Orissa High Court
Sk. Alim And Others vs State Of Odisha And Another .... Opp. ... on 13 October, 2025
Author: Chittaranjan Dash
Bench: Chittaranjan Dash
AFR IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
CRLMC No.660 of 2018
Sk. Alim and Others .... Petitioners
Mr. Pravat Ku. Mohanty, Advocate
-versus-
State of Odisha and another .... Opp. Parties
Ms. Siva Mohanty, Addl. P. P.
CORAM:
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE CHITTARANJAN DASH
Date of Judgment: 13.10.2025
Chittaranjan Dash, J.
1. By means of the present application, the Petitioners seek to
quash the order dated 02.05.2017 passed by the learned JMFC,
Pattamundai in G.R. Case No.357 of 2014, which was initiated at
the instance of the Opposite Party-wife against the Petitioners.
2. The background facts of the case are that the Petitioners,
being the husband and his relatives, were charge-sheeted in
connection with G.R. Case No.357 of 2014, arising out of
Pattamundai P.S. Case No.237 of 2017, for the offences punishable
under Sections 498-A/341/323/294/406/506/34 of the IPC read with
Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.
The Opposite Party No.2 lodged a complaint against the
Petitioners before the I.I.C., Pattamundai, whereupon Pattamundai
P.S. Case No.237 of 2014 was registered, and after investigation,
charge sheet was submitted. As per the allegations, Opposite Party
No.2 married Petitioner No.1 on 24.07.2011, and at the time of
marriage, in compliance with the demand of the Petitioners, a cash
amount of Rs.1,00,000/- along with ornaments and other articles
was given to the family of the bridegroom. After the marriage,
Petitioner No.1 along with his relatives allegedly subjected
Opposite Party No.2 to cruelty demanding further dowry, and on
account of non-fulfillment of such demand, they attempted to kill
her by pouring hot water on her body and subsequently drove her
out of the matrimonial home, compelling her to lodge the report.
3. Mr. Mohanty, learned counsel for the Petitioners, submits
that subsequently, the marital dispute between the parties was
amicably settled through mediation. In terms of the said settlement,
both Petitioner No.1 and Opposite Party No.2, being husband and
wife, agreed to put an end to all litigations. Acting upon such
settlement, they filed a joint petition for compromise before the
learned Judge, Family Court, Kendrapara in Criminal Proceeding
No.824 of 2014, which had been initiated by Opposite Party No.2
seeking maintenance. Pursuant to the settlement, Petitioner No.1
paid a sum of Rs.3,60,000/- to Opposite Party No.2 towards her
permanent alimony and an additional sum of Rs.23,505/- by way of
Bank Draft towards her dower and maintenance for the iddat
period.
4. By order dated 18.04.2017, the learned Judge, Family
Court, Kendrapara disposed of the said proceeding, recording the
fact of receipt of Rs.3,83,505/- by Opposite Party No.2. It was also
clearly stated in the joint petition that Opposite Party No.2
(informant) would withdraw the criminal case initiated by her under
Section 498-A IPC and allied offences. The order dated 25.06.2015
passed by the learned Judge, Family Court, Kendrapara in Criminal
Proceeding No.824 of 2014 has been annexed as Annexure-4.
5. According to learned counsel for the Petitioners, in view of
the compromise having been duly acted upon, the continuation of
the criminal proceeding pending before the learned JMFC,
Pattamundai in connection with Pattamundai P.S. Case No.237 of
2014 would serve no fruitful purpose and, therefore, deserves to be
quashed.
6. Despite service of notice, Opposite Party No.2 did not
appear. This Court has perused the joint petition filed by Petitioner
No.1 and Opposite Party No.2 before the learned Judge, Family
Court in Criminal Proceeding No.824 of 2014, as well as the order
passed therein. It is evident that the proceeding initiated at the
behest of Opposite Party No.2 before the learned JMFC,
Pattamundai, pursuant to the FIR lodged at Pattamundai P.S., arose
out of a matrimonial dispute between the parties. The subsequent
settlement arrived at between Petitioner No.1 and Opposite Party
No.2, being husband and wife, has already been acted upon, as
reflected from the joint petition filed by them and the consequential
order of the learned Judge, Family Court resolving the said dispute.
Upon acceptance of permanent alimony, along with dower and
maintenance for the iddat period by Opposite Party No.2, no fruitful
purpose would be served in allowing the criminal proceeding
pending before the learned JMFC, Pattamundai to continue.
7. It is well-settled law that the very object of Section 498-A
of the IPC should not be allowed to become counterproductive. In
matters concerning family life and marital relationships, the
benefits of discontinuing legal proceedings to give effect to a
compromise or reconciliation often outweigh any social harm that
may result from non-prosecution. If proceedings are allowed to
continue despite a compromise reached by both parties, either the
scope for conviction becomes minimal, or the life of the aggrieved
party may be rendered miserable. In this way, the broader social
good is served. The sensitivity inherent in family disputes, as well
as the individual facts and circumstances of each case, cannot be
overlooked.
8. The counter-argument to the compoundability of offences
under Section 498-A IPC is that permitting compounding would
amount to legal recognition of violence against women, and that
reconciliation cannot serve as a justifiable ground to condone such
violence. Acceptance of this argument would imply that the law's
primary objective is to see criminal proceedings through to their
logical conclusion and to punish the husband, regardless of the
parties' mutual desire to reconcile. In other words, whether or not
reconciliation occurs, the husband must face prosecution and, if
warranted, punishment, for Section 498-A to achieve its purpose.
This reasoning, however, is fallacious. The objectives of Section
498-A are better served by allowing proceedings to take their
natural course while taking into account the reconciliation that may
have occurred between the parties. A balanced and holistic
approach is necessary in addressing issues that affect family and
social relations, with emphasis not solely on the punitive aspects of
the law.
9. In matters of this nature, the law should not stand in the way
of genuine reconciliation or the restoration of harmonious relations
between the husband and the estranged wife.
10. The Hon'ble Apex Court, in B. S. Joshi vs. State of
Haryana, reported in (2003) 4 SCC 675, firmly held that, in order
to serve the ends of justice, the High Court may, in exercise of its
inherent powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, quash criminal
proceedings at the instance of a husband and wife who have
amicably settled their disputes and wish to end the acrimony.
However, the correctness of this decision was doubted by a
Division Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Gian Singh vs.
State of Punjab & Anr., reported in (2012) 10 SCC 303, and the
matter was subsequently referred to a larger Bench. The larger
Bench clarified that the High Court's power to quash criminal
proceedings, FIRs, or complaints in exercise of its inherent
jurisdiction is distinct from the power conferred on a criminal court
to compound offences under Section 320 CrPC. The High Court
may quash criminal proceedings arising out of matrimonial
disputes, including dowry-related cases or other family matters,
where the alleged wrong is essentially private or personal in nature
and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. The decision is
reproduced as follows -
"48. The question is with regard to the inherent power
of the High Court in quashing the criminal proceedings
against an offender who has settled his dispute with the
victim of the G crime but the crime in which he is
allegedly involved is not compoundable under Section
320 of the Code.
49. Section 482 of the Code, as its very language
suggests, saves the inherent power of the High Court
which it has by virtue of it being a superior court to
prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to
secure the ends of justice. It begins with the words,
'nothing in this Code' which means that the provision is
an overriding provision. These words leave no manner of
doubt that none of the provisions of the Code limits or
restricts the inherent power. The guideline for exercise of
such power is provided in Section 482 itself i.e., to
prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to
secure the ends of justice. As has been repeatedly stated
that Section 482 confers no new powers on High Court;
it merely safeguards existing inherent powers possessed
by High Court necessary to prevent abuse of the process
of any Court or to secure the ends of justice. It is equally
well settled that the power is not to be resorted to if there
is specific provision in the Code for the redress of the
grievance of an aggrieved party. It should be exercised
very sparingly and it should not be exercised as against
the express bar of law engrafted in any other provision of
the Code.
×××
51. In the very nature of its constitution, it is the
judicial obligation of the High Court to undo a wrong in
course of administration of justice or to prevent
continuation of unnecessary judicial process. This is
founded on the legal maxim quando lex aliquid alicui
concedit, concedituret id sine qua res ipsa esse non
potest. The full import of which is wheneveranything is
authorised, and especially if, as a matter of duty, required
to be done by law, it is found impossible to do that thing
unless something else not authorised in express terms be
also done, may also be done, then that something else
will be supplied by necessary intendment. Ex debito
justitiae is inbuilt in such exercise; the whole idea is to
do real, complete and substantial justice for which it
exists. The power possessed by the High Court under
Section 482 of the Code is of wide amplitude but
requires exercise with great caution and circumspection.
×××
53. Quashing of offence or criminal proceedings on
the ground of settlement between an offender and victim
is not the same thing as compounding of offence. They
are different and not interchangeable. Strictly speaking,
the power of compounding of offences given to a court
under Section 320 is materially different from the
quashing of criminal proceedings by the High Court in
exercise of its inherent jurisdiction. In compounding of
offences, power of a criminal court is circumscribed by
the provisions contained in Section 320 and the court is
guided solely and squarely thereby while, on the other
hand, the formation of opinion by the High Court for
quashing a criminal offence or criminal proceeding or
criminal complaint is guided by the material on record as
to whether the ends of justice would justify such exercise
of power although the ultimate consequence may be
acquittal or dismissal of indictment.
×××
57. The position that emerges from the above
discussion can be summarised thus: the power of the
High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or
complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is
distinct and different from the power given to a criminal
court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of
the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no
statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord
with the guideline engrafted in such power viz; (i) to
secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent abuse of the
process of any Court. In what cases power to quash the
criminal proceeding or complaint or F.I.R. may be
exercised where the offender and victim have settled
their dispute would depend on the facts and
circumstances of each case and no category can be
prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the
High Court must have due regard to the nature and
gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of
mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity,
etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or
victim's family and the offender have settled the dispute.
Such offences are not private in nature and have serious
impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between
the victim and offender in relation to the offences under
special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or the
offences committed by public servants while working in
that capacity etc; cannot provide for any basis for
quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences.
But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and pre-
dominatingly civil flavour stand on different footing for
the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences
arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil,
partnership or such like transactions or the C offences
arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the
family disputes where the wrong is basically private or
personal in nature and the parties have resolved their
entire dispute. In this category of cases, High Court may
quash criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the
compromise between the offender and victim, the
possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and
continuation of criminal case would put accused to great
oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be
caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite
full and complete settlement and compromise with the
victim. In other words, the High Court must consider
whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of
justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or
continuation of the criminal proceeding would
tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement
and compromise between the victim and wrongdoer and
whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that
criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the
above question(s) is in affirmative, the High Court shall
be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal
proceeding."
11. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in K. Srinivas Rao vs. D.A.
Deepa, reported in (2013) 5 SCC 226, held that the High Court may
quash criminal proceedings initiated pursuant to an FIR alleging an
offence under Section 498-A IPC, even though such an offence is
not compoundable, if the parties have reached an amicable
settlement. Further, a Full Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
Jitendra Raghuvanshi & Ors. vs. Babita Raghuvanshi & Anr.,
reported in (2013) 4 SCC 58 reaffirmed the decision in B. S. Joshi
(supra), holding that the High Court, in exercise of its inherent
powers, can quash criminal proceedings, FIRs, or complaints in
appropriate cases to serve the ends of justice, and that Section 320
CrPC does not limit or affect the High Court's powers under
Section 482 CrPC.
12. In view of the foregoing discussion, since the matter has
been amicably settled between the parties, Petitioner No.1-Husband
and Opposite Party No.2-Wife, as has already been acknowledged
by the learned Judge, Family Court, Pattamundai, the criminal
proceedings pending before the learned JMFC, Pattamundai, will
have no further consequence and, therefore, deserves to be quashed.
Accordingly, the impugned order dated 02.05.2017 passed by the
learned JMFC, Pattamundai in G.R. Case No.357 of 2014 is hereby
quashed. The CRLMC is allowed.
(Chittaranjan Dash)
Judge
AKPradhan
Signed by: ANANTA KUMAR PRADHAN
Location: HIGH COURT OF ORISSA
Date: 14-Oct-2025 16:47:32
