Orissa High Court

National Insurance Company vs Seagold Overseas Private Limited on 30 May, 2025

Author: S.K. Panigrahi

Bench: S.K. Panigrahi

                                              IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK

                                                                W.P.(C) No.5212 of 2025
                                        (In the matter of an application under Articles 226 and 227 of the
                                        Constitution of India, 1950).


                                        National Insurance Company                  ....                Petitioner(s)
                                        Limited,, Bhubaneswar
                                                                         -versus-

                                        Seagold Overseas Private Limited
                                                                 Limited,           ....          Opposite Party
                                                                                                         Part (s)
                                        Bhubaneswar

                                      Advocates appeared in the case through Hybrid Mode:

                                        For Petitioner(s)            :                   Mr. Goutam Misra, Sr. Adv.
                                                                                                         along with
                                                                                                 Mr. J.R. Deo, Adv.


                                        For Opposite Partyy (s)      :          Mr. Santosh Kumar Mishra, Adv.


                                                  CORAM:
                                                  DR. JUSTICE S.K. PANIGRAHI

                                                       DATE OF HEARING:
                                                               HEARING:-07.04.2025
                                                      DATE OF JUDGMENT:-30.05.2025
                                      Dr. S.K. Panigrahi,, J.

1. The present Writ Petition is preferred by the Petitioner challenging

judgment dated 27.1.2025 passed by the Ld. District Judge, Cuttack in

ARBA Case No.3 of 2023 wherein the Ld. Appellate Court was

pleased to dismiss the appeal filed by the present Petitioner Petitio under

Section 37 of the A&C Act.

Designation: Personal Assistant Reason: Authentication Location: Orissa High Court Cuttack Date: 06-Jun-2025 14:25:23 I. FACTUAL MATRIX OF THE CASE:

2. The present Opposite Party had taken a floater policy from the

present Petitioner Insurance Company covering the stocks of shrimps

of the insured stored in the cold storage premises not owned owne by the

Opposite Party for a period of 27.7.2016 to 26.7.2017.

3. The present Opposite Party had also opted for an add-on add on cover for

(a) deterioration of stocks due to accidental power failure in cold

storage premises and (b) deterioration of stocks due to change c in

temperature in cold storage premises. The total sum insured under

the policy was Rs. 5,60,04,750/ 5,60,04,750/-.

4. On 14.6.2017, a fire broke out at the cold storage facility. The entire

stock of the present Opposite Party being exposed to such high

temperature deteriorated severely. The Opposite Party intimated the

present Petitioner and a preliminary surveyor was deputed by the

Petitioner to visit the premises of the cold storage facility on

15.6.2017. After multiple visits, the preliminary surveyor submitted a

Preliminary Survey Report on 21.6.2017.

5. In the meanwhile, a surveyor was also appointed by the Petitioner

who visited the premises of the cold storage facility on 23.6.2017. On

the self same date, the Opposite Party lodged its claim with the

Petitioner Insurance nsurance Company.

6. The surveyor vide email dated 30.7.2017 sent an estimated net

liability to the tune of Rs. 3,50,99,194/ 3,50,99,194/- to the present Petitioner.

Thereafter, the surveyor once again on 11.10.2017 visited the

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Location: Orissa High Court Cuttack Date: 06-Jun-2025 14:25:23 Opposite Party for verification of records to assess the damaged

stock.

7. In response to the requisitions of the surveyor, the Opposite Party

submitted all required documents on 17.10.2017. Pursuant to the

same, the surveyor held a discussion with both the parties on

14.12.2017 and submitted a survey survey report on 24.1.2018. The surveyor

arrived at a figure of Rs. 2,59,52,024/-.

2,59,52,024/ . The present Opposite Party

submitted its representations against the survey report on quantum

of loss on 19.3.2018, and sought an additional sum of Rs. 1,46,05,049/.

8. Only Rs. 2,59,52,024/-- was paid by the Petitioner Insurance Company

and ultimately, the present Opposite Party invoked arbitration vide

its letter dated 23.8.2018.

9. Hon'ble Dr. Justice Arijit Pasayat was nominated as the sole

arbitrator and both parties filed their re respective spective claim petition,

statement of defence and other documents. After hearing both

parties, the Ld. Sole Arbitrator passed award dated 6.3.2020 and

awarded a total sum of Rs. 96,09,117/ 96,09,117/- in favour of the present

Opposite Party alongwith interest at the rate of 17.75% from

28.10.2017 till the date of the award. Furthermore, the Ld. Sole

Arbitrator also granted interest at the rate of 8% from the date of the

award till the date of payment on the said sum of Rs. 96,09,117/ 96,09,117/-.

10. Being aggrieved, the present Pe Petitioner titioner approached the Ld. Sr/ Civil

Judge (Commercial Court), Cuttack u/s 34 of the A&C Act vide ARBP

No. 11 of 2020. The same was dismissed vide order dated 19.8.2023.

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11. Still aggrieved, the present Petitioner approached theLd. District

Judge. Cuttack in ARBA Case No. 3 of 2023 wherein the Ld.

Appellate Court was also pleased to dismiss the appeal filed by the

present Petitioner under Section 37 of the A&C Act vide order dated

27.1.2025, presently impugned.

12. Now that the broad facts leading up to the insta instant nt Petition have been

laid down, this Court shall endeavour to fully summarise the

contentions of the Parties and the broad grounds that have been

urged to seeking the exercise of this Court's writ jurisdiction.

II. PETITIONER'S SUBMISSIONS:

13. It is submitted by Ld. Counsel for the Petitioner that the Impugned

Order is liable to be set aside on three specific grounds. Firstly, that

the award of interest @ 17.75% is not tenable as the same is in

contrary to the IRDA (Protection of Policyholders Interests)

Regulations, tions, 2017. Secondly, the arbitral award is based on no

evidence as neither the evidence nor the statement of claim is

supported by an affidavit. Thirdly, there are patent illegalities on the

face of the arbitral award resulting in excess payment.

III. RESPONDENT'S SUBMISSIONS:

14. Per contra,, it is submitted by Ld. Counsel for the Opposite Party that

the judgments of the commercial appellate court under Section 37 of

the A&C Act are not amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226

of the Constitution and furthermore, that there is no jurisdiction

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Location: Orissa High Court Cuttack Date: 06-Jun-2025 14:25:23 challenge to the impugned order and therefore, this Writ Petition

does not come within the ambit of Article 227 of the Constitution as

well.

15. It is further submitted that interference of this Court under writ

jurisdiction isdiction is restricted to orders that are passed which are patently

lacking in inherent jurisdiction which requires a perversity that stares

one in the face. The same not being the case, this Writ Petition is bad

in law and ought to be dismissed.

IV. ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION:

16. Having heard the parties and perused the materials available on

record, this court has identified the singular following issue that has

to be determined which have emerged contentiously during the

course of the hearing and is germane to to finally decide the lis at hand;

A. WHETHER THIS COURT OUGHT TO INTERFERE WITH THE

IMPUGNED ORDER?

17. The law is well settled that Arbitral Tribunals are a species of

tribunals over which the High Court exercises writ jurisdiction.

Challenge to an order of an arbitral tribunal can be raised by way of a

writ petition. In Union of India v. R. Gandhi, President Madras Bar

Association1 the Supreme Court observed on the question as to what

constitutes 'Courts' and 'Tribunals' as under:

(2010) 11 SCC 1

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Location: Orissa High Court Cuttack Date: 06-Jun-2025 14:25:23 "38. The term 'Courts' refers to places where justice is administered or refers to Judges who exercise judicial functions. Courts are established by the state for administration of justice that is for exercise of the judicial power of the state to maintain and uphold the rights, to punish wrongs and to adjudicate upon disputes. Tribunals on the other hand are special alternative institutional mechanisms, usually brought into existence by or under a statute to decide disputes arising with reference to that particular articular statute, or to determine controversies arising out of any administrative law. Courts refer to Civil Courts, Criminal Courts and High Courts. Tribunals can be either private Tribunals (Arbitral Tribunals), or Tribunals constituted under the ConstiConstitution tution (Speaker or the Chairman acting under Para 6(1) of the Tenth Schedule) or Tribunals authorized by the Constitution (Administrative Tribunals under Article 323A and Tribunals for other matters under Article 323B) or Statutory Tribunals which are created ted under a statute (Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Debt Recovery Tribunals and consumer fora).

Some Tribunals are manned exclusively by Judicial Officers (Rent Tribunals, Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Labour Courts and Industrial Tribunals). Other statutory sta Tribunals have Judicial and Technical Members (Administrative Tribunals, TDSAT, Competition Appellate Tribunal, Consumer fora, Cyber Appellate Tribunal, etc)."

18. Similar observations were made by the Supreme Court in SREI

Infrastructure Finance Limited2as under:

"14. Arbitration is a quasi judicial proceeding, equitable in nature or character which differs from a litigation in a Court. The power and functions of arbitral tribunal are

(2018) 11 SCC. 470

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Location: Orissa High Court Cuttack Date: 06-Jun-2025 14:25:23 statutorily regulated. The tribunals are special arbitration withth institutional mechanism brought into existence by or under statute to decide dispute arising with reference to that particular statute or to determine controversy referred to it. The tribunal may be a statutory tribunal or tribunal constituted under the provisions of the Constitution of India. Section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code vests into the Civil Court jurisdiction to entertain and determine any civil dispute. The constitution of tribunals has been with intent and purpose to take out different categories categories of litigation into the special tribunal for speedy and effective determination of disputes in the interest of the society. Whenever, by a legislative enactment jurisdiction exercised by ordinary civil court is transferred or entrusted to tribunals such such tribunals are entrusted with statutory power. The arbitral tribunals in the statute of 1996 are no different, they decide the lis between the parties, follows Rules and procedure conforming to the principle of natural justice, the adjudication has final finality ity subject to remedy provided under the 1996 Act. Section 8 of the 1996 Act obliges a judicial authority in a matter which is a subject of an agreement to refer the parties to arbitration. The reference to arbitral tribunal thus can be made by judicial au authority thority or an arbitrator can be appointed in accordance with the arbitration agreement under Section 11 of the 1996 Act."

19. Thus, the Apex Court held that arbitral tribunals are private tribunals

unlike those tribunals set up under the statute or specialized

tribunals under the Constitution of India. Thus, a Petition under

Article 227 challenging orders of an Arbitral Tribunal would be

maintainable.

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20. At this juncture, it is necessary to set out certain provisions of the

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

Section 5 states:

"5. Extent of judicial intervention.

intervention.--Notwithstanding Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, in matters governed by this Part, no judicial authority shall intervene except where so provided in this Part."

Part."

Section 37 which is also material states as follows:

"37. Appealable orders.--(1) orders. (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders (and from no others) to the court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decrees of the Court passing the order, nam namely--

(a) refusing to refer the parties to arbitration under Section 8;

(b) granting or refusing to grant any measure under Section 9;

(c) setting aside or refusing to set aside an arbitral award under Section 34.

(2) An appeal shall also lie to a court from an order granting of the Arbitral Tribunal--

Tribunal

(a) accepting the plea referred in sub-section sub section (2) or sub-section section (3) of Section 16; or

(b) granting or refusing to grant an interim measure under Section 17.

(3) No second appeal shall lie from an order pas passed in appeal under this section, but nothing in this section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court."

21. What is also important to note is that under Section 29-A 29 A of the Act

which was inserted by the Amendment Act, 2016 a time-limit time was

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months from the date the Arbitral Tribunal enters upon the reference.

Also, it is important to note that even so far as Section 34 applications

are concerned, Section 34(6) added by the same same amendment states

that these applications are to be disposed of expeditiously, and in

any event, within a period of one year from the date on which the

notice referred to in sub sub-section section (5) is served upon the other parties.

22. Given the aforesaid statutory p provision rovision and given the fact that the

1996 Act repealed three previous enactments in order that there be

speedy disposal of all matters covered by it, it is clear that the

statutory policy of the Act is that not only are time-limits time limits set down

for disposal of the arbitral proceedings themselves but time-limits time

have also been set down for Section 34 references to be decided.

Equally, in Union of India v. Varindera Constructions Ltd Ltd.3The

Supreme Court has imposed the selfsame limitation on first appeals

under Section 37 so that there be a timely resolution of all matters

which are covered by arbitration awards.

23. Most significant of all is the non obstante clause contained in Section

5 which states that notwithstanding anything contained in any other

law, in matters ers that arise under Part I of the Arbitration Act, no

judicial authority shall intervene except where so provided in this

Part. Section 37 grants a constricted right of first appeal against

certain judgments and orders and no others. Further, the statutory statutor

(2020) 2 SCC 111

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second appeal being filed [see Section 37(2) of the Act].

24. Coming now to the question as to what would be the scope of

interference under Article 226/227 against orders passed by the

Arbitral ral Tribunals, though, a number of judgments have been cited

by both parties, recent decisions of the Supreme Court and of this

Court have settled the issue.

25. While there is no doubt that the arbitral tribunal is a tribunal over

which writ jurisdiction can be exercised, the said interference by a

writ court is limited in nature. Recently, in Deep Industries

Ltd. v. ONGC Ltd.4 decided on 28th November, 2019, the Supreme

Court considered S.B.P. &Company v. Patel Engineering Ltd.5

and Fuerst Day Lawson Limited v. Jindal Exports Limited6 and

observed as under:

"17. This being the case, there is no doubt whatsoever that if petitions were to be filed Under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution against orders passed in appeals Under Section 37, the entire arbitral process process would be derailed and would not come to fruition for many years. At the same time, we cannot forget that Article 227 is a constitutional provision which remains untouched by the non-obstante non obstante Clause of Section 5 of the Act. In these circumstances, what wh is important to note is that though petitions can be filed Under Article 227 against judgments allowing or dismissing first appeals Under Section 37 of the Act, yet the

(2020) 15 SCC 706

(2005) 8 SCC 618

(2011) 8 SCC 333

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Location: Orissa High Court Cuttack Date: 06-Jun-2025 14:25:23 High Court would be extremely circumspect in interfering with the same, taking into account the statutory policy as adumbrated by us herein above so that interference is restricted to orders that are passed which are patently lacking in inherent jurisdiction."

26. Recently, in Surender Kumar Singhal v. Arun Kumar Bhalotia7 the

Delhi High Court, rt, after considering all the decisions, of the Supreme

Court, Deep Industries (supra); Bhaven Construction v. Sardar

Sarovar Narmada Nigam Ltd Ltd.8; Punjab State Power Corpn.

Ltd. v. EMTA Coal Ltd.9; Virtual Perception OPC (P)

Ltd. v. Panasonic India (P) Ltd.10 and Ambience Projects &

Infrastructure (P) Ltd. v. Neeraj Bindal11 has laid down

circumstances in which such petitions ought to be entertained. The

relevant portion of the said judgment reads as under:

"24. A perusal of the abovementioned decisions, shows that the following principles are well settled, in respect of the scope of interference under Articles 226/227 in challenges to orders by an Arbitral Tribunal including orders passed under Section 16 of the Act:

(i) An Arbitral Tribunal is a tribunal against which a petition under Articles 226/227 would be maintainable.

2021 SCC OnLine Del 3708

(2022) 1 SCC 75

(2020) 17 SCC 93

2022 SCC OnLine Del 566

2021 SCC OnLine Del 4023

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(ii) The non obstante clause in Section 5 of the Act does not apply in respect of exercise of powers under Article 227 which is a constitutional provision.

(iii) For interference under Articles 226/227, there have to be exceptional circumstances.

(iv) Though interference is permissible, unless and until the order is so perverse that it is patently lacking in inherent jurisdiction, the writ court would not interfere.

(v) Interference is permissible only if the order is completely perverse i.e. that the perversity must stare in the face.

(vi) High Courts ought to discourage litigation which necessarily interfere with the arbitral process.

(vii) Excessive judicial interference in the arbitral arbitr process is not encouraged.

(viii) It is prudent not to exercise jurisdiction under Articles 226/227.

(ix) The power should be exercised in "exceptional rarity" or if there is, "bad faith" which is shown.

(x) Efficiency of the arbitral process ought not to be allowed to diminish and hence interdicting the arbitral process should be completely avoided."

26. A perusal of the above would show that it is only under exceptional

circumstances or when there is bad faith or perversity that writ

petitions ought to be entertained.

27. The power of superintendence vested in High Courts under Article

227 of the Constitution of India is a constitutional safeguard designed

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Location: Orissa High Court Cuttack Date: 06-Jun-2025 14:25:23 to ensure that subordinate courts and tribunals act within their

jurisdiction and adhere to principl principles es of fairness, legality, and

procedural propriety. However, the exercise of this power in the

context of arbitration proceedings governed by the Arbitration and

Conciliation Act, 1996, has been subject to considerable judicial

scrutiny and debate. The Arb Arbitration Act is a self-contained contained code

aimed at promoting minimal judicial interference and ensuring the

speedy resolution of disputes through a quasi-judicial quasi judicial process.

Section 5 of the Act categorically mandates that judicial authorities

shall not intervenee in matters governed by the Act, except where

expressly provided. This non obstante clause, coupled with the

limited appellate mechanism under Section 37, underscores a

deliberate legislative intent to restrict court involvement and

expedite the arbitral process. The Supreme Court in SBP & Co. v.

Patel Engg. Ltd.12 emphasized the autonomy of the arbitral process,

affirming that courts must respect the statutory scheme. While

Article 227 is a constitutional provision and therefore cannot be

ousted by statutory ry language, the Courts have repeatedly held that

this extraordinary jurisdiction must be exercised with great restraint,

especially in arbitration matters. Any intervention should be

confined to cases where there is a patent lack of jurisdiction or

perversity sity that is apparent on the face of the record. The overarching

goal is to preserve the integrity and efficiency of the arbitral process.

(2005) 8 SCC 618

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28. In recent judicial pronouncements, including Deep Industries (supra), (supra)

the Apex Court has emphasized that although Art Article icle 227 cannot be

curtailed by any statutory enactment like Section 5 of the Arbitration

and Conciliation Act, the High Courts must exercise self-restraint self

while considering interference in arbitral proceedings. The Court

acknowledged the supremacy of the constitutional provision but

cautioned that indiscriminate use of writ jurisdiction would

undermine the legislative objective of speedy and efficient dispute

resolution through arbitration. It observed that entertaining petitions

under Articles 226 or 227 against interlocutory or even final orders

passed under Sections 16 or 17 of the Arbitration Act would result in

delaying the arbitral process and open floodgates for unwarranted

challenges. Importantly, the Court held that only in instances where

the order er suffers from a patent lack of jurisdiction or where there is a

manifest miscarriage of justice should the High Court step in. The

rationale was rooted in the principle that arbitral tribunals, while not

civil courts, are adjudicatory bodies that derive their authority from

party autonomy and statutory recognition. Excessive judicial

interference in this sphere would erode the foundational principles of

arbitration and compromise its purpose as an alternate dispute

resolution mechanism. The Court thus laid laid down a threshold of

"exceptional rarity" as a guiding principle. Consequently, even if

maintainability under Article 227 is established, the jurisdiction

ought not to be exercised merely because an error of law or fact

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Location: Orissa High Court Cuttack Date: 06-Jun-2025 14:25:23 exists, unless such error amounts to to perversity or a jurisdictional

transgression. The Court was particularly wary of the potential

derailment of the arbitral process if supervisory jurisdiction were

exercised routinely over orders passed either by arbitral tribunals or

in first appeals und under er Section 37 of the Act. Acknowledging the

supremacy of the Constitution and the enduring nature of Article

227, the Court nevertheless maintained that statutory policy must be

respected and judicial review should not be used as a backdoor

appeal mechanism.

m. The Court held that although the power under

Article 227 is untouched by the non obstante clause in Section 5, such

power must be exercised with utmost circumspection and only in

cases where orders are so patently lacking in inherent jurisdiction or

are manifestly perverse that judicial conscience is shocked. This

nuanced stance balances constitutional principles with statutory

purpose. The Court further explained that if Article 227 petitions

were freely entertained against Section 37 orders, it would n negate the

legislative scheme that provides for only a single appeal and bars

second appeals under Section 37(3). Consequently, High Courts must

tread carefully, ensuring that their intervention does not undermine

the finality and expedition that the Arbitr Arbitration ation Act seeks to promote.

This decision thus reinforces the principle that while constitutional

remedies remain available, they are not to be used as substitutes for

appeals explicitly barred by a self self-contained contained statute such as the

Arbitration and Conciliation Concil Act.

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29. The decision in Surender Kumar Singhal (supra), (supra) further crystallized

the judicial standards governing Article 227 interference in arbitral

matters. After analyzing key Supreme Court precedents, the Delhi

High Court unequivocally held that the ssupervisory upervisory power under

Article 227 can only be exercised when there is demonstrable

perversity or the order of the arbitral tribunal is patently without

jurisdiction. The Court noted that arbitral tribunals, being private

adjudicatory bodies created under the Arbitration and Conciliation

Act, 1996, are distinct from statutory or constitutional tribunals.

Despite this, given their function of adjudicating legal disputes and

their obligation to adhere to principles of natural justice, they fall

within the scope pe of judicial review under Article 227. However, the

Act's statutory framework, particularly Sections 5 and 37, reflects a

clear legislative intent to restrict judicial intervention. Section 5's non

obstante clause ensures that in matters governed by the Act, no

judicial authority shall intervene unless specifically provided. Section

37, by allowing a limited and exhaustive list of appealable orders,

reinforces the notion of finality and minimal interference. The

Courtwarned that permitting Article 227 challenges challenges as a routine

remedy would effectively create a "second bite at the cherry,"

contrary to the Arbitration Act's policy and purpose. Therefore, only

orders reflecting egregious illegality or mala fides warrant

constitutional scrutiny. The judgment also also crystallized the principles

governing the exercise of writ jurisdiction over arbitral orders,

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Location: Orissa High Court Cuttack Date: 06-Jun-2025 14:25:23 emphasizing that such powers under Article 227 must be exercised

only in the rarest of rare cases. The decision made clear that arbitral

tribunals, though priva private te in nature, are still "tribunals" within the

meaning of Article 227 and therefore subject to the High Court's

supervisory control. However, this supervisory control is not

equivalent to appellate review. Rather, the writ court's role is

confined to correcting cting manifest illegality, bad faith, or perversity so

glaring that it indicates a patent lack of jurisdiction. The High Court

reiterated that if orders passed by arbitral tribunals were routinely

challenged and overturned under Article 227, it would nullify nulli the

entire purpose of a separate arbitration regime and revert the process

to the very judicial delays it sought to eliminate. The judgment

stressed the necessity of discouraging such litigation unless the

arbitral order offends the basic structure of jjustice.

30. While Article 227 cannot be statutorily ousted due to its

constitutional origin, its invocation must be exercised with extreme

caution in arbitration matters. If High Courts were to routinely

entertain petitions under Article 227 against orders passed pas under

Section 37 of the Arbitration Act, the entire purpose of creating a

streamlined arbitral regime would be frustrated. Arbitration

proceedings, by their very nature, are intended to be quick and

efficient alternatives to traditional litigation. Exc Excessive essive judicial

interference undermines this objective and delays finality in

commercial disputes. Interference of this Court under Article 227 is

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Location: Orissa High Court Cuttack Date: 06-Jun-2025 14:25:23 not only exceptional but should be exercised in situations where the

order in question is so perverse that it lacks inherent jurisdiction. It

reaffirmed that routine errors of law or fact, or disagreements on the

merits, cannot be grounds for invoking this extraordinary

jurisdiction. The policy underlying the Arbitration Act, reinforced by

its non obstante clause in Section 5 and constricted appellate

structure in Section 37, demands judicial deference to arbitral

decisions. Therefore, unless there is an egregious illegality or an

abuse of power that offends basic judicial conscience, this Court must

refrain from invoking Article 227.

31. In applying these principles to the present case, it becomes clear that

there is no patent illegality, bad faith, or perversity in the arbitral

tribunal's or the appellate court's order that would justify

interference under Article 227.

227. The High Court's supervisory

jurisdiction is not meant to serve as an additional layer of appeal or

to re-examine examine findings of fact or law unless there is a gross

miscarriage of justice or a clear absence of jurisdiction. The

impugned order does not exh exhibit ibit any such glaring defect. The alleged

errors pointed out are at best errors of law or fact that do not reach

the threshold of "perversity" or "patent illegality" required for writ

intervention. There is no indication of malafide, bias, or a

jurisdictional nal overreach that would warrant setting aside or

interfering with the decision. Mere disagreement with the merits

does not convert the petition into a fit case for extraordinary

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Location: Orissa High Court Cuttack Date: 06-Jun-2025 14:25:23 jurisdiction. The High Court must not allow itself to be drawn into

acting as a quasi-appellate appellate forum, especially where the statutory

framework intends the arbitral process to be insulated from excessive

judicial scrutiny. Consequently, this case clearly lacks any

exceptional or rare circumstances that would justify exercising the

High Court's constitutional power under Article 227 to interfere. The

writ jurisdiction, therefore, must be exercised sparingly and

respectfully in alignment with the statutory objectives of arbitration.

V. CONCLUSION:

32. In conclusion, while the High Court undeniably possesses

supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 over arbitral tribunals, this

jurisdiction is inherently limited and must be exercised with utmost

caution and restraint. Interference under Article 227 is permissible

only in exceptional cases marked by patent illegality, bad faith, or a

gross absence of jurisdiction. The present matter falls far short of this

high threshold. The impugned arbitral and appellate orders do not

suffer from any manifest error or jurisdictional defect warranting

supervisory interference. Permitting writ jurisdiction to be exercised

lightly in such matters would undermine the Arbitration Act's

fundamental purpose of providing a self self-contained, contained, efficient, and

expeditious dispute res resolution mechanism.

33. In view of the above, this Court does not find any reason to invoke its

supervisory power in the present matter as there is no exceptional

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Location: Orissa High Court Cuttack Date: 06-Jun-2025 14:25:23 rarity, bad faith or perversity in the impugned order and thus, there

is no reason to interfere w with the arbitral process.