Orissa High Court

Chittaranjan Senapati vs State Of Odisha (Vigilance) ....... ... on 15 May, 2025

         THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK

                    CRLMC No.474 of 2025
 (In the matter of an application under Section 482 of the Criminal
   Procedure Code, 1973 read with Section 528 of the Bharatiya
                  Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023)


Chittaranjan Senapati                     .......                        Petitioner

                                         -Versus-

State of Odisha (Vigilance)                .......                    Opposite Party


        For the Petitioner             : M/s. Subhashree Sen and
                                         Ajit Parija, Advocates

        For the Opposite Party : Mr. Niranjan Moharana, ASC,
                                 (Vigilance)


CORAM:

THE HONOURABLE SHRI JUSTICE SIBO SANKAR MISHRA

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Date of Hearing: 24.03.2025 Date of Judgment: 15.05.2025

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- S.S. Mishra, J. The present petition has been filed under Section

482 CrPC by the petitioner seeking quashing of the criminal

proceeding arising out of Bhubaneswar Vigilance P.S. Case No.20

of 2004 corresponding to T.R. No.83 of 2007, pending before the

Court of the learned Special Judge (Vigilance), Bhubaneswar, for

alleged commission of offence under Section 13(2) read with

Section 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

2. Heard Ms. Subhashree Sen, learned Advocate, appearing for

the petitioner and Mr. Niranjan Moharana, learned Additional

Standing Counsel (Vigilance) appearing for the opposite party-

State.

3. The present criminal proceeding arising out of Bhubaneswar

Vigilance P.S. Case No.20 of 2004, was registered on 23.06.2004

under Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of

Corruption Act, 1988. The case was initiated pursuant to a

preliminary enquiry conducted by the Vigilance Department of

Odisha, which allegedly revealed that during the check period from

01.01.1996 to 01.06.2004, the petitioner acquired assets

disproportionate to his known sources of income. On the basis of

this enquiry, a First Information Report (FIR) was registered

alleging accumulation of disproportionate assets to the tune of

₹29,65,272/- by the petitioner and his wife, which were alleged to

be 274% in excess of their known lawful income.

4. A search was conducted at the petitioner‟s residential

premises and other places on 10.06.2004, during which several

documents were seized including income tax returns, property

documents, loan papers, and other personal financial records.

Pursuant to the search and seizure P.S. Case No. 20 of 2004 was

registered on 23.06.2004. After completion of investigation, the

Investigating Officer submitted final charge sheet on 29.09.2007,

arraying both the petitioner and his wife as accused.

5. According to the charge sheet, the petitioner had

disproportionate assets (DA) to the tune of Rs.29,65,272/- during

the check period from 01.01.1996 to 01.06.2004. It is alleged that

the petitioner failed to satisfactorily account for the same, and hence

the charge sheet was submitted against him and his wife under the

relevant provisions of the P.C. Act.

6. However, the petitioner contended that the said calculation is

fundamentally flawed and factually erroneous due to exclusion of

verifiable and lawful income sources, which were not appropriately

factored and ignored by the Investigating Officer. He submitted that

his wife was engaged in legitimate business activities during the

relevant period, including operation of a cold storage and road roller

service, and that she filed annual income tax returns reflecting an

income of ₹12,32,270/-. The said ITRs were duly recovered during

search and form part of the prosecution case diary yet were

excluded from computation on the technical ground that no prior

permission or disclosure was made by the petitioner regarding the

same under government service Rules.

7. The petitioner asserted that he had sold ancestral landed

property during the check period for a total consideration of

₹2,59,000/- through registered sale deeds and had also availed of a

registered private loan of ₹8,00,000/- for the purpose of

constructing a residential house. These amounts were also excluded

by the Vigilance Department deliberately while computing the total

lawful income and treated as unexplained.

8. It is also contended that a flat valued at ₹5,58,500/- was

wrongly shown as the asset of the petitioner in the charge sheet.

Admittedly, the flat, situated in a residential complex in

Bhubaneswar, was purchased and registered in the name of one

Sailesh Pradhan. The petitioner asserts that he has no proprietary or

possessory right over the said flat and that its inclusion in the list of

assets attributed to him is based merely on speculative inference

drawn from a brochure and an electricity bill recovered during the

search. No evidence of payment from the petitioner‟s account

towards the purchase of the said flat has been produced, nor has the

said Sailesh Pradhan been examined under Section 161 CrPC

during investigation to establish his nexus with the petitioner.

Sailesh Pradhan is no way related to the petitioner rather, he is a

stranger. The prosecution has not even collected an iota of evidence

to connect the petitioner by way of written submission with said

Sailesh Pradhan. The following table furnished by the petitioner

providing a detailed computation of the Disproportionate Assets

(DA) amount would reveal the amounts not factored in the

computation. For better appreciation, it is reproduced below:

A.   DA as per charge-sheet                                     Rs.29,65,272/-
     Less - Asset of
     Strangers shown in
     charge-sheet vide Sl.
     No. 3, to which
     petitioner is no way
     connected as per                                             Rs. 5,58,500
     Sec.161 Cr.P.C.
     statement of the DSR.
                                                                Rs.24,06,772/-
B.   Less: Total income
     based on Public
     documents & part of the
     prosecution record not
     included by I.O., as
     contended in detail in
     Para 5 of the CRLMC
 i) As per IT Returns from
     the established business
     unit for the years 1996
     to 2004                  Rs.12,32,270/-
ii) Sale consideration of
     immovable properties as
     per RSD                  Rs.2,59,000/-
iii) Loan                     Rs.8,00,000/-
     Total Income
                                                   Rs.22,91,270/-
     Hence D.A. Amount comes down to               Rs. 1,15,502/-

Total income should be: Rs.10,42,137/- (as per charge-sheet)+ Rs.22,91,270/- (legitimate income not included by the I.O., as computed „B‟ above in the table) = Rs.33,33,407/-

Thus DA% = (DA amount) Rs.1,15,502 x 100 = 3.464% = 3% rounded up (Total Income) Rs.33,33,407

9. The petitioner asserted that if the aforesaid verifiable and

documented income sources and exclusions are duly considered, the

actual disproportion would drastically fall to ₹1,15,502/-, which

constitutes only 3.46% of the lawful income and is within the

permissible deviation range as laid down by the Hon‟ble Supreme

Court in Krishnanand v. State of M.P., (1977) 1 SCC 816.

10. It is further contended that despite the submission of charge

sheet in the year 2007, there has been an inordinate delay in

commencement of trial. Even after the lapse of nearly 18 years from

the date of submission of the Final Form, charges have not yet been

framed by the learned Trial Court, and the case continues to linger

without effective progress. The petitioner submits that this delay is

not attributable to him and that he has consistently cooperated with

the legal process. He states that he continues to suffer hardship and

stigma due to the prolonged pendency of the case and that he has

been denied pensionary and retiral benefits as a result.

11. It is in this background that the petitioner has approached this

Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. seeking quashing of the entire

criminal proceeding on the grounds of prolonged and unexplained

delay, manifest arbitrariness in computation of disproportionate

assets, and abuse of the process of law.

12. Mr. Moharana, learned Standing Counsel for the Vigilance

Department opposed the prayer for quashing and submitted that a

prima facie case has been made out against the petitioner. He

contended that the claims of lawful income and asset ownership

raised by the petitioner are disputed questions of fact, which can

only be determined through a full-fledged trial.

13. It is argued that the ITRs and documents relied upon by the

petitioner were excluded because they were not supported by prior

official intimation or permission, as required from a government

servant under conduct rules. Therefore, the prosecution considers

the said income to be from "unknown sources."

14. The learned counsel further asserted that the Flat shown as

belonging to Sailesh Pradhan was found to be linked to the

petitioner based on possession of a brochure and an electricity bill

in his name recovered during the search. While the registered sale

deed may be in someone else's name, it is the surrounding

circumstances that raised suspicion about benami ownership.

15. As to the delay in trial, it was submitted that the same was

not entirely due to the fault of the Vigilance Department, and that

the petitioner also did not actively pursue expeditious disposal of

the case. The learned counsel further states that quashing of the

proceeding at this stage would amount to interference with the trial

process and would set an unhealthy precedent in vigilance matters.

16. Reliance is placed on State v. R. Soundirarasu, (2022) 88

OCR 482, where the Hon‟ble Supreme Court held that at the stage

of charge, courts should refrain from quashing prosecution unless it

is manifestly without foundation.

17. I have carefully gone through the materials placed before

this Court and the judgments cited by the learned counsels for the

parties and the prosecution evidence already borne on record in the

form of Charge Sheet.

18. The primary challenge raised by the petitioner is two-fold

firstly, the continuation of the proceeding is unwarranted in law due

to inordinate and unexplained delay in prosecution, and secondly,

the foundational allegations themselves are untenable owing to

suppression or exclusion of undisputed income and asset records by

the investigating agency.

19. The record reveals that the FIR in the present vigilance case

was registered on 23.06.2004 and Charge Sheet was submitted on

29.09.2007. Even after the passage of more than 20 years, charges

have not yet been framed, as such, the trial has not yet commenced.

This prolonged and unexplained inaction strikes at the root of the

petitioner‟s fundamental right to a speedy trial, enshrined under

Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The State Counsel has no

material to dispute this aspect of the matter except to harp upon

general principle that at the charge stage Court should not entertain

while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C.

20. The Hon‟ble Supreme Court in P. Ramachandra Rao v.

State of Karnataka, (2002) 4 SCC 578, has unequivocally held that

a delay of such magnitude, unless convincingly justified, renders

the prosecution oppressive and violative of constitutional

guarantees. In the present case, no reasonable cause has been shown

by the Vigilance Department to explain the delay in trial despite the

submission of the charge sheet as far back as 2007. The prolonged

deprivation of both his liberty and livelihood is not only harsh but

also unjustifiable.

21. The petitioner has placed on record the income tax returns of

his wife reflecting an income of ₹12,32,270/- during the check

period. These returns were not only part of the official record but

also recovered during search operations. There has been no finding

by the prosecution that the returns were fabricated or that the

income therein was bogus. Rather, the only ground for exclusion

appears to be the alleged failure on the part of the petitioner to seek

prior permission under service conduct Rules, which at best

amounts to a departmental lapse, not criminal culpability.

22. Further, the sale proceeds of an ancestral property amounting

to ₹2,59,000/- and a bank-registered home construction loan of

₹8,00,000/- were similarly disregarded, despite being evidenced by

public documents. No counter evidence has been presented to

disprove these transactions. Their exclusion from the computation

of known sources of income seriously impairs the credibility of the

charge sheet.

23. The prosecution has sought to link the petitioner with a Flat

valued at ₹5,58,500/- on the strength of an electricity bill and a

brochure recovered during the raid. However, the registered sale

deed of the said Flat stands in the name of one Sailesh Pradhan, and

there is no recorded evidence or witness statement establishing the

petitioner as the real owner or any kind of nexus between him and

Sailesh Pradhan. In absence of statement under Section 161 CrPC

from Mr. Pradhan, or any enquiry to support the theory of benami

ownership, this Court is constrained to hold that the allegation is

mere presumption without a substantial basis.

24. It is a trite law that benami ownership cannot be presumed.

The Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Binapani Paul v. Pratima Ghosh,

(2007) 6 SCC 100, reiterated that the burden to establish benami

transactions lies heavily on the person alleging it, and in the

absence of clinching evidence, such a claim fails. The Court held

thus,

"47. Burden of proof as regards the benami nature of transaction was also on the respondent. This aspect of the matter has been considered by this Court in Valliammal v. Subramaniam [(2004) 7 SCC 233] wherein a Division Bench of this Court held : (SCC pp. 239-41, paras 13-14 & 18) "13. This Court in a number of judgments has held that it is well established that burden of proving that a particular sale is benami lies on the person who alleges the transaction to be a benami. The essence of a benami transaction is the intention of the party or parties concerned and often, such intention is shrouded in a thick veil which cannot be easily pierced through. But such difficulties do not relieve the person asserting the transaction to be benami of any part of the serious onus that rests on him, nor justify the acceptance of mere conjectures or surmises, as a substitute for proof. Refer to Jaydayal Poddar v. Bibi Hazra [(1974) 1 SCC 3] , Krishnanand Agnihotri v. State of M.P. [(1977) 1 SCC 816 : 1977 SCC (Cri) 190] , Thakur Bhim Singh v. Thakur Kan Singh [(1980) 3 SCC 72] , Pratap Singh v. Sarojini Devi [1994 Supp (1) SCC 734] and Heirs of Vrajlal J. Ganatra v. Heirs of Parshottam S. Shah [(1996) 4 SCC 490] . It has been held in the judgments referred to above

that the question whether a particular sale is a benami or not, is largely one of fact, and for determining the question no absolute formulas or acid test, uniformly applicable in all situations can be laid. After saying so, this Court spelt out the following six circumstances which can be taken as a guide to determine the nature of the transaction:

„(1) the source from which the purchase money came; (2) the nature and possession of the property, after the purchase;

(3) motive, if any, for giving the transaction a benami colour;

(4) the position of the parties and the relationship, if any, between the claimant and the alleged benamidar; (5) the custody of the title deeds after the sale; and (6) the conduct of the parties concerned in dealing with the property after the sale.‟ (Jaydayal Poddar v. Bibi Hazra [(1974) 1 SCC 3] , SCC p. 7, para 6)

14. The above indicia are not exhaustive and their efficacy varies according to the facts of each case. Nevertheless, the source from where the purchase money came and the motive why the property was purchased benami are by far the most important tests for determining whether the sale standing in the name of one person, is in reality for the benefit of another. We would examine the present transaction on the touchstone of the above two indicia.

***

18. It is well settled that intention of the parties is the essence of the benami transaction and the money must have been provided by the party invoking the doctrine of benami. The evidence shows clearly that the original plaintiff did not have any justification for purchasing the property in the name of Ramayee Ammal. The reason given by him is not at all acceptable. The source of money is not at all traceable to the plaintiff. No person named in the plaint or anyone else was examined as a witness. The failure of the plaintiff to examine the relevant witnesses completely demolishes his case."

In the instant case, no such burden has been discharged by

the prosecution as no efforts were made to collect any evidence,

which could form part of the Charge Sheet to establish that the

petitioner is linked with Sailesh Pradhan in any manner whatsoever

except the recovery of a brochure and an electricity bill (not clear it

stands in whose name) and not even in the seizure list.

25. More importantly, the wife of the petitioner, who was arrayed

as a co-accused in the same case, had filed CRLMC No.3657 of

2024, seeking quashing of the entire Charge Sheet. The co-ordinate

bench by a detailed judgment dated 16.04.2025 allowed her petition

and quashed the proceeding qua her.

On 06.05.2025, the learned counsel for the petitioner

mentioned the matter before this Court and brought to the notice of

the Court regarding the aforementioned judgment of the coordinate

bench pronounced on 16.04.2025. She has submitted that the

findings recorded by the coordinate bench while allowing the

petition of the co-accused have shaken the entire foundation of the

prosecution case. Therefore, further continuation of present case

vis-à-vis the petitioner is destined to be a futile exercise. She has

highlighted certain paragraphs of the judgment of the coordinate

bench passed in CRLMC No.3657 of 2024 dated 16.04.2025, which

are extracted for the convenience of ready reference.

"28. Consequently, taking into consideration the aforesaid analysis, and the undisputed fact that the present case, although initiated in the year 2004, has been continuing till today without any trial being commenced or any charge being framed therein, and considering the fact that

there are 73 witnesses in the matter that are yet to be examined, this court has no hesitation in arriving at a conclusion that the inalienable right of the accused to avail a speedy trial as enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution has undeniably been violated in the present matter insofar as the criminal proceeding in question was initiated more than two decades ago and the same has not yet been proceeded with for reasons best known to the prosecution. Therefore, this court is of the considered view that the present case is an apt scenario to exercise the inherent powers of this court under section 482 of the Cr.P.C.

29. Having said that, it must also be mentioned that this Court is aware of the confines within which the powers under section 482 of the Cr.P.C are to be exercised. Time and again, through various decisions, the Hon'ble Supreme Court have cautioned against reckless exercise of the power of quashing of proceedings under section 482 of the Cr.P.C. Although the powers possessed by this Court under the aforesaid provision are very wide, these powers should be exercised in appropriate cases, ex debito justitiae, to do real and substantial justice. The inherent powers under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. do not grant this Court an unfettered or arbitrary jurisdiction to act at its discretion. These powers must be exercised with restraint and only in the rarest of rare cases, where the court, upon examining the material on record, is satisfied that allowing the proceedings to continue would result in an abuse of the judicial process or that quashing the proceedings is necessary to serve the ends of justice. The aforesaid considerations are to be especially borne in mind when dealing with matters involving economic offences, as is the case presently.

32. As such, keeping in view the larger interests of justice and to prevent further abuse of the processes of the Court, this Courts has no hesitation in quashing the criminal proceeding bearing Vigilance PS Case No.20/2004, corresponding to T.R .No. 83/2007, pending in the Court of Ld. Special Judge (Vigilance), Bhubaneswar, so far as the present Petitioner is concerned. Accordingly, the impugned proceeding stands quashed with respect to the Petitioner. However, it is further directed that every endeavor should be made to conclude the trial in respect of the other accused as expeditiously as possible."

This judgment further emphasized that the prosecution

had neither established her independent source of income nor

produced any material to demonstrate that she had knowledge or

intent to participate in the alleged offence. The Court held that

mechanical addition of family members, without prima facie proof

of their culpability, not only violates due process but also burdens

the justice system with avoidable litigation.

26. This finding is not merely persuasive but binding, given that

the allegations, evidence, and legal issues were identical,

intrinsically and indissociably tied with the case of the petitioner. It

would be wholly inequitable to allow the prosecution to proceed

against the present petitioner when the co-accused spouse, who

shared the same facts and documents, has already been exonerated

by this Court.

27. When the above excluded income and assets are accounted

for, the alleged disproportionate assets reduce to approximately

₹1,15,502/-, amounting to only 3.46% of the known income. The

Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Krishnanand v. State of Madhya

Pradesh, (1977) 1 SCC 816, has held that a marginal excess less

than 10% cannot be said to constitute disproportion assets that

attracts criminal liability under Section 13(1)(e) of the P.C. Act.

28. Similarly, in Nirankarnath Pandey v. State of U.P.,

Criminal Appeal No.5009 of 2024, the Hon‟ble Apex Court

quashed proceedings in a D.A. case where deviation was less than

6%, holding that minor errors in computation, especially over a

long check period, do not constitute "grave suspicion" sufficient to

sustain prosecution. The Hon‟ble Supreme Court held thus:

"Further, we have considered that the check period is from the year 1996 to 2020, which is almost twenty five years. It must be taken into account that over such a long period of time, there is inflation and a natural progression in the changing economy that affects the value of assets such as property. This can understandably lead to discrepancies in declaring the value of assets over the years. Therefore, there should be a more dynamic approach while considering an individual‟s income and assets over the span of two decades, such as in the present case. The notion that the declared value of an asset such as property or gold will remain static is flawed. This has to be considered while examining an individual‟s assets and income while making a determination regarding disproportionate assets. Such an examination needs to reflect such adjustments and changes as is natural with the progression of time.

11. We find it pertinent to note that in cases such as these where disproportionate assets are being dealt with, the amounts under scrutiny cannot be looked at in the same manner as one would do a Bank statement or daily ledger of income and expenditure. The scrutiny process cannot be as mechanical as that when you are examining declared assets and the income of an individual over such a long period of time. There has to be a certain margin that is given while making such an assessment as there are invariably economical fluctuations that would have taken place, especially over the course of nearly twenty-five years. It is crucial to have a nuanced appreciation of how time and economic conditions affect asset value in such cases."

29. Moreover, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Vakil Prasad v.

State of Bihar, (2009) 3 SCC 355, emphasized that the right to a

speedy trial is a fundamental right and that excessive delay in

investigation or trial would compromise the fairness of the trial

itself. The facts of the present case are strikingly similar, where the

petitioner‟s right to a fair trial has been compromised due to

unexplained delays. Relevant part of the said judgment reads as

under:-

"18. Time and again this Court has emphasised the need for speedy investigations and trial as both are mandated by the letter and spirit of the provisions of CrPC [in particular, Sections 197, 173, 309, 437(6) and 468, etc.] and the constitutional protection enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution. Inspired by the broad sweep and content of Article 21 as interpreted by a seven-Judge Bench of this Court in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India [(1978) 1 SCC 248] and in Hussainara Khatoon (1) v. State of Bihar [(1980) 1 SCC 81 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 23] this Court had observed that Article 21 confers a fundamental right on every person not to be deprived of his life or liberty except according to procedure established by law; that such procedure is not some semblance of a procedure but the procedure should be "reasonable, fair and just"; and therefrom flows, without doubt, the right to speedy trial. It was also observed that: [Hussainara Khatoon (1) case [(1980) 1 SCC 81 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 23] , SCC p. 89, para 5]

"5. ... No procedure which does not ensure a reasonably quick trial can be regarded as „reasonable, fair or just‟ and it would fall foul of Article 21."

The Court clarified that speedy trial means reasonably expeditious trial which is an integral and essential part of the fundamental right to life and liberty enshrined in Article 21."

Further, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in the case of Mahendra

Lal Das vrs. State of Bihar and Ors, reported in 2002 (1) SCC

149 took a similar view holding that prosecution delay beyond a

reasonable period is not only detrimental to the accused but also

undermines public confidence in the criminal justice system. The

Court stated that inordinate delay causes not only personal

hardship to the accused but also societal harm by rendering the

process of justice ineffective. This delay, lasting over 20 years,

clearly falls within the category of unreasonable and unjustified

delay. Relevant part of the said judgment reads as under:-

"In cases of corruption the amount involved is not material but speedy justice is the mandate of the Constitution being in the interests of the accused as well as that of the society. Cases relating to corruption are to be dealt with swiftly, promptly and without delay. As and when delay is found to have been caused during the investigation, inquiry or trial, the concerned appropriate authorities are under an obligation to find out and deal with the persons responsible for such delay. The delay can be attributed either to the connivance of the authorities with the accused or used as a lever to pressurise and harass the accused as is alleged to have been done to the appellant in this case.

Keeping in view the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, we are inclined to quash the proceedings against the appellant as permitting further prosecution would be the travesty of justice and a mere ritual or formality so for as the prosecution agency is concerned, and unnecessary burden as regards the courts."

30. In that view of matter, the case of the petitioner to trial at this

belated stage on the basis of quality of evidence collected by the

prosecution is destined to be a futile exercise. Conjoint reading of all the

judgments vis-à-vis the facts of the present case makes is abundantly clear

that the delay that has caused in the present case is fatal. Therefore, even if

the petitioner is subjected to trial in a case of present nature at an inordinate

belated stage, it may not be possible for the prosecution to secure

conviction. The right of the accused-petitioner to defend his case is also

marred to an irreparable extent. Hence, further procrastination of the

proceeding in the given facts and circumstances of the case would neither

be beneficial to the prosecution nor to the defence, therefore, the trial is

destined to be a futile exercise. In this context, I am reminded the judgment

of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in the cases of Gian Singh vs. State of

Punjab and another, reported in 2012 (10) SCC 303 and B.S. Joshi &

others vs. State of Haryana & another, reported in (2003) 4 SCC 675. The

Hon‟ble Supreme Court has already held that while exercising the

jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. or revisional jurisdiction, the

Court can scuttle the trial if it arrived at a conclusion that there is a bleak

chance for the prosecution to obtain a conviction. In this context, the

judgment in B.S. Joshi (supra) by Hon‟ble Supreme Court while referring

to the judgment of Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia & Ors. v. Sambhajirao

Chandrojirao Angre & Ors., reported in (1988) 1 SCC 692 assume

importance. For convenience of ready reference, the following paragraph of

the said judgment in B.S. Joshi (supra) reads as under:-

"In Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia & Ors. v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre & Ors. [(1988) 1 SCC 692], it was held that while exercising inherent power of quashing under Section 482, it is for the High Court to take into consideration any special features which appear in a particular case to consider whether it is expedient and in the interest of justice to permit a prosecution to continue. Where, in the opinion of the Court, chances of an ultimate conviction is bleak and, therefore, no useful purpose is likely to be served by allowing a criminal prosecution to continue, the court may, while taking into consideration the special facts of a case, also quash the proceedings."

The aforesaid view has been reaffirmed and repeated in catena

of judgments.

31. In conclusion, taking into consideration the factual

background of the present case, on perusal of the record, the

documents filed in the present CRLMC application, and taking into

consideration the aforesaid analysis and decisions of the Hon‟ble

Supreme Court and this Court as discussed hereinabove, this Court

is of the considered view that the valuable right of the Petitioner for

a speedy trial has indeed been hampered in the present criminal

proceeding owing to the inordinate delay of more than two decades

in commencement of trial. Moreover, the Opposite Party-Vigilance

Department has also not put-forth any reasonable or exceptional