Orissa High Court
Debadutta Mohapatra vs Central Bureau Of Investigation ... on 22 October, 2025
Author: A.K. Mohapatra
Bench: A.K.Mohapatra
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
CRLMC No.1252 of 2025
Debadutta Mohapatra Petitioner
Represented By
Mr.Y. Das, Sr. Adv.,
along with, Mr.S. K. Acharya, Adv.
-versus-
Central Bureau of Investigation Opposite Party
(CBI)
Represented By Adv.
Mr.Sarthank Nayak,
Special Public Prosecutor-cum- Retainer
Counsel for the CBI
CRLMC No.347 of 2025
Aditya Dev Infratech Pvt. Ltd., Petitioner
Bhubaneswar
Represented By
Mr.Y.Das, Sr.Adv.,
Mr.P. K. Rath, Sr. Adv.,
along with, Mr.S. K. Acharya, Adv
-versus-
Central Bureau Of Investigation (CBI) Opposite Party
Represented By Adv.
Mr.Sarthank Naik,
Special Counsel for the CBI
CORAM:
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE A.K.MOHAPATRA
Date of hearing : 22.07.2025 | Date of Judgment : 22.10.2025
A.K. Mohapatra, J. :
1. The abovenoted CRLMC No.1252 of 2025 has been filed with a
prayer to quash the FIR No. RC2172024A0017, dated 07.12.2024, lodged on
behalf of the Central Bureau of Investigation, Anti-Corruption-II, New Delhi,
pending before the Court of the Learned Special Judge, CBI-I, Bhubaneswar
as R.C. No.17(A) of 2024, for commission of offences under sections 7, 8, 9
and 10 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 ("PC Act") read with section
61(2) of the BNS, 2023.
Likewise, CRLMC No.347 of 2025 has been filed by the
Petitioner-Company with a prayer to quash the summons dated 17.12.2024 &
24.12.2024 under Annexure-1 Series issued by the Central Bureau of
Investigation, Anti-Corruption-II, in R.C. No. 17(A) of 2024, which arises out
of the FIR No. RC2172024A0017, dated 07.12.2024, which has been
registered for commission of offence under sections 7, 8, 9 and 10 of the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 ("PC Act") read with section 61(2) of the
BNS, 2023.
2. The factual matrix in both CRLMC No.1252 of 2025 and CRLMC
No.347 of 2025 is identical and arises from the same FIR. The Petitioner in
CRLMC No.1252 of 2025 is the Managing Director of the Company which
figures as the Petitioner in CRLMC No. 347 of 2025. Accordingly, both
matters were heard analogously for the sake of convenience, with CRLMC
No.1252 of 2025 being treated as the lead matter for purposes of analysis of
the factual backgrounds of both the above noted applications.
FACTS OF THE CASE
3. The crux of the factual background of the present case, as culled
out from the copy of the FIR and the Observation-cum-Recovery
Memorandum ("the Memo"), under Annexure-1 and Annexure-2 respectively
(of CRLMC No.1252 of 2025), in brief, is as follows; Initially, M/s Bridge and
Roof Co. India Pvt. Ltd. ("BRCIL") had been awarded certain tenders from the
National Aluminum Company Limited ("NALCO") pertaining to some civil
construction work, which was then entrusted to M/s. Penta A Studio Pvt. Ltd.
("PENTA"). Certain information from a source was received by the CBI that
one Mr.Chanchal Mukherjee, the Group General Manager of BRCIL, might be
indulging in corrupt and illegal activities in the matter of "awarding work
orders and clearing bills" in lieu of obtaining undue advantage.
4. The FIR further reveals that on 06.12.2024, Mr.Mukherjee had
asked one Mr.Santosh Moharana, Director of PENTA, and his father Mr.Mana
Mohan Moharana to meet him at his office concerning some urgent matter. It
was during this meeting held on 06.12.2024 at his Bhubaneswar office, that
Mr.Mukherjee demanded a bribe of Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs) form
Mr.Moharana. The bribe was to be delivered on 07.12.2024 and would
apparently be adjusted towards the future billings of Mr.Moharana.
5. Upon receiving such information, the CBI team members along
with some independent witnesses arrived near the office of Mr.Mukherjee on
the aforesaid date and, upon reaching the forest park road, Bhubaneswar,
followed a car (Hyundai Creta) which was occupied by both Mr.Mukherjee
and Mr.Moharana. The car then reached a café (Mamma Mia) near Mayfair
Hotel in Bhubaneswar and the above named two persons were joined by the
present Petitioner. After a few minutes, it was observed that the Petitioner
exited the car (Hyundai Creta) with a carry bag, which he then deposited on
the right side rear seat of his Mercedes car that was kept nearby. Afterwards,
the Petitioner entered the café. Finally, the CBI team, in presence of
independent witnesses, confronted the aforesaid persons, whereupon it was
discovered that the carry bag kept in the Mercedes car contained the purported
bribe amount of Rs.10,00,000/- comprising 200 packets each containing 100
notes of Rs.500 denomination. It is in the aforesaid background that the
present FIR has been registered for commission of the aforementioned
offences against Mr.Chanchal Mukherjee, Mr.Santosh Moharana, Mr.Mana
Mohan Moharana, PENTA, and, unknown public servants and private persons.
Presently, the investigation is going on and the Petitioner has been implicated
in the present case as an accused. Aggrieved, the Petitioner has approached
this Court, by invoking its inherent powers under section 528 of BNSS, with a
prayer to quash the FIR, in CRLMC No.1252 of 2025, and to quash the
summons issued to the Petitioner-Company in CRLMC No.347 of 2025.
CONTENTIONS OF THE PETITIONER
6. Heard Mr. Yasobant Das and Mr. P. K. Rath, learned Senior
Advocates, assisted by Mr. Saswat Kumar Acharya, learned counsel, for the
Petitioner. Considered the submissions and the documents/affidavits filed on
behalf of the Petitioner. It is the Petitioner‟s categorical stand that no case
whatsoever is made out against him on the face of the record and by accepting
the FIR allegations to be true, that he has no connection with the alleged
transaction in question, that there are procedural irregularities in the course of
investigation, and that the essential ingredients of the alleged offences are not
satisfied as against him. Accordingly, it has been contended that the present
FIR merits quashment at the hands of this Court in exercise of its inherent
powers, insofar as it relates to the Petitioner. In support of the aforesaid stance
of the Petitioner, several grounds have been urged by the learned Senior
Counsel in the CRLMC application, the rejoinder affidavit, and during the
course of arguments. The sum and substance of the grounds urged is as under;
a. At the very outset, it has been stated that the FIR in the
present case has been registered solely based on the information
received from a source and the Petitioner has neither been named in
the FIR nor has it been shown that the Petitioner has any connection
with BRCIL, NALCO or PENTA. The FIR also does not disclose any
clear involvement of the Petitioner in the alleged offence. In fact, the
Petitioner has been unjustly and illegally implicated at a later stage
during the course of investigation without there being any fresh or
substantive material justifying such inclusion. It has been reiterated
that the Petitioner has neither participated in any of the acts
constituting the alleged offence nor has he derived any benefit
therefrom. He is also not in possession of any purported proceeds of
the alleged crime.
b. Moreover, mere recovery of cash from the Petitioner's
vehicle, without any demonstrable nexus with the alleged bribery
transaction, cannot by itself constitute valid grounds for implicating
him in the purported offence. Such recovery, devoid of corroborative
evidence linking the Petitioner to the alleged act, fails to satisfy even
the basic threshold of criminal liability. Additionally, it has been
contended that the actions of the investigative agency appear to
extend beyond the legitimate scope of investigation. Inasmuch as the
Petitioner has been repeatedly pressured to provide information
concerning individuals who are entirely unconnected to the case at
hand. Such conduct of the CBI suggests at the misuse of investigative
powers.
c. With regard to the "independent witnesses" cited by the CBI,
it has been submitted that such individuals have, in fact, been
procured by the prosecuting agency and were not actually present at
the scene of the alleged incident. This raises serious doubts regarding
the authenticity and credibility of the evidence relied upon by the
CBI.
d. It has been firmly stated that the Petitioner is a private
individual with no connection whatsoever to the alleged transaction or
the public officials involved therein. Moreover, even after the lapse of
several months since the alleged incident, the CBI has not produced
any incriminating material or filed any charge-sheet against the
Petitioner. The entire case, therefore, rests solely on conjectures and
inferences, without an iota of evidence having been accumulated by
the prosecution to justify the implication of the Petitioner in the
alleged crime.
e. Next, it was stated that the Petitioner was not arrested at the
time of the purported transaction. Instead, he was apprehended only
after he had returned to the café. This circumstance negates the
essential requirement of "immediate arrest" that is fundamental to a
lawful trap proceeding, thereby undermining the credibility of the
CBI‟s modus operandi in the present case.
f. So far as the Observation-cum-Recovery Memorandum ("the
Memo") under Annexure-2 is concerned, it has been stated that the
CBI team prepared a site plan to track the accused persons near the
forest road. However, no such site plan was prepared for the time or
place where the alleged main operation took place. Furthermore, the
Observation memo reveals that the Petitioner was called from inside
the café and was not even present at the spot where the alleged
transaction occurred. Moreover, it has also been contended that the
Memo does not contain vital information regarding the site map of the
relevant location and a clear chronological record of events. No
timings have also been mentioned either for the alleged transaction or
for the movements of the parties involved, rendering the document
unreliable and incomplete.
g. Regarding the actual delivery of cash, it has been submitted
that the Memo makes no reference whatsoever to any actual delivery
of cash to the Petitioner. It fails to specify the exact person who
purportedly delivered the bribe, the point of time when the transaction
occurred and in what manner such delivery occurred.
h. Referring to the Counter affidavit filed by the Opposite
Party-CBI, it was submitted that in the said counter affidavit, the
Opposite Party-CBI has subsequently advanced a wholly
unsubstantiated claim that the bribe amount was handed over by
Mr.Mukherjee to the Petitioner. This assertion is entirely contrary to
the contents of the Memo.
i. The alleged transaction was actually between Mr.Mukherjee
and Mr.Moharana. The primary allegation, even as per the CBI‟s own
case, concerns Mr.Mukherjee and Mr.Moharana alone. It was
submitted that as per the FIR the alleged bribe amount was to be
adjusted towards future billings of Mr.Moharana and no element of
gratification can be attributed to the present Petitioner. In fact, the
Petitioner‟s alleged involvement arises merely from the assertion that
he allegedly exited the café and kept a carry bag in his car. Such an
act, in itself, does not constitute an offence or establish any element of
bribery. Also, the contention of the Opposite Party-CBI that the
Petitioner was the „facilitator‟ in the alleged crime in order to protect
the public servant from legal proceedings, does not hold any ground
since it does not attract the ingredients of the sections 7, 8, 9 and 10
of the PC Act or even section 61(2) of the BNS, 2023.
j. It was further submitted that, hypothetically even if the
allegations are considered true, then, on CBI‟s own showing, the
alleged bribe amount was purportedly transferred from Mr.Moharana,
a private person, to the Petitioner, who is also a private individual.
The transaction, therefore, even on its face, would be between two
private individuals which would place the alleged transaction outside
the purview of the PC Act. Moreover, the Memo also does not
disclose any instance of gratification being received by a public
servant at the behest of the Petitioner or his company.
Notwithstanding the same, the Petitioner and the Petitioner‟s
company (i.e. the Petitioner in CRLMC No.347 of 2025) have
repeatedly been issued summons u/s 94 of the BNSS and are being
harassed by the Opposite Party-CBI, which is an indication of the
vindictive and malafide intention of the CBI.
k. Learned senior counsel for the Petitioner has also pointed out
some apparent procedural irregularities in the present case. It was
stated that even though the Petitioner‟s vehicle was seized, the same
has neither been reflected in the Memo nor in the Arrest Memo
prepared at the time of detention. It was also contended that the Creta
car, in which both Mr.Moharana and Mr.Mukherjee were travelling,
has not been seized by the CBI.
l. The learned senior counsel for the Petitioner has expressed
his reservation regarding the Opposite Party-CBI‟s contention of an
"extended spot of arrest", and it has been stated that the same is
legally untenable, particularly since the office premises of BRCIL,
located at Janpath, Bhubaneswar, is situated approximately five
kilometres away from the alleged place of occurrence. There are also
inconsistencies regarding the time and date of arrest of the Petitioner
as recorded in the Arrest Memo (i.e. 08.12.2024 at 1140 hrs) and the
Observation Memo (i.e. on 07.12.2024).
m. Additionally, it has been stated that the investigating
agency‟s insistence on obtaining the Petitioner‟s electronic passwords
and compelling disclosure of material from his personal devices
constitutes a direct violation of the constitutional protection
guaranteed under Article 20(3). Such compulsion to provide
potentially incriminating information amounts to a breach of the
Petitioner‟s right against self-incrimination, as well as his right to
privacy and personal liberty. This coercive demand cannot be justified
under the guise of investigation, particularly in the absence of any
prima facie evidence linking the Petitioner to the commission of any
offence.
n. Lastly, the Petitioner has cited the following cases in support
of his stance; State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, reported in 1992 Supp
(1) SCC 335; Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab, reported in (2014) 6
SCC 466; Imran Pratapgadhi v. State of Gujarat, reported in 2025
SCC OnLine SC 678; the order of the Hon‟ble Apex Court dated
07.03.2025 in Kulandaisamy & Anr. v. State, bearing Criminal
Appeal No.1224 of 2025; and Pepsi Foods Ltd. v. Special Judicial
Magistrate, reported in (1998) 5 SCC 749; and Lovely Salhotra v.
State, reported in (2018) 12 SCC 391.
CONTENTIONS OF THE OPPOSITE PARTY-CBI
7. Heard Mr.Sarthak Naik, learned special public prosecutor-cum-
retainer counsel for the Opposite Party-CBI. Perused the submissions and the
Counter Affidavits filed. The counsel for the Opposite Party-CBI emphatically
argues that there are sufficient grounds to justify the investigation into the role
of the Petitioner in the present crime and that the investigation is being
conducted fully in accordance with law. It has been contended that the grounds
taken in the CRLMC application by the Petitioner are devoid of merit. As
such, it should be dismissed at this stage. The learned counsel for the Opposite
Party-CBI advanced detailed submissions in support of his contentions, which
may be summarised as follows;
a. Initially, pursuant to information received from a reliable
source and subsequent registration of an FIR, a trap was laid by the
CBI team on 07.12.2024. During the said operation, it was discovered
that the bribe amount of Rs.10,00,000/- was first handed over by
Mr.Moharana to Mr.Mukherjee and, subsequently by Mr.Mukherjee
to the present Petitioner. Ultimately, the bribe money was recovered
from the Petitioner‟s vehicle (a Mercedes car) in the presence of
independent witnesses.
b. It was further submitted that the Petitioner was arrested
strictly in accordance with the prescribed legal procedure. Therefore,
there is a strong prime facie evidence to establish the involvement of
the petitioner in the demand and acceptance of the bribe money and, it
can very well be said that the Petitioner was engaged in a conspiracy
with the co-accused public servant.
c. It was further submitted that the Mercedes car belonging to
the Petitioner was seized vide the "Observation-cum-Recovery
Memorandum." The Petitioner was arrested on the spot, and the place
of arrest has been mentioned in the Arrest Memo as the office of M/s.
BRCIL, which was treated as an "extended spot" for the purpose of
completing the necessary formalities. Therefore, there is no illegality
either in the arrest of the Petitioner or in the seizure of his vehicle. It
has further been stated that the Petitioner‟s involvement in the illegal
exchange is clear since the petitioner had gone to the café, from
whence he was asked to come out and then arrested, just after
receiving the bribe of Rs.10,00,000/-, which was recovered from the
vehicle of the Petitioner.
d. As regards the Petitioner‟s contention that he is a private
individual and therefore cannot be brought within the ambit of the
offences alleged, the learned counsel submitted that such a plea is
wholly misconceived. The PC Act contemplates the liability of
private individuals who, though not public servants themselves, act in
concert with or abet public servants in corrupt practices. Thus, there
may arise situations where a private individual who knowingly
participates in the receipt, transmission, or facilitation of bribe money
can be held culpable under the PC Act.
e. Next, regarding the Petitioner‟s contention that he has not
been named in the FIR, it was submitted that the role of the Petitioner
emerged during the subsequent course of investigation and that the
omission of his name in the FIR does not in any manner invalidate the
proceedings. It is a fairly well-settled principle of law that an FIR is
merely a first information report which sets the criminal law in
motion and need not contain exhaustive details of all the accused or
all particulars of the offence. The FIR need not be treated as an
almanac or encyclopaedia of the offence. The learned counsel further
emphasized that the powers of search and seizure vested in the
investigating agency are intended to safeguard societal interest and
maintain public order, and reasonable restrictions upon the accused
may lawfully be imposed during the pendency of investigation to
ensure its integrity and efficacy.
f. It has been further submitted by the learned counsel for the
Opposite Party-CBI that the Petitioner has not been cooperating with
the investigation. Instead, on one pretext or another, the Petitioner has
filed multiple frivolous petitions with the sole objective of delaying
and frustrating the investigative process. The present petition, it was
contended, is nothing but a stratagem intended to stifle the
investigation and there exists on record cogent and overwhelming
evidence against the Petitioner, justifying the continuation of
investigation. Moreover, the summons issued to the Petitioner‟s
company are for the purpose of unearthing any possible larger
conspiracy which might be existing and no right of the Petitioner‟s
company has been violated in lieu of such notices.
g. It was further stated that the Petitioner was summoned to
provide the password to his mobile phone to facilitate forensic
imaging and extraction of relevant data. However, despite issuance of
multiple notices, the Petitioner failed to comply. It was submitted that
such conduct of the Petitioner points towards his deliberate non-
cooperation with the investigation.
h. The learned counsel for the CBI has further argued that the
demand for disclosure of a password does not in any way violate
Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India. The said constitutional
protection extends only to testimonial compulsion, whereas a
password, which is akin to a fingerprint/ specimen signature/ voice
sample/ DNA profile, is merely a means of identification and does not
in itself amount to self- incriminatory. What may be incriminating is
the content of the data accessed and not the means of access the
potential evidence. Hence, no violation of the Petitioner‟s rights arises
at this stage.
i. Additionally, it was submitted that at this nascent stage of
the on-going investigation, detailed particulars of the investigation
cannot be disclosed to the Petitioner, as there exists a strong
apprehension that he may attempt to interfere with or hamper the
ongoing investigation.
j. Lastly, the learned counsel for the CBI once again reiterated
that the Petitioner‟s arrest was executed in accordance with law, and
that the investigation is being carried out by following the due legal
process and in strict adherence to statutory procedure. Moreover,
there is clear indication of the involvement of the Petitioner in the
transaction of the bribe money. As such, the grounds urged by the
Petitioner in the instant CRLMC petition, as well as those advanced
during arguments, are devoid of merit and the petition is therefore
liable to be dismissed.
k. To support the aforesaid submissions, the learned counsel
has placed reliance on the following judicial precedents; M/s Jayant
Vitamins Ltd. vs. Chaitanyakumar and Anr., reported in (1992) 4
SCC 15; State of Chhattisgarh vs. Aman Kumar Singh, reported in
(2023) 6 SCC 559; Skoda Auto Volkswagen (India) Private Limited
vs. State Of Uttar Pradesh, reported in (2021) 5 SCC 795; Union of
India vs. B.R.Bajaj & Others, reported in 1994 Crl.L.J. 2086.
ANALYSIS
8. Heard learned counsels for the respective parties. Perused CRLMC
application, the documents on record, the Counter Affidavits and the Rejoinder
filed by the parties. At the very outset, it is undisputed that the CBI had
initially received information from a source regarding a possible bribery
transaction being planned between a public servant and some private
individuals. Following the tip-off, the investigating agency laid out a trap. In
the course of their operation it was discovered that one Mr.Mukherjee has
allegedly received a sum of Rs.10,00,000/- as bribe from one Mr.Moharana
and the present Petitioner is also involved in the dealings. However, the
Petitioner maintains that he is in no way involved in the aforesaid illegal
transaction which attracts provisions of the PC Act.
9. As has been recapitulated in scores of pronouncements by this
Court and the Apex Court, the law regarding exercise of the inherent powers of
this Court to quash an FIR, or an investigation emanating therefrom, is now
well settled. In State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, reported in 1992 Supp (1)
SCC 335 the Hon‟ble Supreme Court has very succinctly laid down the
following non-exhaustive instances where a High Court may quash the
impugned FIR;
"(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or
the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted
in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make
out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other
materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable
offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section
156(1) of the Code, except under an order of a Magistrate within the
purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or
complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not
disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against
the accused.
(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable
offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation
is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as
contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so
absurd and inherently improbable based on which no prudent person
can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for
proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the
provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal
proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the
proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or
the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of
the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with
malafide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with
an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a
view to spite him due to a private and personal grudge."
10. Similarly, in Punit Beriwala v. State (NCT of Delhi), reported in
2025 SCC OnLine SC 983, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has laid down that the
High Court, while exercising its inherent jurisdiction under section 482 Cr.P.C,
has to take the allegations in the FIR at the face value. Furthermore, it is also a
well-settled principle that the High Court, while exercising its inherent powers
under Section 528 of BNSS (i.e. erstwhile section 482 Cr.P.C), is not intended
to conduct a mini-trial. Instead, the inquiry is to be restricted to whether the
allegations made in the complaint or FIR, if accepted as true on their face,
constitute a prima facie offence (reference, in this regard, may be had to the
Apex Court‟s dictum in CBI vs Aryan Singh, reported in 2023 SCC Online
SC 37, Abhishek Singh v. Ajay Kumar & Ors., bearing 2025 INSC 807, and
Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar v. State of Maharashtra, reported in (2019) 18
SCC 191). Therefore, it is clear that while adjudicating the veracity of the
Petitioner‟s prayer to quash the investigation, this Court is required to see
whether, on the face of the record, any prima facie case is made out against
him.
11. Next, as is clear from the record, the present case is at the stage of
investigation, that too at an incipient stage. If the date of filing of the CRLMC
applications is considered, it can be seen that they have been filed 87 days (i.e.
04.03.2025 in the case of CRLMC No.1252 of 2025) and 41 days (i.e.
17.01.2025 in CRLMC No.347 of 2025) after the registration of the FIR (i.e.
on 07.12.2025). It is needless to reiterate that the stage of investigation is
squarely the realm of the executive, i.e. the investigating authority and the
Courts should generally not interfere with the investigation until its
completion. Nevertheless, it is not as if there can be no such instances where
the High Court cannot quash an FIR when the investigation therein is at an
initial stage.
12. It would be apposite to mention here that there have been several
instances where the Hon‟ble Apex Court have upheld the quashing of such
FIRs, more recently in Imran Pratapgadhi v State of Gujrat & Ors., reported
in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 678 wherein, in para 42, while summarizing its
conclusions, the Apex Court has observed that there is no absolute rule that
when the investigation is at a nascent stage the High Court cannot exercise its
jurisdiction to quash the FIR. However, the aforesaid observation (in point vii
of para 42) has been prefaced by another observation to the effect that the High
Court, in the given case, must first see if any offence was made out on the face
of it, and only then, to prevent abuse of the process of law, can the High Court
interfere/ proceed with the quashing of the FIR even though the investigation
is at the nascent stage. That is to say, it all depends on the facts and
circumstances of each case as well as the nature of the offence and there is no
such blanket rule in this regard.
13. Per contra, it has also been reiterated time and again that when the
FIR discloses the commission of a cognizable offence, the investigating
agency has the exclusive authority to inquire into the allegations and collect
evidence. Judicial intervention at this stage is generally not merited, as the
process from registration of the FIR up to the filing of the final report under
Section 173(2) Cr.P.C (presently section 193(2) of the BNSS, 2023) falls
squarely within the domain of the investigating agency. Interference may be
justified only in rare and exceptional cases where the allegations, on the face
of the record, do not disclose any offence or where continuation of the
investigation would clearly amount to an abuse of the process of law
(reference may be had to the pronouncements of the Hon‟ble Apex Court in
State of West Bengal v. Swapan Kumar Guha, reported in 1982 AIR 949;
S.M. Datta v. State of Gujarat, reported in (2001) 7 SCC 659; State of
Karnataka v. Pastor P. Raju, reported in (2006) 6 SCC 728 (para 11); Union
of India v. Prakash P. Hinduja and Another, 2003 (6) SCC 195 and other
similar decisions).
14. Additionally, the Petitioner has put forth an argument that being a
private individual he cannot be subjected to the provisions of the PC Act. To
such a contention, this Court observes that there is no such provision or rule
which unequivocally excludes a private individual from falling within the
scope of the PC Act and, a non-public servant can very well be convicted for
abetting offences under the provisions of the PC Act (see P. Shanthi
Pugazhenthi v. State, reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1091).
15. Reverting back to the facts of the present case, on a careful scrutiny
of the FIR and the Memo, it is clear on the face of the record that a sum of
rupees ten lakhs, which is alleged to be the exact amount of money involved in
the illegal transaction under scrutiny in the present case, was recovered from
the Petitioner‟s vehicle. Moreover, the Petitioner had also joined the two other
co-accused persons in their car (Hyundai Creta) in front of the café where the
Petitioner was initially spotted prior to his arrest. Therefore, it is clear on the
face of the record that prima facie the Petitioner‟s involvement in the present
case cannot be ruled out. Additionally, even though the Petitioner has
attempted to demonstrate certain procedural irregularities in the investigative
process, there is no showing on the face of the record that the CBI‟s
investigation is clearly transgressing any legal provision. Since the
investigation is at an early stage and evidence is still being garnered, with no
charge-sheet or final report before this Court, any interdiction at this point
would only serve as obstructing the due course of investigation and amount to
unnecessary judicial overreach.
16. Moreover, while holding that the stage to examine the case for
quashing by applying the principles laid down by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court
of India, this Court observes that the stage is premature to draw a conclusion
with regard to alleged involvement of the Petitioner in the reported crime
especially when the investigation of the case is still continuing and on the face
of availability of prima facie material against the Petitioner in the shape of
seizure of a sum of Rs.10 lakhs from a vehicle which undisputedly stands
recorded in the name of the Petitioner. Moreover, the questions raised by the
Petitioners are yet to be verified during investigation. It is needless to mention
here that if the Petitioners are innocent and there exists no incriminating
material against them or no material to establish their involvement in the
alleged crime, the law provides that the I.O may file a final form exonerating
the Petitioners of all allegations. Additionally, in the event any charge-sheet is
filed against the Petitioners, the same can very well be challenged at a
subsequent stage. Ultimately, on a careful overall analysis of the factual
background of the present case, this Court finds no justification to stifle a
legitimate investigation without waiting for the final outcome thereof.
17. Therefore, in light of the above discussion, this court, at this stage,
is not inclined to interfere or prematurely halt the on-going investigation.
However, while disposing of the present applications, liberty is granted to the
Petitioners to approach this Court after conclusion of the investigation and
consequential filing of the charge sheet, if the Petitioners are so advised.
(A. K. Mohapatra)
Judge
Orissa High Court, Cuttack
The 22nd October, 2025/Rubi Behera, Junior Stenographer
