Orissa High Court
Anita Manjari Dash & Another vs Ssubhrajyoti Mishra & Another .... ... on 10 November, 2025
Author: R.K. Pattanaik
Bench: R.K. Pattanaik
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
AFR CRLREV No.378 of 2024
Anita Manjari Dash & Another .... Petitioners
Mr. Basudev Pujari, Advocate
-Versus-
SSubhrajyoti Mishra & Another .... Opposite Parties
Mr. Lalitendu Mishra, Advocate
CORAM:
JUSTICE R.K. PATTANAIK
DATE OF HEARING: 11.08.2025
DATE OF JUDGMENT:10.11.2025
1. Instant revision is filed in terms of Section 442 read with
Section 438 BNSS, 2023 at the behest of the petitioners
assailing the correctness, legality and judicial propriety of the
impugned judgment as at Annexure-6 dated 29th June, 2024
passed in connection with Criminal Appeal No.44 of 2023 by
the learned Additional Sessions Judge-cum-Presiding
Officer, Designated Court under the OPID Act, Cuttack on
the grounds inter alia that such decision is legally untenable,
hence, liable to be interferred with in the interest of justice.
2. The petitioners filed an application under Section 12 of the
Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005
(hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') registered as D.V. Misc.
Case No.42 of 2020 seeking protection order with other
Page 1 of 22
reliefs including maintenance and compensation payable to
them by the opposite parties.
3. Petitioner No.1 is the wife of opposite party No.1,
whereas, petitioner No.2 is their daughter and in so far as
opposite party No.2 is concerned, she is the mother of
opposite party No.1. In fact, the proceeding under the Act
was initiated against the opposite parties and two others,
namely, father-in-law and sister-in-law as respondent Nos.2
and 4 respectively with the plea that except respondent No.4,
the parties are in a domestic relationship residing in a shared
household. According to petitioner No.1, soon after her
marriage with opposite party No.1, she was subjected to ill-
treatment on demand of dowry, hence, a criminal case vide
C.T. No.440 of 2014 was registered in the Court of learned
S.D.J.M., Bhubaneswar. With such other facts pleaded, the
petitioners demanded protection against any act of domestic
violence by the opposite parties and other reliefs besides
payment of Rs. 25,000/- per month towards maintenance. A
show cause was filed by the opposite parties before the
learned S.D.J.M., Sadar, Cuttack. Ultimately, the learned
J.M.F.C., Cuttack, while dealing with an application under
Section 23 of the Act restrained opposite party No.2 not to
alienate the property in Lot 1 situate over Plot No.3C/261,
Sector-9, CDA, Cuttack, wherein, the petitioners claimed
their shared household and being aggrieved of, the opposite
parties challenged the same in Criminal Appeal No.44 of
2023, which was disposed of on 29th June, 2024 setting it
aside vide Annexure-6. In view of the decision in appeal, the
petitioners have approached this Court in revision on the
ground that the learned Appellate Court failed to appreciate
the fact that the parties are in domestic relationship and
enjoying a shared household, hence, any disposal of the
property in question is likely to prejudice them.
4. Perused the show cause reply of the opposite parties,
wherein, it has been pleaded that such an order is not to affect
the petitioners as there is a provision under Section 19(1)(f)
of the Act which allows to secure the same level of
alternative accommodation as enjoyed by them in a shared
household or to make provision for payment of rent, if the
circumstances so required and therefore, the learned Court
below after taking into account all such aspects of the case,
rightly, on just and reasonable ground interfered with the
order of restraint of the learned J.M.F.C., Cuttack.
5. The rejoinder affidavit filed by the petitioner is gone
through, wherein, the impugned decision has been questioned
on the ground that alternative accommodation cannot be a
substitute to a shared household irrespective of, whether,
petitioner No.1 is having any right, title or interest therein.
6. Heard Mr. Pujari, learned counsel for the petitioners and
Mr. Mishra, learned counsel for the opposite parties.
7. The learned Court below considered the allegation of
domestic violence put forth by petitioner No.1 and the denial
by the opposite parties took cognizance of the fact about
estranged relationship between her and opposite party No.1
and also the claim that the parties are residing together.
While dealing with the application under Section 23 of the
Act, the learned Court below has also taken judicial notice of
the fact that petitioner No.1 having approached the Civil
Court with a request to restrain opposite party No.2 from
alienating property in question and whether, to stand as a bar
in a proceeding under the Act and finally, passed the
impugned order i.e. Annexure-6.
8. Lot No.1 property stands recorded in the name of opposite
party No.2, who happens to be the mother-in-law of
petitioner No.1, the factual position, which is not denied.
9. With the conclusion that there is no material on record to
convince the Court of first instance about the fact that the
petitioners have ever been threatened by the opposite parties
from being dispossessed from Lot No.1 property and if at all
to restrain opposite party No.2 from alienating such property,
which stood exclusively in her name and referring to a
decision of the Apex Court in Satish Chander Ahuja Vrs.
Sneha Ahuja (2021) 1 SCC 414, the learned Court below
concluded that such demand of residence under Section 19 of
the Act is not an indefeasible right and in absence of any
evidence of immediate dispossession of the petitioners, the
order of restraint in terms thereof is unjustified and
resultantly, allowed the appeal filed by the opposite parties
and set aside the order dated 27th April, 2023 at Annexure-5
of the learned J.M.F.C., Cuttack.
10. It is brought to the notice of this Court that petitioner
No.1 has proceeded against opposite party No.1 demanding
maintenance before the Family Court and in that connection,
recovery of arrear and regular maintenance with an
application under Section 128 Cr.P.C. arising C.R.P No.27 of
2014 disposed of on 21st January, 2015 is stated to be
pending disposal. It is also made to understand that opposite
party No.2 has approached the learned Sub-Divisional
Officer Maintenance Tribunal, Cuttack in Misc. Case No.5 of
2023 with an application under Section 4 of the Maintenance
and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007
(shortly as 'the Act, 2007') against petitioner No.1 and three
others. That apart, the petitioners have knocked the doors of
the Court of learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), First
Court, Cuttack in C.S. No.935 of 2022 to permanently injunct
opposite party No.2 from disposing of or creating a third
party interest over and in respect of the case property and not
to interfere with their peaceful residence right being in a
shared household with I.A. No.1 of 22 filed therein and
disposed of on 20th February, 2023 denying any such relief as
an interim measure, as against which, an appeal in FAO
No.37 of 2023 is pending decision in the Court of learned
District Judge, Cuttack.
11. Mr. Pujari, learned counsel for the petitioners submits
that the impugned judgment in Criminal Appeal No.44 of
2023 is liable to be set aside since it has interfered with the
right of residence of the petitioners oblivious of the fact that
petitioners are in a domestic relationship with opposite party
No.1 and residing in a shared household and any such
disposal of the property is likely to dispossess them and
defeat such right allowed under Section 19 of the Act. It is
further submitted that the relationship between petitioner
No.1 and opposite party No.2 since strained, the former had
to obtain the order of residence, which has been unduly
interfered with by the learned Court below without
appreciating the fact that any such dispossession from a
shared household is certainly to cause the petitioners
immense hardship and inconvenience, hence, the impugned
decision at Annexure-6 deserves to be set at naught restoring
the restraint order allowed in the proceeding in terms of
Section 19(1)(d) of the Act.
12. On the contrary, Mr. Mishra, learned counsel for the
opposite parties vehemently objected to the claims of the
petitioners and would submit that the learned Court below
did not commit any error or serious illegality in interfering
with the restraint order since the property involved is the
exclusively interest of opposite party No.2, who could not
have been gagged by any such order, all the more when, there
is alternative provision to accommodate them, to which, they
are entitled under the Act and in support of such contention,
the decision in Satish Chander Ahuja (supra) is referred to
besides the following, such as, S.R. Batra & another Vrs.
Smt.Taruna Batra (2007) 3 SCC 169 and the judgments of
Delhi High Court in Smita Jina Vrs. Amit Kumar Jina in
MAT Appeal (F.C.) 270 of 2025; Sachin & another Vrs.
Jhabbu Lal & another in RSA No.136 of 2016; Shumita
Didi Sandhu Vrs. Sanjay Singh Sandhu & others in FAO
(OS) No.341 of 2007; Nena Jain & another Vrs. Gunmala
Devi Jain & another in RSA No.282 of 2015; Madalsa
Sood Vrs. Maunicka Makkar & another in CS (OS) No.93
of 2021; and Ajay Kumar Jain Vrs. Baljit Kaur Jain in
FAO (OS) No.278 of 2007 to further contend that under the
facts and circumstances of the case at hand, when the
petitioners have not been deprived of receiving monthly
maintenance as per the order of the Family Court, there
cannot be a restraint order against opposite party No.2 from
dealing with Lot 1 property, in any manner whatsoever,
which is her self-acquired and exclusive interest and hence,
the learned Court below did not commit any illegality in
superseding the decision i.e. Annexure-5 and hence, the
revision is liable to be dismissed.
13. According to the learned Court below, opposite party
No.2 should not be restrained by any such order from
alienating Lot 1 property, which is her exclusively interest,
furthermore when, no such case is made out by the
petitioners. The conclusion in respect of Lot 2 property is that
they are not part of the shared household and therefore, it is
beyond the purview of Section 19 of the Act. Taking into
account the decision of the Apex Court in Satish Chandra
Ahuja (supra), the learned Court below finally concluded
that any such order in respect of Lot Nos.1 & 2 properties
would be unjustified, hence, the decision of the learned
J.M.F.C., Cuttack vis-à-vis the properties with restraint order
has been set aside for the above mentioned reasons.
14. As further submitted by Mr. Pujari, learned counsel for
the petitioners, the right of residence of the petitioners would
be frustrated, if the properties are allowed to be disposed of,
particularly when, Lot 1 property is a shared household. The
contention is that even if the said property is the exclusive
interest of opposite party No.2, the same being a shared
household, it cannot be parted with and therefore, the learned
J.M.F.C., Cuttack rightly passed the order of restraint. The
further contention is that permission has been applied with an
application by opposite party No.2 to the Cuttack
Development Authority (CDA) to sell Lot 1 property and the
intent and purpose is, therefore, to dispossess the petitioners
therefrom, the fact which was totally lost sight of by the
learned Court below in unsettling the order of prohibition.
15. In reply to the above, Mr. Mishra, learned counsel for the
opposite parties would submit that no fetters can be put in
respect of the schedule properties and correctly, therefore, the
learned Court below set aside the restraint order i.e.
Annexure-5. The further submission is that Lot 1 property is
owned by opposite party No.2 and the one under Lot 2 is the
interest of opposite party No.1, which is not a shared
household. The claim is that Lot 2 interest with the assets
have been acquired by opposite party No.1 and not a subject
of shared household. As far as Lot 1 property is concerned,
the same being the separate and exclusive interest of opposite
party No.2, who is the mother-in-law, old and ailing, even
though, it is used as a shared household, no such prohibition
is to be allowed against its disposal. In any case, according to
Mr. Mishra, learned counsel, there is no material on record to
establish that opposite party No.2 is in any way
contemplating to dispose of Lot 1 property in order to oust
the petitioners in order to deprive them the right of residence.
Even any such permission sought for from the CDA,
according to Mr. Mishra, learned counsel, by itself is not
sufficient to prove the intention of opposite party No.2 to be
otherwise only to dispossess the petitioners from the shared
household. That apart, a separate property of opposite party
No.2 cannot be a subject of restraint order, as has been
demanded by the petitioners.
16. To reiterate, it is not in denial that Lot 1 property is the
self-acquired interest of opposite party No.2, who is a retired
doctor. The question is, whether, the entire or at least, Lot 1
of the properties may be a subject of the prohibition order as
was directed by the learned J.M.F.C., Cuttack? In fact,
backstage, the issue is primarily concerned with the right of
residence pleaded by the petitioners and it relates to Lot 1
property, as Lot 2 properties are not used as a shared
household but claimed to be the separate interest of opposite
party No.1. When Lot 2 interest belongs to opposite party
No.1 and in respect of such properties, no right of residence
to lie, it cannot be a subject matter of consideration, while
dealing with an application under Section 19 of the Act. The
Court of first instance, as it appears, directed the opposite
parties not to alienate all the properties. When demand is
predominantly for protecting the right of residence claiming
shared household, according to the Court, it shall have to
confine to Lot 1 property. For any other rights, the petitioners
shall have to avail such other remedy available under law. If
there is any interest of the petitioners is involved in respect of
Lot 2 properties, it cannot be considered under Section 19 of
the Act but by a separate action initiated by the petitioners.
Since Lot 1 property is claimed to be the place of residence,
in respect of which, the petitioners demand residence order
and/or others reliefs, the Court is to consider, whether, any
such direction may be issued preventing its disposal by
opposite party No.2 in juxtaposition to the claim of the
petitioners in respect thereof.
17. According to the opposite parties, the provision of
alternative accommodation under Section 19(1)(f) of the Act
may be considered in respect of the petitioners but not the
restraint order as Lot 1 property is the separate interest of
opposite party No.2. The argument is that a separate property
of in-laws should not be subject of any restraint order when
law allows alternative accommodation for the aggrieved
person. It is also claimed that the petitioners instituted the suit
in C.S. No.935 of 2022, wherein, I.A. No.1 of 2022 was
disposed of on 20th February, 2022 denying injunction in
terms of Order 39 Rules 1 & 2 in respect of the schedule
property, the fact, which was not disclosed before the learned
J.M.F.C., Cuttack even though necessary as a statutory
compliance. Replying to the above, it is pleaded that the
paramount interest of the petitioners is to be kept in view as
any such alienation of properties and in particular, Lot 1 is
likely to defeat their rights under the Act.
18. There is no denial to the fact that the petitioners are
staying in Lot 1 property. It is not denied by the opposite
parties with regard to the claim of the petitioners regarding
the residency. It is also not in dispute that the petitioners do
have a right of residence in a shared household.
19. If the aggrieved person lives or ever stayed at any place
with the respondents, the same shall become a shared
household as defined in Section 2(s) of the Act even though a
rented house or is not owned by the parties. Even if it is a
joint property of the in-laws, it can be a subject of a
proceeding under Section 19 of the Act, in respect of which,
the right of residence is claimed.
20. In Satish Chandra Ahuja (supra), the Apex Court held
and observed that such a right under Section 19 of the Act is
not indefeasible in a shared household especially when the
daughter-in-law is pitted against aged parents-in-law. It is
further held therein that the senior citizens in the evening of
their life are also entitled to live peacefully, not haunted by
the marital discord between their son and daughter-in-law
and therefore, while granting reliefs both in an application
under Section 12 of the Act or in any civil proceedings, a
Court has to balance the rights of the parties. It is also held
that pendency of a proceeding under Section 12 of the Act
does not preclude or bar a civil proceeding.
21. In the instant case, the petitioners though knocked the
doors of the Civil Court in a suit and the same is stated to be
pending, therein, the application for injunction under Order
39 Rules 1 & 2 CPC was filed but has been dismissed. Even
though the injunction in respect of the properties has been
denied in favour of the petitioners in the suit, according to the
Court, it does not prevent them from demanding such other
rights under the Act, which deals with right of residence and
host of other reliefs. Notwithstanding any such adverse order
in the suit with the dismissal of I.A. No.1 of 2022 in the year
2023, it is unlikely to affect the rights of the petitioners
demanding residency in respect of Lot 1 property. The
objective of the law and provisions of the Act is to deal with
rights of an aggrieved person, who has been subjected to
domestic violence. If such right of residence, irrespective of
any such suit or civil proceeding pending or initiated, exists,
it would still fall within the ambit of an action and proceeding
under Section 19 of the Act, in which, right, title or any such
interest over the shared household property is inconsequential
and hence, is not adjudicated upon and determined.
22. Apart from the right of residence in a shared household, a
provision of alternative accommodation may also be explored
and considered in a situation where separate and exclusive
properties of the in-laws are involved, as has been observed
in Satish Chandra Ahuja (supra). The intention and purpose
of the law is to prevent immediate dispossession of the
aggrieved person from a shared household, if she resides or
lived in such a shared household with her husband and in-
laws. Anyone, who is likely to be dispossessed after being
subjected to domestic violence, to protect her against the
mischief of the in-laws besides the husband, such a provision
has been made and that apart, a corresponding duty and
obligation lies with the husband to look after the wellbeing of
his better half and others with whom he is in a domestic
relationship. But, when a property, which is not owned by the
husband but a separate interest or exclusively owned by the
in-laws or one of them, before considering right of residence
in respect of such property, a Court has to balance the
competing rights and to take a decision accordingly. When
right of residence is claimed, a Court is enjoined with an
onerous responsibility to maintain a balance, otherwise, any
such order of restraint vis-à-vis a shared household, a
separate interest of any in-laws, is definitely to cause
hardship and inconvenience to the latter further resulting in
family disorder.
23. In S.R. Batra (supra), it has been held that the claim of
alternative accommodation can be made only against the
husband and not in-laws or other relatives and therein, the
property was neither of the husband nor was taken by him on
rent or a joint family interest but an exclusive and separate
property of the mother-in-law and it was held to be not a
shared household and further observed that the definition of
'shared household' in Section 2(s) of the Act is not very
happily worded and appears to be the result of clumsy
drafting and hence, it has to be interpreted sensibly to avoid
any such chaos in the society.
24. In Shumita Didi Sandhu (supra), it has been held that
property when does not belong to the husband or he has share
or interest therein, it cannot be referred to as a shared
household and further held that the expression 'matrimonial
home' is not at all defined in the Act and the concept of
'matrimonial homes' as prevailing in England by virtue of
Matrimonial Homes Act, 1967 cannot be applied in India as
pointed out in S.R. Batra case and while discussing further,
it has been concluded that right of residence is no doubt an
independent right but it does not translate into a right to
reside in a particular house and referring to other case laws,
the conclusion therein is that the right of residence or the
provision for residence may even be considered either by
providing a lumpsum amount or property in lieu thereof and
in the said case, alternative accomodation had been offered to
the wife but she refused to accept the same instead insisted on
retaining the property in question claiming to be her
matrimonial home.
25. According to the Court, while dealing with the request for
a restraint order, what is more important is to ensure
protection of interest of the aggrieved person, be a right of
residence or any other rights, to which, she is otherwise
entitled to under the Act. The right of residence is a valuable
right to be protected against ill-intention of the husband and
in-laws and from being frustrated but at the same time, when
the property is separately owned by the parents-in-law or any
in-laws, such demand is to be considered with care and
caution.
26. In Neha Jain (supra), while dealing with a similar
situation, it has been held and concluded that a daughter-in-
law has no right to continue to occupy the self-acquired
property of her parents-in-law against their wishes, more so
when, her husband has no independent right therein, as it is
not a shared household within the meaning of Section 17(1)
of the Act and the wife is entitled to claim a right in a shared
household, which means, a house belonging to any of them or
taken on rent by the husband or any such premises of the
joint family, of which, husband is a member; and that, a
daughter-in-law cannot assert her rights, if any, in the
property of her parents-in-law, wherein, husband has no right,
title or interest and hence, cannot be allowed to continue to
live in such a house against their consent.
27. As regards the property prevented from being disposed of
by sale, gift etc. by orders under the Act, no doubt, a Court
has powers to direct so, if the aggrieved person is likely to be
dispossessed from there. The Legislature in its wisdom
introduced such a provision chiefly to prevent imminent
danger of dispossession of the aggrieved persons from a
shared household. But, the situation may be different when
the property belongs to the parents-in-law. In such a case,
according to the Court, a proper course of action would be to
direct the husband to consider alternative accommodation to
be made available to the wife when such disposal is
anticipated. In the case of the petitioners, an apprehension has
been expressed that they are likely to be dispossessed from
the shared household as opposite party No.2 has applied for
permission to the CDA with such intention behind in respect
of Lot 1 property. It may be said that such apprehension is
not entirely misplaced in view of such conduct of opposite
party No.2, but, at the same time, it would not be wrong to
conclude that there is unlikelihood of instant dispossession of
the petitioners from Lot 1 property taking into account the
facts and circumstances of the case in its entirety.
28. A property which is owned exclusively by one of the in-
laws claimed to be a shared household, any such order of
restraint is likely to affect their interest. If there is a shared
household by staying together or resided once and on account
of domestic violence, dispossession is certain or likely to
follow, in such a situation, right of residence is claimed and a
Court has powers to deal with the same primarily to protect
the aggrieved persons from being dispossessed and may even
direct the husband to leave the premises, if he is guilty of
domestic violence. In the context of right of residence and the
spirit of law, a Court has to take a decision, while dealing
with an application under Section 19 of the Act keeping in
view the law expounded in S.R. Batra (supra).
29. In Madalsa Sood (supra), it is concluded that even where
the residence is clearly a shared household, it does not bar the
owner from claiming eviction against her daughter-in-law, if
circumstances call for it. In Ajay Kumar Jain (supra), it is
concluded that a shared household can indeed be partitioned,
and the female occupants' right to residence may be protected
without conferring a greater proprietary entitlement than what
is legally owned. Having considered the case laws with an
overall understanding the provisions dealing with right of an
aggrieved person, it has to be held that the purpose
demanding a restraint order is to avoid a situation leading to
one's dispossession but not to demand any such right in
respect of the property separately owned by the in-laws. In
the instant case, Lot 1 property belongs to opposite party
No.2. There is no reason to consider in respect of Lot 2
properties, when it forms no part of the shared household. In
fact, the properties under Lot 2 are the separate or joint
family interest and nothing to do with a shared household and
therefore, it has been kept away from consideration. Only Lot
1 property is involved, in respect of which, restraint order is
demanded on the plea that it is being used as a shared
household. When such a property does not belong to opposite
party No.1 or of the joint family interest though alleged to be
but prima facie shown to be exclusively owned by opposite
party No.2, who said to have acquired it with her own source
of income being a doctor, it cannot be subjected to any such
restraint order, apart from when, instant dispossession is not
established. If in case, the said property is decided to be sold
in future, to look after the interest of the petitioners and their
peaceful residence, the responsibility in providing them a
suitable and alternative accommodation is to fall back upon
opposite party No.1, who has a bounden duty and obligation
to discharge the same. Having said that, the Court is of the
conclusion that the apprehension of the petitioners, as earlier
stated, may not be completely misplaced but to demand any
such restraint order in respect of Lot 1 property owned
separately by opposite party No.2 could lead to an unpleasant
situation. The very purpose of any such disposal of Lot 1
property could only be to prevent dispossession of the
petitioners, which, in the considered view of the Court, may
be appropriately addressed by opposite party No.1 by
providing them the alternative accommodation, if, in case,
any such contingency arises in future.
30. The other plea of the petitioners advanced is that the
learned Court below completely brushed aside the fact that
they have been harassed by the opposite parties, hence, was
the order against alienation of the property in question
especially considering non-payment of maintenance regularly
to them even depriving of their daily expenses. The further
plea is that lot 1 property though stands in the name of
opposite party No.1, the same has been acquired utilizing the
funds of the joint family property and therefore, it cannot be
claimed as her exclusive interest. Furthermore, pendency of
any such suit is not an embargo for an action under the Act
and as such, rule of res judicata does not apply. It is claimed
that right of petitioner No.1 under the Act and to secure a
residence order in respect of a shared household cannot be
defeated by an order procured under the Act, 2007, wherein,
a summery procedure is adopted as has been held in Smt.
Khushboo Shukla Vrs. District Magistrate, Lucknow and
others 2022 (230) AIC 888.
31. The dispute is primarily over the residential plot, which
stands in the name of opposite party No.2, with the claim that
it is being used as a share household. As far as the rights of
the petitioners are concerned, it is regulated by the provisions
of the Act. The claim that the petitioners failing to obtain an
interim order in the suit with a relief of similar nature, as
already concluded, does not stand as a bar for an aggrieved
person to demand protection under the Act including a
residence order and injunction against alienation or disposal
of property in any manner to avoid immediate dispossession
from a share household. A rule of res judicata cannot be
invoked claiming that petitioner No.1 as no rights to demand
any such protection under the Act including an order against
alienation in respect of a share household due to the
pendency of the suit. A right under the Act, 2007 is to be
independently examined in the circumstances as against the
proceeding under the Act. To add further, a shared household
must be a property belonging to or rented by husband or joint
family property, of which, the husband is a member and the
Apex Court in Smt. Hardeep Kaur and others Vrs. State
of Uttarakhand and others 2010 SCC OnLine Utt 2187
held and concluded that any such property owned exclusive
by the mother-in-law does not qualify as a share household.
Furthermore, in Vibhuti Wadhwa Sharma Vrs. Krishna
Sharma and another 2021 SCC OnLine Del 2104, it has
been concluded that a right to residence is not indefeasible
and must be balanced against the rights of senior citizens,
particularly when, they seek to live peacefully. In Sujata
Gandhi Vrs. S.B. Gandhi 2020 SCC OnLine All 763, the
Apex Court further concluded that if the property is found
not to be a shared household, the daughter-in-law can even be
evicted without the need for a decree against the husband.
But, in a given situation, the Courts may consider providing
alternative accommodation to a daughter-in-law, if necessary
but it would be contingent upon the specific circumstances of
a case. Considering the case laws, it may be summed up that
what is to be determined is, whether, the property in question
qualifies as a shared household under the Act but if it is
solely owned by the mother-in-law, the daughter-in-law's
right to reside there is diminished. However, when a claim in
respect of such a property has failed demanding residence or
restraint order, the Court may consider any such alternate
arrangement directing the husband to ensure the same when
the parties are survived by children or if the aggrieved person
is in a vulnerable position.
32. Having discussed this far, the irresistible conclusion of
the Court is that since Lot 1 property is separately recorded in
the name of opposite party No.2, prima facie being owner
thereof, it has to be held that there can be no such blanket
order to restrain her in dealing with the same in the manner
she chooses but at the same time, to ensure that there is no
imminent dispossession of petitioner No.1 therefrom. If in
case or assuming that such property likely to be disposed of,
well before such disposal, alternate accommodation of the
petitioners shall have to be provided by opposite party No.1.
Taking into account the facts of the case as a whole and after
having given anxious consideration to rights of the parties, in
the humble view of the Court, the decision of the learned
Court below even though to be upheld, it needs modification
in order to protect the interest of the petitioners against any
such immediate threat of being dispossessed by taking care of
their alternate accommodation.
33. Accordingly, it is ordered.
34. In the result, the revision petition stands disposed of with
the impugned decision by judgment dated 29 th June, 2024 at
Annexure-6 in Criminal Appeal No.44 of 2023 of the learned
Additional Sessions Judge-cum-Presiding Officer Designated
Court under the OPID Act, Cuttack being modified to the
extent as aforesaid. It is directed that in case, any such
situation arises in future, towards disposal of Lot 1 property,
before it is accomplished, opposite party No.1 shall ensure
alternative accommodation of the petitioners with all such
provisions made in that regard. It is made to clear that no
such dispossession of the petitioners shall take place unless
the above direction is complied with.
35. In the circumstances, there is no order as to the costs.
(R.K. Pattanaik)
Judge
Alok/Tudu
