Orissa High Court

Kabiraj Jena vs State Of Orissa And Ors. .... Opposite ... on 17 October, 2025

Author: Sanjeeb K Panigrahi

Bench: Sanjeeb K Panigrahi

                                                                        Signature Not Verified
                                                                        Digitally Signed
                                                                        Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR
                                                                        Reason: Authentication
                                                                        Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT,
                                                                        CUTTACK
                                                                        Date: 17-Oct-2025 18:58:02




                 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK

                                W.P.(C) No.23452 of 2014
                                      Along with
                                Batch of Writ Petitions

       (In the matters of applications under Articles 226 and 227of the
       Constitution of India, 1950).
                            (W.P.(C) No.23452 of 2014)
       Kabiraj Jena                         ....              Petitioner(s)

                                         -versus-
       State of Orissa and Ors.                     ....           Opposite Party (s)

     Advocates appeared in the case through Hybrid Mode:

       For Petitioner(s)             :                   Ms. Deepali Mahapatra, Adv.

       For Opposite Party (s)        :                         Mr. D.K. Nayak, AGA



                 CORAM:
                 DR. JUSTICE SANJEEB K PANIGRAHI

                   DATE OF HEARING:-11.08.2025
                  DATE OF JUDGMENT:-17.10.2025
        (W.P.(C) No.23452 of 2014 Along with W.P.(C) Nos.20746,
              21504, 23453, 23454, 23455 and 23456 of 2014)

     Dr. Sanjeeb K Panigrahi, J.

1. Since common questions of fact and law are involved in the above-

mentioned Writ Petitions, the same were heard together and are being

disposed of by this common judgment. However, this Court finds it

appropriate to treat W.P.(C) No.23452 of 2014 as the leading case for

proper adjudication of these matters.

2. The Petitioner in the present Writ Petition has assailed order dated

26.09.2014 passed by the Opposite Party No.2/Collector, Sambalpur in

OPLE Revision Case No.4 of 2012 filed by the Opposite Party No.5/

VSS Medical College and Hospital, Burla reversing the order dated

20.07.2012 passed by the Opposite Party No.3/ Sub-Collector,

Sambalpur in OPLE Appeal No.31 of 2012 and confirming the order of

eviction dated 06.01.2012 passed by the Opposite Party No.4/

Tahasildar, Sambalpur in Encroachment Case No.7/4-21/2011

I. FACTUAL MATRIX OF THE CASE:

3. The brief facts of the caseare asfollows:

(i) The factual backdrop, in brief, is that the disputed land, recorded

under Khata No. 387 comprising various plots, stands vested in

the Irrigation Department of the Government. It is averred that

the Petitioner and several similarly situated persons have been

residing over the said land for more than six decades, having

constructed their residential houses thereon. The genesis of their

occupation traces back to the period of construction of the

Hirakud Dam Project, when the forefathers of the present

occupants migrated to Burla for engagement in the dam

construction activities and, having settled thereafter, continued

to occupy the said land on a long-standing and uninterrupted

basis.

(ii) It is further stated that, over the years, they have secured

electricity connections to their respective houses, paid holding

tax and rent to the Burla Notified Area Council (NAC), and have

also availed domestic water supply connections in due course of

time, thereby evidencing possession recognized by public

authorities. The Petitioners assert that they have no alternative

site for residence, and their occupation, being rooted in historical

and socio-economic necessity, merits sympathetic and lawful

consideration.

(iii) While the matter thus rested, a Public Interest Litigation came

to be instituted before this Court by certain students of V.S.S.

Medical College and Hospital, Burla, registered as W.P.(C) No.

25562 of 2011, wherein a prayer was made seeking appropriate

directions for removal of unauthorised encroachers and for

prevention of further trespass over the lands appertaining to the

said Medical College and Hospital campus. Upon consideration

of the issues raised and the materials placed on record, this

Court, by order dated 05.12.2011, was pleased to dispose of the

said Writ Petition with the following direction:

"The concerned authorities, including the Estate Officer of the property, need not await completion of the process of recording the land in the name of V.S.S. Medical College and Hospital, Burla. They are directed to initiate proceedings against the unauthorised occupants under the relevant provisions of law."

Pursuant to the aforesaid direction, the administrative

machinery was set in motion for initiation of proceedings against

the alleged encroachers occupying Government land within and

around the precincts of the V.S.S. Medical College and Hospital

campus.

(iv) Pursuant to the directions rendered by this Court in W.P.(C)

No. 25562 of 2011, the Opposite Party No. 4 - Tahasildar,

Sambalpur, invoking his powers under the Orissa Prevention of

Land Encroachment Act, 1972, initiated Urban Encroachment

Proceeding No. 714-92/2011 against the present Petitioners. It is

alleged that the said proceeding culminated, in undue haste and

without the observance of the minimum procedural safeguards,

in an order of eviction dated 06.01.2012, whereby the Petitioners

were directed to vacate the land in question. The Petitioners

contend that the said order was passed per incuriam, in a

mechanical fashion, and in disregard of the long-standing de

facto possession and civic regularisation of their occupation,

thus rendering the proceeding tainted with arbitrariness and

jurisdictional infirmity.

(v) Being aggrieved by the aforesaid eviction order, the Petitioners

approached this Court in W.P.(C) No. 1394 of 2012, challenging

the same inter alia on the grounds of ultra vires exercise of

authority and violation of the audi alteram partem rule. This

Court, while refraining from adjudicating on the merits, was

pleased, vide order dated 06.03.2012, to dispose of the writ

petition, reserving liberty to the Petitioners to avail the statutory

appellate remedy provided under the Act. Availing such liberty,

the Petitioners preferred OPLE Appeal No. 31 of 2012 before the

Sub-Collector, Sadar, Sambalpur, assailing the legality,

propriety, and jurisdictional competence of the Tahasildar's

order dated 06.01.2012

(vi) The Appellate Authority, upon analogously hearing twenty-

two appeals arising from identical eviction orders passed by the

Tahasildar in relation to different occupants within the same

geographical cluster, and upon an exhaustive scrutiny of the

record and the legal provisions governing the field, delivered a

reasoned adjudication dated 20.07.2012, wherein it was

categorically held as follows:

"In view of the above facts, I am of the considered opinion that the Tahasildar has no jurisdiction to entertain or adjudicate encroachment cases pertaining to Burla town during the pendency of settlement operations. Hence, the orders dated 06.01.2012 passed by the learned Tahasildar, Sambalpur in the respective Encroachment Cases are hereby set aside."

The Sub-Collector thus conclusively determined that the impugned

eviction orders were nullities in law, having been rendered by an

authority bereft of jurisdiction ratione materiae owing to the pendency

of the settlement operation in the concerned urban unit.

(vii) Notwithstanding the jurisdictional bar and absence of

proprietary nexus, the Opposite Party No. 5 - V.S.S. Medical

College and Hospital, Burla, purporting to act as an interested

institution, though admittedly neither the recorded owner nor

the beneficiary of the land in dispute, preferred a revision before

the Opposite Party No. 2 - Collector, Sambalpur, registered as

OPLE Revision Case No. 4 of 2012, seeking reversal of the well-

reasoned appellate order dated 20.07.2012.

(viii) The Revisional Authority - Collector, Sambalpur, vide order

dated 26.09.2014, allowed the said revision and thereby set aside

the appellate findings, without adverting to or analytically

engaging with the jurisdictional observations recorded by the

Sub-Collector. The Revisional Authority, instead of conducting

an independent appraisal of the factual and legal issues, appears

to have been solely guided by the general directions issued by

this Court in W.P.(C) No. 25562 of 2011, which were of a

facilitative and administrative character, rather than a mandate

for indiscriminate eviction. Consequently, the revisional order,

being non-speaking, perverse, and reflective of extraneous

influence, stands impugned in the present proceeding as having

been rendered in excess of jurisdiction, and in derogation of the

settled principles governing quasi-judicial adjudication under

the OPLE Act.

II. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER:

4. Learned counsel for the Petitioners earnestly made the following

submissions in support of his contentions:

(i) The admitted position, as emerging from the counter affidavit

filed by the Tahasildar, Sambalpur, unequivocally establishes

that the subject land forms part of the estate vested in the

Irrigation Department, and not in the Revenue Department.

Once such vesting is acknowledged, the Tahasildar, acting as a

revenue authority, stands denuded of jurisdiction ratione

materiae to invoke the machinery of the Orissa Prevention of

Land Encroachment Act, 1972 .The statutory precondition for the

assumption of jurisdiction under the OPLE framework is that the

land must fall within the administrative control of the Revenue

Department, or be placed under its custody by a competent

requisitioning authority. Absent such requisition from the

Irrigation Department, the initiation of Urban Encroachment

Case No. 714-92/2011 constitutes an act coram non judice -- one

rendered by an authority lacking inherent jurisdiction.

(ii) The principle of competence, which undergirds all

administrative and quasi-judicial action, posits that jurisdiction

is the lifeblood of legality. As consistently held in Kiran Singh v.

Chaman Paswan1, and reaffirmed in A.R. Antulay v. R.S.

Nayak2, an order passed without jurisdiction is a nullity,

incapable of being sanctified by consent, acquiescence, or even

appellate affirmation. Jurisdiction must be conferred de jure, not

de facto; it cannot be usurped through administrative zeal. Hence,

the eviction order dated 06.01.2012, being born of jurisdictional

incompetence, is void ab initio and liable to be effaced ex debito

justitiae.

(iii) The material on record further discloses that the Petitioners

and their predecessors-in-interest have remained in open,

continuous, and uncontested possession of the land for more

AIR 1954 SC 340, 2 (1988) 2 SCC 602

than five decades. Their possession is not clandestine but

institutionally recognized -- evidenced by the issuance of

electricity and water connections, assessment of holding tax by

the Burla Notified Area Council, and unbroken civic engagement

with municipal authorities. Such possession, though originating

in informal occupation, has over time attained the complexion of

de facto settlement protected by the doctrines of legitimate

expectation and administrative acquiescence.

(iv) The contemporaneous correspondence of the Collector,

Sambalpur, dated 15.02.2012, addressed to the State

Government, assumes critical evidentiary value. The Collector,

acknowledging both the temporal longevity and civic legitimacy

of such possession, recommended a policy accommodation in

lieu of coercive displacement. The tenor of the letter, which

emphasizes that the occupied land falls outside the operational

campus of V.S.S. Medical College and Hospital, and that

indiscriminate eviction would precipitate "massive resistance

and law and order problems," evinces an administrative

recognition of settled expectations. Such acknowledgment

triggers the equitable doctrine of estoppel against arbitrary State

action, as elaborated in Union of India v. Anglo Afghan

Agencies3, and Navjyoti Coop. Group Housing Society v. Union

of India4,.It follows that, in the light of prolonged acquiescence

and governmental tolerance, the Petitioners' possession cannot

AIR 1968 SC 718 4 (1992) 4 SCC 477

be trivialized as "encroachment" in the pejorative sense

contemplated under Section 7 of the OPLE Act, but must instead

be treated as long-standing occupation carrying equitable and

administrative weight.

(v) Furthermore, the Opposite Party No. 5 - V.S.S. Medical College

and Hospital, Burla, which neither holds the title nor

demonstrates any legal interest in the land beyond moral

indignation, cannot be characterized as a "person aggrieved"

competent to maintain a revision under the OPLE Act. The locus

standi doctrine, rooted in S.P. Gupta v. Union of India5, , and

Jasbhai Motibhai Desai v. Roshan Kumar6 predicates that the

right to invoke supervisory jurisdiction arises only where there

exists a direct and personal injury to a legally protected interest.

In the present case, the revision was pursued by an entity

extraneous to the proprietary dispute, rendering the revisional

order dated 26.09.2014 an exercise in excess of jurisdiction. The

Collector, as revisional authority, acted ultra vires by

entertaining a revision filed by a stranger to the proceedings,

thereby violating the principle that jurisdictional competence

cannot be expanded by third-party invocation.

(vi) Moreover, the Collector's reasoning reflects a fundamental

misapprehension of the binding nature of this Court's earlier

order in W.P.(C) No. 25562 of 2011. That order was directive and

supervisory, not self-executory; it required initiation of lawful

5 1981 Supp SCC 87 6 (1976) 1 SCC 671

proceedings by competent authorities, not mechanical eviction

irrespective of jurisdiction or ownership. The Revisional

Authority, in treating that judicial observation as a carte blanche

for eviction, substituted judicial direction for administrative

discretion -- a course that offends the constitutional principle of

institutional fidelity to statutory limits.

(vii) Viewed holistically, the impugned revisional order

(Annexure-14) suffers from multiple vices of illegality -- lack of

jurisdiction, misapplication of judicial directions, failure of

natural justice, and disregard of equitable considerations that

have crystallized over decades of civic integration. The order is,

therefore, ultra vires the parent statute, per incuriam of settled

administrative jurisprudence, and arbitrary within the meaning

of Article 14 of the Constitution. The Petitioners' case,

conversely, is anchored in the constitutional ethos of fairness,

reasonableness, and human dignity implicit in Article 21, as

reiterated in Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation7 ,

which recognizes the right to shelter as an inseparable facet of

the right to life.

(viii) Consequently, this Court would be justified, in exercise of its

constitutional supervisory jurisdiction under Articles 226 and

227, to quash the impugned revisional order, and to direct the

State Government to consider settlement of the land in favour of

the Petitioners, consistent with their long-standing possession,

(1985) 3 SCC 545

administrative recognition, and the equitable imperatives of

social justice embedded in the constitutional framework.

III. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE OPPOSITE PARTIES/ STATE:

5. The Learned Counsel for the Opposite Parties/ State earnestly made

the following submissions in support of his contentions:

(i) The factual conspectus, distilled from the pleadings, reveals that

the Petitioner's father, a Class-IV employee under the

establishment of V.S.S. Medical College and Hospital, Burla, was

constrained, upon retirement and for want of any official

accommodation or private holding within the Burla Notified

Area Council, to construct a modest dwelling upon Plot No. 3418

under Khata No. 687, land recorded in the name of the Irrigation

Department. The said construction, effected several decades ago,

marks the genesis of a continued occupation, now spanning over

half a century. It is asserted that such occupation predates the

constitution of Burla Township, as well as the establishment of

Sambalpur University, V.S.S. Engineering College, and V.S.S.

Medical College, thereby evidencing that the Petitioner's

possession is not an instance of recent encroachment but a

settled social fact of historical genesis intertwined with the

Hirakud Dam Project era migration.

(ii) The Petitioner's contention is fortified by the documentary

record, wherein it appears that the land earlier reserved for the

Irrigation Department during the construction of the Hirakud

Dam was relinquished in favour of the Revenue Department on

18.04.1987, thereby altering the administrative custody of the

said parcel. Consequent thereto, the Collector, Sambalpur, vide

notification dated 21.12.1999, addressed the State Government

recommending the formulation of a policy framework to

regularize long-standing residential occupations of such lands,

citing humanitarian and administrative considerations. The

tenor of the Collector's recommendation manifests an early

recognition of the principle of equitable regularization--that

administrative inertia cannot be allowed to convert bona fide

human habitation into criminalized "encroachment."

(iii) Despite this policy inclination, the Tahasildar, Sambalpur,

issued a public notice dated 24.11.2011 bearing Letter No. 7181,

invoking the directions of this Court in W.P.(C) No. 25562 of

2011, and directing the purported "encroachers" to vacate within

twenty-four hours, failing which forcible eviction would ensue.

Pursuant thereto, a notice in Form (Ka) was issued to the

Petitioner under the Orissa Prevention of Land Encroachment

Act, 1972 (for short, OPLE Act). The issuance of such notice,

unaccompanied by jurisdictional verification as to departmental

ownership or statutory competence, and absent observance of

the principles of audi alteram partem, stands prima facie vitiated

by procedural impropriety and jurisdictional infirmity.

(iv) Aggrieved thereby, the Petitioner invoked the writ jurisdiction

of this Court in W.P.(C) No.1394 of 2012, challenging the eviction

notice on the twin grounds of want of jurisdiction and denial of

natural justice. This Court, while refraining from entering upon

the merits, by order dated 06.03.2012, held that the impugned

order was appealable under the OPLE Act, and accordingly

disposed of the writ petition granting liberty to the Petitioner to

approach the appellate authority, with a direction that the

pendency of the writ may be cited as a ground for condonation

of delay. The interim protection earlier granted on 24.01.2012

stood vacated. This order thus restored the statutory process

while preserving the procedural rights of the Petitioner.

(v) Consequent thereto, the Tahasildar, Sambalpur, proceeded to

pass a final order of eviction dated 06.01.2012 in Encroachment

Case No. 714-92/2011, directing removal of the Petitioner's

occupation. The said order, when carried in appeal before the

Sub-Collector, Sadar, Sambalpur, culminated in OPLE Appeal

No. 31 of 2012, wherein the Appellate Authority, upon a detailed

jurisdictional analysis, by order dated 20.07.2012, categorically

held that the Tahasildar lacked jurisdiction to entertain

encroachment matters concerning Burla town during the

subsistence of settlement operations, and accordingly set aside

the impugned eviction order. However, the said appellate

determination was challenged by the V.S.S. Medical College and

Hospital, Burla, before the Collector, Sambalpur, in OPLE

Revision Case No. 4 of 2012, despite the admitted fact that the

said institution held no proprietary or possessory nexus with the

disputed land. The Collector, acting as Revisional Authority, by

order dated 26.09.2014, reversed the appellate findings and

reinstated the eviction order dated 06.01.2012, purportedly

relying upon this Court's directive dated 05.12.2011 in W.P.(C)

No. 25562 of 2011, which was merely administrative in tenor and

did not vest blanket authority for eviction irrespective of

jurisdictional competence.

(vi) In response, the learned counsel for the Opposite Parties

contends that the Collector's order dated 26.09.2014 is

unimpeachable, asserting that the Petitioner's possession is ipso

facto illegal, being unsupported by any legal conveyance, lease,

or authorization, and hence no right--statutory or equitable--

can be claimed. It is argued that the encroachment proceedings

were initiated strictly in compliance with the directions issued

by this Court in the aforesaid Public Interest Litigation, and that

the Tahasildar acted within his executive competence under

Section 7 of the OPLE Act.

(vii) It is thus urged on behalf of the Opposite Parties that the

present writ petition is devoid of merit, the impugned revisional

order being a legally sustainable administrative consequence of

judicial directives issued by this Court. Accordingly, it is prayed

that the writ petition be dismissed, affirming the Collector's

order dated 26.09.2014.

IV. COURT'S REASONING AND ANALYSIS:

6. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials

placed on record. The following questions emanates for discussion by

this Court:

a) Whether, on the admitted facts, the Tahasildar possessed

jurisdiction to initiate and decide the impugned

encroachment proceedings under the OPLE framework

during subsisting settlement operations and without a

foundational requisition or endorsement from the land-

owning Irrigation Department?

b) Whether VSS MCH had locus standi to maintain the

revision before the Collector against the Petitioners, given

the Petitioners' assertion (and administrative material)

that the occupied plots lie outside the presently demarcated

medical-college campus and the lack of title/allotment in

VSS MCH's favour for those plots?

c) What is the legal ambit and effect of this Court's PIL order

dated 05.12.2011; specifically, whether it can be read as

dispensing with jurisdictional predicates, title demarcation,

and the statutory architecture of the OPLE/settlement

regime?

d) Whether the Collector's revisional order dated 26.09.2014 is

liable to interference for jurisdictional error, misdirection in

law, and non-consideration of relevant factors; and what

consequential orders ought to follow?

7. The OPLE framework, being a summary remedy presupposes a clear

identification of (a) the public land, (b) the competent estate authority

of the Government department in whom the land vests, and (c) the

jurisdictional facts that the occupant is an unauthorized encroacher

thereon. Where settlement operations are ongoing, the law ordinarily

channels contests touching identification, description, boundaries and

recordal of public lands through the specialized fora/mechanisms,

precisely to avoid discordant adjudications and to ensure cadastral

integrity. The Sub-Collector, in appeal, correctly recognised that

premise and interdicted the Tahasildar's exercise.

8. The land belongs to the Irrigation Department is not only asserted by

the Petitioners but finds affirmation in the Tahasildar's own counter.

In such a situation, the Tahasildar could not, proprio motu, and

divorced from the land-owning department's

requisition/authorization, press the OPLE engine to evict decades-old

residential occupation--particularly when the administrative record

reflects contemporaneous exploration of settlement/regularisation

(Collector's letter dated 15.02.2012) and when the State itself

contemplated demarcation/exchange solutions. The requirement that

the department in whom the title vests be the prime mover is not a

pedantic technicality but a structural safeguard against misdirected

proceedings.

9. For clarity, long possession does not ripen into title against the State

by mere efflux of time; yet, where the State's own instrumentalities

have permitted a settled residential ecosystem to crystallize over

decades--with civic amenities, municipal taxation, and absence of

immediate public-purpose urgency--summary OPLE action must be

scrupulously anchored in jurisdictional predicates and preceded by a

considered, departmental decision to evict, rather than be propelled

solely by a generic exhortation. Hence, the Tahasildar's assumption of

jurisdiction, during settlement operations and sans a foundational

requisition from the Irrigation Department, was legally infirm. The

Sub-Collector's contrary conclusion was sound; the Collector's

reversal ignored this jurisdictional bedrock.

10. In so far as the PIL remedy adopted by the students of the Medical

College, it may be stated that standing in administrative revision is not

a roving passport. The revisional forum is not an agora for all public-

spirited entities; it is a statutory avenue for a person aggrieved. On the

Petitioners' case--fortified by the Collector's own correspondence--

the plots in question lie outside the presently situated medical campus.

There is no revenue record placed before this Court demonstrating

that title to these very parcels stands in the name of VSS MCH or that

the State has lawfully allotted/vested such lands in VSS MCH. The PIL

order of 05.12.2011 is likewise not a conveyance of title. Absent such

vesting, VSS MCH's grievance is, at best, collateral or institutional, not

proprietary.

11. Even assuming arguendo that VSS MCH could articulately voice a

public interest, that does not translate into statutory standing to

overturn an appellate order that rested on the Tahasildar's

jurisdictional want under the OPLE/settlement scheme. The Collector's

readiness to entertain the revision at VSS MCH's behest, without first

ascertaining vesting/title or campus demarcation, betrays a

misdirection in law. Hence, VSS MCH failed to establish that it was a

person aggrieved qua the particular plots. The revision at its instance

was, therefore, not maintainable.

12. Further. a PIL direction to proceed "under the relevant provisions" is

an injunction to act lawfully, not a charter to dispense with

jurisdictional facts, title demarcation, or statutory safeguards. The

Collector appears to have read the PIL order as a mandate to evict first

and reason later. That approach inverts the rule of law. Courts have

repeatedly cautioned that directions in PILs cannot supplant the

statute, and administrative action must remain tethered to the four

corners of the enabling law. The phrase "need not wait to get the

property recorded in the name of VSS MCH" merely obviated a

ministerial delay in mutation where title was otherwise clear; it did not

authorize the State to ignore that, here, the land is admittedly of the

Irrigation Department and that demarcation/settlement questions

subsisted. Hence, the Collector's reliance on the PIL order as a self-

executing warrant for eviction is misplaced. The order neither

conferred title on VSS MCH nor diluted the OPLE/settlement

architecture.

13. The Revisional jurisdiction is supervisory, not substitutive. It is

ordinarily attracted to correct jurisdictional errors, perversity, or

manifest illegality. The Sub-Collector had rested the appellate decision

on a threshold jurisdictional bar--settlement operations and

Tahasildar's competence--after hearing a batch of appeals and

surveying the field. The Collector, however, set aside that order

without addressing the jurisdictional bar, without engaging with

departmental vesting, and without resolving locus. The reasoning

reduces to a reiteration of the PIL order and to generalities about

encroachment. That is a classic case of failure to exercise revisional

jurisdiction according to law. Hence, The revisional order dated

26.09.2014 is vitiated by non-application of mind to jurisdictional facts,

misdirection in law regarding the PIL's effect, and failure to determine

locus/title. It cannot be sustained.

14. The Court is not endorsing a theory of amnesty by long possession.

The State retains the plenary authority--consistent with law and

policy--to remove encroachments from public land. However,

especially when (a) the land-owning department is Irrigation; (b) there

is administrative material contemplating settlement/regularization

with an alternative allotment plan for VSS MCH; (c) the occupants

constitute a long-standing residential cluster with municipal services;

and (d) the Tahasildar's jurisdiction was shaky during settlement

operations--the proper course is to reset the process on a lawful

footing, not to sanctify a defective eviction.

V. CONCLUSION:

15. In view of the foregoing discussion, these Writ Petitions are allowed in

part with the following directions:

a. The revisional order dated 26.09.2014 passed by the Collector,

Sambalpur in OPLE Revision Case No. 4 of 2012 is quashed.

Consequentially, the appellate order dated 20.07.2012 passed

by the Sub-Collector, Sambalpur in OPLE Appeal No. 31 of

2012 stands restored.

b. The foundational eviction order dated 06.01.2012 of the

Tahasildar, Sambalpur in Encroachment Case No. 7/4-21/2011

(and connected cases analogously situated) is set aside for

want of jurisdiction and for failure to adhere to the statutorily

intended coordination with the land-owning Irrigation

Department during settlement operations.

c. It shall be open to the State/Irrigation Department, if so

advised, to proceed afresh strictly in accordance with law,

subject to the following pre-conditions:

(a) A speaking determination identifying the precise

plots, their vesting in the Irrigation Department, and

whether any portion stands lawfully allotted/vested

in VSS MCH;

(b) Any OPLE action, if warranted, shall be initiated

by/at the instance of the competent estate authority

of the land-owning department, not merely on a

generic reference;

(c) If settlement operations subsist or are re-opened,

land identification/recordal issues shall be first

addressed under the settlement regime;

(d) Fresh proceedings shall scrupulously comply with

notice, opportunity, and reasoned orders, with due

consideration of individual claims, duration of

possession, and any policy on

regularization/rehabilitation;

16. The competent authority shall consider--and record reasons upon--

whether, in light of the Collector's 15.02.2012 correspondence and any

extant Government policy, the Petitioners' cluster admits of

regularization/alternative rehabilitation, particularly if the land is

outside the present VSS MCH campus and no immediate public

purpose requires eviction.

17. Until the completion of the exercise in Clause (c) and for a period of

six months thereafter, the Petitioners shall not be dispossessed except

in pursuance of fresh, lawful orders passed after compliance with due

process. This protection shall not be construed to create any equitable

title.

18. Any future challenge at the revisional stage by VSS MCH shall be