Orissa High Court
M/S Hara Briquette Industries vs Collector And District Magistrate on 17 October, 2025
Author: Sanjeeb K Panigrahi
Bench: Sanjeeb K Panigrahi
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR
Reason: Authentication
Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT,
CUTTACK
Date: 22-Oct-2025 15:32:00
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
W.P.(C) No.3197 of 2025
(In the matter of an application under Articles 226 and 227 of the
Constitution of India, 1950).
M/s Hara Briquette Industries .... Petitioner(s)
-versus-
Collector and District Magistrate, .... Opposite Party (s)
Jagatsinghpur and Ors.
Advocates appeared in the case through Hybrid Mode:
For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Manash Ranjan Nayak, Adv.
For Opposite Party (s) : Mr. Bibakananda Nayak, AGA
Mr. Bijaya Kumar Dash, Adv.
CORAM:
DR. JUSTICE SANJEEB K PANIGRAHI
DATE OF HEARING:-03.09.2025
DATE OF JUDGMENT:-17.10.2025
Dr. Sanjeeb K Panigrahi, J.
1. The Petitioner, in this Writ Petition, challenges Estate Officer's order
No.12499 dated 25.04.2023 passed in EUO Case No.27/87 and the
Collector and District Magistrate, Jagatsinghpur's appellate order dated
08.02.2024.
I. FACTUAL MATRIX OF THE CASE:
2. The brief facts of the case are as follows:
(i) The property is IDCO Plot No.35(A), Village Paradeepgarh, Khata
No.381, Revenue Plot No.1067(P), area Ac.0.125, originally allotted on
13.05.1982 for a coal briquette unit (registration No.150406623), with
initial identification as Plot No.43(2) later renumbered to 35/A.
(ii) IDCO cancelled the allotment on 06.11.1986 citing dues/non-utilization
and initiated EUO No.27/87; an eviction order was passed on 21.07.1987.
(iii) The petitioner deposited Rs.32,500 under an OTS in 2009-2011 period
towards HP dues; earlier and later settlement/OTS communications
were issued by IDCO.
(iv) Fresh show-cause notices for cancellation issued on 22.07.2015 and
10.03.2017 referred to non-utilization, arrears (Rs.2,334 as on
04.03.2017), absence of industrial activity, and unauthorized residential
use.
(v) The petitioner claims operations of "Hara Briquette Industry" occurred
broadly between 1988 and 2004 and later sought to change activity to a
prawn processing unit; IDCO asserts no approval for such change exists
on its portal or records.
(vi) The petitioner relies on online payments/receipts including Rs.6,490
dated 09.03.2022 for "activity charges," Rs.7,060 and Rs.1,516 dated
13.03.2022, and Rs.1,139 dated 26.12.2024; IDCO disputes that these
reflect a sanctioned trade modification.
(vii) The petitioner applied on the IDCO portal on 10.03.2022 seeking
revocation of cancellation; objections were issued on 04.05.2023 noting
pendency of appeal/proceedings.
(viii) The Estate Officer on 25.04.2023 authorized eviction under Section 5(2)
of the OPP(EUO) Act; DH Cuttack requested police support on
30.05.2023; interim stay was granted on 03.07.2023 in OPP EUO Appeal
No.03/2023; the appeal was dismissed on 08.02.2024.
(ix) Following dismissal, the Estate Court issued memo dated 01.11.2024
directing eviction; DH Paradeep sought deputation of an Executive
Magistrate on 13.01.2025 for execution.
(x) The petitioner pleads that the 1986 cancellation had been revoked in
2011 and that later notices in 2017 and cancellation in 2018 constituted
a fresh cause; IDCO maintains continuity of breaches justifying eviction.
(xi) Both sides rely on IDCO Circulars and procedural records, including
references to Clause 2.7 (change of activity) and Clause 2.11 (revocation)
of the 23.07.2016 circular, though their application to the petitioner's
case is contested.
(xii) The current writ WP(C) No.3197/2025 seeks quashing of the 25.04.2023
and 08.02.2024 orders and revival/continuation of allotment with
permission to change activity; the Opposite Parties seek dismissal with
costs.
II. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER:
3. Learned counsel for the Petitioner earnestly made the following
submissions in support of his contentions:
(i) The impugned orders dt.25.04.2023 and 08.02.2024 are bad in law,
illegal, mechanical, and passed without proper appreciation of facts and
records.
(ii) Both Estate Officer and Appellate Authority failed to consider IDCO
Circular dt.23.07.2016, particularly Clause 2.7 (change of activity with
penalty) and Clause 2.11 (revocation of cancellation upon compliance).
(iii) The petitioner complied with all requirements, payment of dues,
penalty for unauthorized change of activity, submission of documents,
sufficient to entitle revocation and continuation of allotment.
(iv) Divisional Head, IDCO, Cuttack, accepted compliance, recommended
closure of EUO No.27/87, and it was recorded in Estate Officer's order
dt.25.07.2022. Yet eviction order was later passed ignoring this fact.
(v) Continuation of EUO No.27/87 initiated on the basis of 1986 cancellation
is unsustainable since that cancellation was revoked in 2011, and new
notices/cancellation in 2017-2018 impliedly extinguished earlier
proceedings.
(vi) IDCO's acceptance of subsequent payments including Rs.1,139/- on
26.12.2024 shows its intention to continue the allotment, contradicting
eviction.
III. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE OPPOSITE PARTIES:
4. The Learned Counsel for the Opposite Parties earnestly made the
following submissions in support of his contentions:
(i) Orders of Estate Officer and Collector are strictly in accordance with
Section 9(2) of the Odisha Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized
Occupants) Act, 1972, passed after due statutory compliance, hearing,
and appreciation of records; writ is devoid of merit.
(ii) Petitioner's persistent defaults in HP and statutory dues, non-utilization
of plot for the sanctioned industrial purpose, cessation of activity since
2004, encroachment, and unauthorized residential use constitute clear
breaches justifying cancellation and eviction under OPP(EUO) Act.
(iii) Any payments such as Rs.6,490 shown by petitioner are not backed by
a valid, sanctioned change-of-trade authorization; searches of GO-1
Pass portal and Divisional records reveal no approved application or
order permitting conversion from coal briquette to prawn processing.
(iv) The claim of employing 30 destitute women and of continuous
industrial operations is unsubstantiated; petitioner engaged in
unauthorized activities without approvals, aggravating violations of
allotment terms and IDCO norms.
(v) Appellate delay of 12 days was condoned to afford fair opportunity;
after full consideration, the Collector rendered a reasoned affirmance;
hence, no procedural prejudice or violation of natural justice can be
alleged by the petitioner.
(vi) Prior OTS/GTS settlements and deposits (including Rs.32,500)
addressed parts of dues but did not cure foundational breaches of non-
utilization and unauthorized use; compliance with financial settlements
does not create equity against lawful eviction for continuing breaches.
(vii) The 1986 cancellation and subsequent EUO proceedings, coupled with
fresh show-cause notices in 2015/2017 and continued violations,
establish a consistent course of enforcement; the petitioner cannot rely
on isolated receipts or portal entries to defeat statutory eviction orders.
(viii) Consequent eviction steps taken post-appeal dismissal, including Estate
Court memo dated 01.11.2024 and requisition for Executive Magistrate
in January 2025, are lawful sequelae; writ reliefs for revocation,
restoration, or change-of-activity approval are untenable and should be
rejected with costs.
IV. COURT'S REASONING AND ANALYSIS:
5. Heard Learned Counsel for the parties and meticulously analysed the
documents placed before this Court.
6. Having perused the record and considered rival submissions, this
Court's interference under Articles 226/227 is limited to correcting
jurisdictional errors or violations of natural justice. It is evident that the
petitioner was given due notice of cancellation and eviction
proceedings, an opportunity to show cause, and a statutory appeal
before the Collector. The Estate Officer's order dated 25.04.2023 and the
appellate order dated 08.02.2024 are reasoned decisions addressing the
petitioner's contentions.
7. A plethora of judicial precedents have cautioned that in matters of
eviction from public premises, High Courts should not interfere with
the statutory process unless there is a clear breach of natural justice.
When a case pertains to eviction from public premises, High Courts
should not interfere with the statutory process unless there is a clear
breach of natural justice. This stance was affirmed by the Supreme
Court in the case of Municipal Council, Neemuch v. Mahadeo Real
Estate1 wherein it held as follows:
"14. It could thus be seen that the scope of judicial review of
an administrative action is very limited. Unless the Court
comes to a conclusion that the decision-maker has not
understood the law correctly that regulates his decision-
making power or when it is found that the decision of the
decision-maker is vitiated by irrationality and that too on the
principle of 'Wednesbury unreasonableness' or unless it is
found that there has been a procedural impropriety in the
decisionmaking process, it would not be permissible for the
(2019) 10 SCC 738
High Court to interfere in the decision-making process. It is
also equally well settled that it is not permissible for the Court
to examine the validity of the decision but this Court can
examine only the correctness of the decision-making process.
***
16. It could thus be seen that an interference by the High
Court would be warranted only when the decision impugned
is vitiated by an apparent error of law i.e. when the error is
apparent on the face of the record and is self-evident. The
High Court would be empowered to exercise the powers when
it finds that the decision impugned is so arbitrary and
capricious that no reasonable person would have ever arrived
at. It has been reiterated that the test is not what the Court
considers reasonable or unreasonable but a decision which the
Court thinks that no reasonable person could have taken. Not
only this but such a decision must have led to manifest
injustice"
8. The abovementioned precedent makes it clear that if an aggrieved party
has been afforded a fair hearing, even an erroneous conclusion by the
authority is not per se ground for writ intervention. In the present case,
no procedural impropriety or denial of hearing is demonstrated. The
appellate authority even condoned a filing delay to ensure the
petitioner was heard on merits. Thus, no telling circumstances of
unfairness are shown that would warrant this Court's extraordinary
interference.
9. However, even if this Court examines the case on merits, the petitioner
has failed to establish any illegality in the cancellation of the industrial
plot or the ensuing eviction order. It is undisputed that the plot, allotted
in 1982 for a coal briquette unit, was not utilized for the sanctioned
purpose for an extensive period (by the petitioner's own account,
industrial operations ceased around 2004). The allotment was
conditional on productive use of the land for industrial development,
and prolonged non-utilization strikes at the very object of the scheme.
10. The petitioner's arguments to invalidate the eviction do not withstand
scrutiny. First, the contention that the 1986 cancellation was revoked in
2011 is not supported by any cogent proof of a formal revocation order.
The record indicates that while certain one-time settlement (OTS)
payments were accepted towards outstanding dues in 2009-2011, IDCO
never issued an order rescinding the cancellation or restoring the lease.
Mere acceptance of arrears or penalties does not, by itself, create a right
to continued allotment when the foundational breach, failure to
establish and run the industry, remained unremedied.
11. Indeed, the Supreme Court in the recent case of Kamla Nehru Memorial
Trust and Anr. v. U.P. State Industrial Development Corporation
Limited and Ors.2 declined equitable relief to an allottee who belatedly
sought to cure defaults long after the stipulated period, underscoring
that continued non-compliance with essential obligations disentitles the
allottee from claiming restoration of the allotment as a matter of right.
The relevant excerpts are produced below:
"Having upheld the cancellation due to KNMT's chronic
default, we observe that the hasty allotment followed by years
of litigation exemplifies systemic deficiencies in the allocation
process. This necessitates comprehensive directions to ensure
that future allocations uphold principles of transparency and
accountability, thereby preventing prolonged disputes while
ensuring that public resources genuinely promote industrial
development and economic growth."
2025 INSC 791.
12. In the present case, even after availing the OTS, the petitioner did not
revive the coal briquette unit or obtain any approval for an alternative
project in a timely manner. Fresh notices were issued in 2015 and 2017
because the breaches persisted, the unit was non-functional, arrears had
accrued, and unauthorised use i.e. residential occupation was noted.
This led to a fresh cancellation decision in 2018 after due notice, which
the petitioner chose not to specifically challenge at that time. Thus, the
eviction proceeding (EUO 27/87) was effectively in furtherance of the
sustained enforcement action against the petitioner's continued
unauthorised occupation, not a barred or concluded matter. The
petitioner cannot credibly treat the long history of leniency and multiple
notices as a waiver of default; on the contrary, those factors highlight
that ample opportunity was given to comply, and yet the core violation,
non-utilisation of a public industrial asset, remained.
13. The petitioner's reliance on IDCO's Circular dated 23 July 2016 ("Master
Circular"), particularly Clause 2.7 (change of activity) and Clause 2.11
(revocation of cancellation), is misplaced. Clause 2.7 allows change of
project activity only with prior IDCO approval and payment of
prescribed charges, while Clause 2.11 permits revocation of cancellation
only after full compliance with the causes of cancellation. These
provisions offer a second chance only when the default is completely
cured and the competent authority formally approves it.
14. In this case, cancellation was due to failure to establish and operate the
sanctioned industry and unauthorized use of the premises. That default
was never rectified, the plot remained unused industrially, and no
prawn processing unit was ever authorized. The petitioner's online
payments in March 2022 (e.g. ₹6,490 labelled "activity charges") were
unilateral deposits without any sanctioned change of project. IDCO's
records show no approval for converting the coal briquette project into
a prawn unit. Moreover, the petitioner's application for revocation, filed
while eviction proceedings were pending (EUO 27/87), could not be
considered. Both the Estate Officer and appellate Collector (2023-24)
found no substantive compliance, payment of dues alone cannot revive
a defunct unit or cure misuse of land.
15. The Master Circular is only a policy guideline; it creates no enforceable
right without actual fulfilment of conditions and an IDCO decision
applying it. Given the petitioner's persistent default and non-
utilization, the authorities' decision to recover the industrial land rather
than entertain a belated proposal for change of project was lawful and
justified.
16. The facts of this case exemplify the principle that public properties
allotted for industrial development cannot be allowed to remain
unproductive indefinitely in the hands of an allottee who fails to deliver
on the promised venture. The Odisha Industrial Infrastructure
Development Corporation (IDCO), as a statutory development
authority, holds and allots land in public trust for the purpose of
catalyzing industrial growth and employment. When an allottee
breaches the terms and leaves the land idle or puts it to unauthorised
use, the authority not only has the right but indeed a duty to cancel the
allotment and reallocate the land to someone who will utilize it for the
intended public benefit.
17. It is imperative to note that equitable considerations cannot override the
necessity of adhering to the terms of an allotment, especially when
public resources are involved. The present petitioner's plea for
indulgence, after roughly four decades since allotment and over fifteen
years of admitted inactivity, cannot be countenanced without doing
violence to these well-settled norms.
V. CONCLUSION:
18. In sum, the petitioner has not demonstrated any illegality, perversity,
or procedural unfairness in the impugned orders of eviction that would
justify judicial intervention. On the contrary, the record reveals a
justified exercise of statutory power by IDCO to reclaim an industrial
plot that was grossly underutilized and misused, after extending
multiple opportunities to the allottee. The Estate Officer's order under
Section 5(2) of the OPP(EUO) Act and the appellate order of the
Collector (passed under Section 9 of the Act) are in accordance with law,
based on evidence of persistent breach by the petitioner, and have
considered the petitioner's representations. This Court's writ
jurisdiction is not an appellate forum to re-appreciate facts or to indulge
a defaulting allottee with unlimited leniency.
19. Accordingly, the Writ Petition is devoid of merit. It stands dismissed.
IDCO and its authorities are at liberty to proceed with eviction and
resumption of the property in question, in accordance with law and
applicable rules.
20. Interim order, if any, passed earlier stands vacated.
(Dr. Sanjeeb K Panigrahi)
Judge
Orissa High Court, Cuttack,
Dated the 17th October, 2025/
