Nihar Ranjan Biswal vs Life Insurance Corporation Of India
2025 Latest Caselaw 9046 Ori

Orissa High Court

Nihar Ranjan Biswal vs Life Insurance Corporation Of India on 14 October, 2025

Author: Murahari Sri Raman

Bench: Murahari Sri Raman

        IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
                            W.A. No.1249 of 2025

 Nihar Ranjan Biswal                                ....                  Appellant

                            -Versus-
 Life Insurance Corporation of India                ....              Respondents
 Ltd. (LIC) and others



Advocates appeared in these cases:
        For Appellant             : Mr. Prasanna Kumar Mishra, Advocate


        For Respondents           : Mr Prakash Ranjan Barik, Advocate
                                    (For Respondents No.1, 2 & 3-LIC)

                                      Mr. Anupam Dash, Advocate
                                      (For Respondent No.4)


                        CORAM:
              HON' BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
                          AND
        HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MURAHARI SRI RAMAN

                               JUDGMENT

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Date of Hearing and Judgment : 14th October, 2025

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ HARISH TANDON, CJ.

1. Dead wood is sought to be resuscitated by filing a writ petition, when

the cause of action, which accrued as far back as on 19th December, 2014,

is challenged in the instant writ appeal.

2. Pursuant to the scheme floated by the Life Insurance Corporation of

India (LIC) for providing the housing to its policyholders, an invitation

was made and undeniably, the appellant was selected in the draw of lots.

He was requisitioned to deposit a sum of Rs.1.00 lakh and the balance

consideration money was to be paid in terms of the said scheme or the

tender to be floated in this regard. But before the same matured, a

communication was made to the appellant that an objection is raised by

the Government that the land over which such housing infrastructure is to

be made is actually a forest land and unless a clearance and/or permission

is granted, no construction shall be allowed as there is a clear prohibition

imposed in the statutory law.

2.1. The appellant was provided an option either to continue with his

application or may seek for refund of the amount paid in terms of the letter

of allotment. Admittedly, the appellant continued with such allotment and

declined to take back the amount so paid. By a subsequent letter dated 19th

December, 2014, the LIC cancelled the allotment and indicated that the

application fee deposited by the appellant shall be refunded by NEFT to

the bank account provided the said details of the bank account is given

along with the cancelled cheque.

2.2. The appellant remained silent, except a letter was subsequently

issued raising a concern, but did not approach the Court assailing the said

letter of cancellation dated 19th December, 2014. The silence can be

reasonably gathered from the documents enclosed with the writ petition,

that only in the year 2025, the writ petition is filed for the reliefs other

than challenging the order of cancellation which are adumbrated

hereinafter.

2.3. It is revealed from the record that the LIC challenged the decision

of the Government in treating the land over which such housing

infrastructure was undertaken to be on a forest land before this Court and

the said writ petition remained pending for a pretty long period.

Ultimately, the Government communicated to the Court that the land over

which the said housing colony or infrastructure is constructed by the LIC

does not come within the purview of a forest land. Since the said decision

was taken in the year 2024, the appellant perceived the resurrection of the

cause of action for allotment of flat as an integral part thereof and filed the

instant writ petition, which is dismissed by the learned single Judge.

2.4. According to the counsel appearing for the appellant, the single

Bench ought not to have dismissed the writ petition on the ground

enumerated therein. The single Bench proceeded to dismiss the said

application on the premise that the moment the allotment is cancelled by

the LIC, it does not create any right of revival thereof. It further held that

since there was no concluded contract, no inchoate or a legally enforceable

right accrued to the appellant. Since the right of the appellant after the

cancellation is made does not appear to the single Bench enforceable in

law, the writ petition came to be dismissed.

2.5. It is further submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant that

the Court ought not to have taken such a stand, as the right to the order of

cancellation having been founded upon a conscious decision of the

Government, which is immuned from being challenged by a common man

and the moment the Government has communicated that the land does not

fall within the forest land, the ground for cancellation automatically

eclipsed and cannot remain valid and, therefore, the LIC is prevented from

retracting and/or resiling from their own commitment or contract.

2.6. In proceeding to invite fresh applications for allotment both in

phase I and phase II structures, it is further submitted that the single Bench

has discriminated the appellant with other similarly circumstanced person

by allowing their writ petitions upholding their rights, on the other hand

dismissing the writ petition of the appellant. By way of reference, reliance

is placed upon the judgment and order dated 10th September, 2025 passed

in W.P.(C) Nos.10837 of 2018, 6239 of 2015, 6240 of 2015 and 62 of

2018, where the writ petitions were decided in favour of the persons who

stand on an identical footing to that of the appellant.

2.7. He further submits that there is no hard and fast rule that a writ

petition should be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches, as the

Court is required to take into account the aspects which has been

highlighted in the judgment of the Apex Court rendered in case of

Shankara Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. vs. M. Prabhakar and

others, (2011) 5 SCC 607. According to the learned counsel for the

appellant, if there is a sufficient explanation offered which prevented the

litigant to approach the Court promptly, it is not desirable that the High

Court should dismiss the writ petition on the ground of delay. He, thus,

submits that a legally enforceable right is immediately created on issuance

of a letter of allotment and the deposit of the money in terms of the

conditions embodied in the scheme and, therefore, the finding of the single

Bench that no legally enforceable right has accrued is unsustainable in

law.

2.8. It is further submitted that the appellate Court should not

venture to decide the appeal on a point not considered by the single

Bench. In other words, it is sought to be contended that the single

Bench proceeded to decide the writ petition solely on the ground that

mere allotment of the flat does not create a concluded contract nor

confers any legally enforceable right to be decided by the Court and,

therefore, the delay and laches should not be taken as a ground to

dismiss the instant appeal. Apart from the same, the learned counsel

for the appellant submits that if there is a sufficient explanation

offered in the writ petition which constrained the appellant to

approach the Court in a time bound manner, the writ Court should

not dismiss the writ petition on such ground. It is arduously

submitted that if the substantive justice is confronted with the

technical justice, the former must prevail. It is vociferously

submitted before us that the right which is created by virtue of an

allotment of the flat cannot be taken away if such right is postponed

because of the ongoing litigation at the behest of the LIC and,

therefore, the learned single Bench has committed an error in

dismissing the writ petition.

3. Per contra, the learned counsel for the LIC took a formal stand

that there is a gross delay and laches attributable to the conduct of

the appellant in approaching the Court and such point was taken

before the single Bench and, therefore, it will not be deemed that the

said point is abandoned by the contesting respondent. It is further

submitted that the allotment of the flat was cancelled as far back as

in the year 2014 which was duly communicated to the appellant, but

the said decision to cancel the allotment was never challenged before

the court of law, nor in the instant writ petition, such challenge is

made. He submits that the entire relief claimed in the instant writ

appeal revolves around the further tender and/or auction notice

published by the LIC for allotment of the remaining flats and,

therefore, the allottee whose allotment stood cancelled cannot come

forward and challenge the subsequent tender/auction notice

published by the LIC.

4. On the conspectus of the aforesaid submissions, let's examine

whether the conduct of the appellant instill any confidence that there

is no delay or laches attributable to him in approaching the Court.

Though the findings returned in the impugned judgment does not

expressly and/or lucidly touches upon the delay and laches, but we

find that the said point was agitated by the LIC from the submissions

recorded in the impugned order. Once a plea is taken at the time of

an argument and if the single Bench omits to return its finding

thereupon, there is no fetter on the part of the appellate Court to

consider such point, if agitated by the same party. We do not find

any obstacle in the appellate Court to decide the matter taking a

different route in order to achieve the same destination. The appellate

Court may substitute its own finding, if the ultimate decision taken

by the single Bench appears to be correct. We do not find any

substance in the stand of the appellant that the appellate Court should

stay away from deciding the plea of delay and laches. As we find

that the said point was taken by the LIC before the single Bench and,

therefore, if such point is agitated, there is no fetter on the part of the

appellate Court to decide the same.

5. We are conscious of the proposition of the law that for filing

and/or initiating the proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution

of India, no period of limitation is provided in the Limitation Act,

1963. Despite having not provided a specific timeline within which a

litigant must initiate a proceeding before the High Court under

Article 226 of the Constitution of India, a common law principle has

evolved through a catena of decision rendered by the apex Court as

well as High Court that the writ Court shall decline to exercise its

discretion in entertaining the writ petition, if the delay and laches can

be attributed to the conduct of the litigant.

6. In Shankara Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. (supra), the apex

Court traces the origin of the delay and laches as one of the

determinant factor in denying the relief to the litigant, since the era

of the privy council where in Lindsay Petroleum Company v.

Prosper Armstrong Hurd, (1874) LR 5 PC 221, and held that the

extraordinary powers conferred upon the High Court may be refused

to be exercised, if the litigant has approached the Court after a delay

of considerable period.

7. The aforesaid concept is furthered after the establishment of the

Supreme Court in Moon Mills Ltd. v. Industrial Courts, AIR 1967

SC 1450 and Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation v.

Balwant Regular Motor Service, AIR 1969 SC 329 wherein it has

been held in unequivocal terms that the doctrine of delay and laches

adopted by the Court is neither arbitrary nor a technical doctrine, but

based upon the sound legal principles to cause a justice and on a

substantial equity principles. The apex Court further took note of the

other decision of the apex Court where the High Court refused to

exercise the discretion on the ground of delay and laches and

succinctly expressed in the following:

"54. The relevant considerations, in determining whether delay or laches should be put against a person who approaches the writ court under Article 226 of the Constitution is now well settled. They are:

(1) There is no inviolable rule of law that whenever there is a delay, the Court must necessarily refuse to entertain the petition; it is a rule of practice based on sound and proper exercise of discretion, and each case must be dealt with on its own facts. (2) The principle on which the Court refuses relief on the ground of laches or delay is that the rights accrued to others by the delay in filing the petition should not be disturbed, unless there is a reasonable explanation for the delay, because Court should not harm innocent parties if their rights had emerged by the delay on the part of the appellants.

(3) The satisfactory way of explaining delay in making an application under Article 226 is for the appellant to show that he had been seeking relief elsewhere in a manner provided by law. If he runs after a remedy not provided in the statute or the statutory rules, it is not desirable for the High Court to condone the delay. It is immaterial what the appellant chooses to believe in regard to the remedy. (4) No hard-and-fast rule, can be laid down in this regard. Every case shall have to be decided on its own facts.

(5) That representations would not be adequate explanation to take care of the delay."

8. There does not appear any cavil of doubt that despite having

not provided a period of limitation for filing an application under

Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the concept of delay and

laches has gained momentum in judicial dispensation and may be a

factor to be taken into account in refusing to grant relief. It further

augments the belated and the stale claim to be resuscitated after a

lapse of time and it would not be conducive in a healthy judicial

system to permit such claim to be adjudicated when it is apparent

from the conduct of the litigant that he slept in a slumber for a

considerable period of time and woke up only after sensing that such

right is inchoate or vested.

9. The letter of cancellation of the allotment was admittedly served

upon the appellant in the year 2014 and an objection to such

cancellation was also filed within a close proximity of time, but

thereafter, a silence can be noticed from the conduct of the appellant.

The explanation is sought to be made that the LIC itself challenged

the decision of the Government in declaring the land over which

such construction was undertaken to be a forest land before this

Court and, therefore, the ground of cancellation remained in limbo

and, therefore, there was no occasion on the part of the appellant to

approach the Court, being a law abiding citizen, to take a contrary

stand to the decision of the State Government. On the ground of

parity, it is sought to be contended that the other writ petitions have

been decided by the same single Bench in a different manner and it is

inconceivable that the appellant would be treated differently having

standing upon the same pedestal.

10. In an earlier portion of the judgment, we have narrated the

aforesaid fact and the writ petitions which were disposed of

wherefrom it is manifestly clear that the approach was made by those

writ petitioners within a short period of time and were pending for a

considerable period until decided by the single Bench. It is

undisputed that the LIC was taking steps in challenging the stand that

the land is recorded as forest land and after the removal of any such

doubts, proceeded with the project and invited the applications from

the intending purchasers by issuing a tender inviting an application

therefor. The challenge to the said tender notice is basically founded

on the aforesaid fact, more particularly, that once the allotment is

made, no further application could be invited, does not appear to be a

ground to invalidate such tender notice. The reason being that the

letter of cancellation issued by the LIC is never challenged by the

appellant before the Court nor has been declared as illegal, invalid

and not in consonance with the contractual terms and conditions.

Mere filing an objection to a letter of cancellation does not

automatically render such cancellation illegal unless the contracting

party rescinding the contract recalls such cancellation or the same is

declared by the competent Court to be illegal and invalid in law.

11. It is unacceptable that a litigant after filing an objection to a

letter of cancellation issued to him remained silent for more than a

decade in anticipation that the litigations which are filed by the LIC

or the other writ petitioners, if decided would enure to its benefit.

The fence sitter who is watching the litigation should not be

encouraged to approach the Court after more than a decade. Apart

from the same, the LIC has proceeded to allot the flats to the other

intending purchasers, but according to the appellant, they have still

certain flats left where the appellant can be accommodated. We do

not find such submissions to have any substance. Once the allotment

is cancelled and such cancellation is neither withdrawn nor declared

to be illegal and invalid by a competent Court, the appellant cannot

be regarded to have a subsisting right. From whatever angle the

matter is looked at, we do not find the ultimate decision taken by the

single Bench to be infirmed and/or illegal.

12. The writ appeal, sans merit, is thus dismissed.

                                        (M.S. Raman)                           (Harish Tandon)
                                          Judge                                  Chief Justice



               Aswini Sethy/PA
               S.K. Guin/ PA








Location: High Court of Orissa, Cuttack
Date: 22-Oct-2025 12:09:46