
complaint or from the statements of witnesses recorded under
Section 202 of the CrPC. He further submitted that the entire
allegation rests upon the admitted fact that the Petitioners were
occupying the house of the Opposite Party with his consent and
subsequently vacated the same. The alleged payment of money by
the Opposite Party under duress is, according to the Petitioners,
entirely false and misconceived. It is inconceivable that the
Opposite Party, being a highly educated and literate person, would
characterise such payment as extortion, particularly when, in his
own complaint, he has stated that he extended financial support to
Petitioner No.1 keeping in view her financial condition and their
close familial relationship.
It is thus contended that the amount, if paid at all, cannot be
termed as extortion rather as financial assistance extended to
facilitate the Petitioners' rehabilitation in a separate establishment.
Learned Senior Advocate further submitted that the fact that the
Opposite Party has instituted a civil suit against Petitioner No.1
seeking a declaration that the registered Sale Deed bearing No.
11621301591, executed and registered on 10.05.2018 under the seal
and signature of the DSR, Sambalpur, is null and void, and for
declaration of his right, title, and interest over the suit property,
clearly demonstrates that the dispute between the parties is civil in
nature. The present criminal proceeding, therefore, has been
maliciously instituted to give a colour of criminality to what is
essentially a civil dispute.
4. Mr. Mustak, learned counsel appearing for the Opposite
Party, argued that the allegations made in the complaint clearly
disclose the commission of cognizable offences punishable under
Sections 384, 506, and 34 of the IPC, and that the learned court
below has rightly taken cognizance thereof after due application of
mind. He submitted that the Petitioners, by taking undue advantage
of their close familial relationship with the Opposite Party, had
unlawfully occupied his residential house at Sambalpur and, when
requested to vacate the same, resorted to intimidation and coercion.
It was further contended that Petitioner No.1, along with her two
sons, threatened the Opposite Party with dire consequences and put
him under immense fear of harm to himself and his family,
compelling him to pay a sum of ₹3,00,000 in cash in order to regain
possession of his property. The learned counsel submitted that such
acts clearly satisfy the ingredients of "extortion" as defined under
Section 383 of the IPC, since the Petitioners intentionally put the
Opposite Party in fear of injury and thereby dishonestly induced
him to deliver money to them.
He further submitted that the plea of the Petitioners that the
amount was voluntarily paid as financial assistance is an
afterthought, devised only to escape criminal liability. The conduct
of the Petitioners in refusing to vacate the premises despite repeated
requests, followed by their demand for a monetary payment as a
precondition for vacating the house, demonstrates a deliberate
design to extract wrongful gain. Learned counsel also contended
that the pendency of a civil suit between the parties does not ipso
facto preclude criminal prosecution, as both civil and criminal
proceedings can proceed simultaneously if the ingredients of the
alleged offence are prima facie made out. It was, therefore, urged
that the present application seeking quashing of the criminal
proceeding is devoid of merit and has been filed only to delay the
process of law. Accordingly, the learned counsel prayed for
dismissal of the petition with costs.
5. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and perused
the materials on record, the principal question that arises for
consideration is whether, on the basis of the averments made in the
complaint and the statements recorded under Sections 200 and 202
CrPC, a prima facie case is made out against the Petitioners for the
offences alleged under Sections 384, 506, and 34 of the IPC, or
whether the dispute is essentially of a civil nature, warranting
interference by this Court in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction
under Section 482 CrPC.
6. It is pertinent to note that, vide order dated 22.08.2025, this
Court had referred the matter for mediation through the learned
S.D.J.M., Sambalpur, keeping in view the fact that the parties are
close family members and the dispute concerns family and property
matters. However, the mediation process could not yield any
fruitful result, and no amicable settlement was arrived at between
the parties. The matter has, therefore, been taken up for
adjudication on merits.
7. In this context, reference can be made to the recent decision
of the Hon'ble Apex Court, in the matter of S.N. Vijayalakshmi &
Ors. vs. State of Karnataka & Anr., reported in 2025 LiveLaw (SC)
758¸ as follows: -
"42. Coming to the second question i.e., whether civil
and criminal proceedings both can be maintained on the
very same set of allegations qua the same person(s), the
answer stricto sensu, is that there is no bar to
simultaneous civil and criminal proceedings. If the
element of criminality is there, a civil case can co-exist
with a criminal case on the same facts. The fact that a
civil remedy has already been availed of by a
complainant, ipso facto, is not sufficient ground to quash
an FIR, as pointed out, inter alia, in P Swaroopa Rani v
M Hari Narayana, (2008) 5 SCC 765 and Syed Aksari
Hadi Ali Augustine Imam v State (Delhi Admn.), (2009)
5 SCC 528. The obvious caveat being that the
allegations, even if having a civil flavour to them, must
prima facie disclose an overwhelming element of
criminality. In the absence of the element of criminality,
if both civil and criminal cases are allowed to continue, it
will definitely amount to abuse of the process of the
Court, which the Courts have always tried to prevent by
putting a stop to any such criminal proceeding, where
civil proceedings have already been instituted with
regard to the same issue, and the element of criminality is
absent. If such element is absent, the prosecution in
question would have to be quashed. In this connection,
Paramjeet Batra v State of Uttarakhand, (2013) 11 SCC
673 can be referred to:
'12. ... Whether a complaint discloses a criminal
offence or not depends upon the nature of facts alleged
therein. Whether essential ingredients of criminal
offence are present or not has to be judged by the High
Court. A complaint disclosing civil transactions may
also have a criminal texture. But the High Court must
see whether a dispute which is essentially of a civil
nature is given a cloak of criminal offence. In such a
situation, if a civil remedy is available and is, in fact,
adopted as has happened in this case, the High Court
should not hesitate to quash the criminal proceedings
to prevent abuse of process of the court.'
(emphasis supplied)
43. In Usha Chakraborty v State of West Bengal, (2023)
15 SCC 135, while quashing the FIR therein and further
proceedings based thereon, it was observed '...the
factual position thus would reveal that the genesis as
also the purpose of criminal proceedings are nothing but
the aforesaid incident and further that the dispute
involved is essentially of civil nature.'"
8. In the present case, it is not in dispute that the Petitioners
and the Opposite Party are closely related. Petitioner No.1 is the
real sister of the Opposite Party, and Petitioners Nos. 2 and 3 are
her sons. The materials on record reveal that the Petitioners were
permitted by the Opposite Party to occupy his house property at
Sambalpur in or around 2013-14, as they did not have a residence
of their own. Subsequently, the Opposite Party, having returned to
India, required the said house for his own use and requested the
Petitioners to vacate it. The allegations of the Opposite Party are
that the Petitioners refused to vacate the premises and demanded a
sum of ₹3,00,000 as a precondition for doing so, thereby
committing the offence of extortion.
9. The undisputed facts reveal that the Petitioners were in
occupation of the Opposite Party's house with his consent and
subsequently vacated the same. The allegation of payment of
₹3,00,000, though claimed by the Opposite Party to have been
made under duress, is not supported by any contemporaneous
material, and the FIR lodged thereafter does not disclose the
ingredients of the offences under Sections 383 and 506 IPC.
10. Furthermore, demanding the vacation of a rented or
occupied house, by itself, does not constitute the offence of
extortion. Extortion, as defined under Section 383 IPC, necessarily
involves an intentional act of putting a person in fear of injury and
thereby dishonestly inducing them to deliver property. In the
present case, the background in which the Petitioners were
permitted to occupy the house by the Opposite Party, coupled with
their close familial relationship, rules out any such element of force
or criminal intent. Petitioner No.1 is a widow, and the Opposite
Party is her real brother. The alleged "tug of war," if any, between
them cannot, by any stretch of imagination, bring the alleged
demand for money in lieu of vacating the house within the mischief
of Section 384 IPC.
11. This, viewed in the context of a brother having permitted
his widowed sister and her children to reside in his house out of
compassion, the allegations cannot reasonably be interpreted as
disclosing criminality in the true sense of the offence alleged. On
the contrary, the Opposite Party himself has instituted a civil suit
seeking declaration of title and invalidation of a sale deed, which
indicates that the dispute pertains primarily to ownership and
possession of immovable property. At best, the alleged demand for
money may be viewed as a form of familial or emotional pressure
in the backdrop of a property dispute, but it does not satisfy the
essential ingredients of extortion or criminal intimidation so as to
attract criminal liability.
12. Having regard to the totality of circumstances, this Court
finds that the allegations, though couched in criminal language, are
essentially civil in nature, arising from a familial dispute over
possession and ownership of property. The pendency of civil
proceedings between the parties on the same subject matter further
substantiates the civil character of the dispute.
13. In view of the aforesaid principles, this Court is of the
considered view that the dispute between the parties is
predominantly civil in nature, and the continuation of the impugned
criminal proceeding would amount to an abuse of the process of
law.
14. In the result, the order of cognizance dated 18.12.2021
passed by the learned SDJM, Sambalpur, in I.C.C. Case No. 256 of
2021 stands quashed. Accordingly, the CRLMC is disposed of as
allowed.
Digitally Signed Judge
Signed by: ANANTA KUMAR PRADHAN
Designation: Sr. Stenographer
Reason: Authentication
AKPradhan
Location: HIGH COURT ORISSA
Date: 23-Oct-2025 17:55:25
