M/S. Trident Properties Pvt vs Abhisek Mohanty & Another
2025 Latest Caselaw 10142 Ori

Orissa High Court

M/S. Trident Properties Pvt vs Abhisek Mohanty & Another on 18 November, 2025

Author: R.K. Pattanaik

Bench: R.K. Pattanaik

        IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
AFR                     MSA No.37 of 2025

       M/s. Trident Properties Pvt.    ....         Appellant
       Limited, Bhubaneswar
                          Mr. Lalit Kumar Maharana, Advocate

                                -Versus-


        Abhisek Mohanty & another    ....       Respondents

Mr. Mohit Agarwal, Advocate Mr. B. Nayak, Advocate (ORERA) And

MSA No.38 of 2025

M/s. Trident Properties Pvt. .... Appellant Limited, Bhubaneswar Mr. Lalit Kumar Maharana, Advocate

-Versus-

Subash Chandra Dehury & .... Respondents another Mr. Mohit Agarwal, Advocate Mr. B. Nayak, Advocate (ORERA)

CORAM:

JUSTICE R.K. PATTANAIK

DATE OF HEARING: 14.08.2025 DATE OF JUDGMENT:18.11.2025

1. Both the appeals are disposed of by the following judgment since a common question of law is involved.

2. Instant appeals under Section 58 of the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') are filed by the appellant challenging the impugned orders dated 16th May, 2025 passed in connection with IA No.28 of 2025 and IA No.368 of 2024 arising out of OREAT Appeal No.12 of 2025 and OREAT Appeal No.182 of 2024 respectively of the learned Odisha Real Estate Appellate Tribunal, Bhubaneswar (shortly as 'the OREAT'), whereby, the applications seeking delay condonation have been disposed of and dismissed being barred by limitation on the grounds inter alia that such decisions are liable to be interfered and set aside since not legally tenable and also in the interest of justice.

3. As the appeals were filed beyond the stipulated period, the appellant moved the applications applying condonation of delay as per Annexure-2 and also deposited the statutory amount in terms of Section 43(5) of the Act securing the sum payable to the respondents by the order of the learned ORERA, to which, objections were received and ultimately, such delay was declined to be condoned on the premise that there is gross negligence on its part and the delay is inordinate without any sufficient cause being shown to explain away. The appellant challenges the decisions in both the appeals on the following grounds, such as, (i) that, the learned OREAT erred in not allowing delay to be condoned adopting a hyper-technical approach without considering the fact that respondents to be in possession of the flats since 2022 and the sole question involved is with regard to the

quantum of interest payable; (ii) that, it has been lost sight of by the learned OREAT that substantial justice is to prevail when pitted against technical considerations while dealing with the delay condonation; (iii). that, the reason behind the delay in filing of the appeals has not been appreciated by the learned OREAT in its proper perspective and to allow an opportunity to the appellant to pursue the matter on merits, inasmuch as, the grounds demanding condonation have not been examined before concluding that the same is inordinate and on account of gross negligence and utter callousness from its side.

4. Perused the copies of the appeal memorandums as at Annexure-1 filed before learned OREAT by the appellant.

5. In fact, the proceedings in Complaint Case Nos.34 and 49 of 2018 were initiated against the appellant and the orders passed in Execution Case Nos.12 and 15 of 2019 were challenged and since, in such proceedings, interest on different heads was allowed in favour of the respondents, it was finally challenged by filing the appeals and therein, the delay was declined to be condoned. Such refusal to condone the delay requested by the appellant since was rejected by the learned OREAT, the appellant preferred the present appeals.

6. Heard Mr. Maharana, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. Agrawal, learned counsel for the respondents besides Mr. Nayak, learned counsel for the ORERA.

7. The following are the substantial questions of law formulated by the Court for adjudication, such as, (i) whether

the impugned orders at Annexure-4 in dismissing the applications for condonation of delay in preferring the appeals are legally tenable? (ii) whether sufficient cause has been assigned by the appellant while pleading for condonation of delay? (iii) whether the impugned decision as per Annexure-4 is in consonance with the settled principles of law on limitation?

8. According to Mr. Maharana, learned counsel for the appellant, the learned OREAT committed serious error in denying delay condonation. It is further submitted that plausible explanation was offered by the appellant in both the cases and the same are sufficient cause for condonation of delay but the learned OREAT dismissed the IAs filed in that regard. It is contended by Mr. Maharana, learned counsel that the appeals involve a pertinent question whether interest directed on different heads to be payable or not is required to be examined and the reason behind delay in filling the same approaching the learned OREAT was pleaded on record but with the conclusion that such delay is inordinate, as there has been abject negligence and utter callousness on the part of the appellant, rejected the IAs declining to condone the same. Such erroneous conclusion of the learned OREAT, as further submitted, is required to be set at naught in order to advance the cause of justice. In support of the above contention put forth, Mr. Maharana, learned counsel cited the following decisions, such as, Collector Land Acquisition, Anantnag and another Vrs. Mst. Katiji and others (1987) 2 SCC 107; Inder Singh Vrs. The State of Madhya Pradesh 2025

Live Law (SC) 339; and Mool Chandra Vrs. Union of India and another of the Apex Court in Civil Appeal No.8435-8436 of 2024 decided on 5th August, 2024.

9. On the contrary, Mr. Agrawal, learned counsel for the respondents submits that the delay has not been condoned and rightly so, inasmuch as, the learned OREAT found it to be inordinate and such decision is based on the principles enunciated and based on the settled position of law. The reasons assigned by the appellant before the learned OREAT have not been treated as sufficient which is necessary while demanding condonation of delay. In support of the above argument advanced, Mr. Agarwal, learned counsel placed reliance on the following decisions, such as, H. Guruswamy Vrs. A. Krishnaiah MANU/SC/0051/2025; State of Madhya Pradesh Vrs. Ramkumar Choudhary 2024 (15) SCALE 484; Nazir Mohamed Vrs. J. Kamala and others 2020 (19) SCC 57; and Bhagyashree Anant Gaonkar Vrs. Narendra alias Nagesh Bharma Holkar & another 2023 SCC Online SC 1236.

10. The final orders and the orders in the execution proceedings were challenged before the learned OREAT arising out of Complaint Case Nos.49 and 34 of 2018 and in the appeals, the IAs were pressed into service demanding delay, which had occasioned thereby for being condoned on the ground that the appellant had earlier approached this Court in W.P.(C) Nos.16880 and 16878 of 2018 assailing the orders dated 9th July, 2018, wherein, 25% of the amount was directed to be deposited before the learned ORERA and it

was duly complied with in each case and the operation of the order was accordingly stayed but ultimately, it was disposed of on 8th July, 2021 and thereafter, according to the appellant, the same though could not be challenged for certain reasons but in so far as the period spent before this Court between 1st June, 2018 and 8th July, 2021 is concerned, it is to be condoned under Section 14 of the Limitation Act and also another period between 15th March, 2020 and 28th February, 2022 being covered by the order of the Apex Court in Suo Motu Writ Petition (C) No.3 of 2020 but such request for condonation was not entertained and finally, rejected with the conclusion that it was severely negligent and that apart, no sufficient cause was shown to exist.

11. On a reading of the impugned orders at Annexure-4, the Court finds that after disposal of W.P.(C) Nos.16880 and 16878 of 2018 on 8th July, 2021, the appellant preferred the appeals in 2025 after about three and half years, the learned OREAT concluded that in view of the indolent conduct of the appellant, any such condonation would amount to showing misplaced sympathy and hence, the same should not be allowed.

12. According to Mr. Maharana, learned counsel for the appellant, the learned OREAT failed to appreciate the facts and circumstances of the case, while considering delay condonation and ultimately dismissed the appeals. The submission is that the appellant has not been guilty of gross default as it had approached this Court in W.P.(C) Nos.16880 and 16878 of 2018 after the disposal of the complaints in the

year 2018 itself. It is contended that the respondents moved action for execution in 2019 and all along, the appellant defended the same. It is claimed that talks for settlement were in progress in the year 2022, during pendency of which, the execution was directed and it ultimately led to submission of requisition for execution of the orders of the learned ORERA. In the meantime, according to Mr. Maharana, learned counsel, the appellant had to knock the doors of this Court once again when its account was freezed and ultimately, it was allowed subject to deposit of secured amount before the Registry. Under such circumstances, it is submitted that whatever delay occasioned in filing the appeals sought to be condoned with the IAs moved by the appellant, it should have been allowed. The contention is that the appellant against the aforesaid background facts cannot be said to be seriously negligent especially when during the interregnum, it was intervened by COVID-19 and the period from 15th March, 2020 to 28th February, 2022 was directed to be suspended for the purpose of limitation by the order of the Apex Court in Suo Motu Writ Petition(C) No.3 of 2020. The further contention is that the flats were already ready for delivery of possession in 2017 and ultimately, handed over in 2022 and when the question remains for consideration with respect to the quantum of interest payable to the respondents and it had been secured with the deposits made pursuant to the direction of this Court and also before the learned OREAT upon filing of the appeals, the delay should have been condoned.

12.1. According to Mr. Maharana, learned counsel, it would not be correct to allege that the appellant was not vigilant all through but defended the complaint and also the execution levied against it and also approached this Court couple of times. In fact, as per the submission of Mr. Maharana, learned counsel, the order of the learned ORERA would not be challenged immediately and it was on one of the grounds that the OREAT has not been established. It is argued that the learned OREAT should have appreciated the same while dealing with the condonation of delay but it has been followed by the impugned orders at Annexure-4. The plea of the appellant is that delay is required to be condoned in the interest of justice as the decision on the quantum of interest should be determined on merit and hence, the appeals should not be rejected at the threshold on technical ground like limitation. Mr. Maharana, learned counsel would further submit that the learned OREAT failed to take cognizance of the settled principles of law that when substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, the former is to prevail, hence, therefore, the condonation of delay ought to have been allowed instead of denying the same with a hyper-technical approach. It is also pleaded that a Court is to adopt a pragmatic approach, not a pedantic one, which is the law propounded, while considering question of limitation and in normal course, it should be condoned. Finally, the contention is that the learned OREAT should have considered such delay condonation liberally in order to facilitate disposal of the appeals on merit when the appellant

is primarily affected on account of a decision vis-à-vis interest payable to the respondents.

13. On the contrary, Mr. Agarwal, learned counsel for the respondents would submit that conduct of the appellant is not bonafide, considering which, the learned OREAT declined the delay to be condoned. It is contended that the appellant after the disposal of the complaint cases by the learned ORERA was required to approach the Odisha Sales Tax Tribunal as was designated as the Appellate Tribunal under the Act in the year 2017, hence, it was not remediless. That apart, it is alleged that the appellant with suppression of facts and by playing fraud managed the orders of this Court in the year 2021, hence, it cannot take benefit of any such plea on limitation for filing of the appeals which is to be counted from 9th July, 2018. According to Mr. Agarwal, learned counsel, in any event, this Court disposed of the writ petitions in 2021 and granted liberty for the appellant to file appeals with applications for condonation of delay but such remedy was not availed of and in the meanwhile, the respondents demanded the execution before the learned ORERA and it was followed by the orders in 2022 for recovery under the OPDR Act. It is further alleged that the appellant misconducted itself and deliberately abstained and hence, dragged the litigation and lastly, filed the appeals with such delay, which, therefore, it should not be condoned at all. It is contended that the appellant was to file appeals within sixty days from the date of orders of the learned ORERA but it did not do so and not only that, when liberty was granted by this

Court in 2021, the same was not duly availed and furthermore, it could have filed the appeals after passing of the orders in the execution proceedings in 2022. It is further contended that the appellant should have filed the appeals after 6th April, 2023, when it received notices in certificate proceedings but again failed and after a long and inordinate delay, filed the appeals before the learned OREAT and the same speaks volumes about its conduct and considering the same, the delay was not condoned vide Annexure-4, a decision, which is perfectly justified and according to law.

13.1. As regards, the period of limitation extended to file the appeals till 28th April, 2022, the appellant did not plead anything in that regard before the learned OREAT and measurably failed to show sufficient cause as to what prevented it not to file the appeals within a period of sixty days after the aforesaid date and therefore, such a plea demanding delay condonation should be outrightly rejected, as further claimed. In the meantime, according to Mr. Agarwal, learned counsel, the respondents approached this Court by filing the writ petitions to direct early disposal of the certificate proceedings and therein, the appellant was noticed to appear but intentionally avoided the same and only after the communication dated 20th November, 2024 was received from the office of the learned AG, Odisha by the Inspector General of Registration, Odisha not to register any agreements for sale and sale deeds from being executed by the appellant that the appeals were filed before the learned OREAT.

13.2. According to Mr. Agarwal, learned counsel, the appellant cannot be allowed to take a plea while demanding delay condonation on the ground of being involved in number of litigations, inasmuch as, such a defence is not to be entertained to explain a delay of more than six years in filing the statutory appeals. It is submitted that the appellant was to complete the project with the occupancy certificates obtained by June, 2014 so as to deliver the possession of the flats to the allottees but completion of the same was inordinately delayed and such certificates were finally received in June, 2021 and in such a situation, the respondents could not have agreed to take possession of their flats especially when it was not fully complete and pending rectification of structural defects. That apart, the appellant cannot take a stand that it suffered litigations in the hands of the allottees, hence, was the delay but such claim is false for the fact that by then, it was launching new projects as is apparent from the plan approval granted by the Bhubaneswar Municipal Corporation revealed from a letter dated 27th April, 2023, a copy of which, has been produced before this Court. In so far as, the claim of the appellant that the possession was offered in 2017 but the respondents deferred it on some pretext or the other is again a falsehood since the occupancy certificates were managed only in 2021. Mr. Agarwal, learned counsel would submit that the respondents could not have been delivered with possession of the flats without the occupancy certificates being obtained, which is mandatory in view of Regulation 66 (1) of the BDA (Building and Planning Standard) Regulations, 2008 which stipulates that no one can occupy a

multistoried building unless there is issuance of the certificate of occupancy. At last, it is contended that in absence of sufficient cause explaining the delay of more than six years and when the rights of the respondents are involved, for such serious negligence on the part of the appellant, when again its conduct is not bonafide but to delay and drag the litigations, there cannot be any liberal approach especially when the law on limitation is to the effect that any such approach if adopted, it would defeat the substantial law of limitation.

13.3. As further pleaded, since no substantial question of law is involved, the delay in filing of the appeals before the learned OREAT is not condonable and therefore, no illegality has been committed in denying the same and hence, the impugned orders at Annexure-4 as suffer from no legal infirmity, it should not be tinkered with.

14. In H. Guruswamy (supra), it has been held that the concepts, such as, 'liberal approach', 'justice oriented approach', 'substantial justice' should not be employed to defeat or jettison the substantial law of limitation as therein a delay of six years in filing an application seeking recall of an order had taken place in connection with the suit instituted in the year 1977 and pending disposal for nearly 48 years stated to be at the stage of recording of evidence. It was held therein by the Apex Court that the rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties but to ensure that dilatory tactics are not resorted to but to seek remedy promptly; the length of delay is definitely a relevant factor which a Court must take into consideration, while dealing with an issue on

delay condonation. In the decisions (supra), the Apex Court further held that the respondents therein lost their rights to have the matter considered on merit because of own inaction for a long period, hence, it cannot therefore be presumed to be a non-deliberate delay and in such circumstances, they cannot be allowed to plead that substantial justice deserves to be preferred as against the technical considerations and finally, concluded that while considering any such plea demanding delay condonation, a Court must not start with the merits of the original matter, rather, it owes a duty to ascertain the bonafide of the explanation offered towards the same by the party seeking condonation and only if, there is sufficient cause assigned and that the opposition of the other side is equally balanced that the Court may bring into aid the merits of the matter for the purpose of condoning the delay with an observation at the end that the question of limitation is not merely a technical consideration and the rules applying to the same are based on the principles of sound public policy since no Court should keep the 'Sword of Damocles' hanging over the head of a litigant for an indefinite period of time. On a reading of the above decision, the conclusion of the Court is that a litigant has to be vigilant and for a wrong of his own or inaction for an indefinite period cannot demand delay condonation with a plea that the technical considerations should not outweigh the substantial justice. Referring to the above decision, Mr. Agarwal, learned counsel for the private respondents submits that considering the conduct of the appellant being deliberately at default in not filing the appeals in time, in absence of any such sufficient cause, it is a fit

case, where, condonation of such delay is not to be entertained and rightly so, by the learned OREAT, which dismissed the IAs finally.

15. Mr. Maharana, learned counsel for the appellant placed reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag (supra) to contend that the principles enunciated therein on delay condonation should be borne in mind and herein, the appellant never avoided, rather, defended the proceedings till the very end and ultimately, filed the appeals with reasons offered, hence, it cannot be alleged to be not vigilant at all. In the decision (supra), the Apex Court held and concluded that the Legislature conferred the power to condone delay under the Limitation Act in order to enable the Courts to do substantial justice to the parties by disposing of matters on merits and expression 'sufficient cause' employed therein is adequately elastic to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice, that being the life purpose for the existence of the institutions of Courts and at last, summarized as to what should be the approach of a Court, while considering the question on limitation in the following words, such as, (i) ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.

(ii) that, refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated; as against this, when delay is condoned, the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties; (iii) that 'every day's delay must be explained' does not mean that a pedantic

approach should be made; why not every hour's delay, every second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner; (iv) that, when substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay; (v) that, there is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or mala fide; a litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay, in fact, he runs a serious risk; (vi) that, it must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. Further therein, it has been held that a Court is not to distinguish a State from other litigants and to place it in a disadvantageous position since the doctrine of equality before law demands that all litigants including the State are to be accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even-handed manner. In fact, in the decision (supra), the concept of substantial justice deserves a preference was coined by the Apex Court and held that, it shall have to prevail in juxtaposition to the technical considerations.

16. In Inder Singh (supra), the Apex Court reminded that though there can be no quarrel on the settled principle of law that delay cannot be condoned without sufficient cause, but a major aspect which has to be kept in mind is with regard to the merits of a case to be examined and it should not be

scuttled merely on the basis of limitation. In Mool Chandra (supra), it has been concluded by the Apex Court that no litigant stands to benefit in approaching the Courts belatedly; it is not the length of delay that is required to be considered while examining the plea for condonation of delay; it is the cause for the delay, which has to be examined and if, it falls within the four corners of 'sufficient cause', irrespective of the length of delay, same deserves to be condoned, however, if the cause is insufficient, condonation should not be allowed. From the above, it has to be understood that what is more important is the cause shown by a party demanding delay to be condoned irrespective of the length of delay. In a particular case, even if, the delay is for long, but it is shown to the Court that the party was genuinely prevented from approaching it in time and within limitation, it shall have to be condoned. The conduct of the litigant plays a permanent role, while considering his plea on limitation. If the conduct is not explainable and the delay is inordinate, it is not to be condoned as any such approach is likely to prejudice the adversary, whose rights must have become crystallized by passage of time. That apart, the public policy of the State is with a purpose that a litigation must have a lifespan as it cannot be kept alive indefinitely, hence, the law of limitation. The said aspect is to be kept in view and while considering the question of limitation, a Court has to deal with the defence plea on delay condonation accordingly searching for the explanation offered towards the same. Any such liberal approach would be counterproductive. Even though, the right is not to be frustrated on technical grounds but a litigant, who

wakes up out of deep slumber and knocks the doors of the Court without reasonable excuse cannot be allowed to pursue the litigation, all the more when, gross negligence is revealed from his conduct.

17. In Ramkumar Choudhary (supra), the Apex Court held and observed that where a case has been presented beyond limitation, it has to be explained as to what was the cause behind, which means, adequate and enough reasons are to be revealed while demanding condonation of delay referring to an earlier decision Majji Sannemma Vrs. Reddy Sridevi and others MANU/SC/1269/2021. It has been further held therein that even though, limitation may harshly affect the rights of a party, the same has to be applied with all its rigour when prescribed by the statute. A reference has also been made to another decision in Ajay Dabra Vrs. Pyare Ram and others MANU/SC/0081/2023.

18. In Basawaraj and another Vrs. Special Land Acquisition Officer (2013) 14 SCC 81, while rejecting an application for condonation of delay for lack of sufficient cause, it was concluded therein by the Apex Court that in case, a party is found to be negligent of want of bonafide on his part or not to have acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay; no court is to condone any such inordinate delay by imposing such other conditions whatsoever; the application for delay condonation is to be decided only within the parameters laid down under law and in case, there is no sufficient cause, which prevented a litigant to approach the Court in time,

condoning the delay without any justification by fixing conditions amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamount to showing utter disregard to the Legislature. In the aforesaid decision, the Apex Court held that there is another aspect of the matter, which must not be overlooked, as over a period of time, when there is a plea for condonation of delay, be it at the instance of a private litigant or the State, the delay is sought to be explained right from the time, the limitation starts. It has also been held that for instance, where the period of limitation is 90 days, then the party seeking condonation has to explain why it was unable to institute the proceedings within that period of limitation; what events occurred after the 91 st day till the last is of no consequence; the Court is required to consider what came in the way of the party that it was unable to file the case between the 1st day and 90th day; it is true that a party is entitled to wait until the last day of limitation, but when, it allows the limitation to expire and pleads sufficient cause for not filing the appeal earlier, the sufficient cause must establish that the cause of some event or circumstance arising before the limitation expired, it was not possible to file the same. In categorical terms, as further held therein, no event or circumstance arising after the limitation expired can constitute such sufficient cause as there may be events or circumstances thereafter, which may further delay the filing of the appeal but that the limitation has been allowed to expire without the appeal being filed must be traced to a cause arising within the period of limitation and while restating the law referred to an earlier decision in Ajit Singh

Thakur Singh and another Vrs. State of Gujarat AIR 1981 SC 733.

19. As regards, the formulation of substantial question of law, Mr. Agarwal, learned counsel for the respondents cited the following decisions, such as, Nazir Mohamed Vrs. J. Kamala and others (2020) 19 SCC 57 and Bhagyashree Anant Gaonkar Vrs. Narendra alias Nagesh Bharma Holkar and another 2023 SCC Online SC 1236 to contend that no such question of law is involved herein and hence, the appeals are liable to be dismissed in limine. In Nazir Mohamed (supra), the Apex Court reiterated the principles for deciding when an issue becomes a substantial question of law enunciated by the Constitution Bench in Sir Chunilal V. Mehta & Sons Ltd. Vrs. Century Spg. & Mfg. Co. Ltd. AIR 1962 SC 1314, wherein, it has been held that the proper test for determining, if a question of law raised is substantial, would be, whether, it is of general public importance or directly and substantially affects the rights of the parties and if so whether, it is either an open question in the sense that it is not finally settled or is not free from difficulty or calls for discussion of alternative views; if the question is settled by the highest court or general principles to be applied in determining the question are well settled and there is a mere question of applying such principles or that the plea raised is palpably absurd, the question would not be substantial question of law. Referring to the above decisions, it is contended by Mr. Agarwal, learned counsel for respondents that in the appeals, the question on limitation is to be

considered in the light of the principles already settled and as such, there is no substantial question of law involved and hence, they are liable to be dismissed.

20. The Court is alive to the settled question of law discussed herein before and is of the conclusion that a law on limitation is to be strictly applied and only upon a satisfaction reached that sufficient cause is shown for the alleged default, the delay should be condoned. No other conditions should be imposed with a liberal approach, while dealing with a plea for delay condonation, when it is prima facie proved and established that the litigant, who approached the Court is guilty of gross negligence. Irrespective of the length of delay, as it has been discussed earlier, a Court is to consider the cause behind the delay and whether, it should be condoned or otherwise. If the explanation is acceptable and it is shown by the litigant that there was sufficient cause which prevented him from approaching the Court under such circumstances only, the condonation of delay should be allowed.

21. In so far as, the case of the appellant is concerned, it is claimed that the delay in filing the appeals before the learned OREAT has been explained. It is further claimed that the appellant is not at all negligent but managed to defend the proceedings initiated by the respondents with all its resources and wherewithal. One of the grounds is that the appellant was besieged with litigations, hence, failed to manage the situation and thus, the delay, which should be appreciated. But, according to the Court, any such ground is unacceptable for the reason that when the appellant was able to defend

other cases, how could it be negligent to file the appeals. The appellant involved in real estate business cannot be allowed to take such a stand, while claiming the delay to be condoned. That apart, the order of the learned ORERA could have been challenged immediately before the Odisha Sales Tax Tribunal as it was the Tribunal designated by virtue of the notification dated 16th September, 2017 issued by the Government of Odisha in Housing and Urban Development Department to hear the appeals under the Act till establishment of the regular Tribunal.

21.1. The appellant managed to approach this Court by filing writ petitions in the year 2018 and admittedly, made the deposit. It is also a fact that this Court further allowed the appellant to deposit an amount at the time of defreezing of its account directed by the OPDR Authority in the recovery proceedings. Though, the appellant was granted the liberty to file appeals with the disposal of the writ petitions in 2021, the same was not availed of for reasons unknown. Not only the appellant was default in filing the appeals within sixty days from the date of the final orders of the learned ORERA but is also guilty of default even after liberty was granted by this Court to file the same. That apart, the appeals could have been filed after the orders in the execution proceedings in 2022. The recovery proceedings were initiated and therein, the appellant received notices as further made to reveal from the record, whereafter, it could have approached the learned OREAT but all along, it remained aloof and dragged the

litigation till the month of January, 2025 when the appeals were finally filed.

21.2. As it appears, it was never the intention of the appellant to cut-short the litigation. The Court further finds that the appellant had sporadic responses without any genuine attempt to bring litigation to an end. As it appears, the possession of the flats could not have been delivered by the appellant in 2017 in absence of occupancy certificates said to have been managed three to four years thereafter. How it can be claimed that the respondents would have been allowed to occupy the flats without the occupancy certificates in place and therefore, they cannot be alleged of dragging the litigation, rather, it was a delay solely attributable to the appellant. By having correspondences infrequently or with irregular responses in between, the appellant cannot claim that it has been diligent all along and was inclined to settle the dispute with the respondents. The settlement, if any, with the respondents though claimed by the appellant, it has not been demonstrated by any sincere efforts. The appellant did whatever possible to defer and drag on the dispute trying best to avoid execution and recovery proceedings. It was all along with the intention of the appellant, as it further appears from the materials on record, was to evade actions as a temporary measure instead of challenging the final orders in the complaint of the learned ORERA. Such makeshift solution was managed by the appellant and under compulsion, it had made the deposits. On any such ground, with the claim that deposits were made at the time when defreezing of the

account was allowed, according to the Court, cannot be a ground sufficient to explain the delay. By taking any such plea about negotiation or settlement attempted during the relevant period or for that matter, having made the deposits, the appellant cannot be said to have offered an explanation with 'sufficient cause'.

21.3. It has been the law laid down by the Apex Court in Ramkumar Choudhary (supra) that limitation is to be explained for the period prescribed which should not be connected to any event or circumstance arising after expiry of the same. It has also been held that there should not be a liberal approach when a litigant is grossly negligent as held in H. Guruswamy (supra). It is more about the conduct of the appellant than the length of delay which weighs in the mind not to condone the delay. A litigation cannot be dragged on for long with casual approach and finally, inordinate delay is sought to be condoned. The conduct of the appellant without sincerity and for having lackadaisical attitude cannot be countenanced. Mere deposits made by the appellant by itself is not a ground either to condone the delay. As earlier discussed, inordinate delay without sufficient cause is not to be condoned by imposing conditions like cost, an approach, which is again deprecated by the Apex Court in Basawaraj (supra). The respondents are fighting a long battle against the appellant and facing the ordeal. The Court, considering the settled position of law discussed herein before, is of irresistible conclusion that the learned OREAT did not commit any serious wrong or illegality in denying such

condonation ultimately dismissing the appeals, especially when, the dispute merely revolves around the quantum of interest payable to the respondents.

21.4. To summarize the discussions so far held, the Court finds that the final orders of 2018 were allowed to exist till recently and the question is why? Apparently, it is left with no answer. It is claimed by the appellant that settlement was in progress, which is not demonstrated at all. Whatever correspondences exchanged between the parties until 2022, as it appears, were connected to the readiness of the flats for delivery of possession. The e-mails on record do suggest the same and nothing about any negation or discussion for an amicable settlement. What stares at the appellant is period post-delivery possession of flats. There is no reasonable explanation coming forth as to why the appellant maintained a stony silence even after the execution proceedings were disposed of with the action initiated under the OPDR Act. No doubt, the appellant made the deposits but that cannot be a justification to demand the delay condonation claiming the amounts payable to the respondents have been secured. The deposits have been made only to avoid action and therefore, it cannot be a ground to explain the delay and laches. It is contended that no right has accrued in favour of the respondents for delay in filling the appeals. Of course, a respondent does not acquire a right automatically due to the appellant's default but has every right to oppose the condonation of delay. It is equally true that a respondent gains a valuable right by lapse of time. But, in any case, the

appellant must have to demonstrate sufficient cause for the delay and the same is not dispensed with. The legal position is that once the limitation period for an appeal expires, the respondent acquires a vested right to a decision in his favour. A limitation is prescribed which is based on the principle founded on the public policy maxim-'interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium'. Therefore, the right of a respondent is not to be easily tinkered with and any such unexplainable delay if condoned, it can cause serious prejudice, uncertainty and injustice to him. For a delay to be condoned, the appellant must provide a valid and sufficient reason. It shall have to be considered whether the appellant was really diligent in pursuing the legal remedy or abandoned it fully knowing the consequence, a conduct, which may be branded as an act of acquiescence. A non-chalant attitude towards the legal process can lead to rejection of delay being condoned. As earlier discussed, merits of the case are not to be considered though not to be totally overlooked but everything falls in place when sufficient cause with proper justification is shown for condonation of delay and it is rightly pleaded on record that reason is the soul of any such application filed demanding such condonation. A delay without proper explanation is not to be condoned when the other side has suffered long enough. The Court is of the view that marginal or bonafide errors or default may be ignored but not serious lapses or default not backed by just and acceptable reasons. The appellant herein is concerned with penal interest payments for the default in delivery of possession managed after about eight years when the project was to be completed

in 2014. Equal interest at the same rate has been levied against the respondents compounded annually for the period of default in making payments. Regard being had to the above facts, in absence of any just explanation received from the appellant for the delay and lapses at every stage of the litigation commencing from 2018 till 2025, of course, the periods spent in this Court (to be excluded under Section 14 of the Limitation Act) and limitation suspended for COVID- 19, the Court is to reiterate that the same is beyond condonable despite the deposits made as it is better for the appellants to give a quietus to the dispute. To state further, power to extend the period of limitation is to be exercised judiciously and not on equitable grounds as held by the Apex Court in P.K. Ramachandran Vrs. State of Kerala and another (1997) 7 SCC 556. It is also a well recognized principle of jurisprudence that a right not exercised for a long time is non-existent as observed in Prabhakar Vrs. Joint Director, Sericulture Department and another (2015) 15 SCC1, wherein, it was concluded that even when there is no limitation period prescribed by any statute relating to certain proceedings, in such cases, the Courts have coined the doctrine of laches and delays as well as the rule of acquiescence and non-suited the litigants, who approached belatedly without justifiable explanation for bringing the action after unreasonable delay restating the law that delay defeats equities. So, therefore, with the above discussion, the conclusion is that the appellant's plea for delay condonation must have to fail.

22. It is not a case, where, the factual findings are to be looked upon down as perverse, which could become a substantial question of law. Furthermore, keeping in view the law laid down in Sir Chunilal V. Mehta & Sons Ltd. (supra), the Court is of the conclusion that there is no merit in the appeals.

23. Hence, it is ordered.

24. In the result, the appeals stand dismissed. As a necessary corollary, the impugned orders dated 16th May, 2025 passed in connection with IA No.28 of 2025 and IA No.368 of 2024 arising out of OREAT Appeal No.12 of 2025 and OREAT Appeal No.182 of 2024 respectively of the learned Odisha Real Estate Appellate Tribunal, Bhubaneswar are hereby affirmed.

25. In the circumstances, there is no order as to the costs.

(R.K. Pattanaik) Judge Tudu/Rojina