Manjulata Bag vs State Of Odisha And Others
2025 Latest Caselaw 4 Ori

Orissa High Court

Manjulata Bag vs State Of Odisha And Others on 1 May, 2025

Author: Murahari Sri Raman

Bench: Murahari Sri Raman

    IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
                          W.A. No.539 of 2025
Manjulata Bag                                      ....                  Appellant

                                     -Versus-
State of Odisha and others                         ....              Respondents


Advocates appeared in this case:
For Appellant              : Ms. Bini Mishra, Advocate

For Respondents            : Mr. Bimbisar Dash
                             Additional Government Advocate


                       CORAM:
             HON' BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
                         AND
       HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MURAHARI SRI RAMAN

                             JUDGMENT

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Date of hearing and judgment: 1st May, 2025

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- HARISH TANDON, CJ.

1. The writ petition filed by the petitioner-appellant is

dismissed by the single Bench solely on the ground of delay and

laches. It is expressly indicated in the impugned order that though

there is no period of limitation for filing the writ petition before the

High Court provided in the Limitation Act yet the Court may

refuse to entertain a belated writ petition on the ground of delay

and laches. There appears to be a delay of one and half year from

the date of an accrual of the cause of action which is also indicated

in the impugned order. The single Bench proceeded simpliciter on

the basis that there is no explanation offered in the writ petition for

such delay which invites dismissal in limine.

2. The counsel for the appellant submits that there was in fact

no delay in approaching the Court and, therefore, the single Bench

cannot hold that there has been a conscious delay and laches

attributable to his conduct in approaching the Court.

3. Mr. Dash, learned Additional Government Advocate

submits that there has been a considerable delay which is noticed

by the single Bench and there is no fetter on the part of the writ

Court in dismissing the writ petition on the ground of delay and

laches, provided the Court finds that there is sufficient explanation

offered by the petitioner in the said writ petition.

4. There is no quarrel to the proposition that the delay and

laches attributable to the conduct of the person may invite a refusal

to entertain such writ petition. It admits no ambiguity that the

power enshrined under Article 226 of the Constitution of India

upon the High Court is a discretionary one and a person who

approaches the Court must satisfy that he was vigilant and careful

in asserting his right and his conduct should not be blameworthy.

Though the period of limitation is not provided under the

Limitation Act in relation to filing of an application under Article

226 of the Constitution of India, but the principles akin to it has its

equal application when the High Court may refuse to exercise such

discretion vested under Article 226 of the Constitution of India on

the ground of delay and laches. Such principles emanating from a

common law has been adopted in the Indian judicial parlance and

its recognition can be seen from the Three Judge Bench decision of

the apex Court in the State of Maharashtra v. Digamber, reported

in (1995) 4 SCC 683 in the following:

"19. Power of the High Court to be exercised under Article 226 of the Constitution, if is discretionary, its exercise must be judicious and reasonable, admits of no controversy. It is for that reason, a person's entitlement for relief from a High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, be it against the State or anybody else, even if is founded on the allegation of infringement of his legal right, has to necessarily depend upon unblameworthy conduct of the person seeking relief, and

the court refuses to grant the discretionary relief to such person in exercise of such power, when he approaches it with unclean hands or blameworthy conduct.

20. Laches or undue delay, the blameworthy conduct of a person in approaching a court of equity in England for obtaining discretionary relief which disentitled him for grant of such relief was explained succinctly by Sir Barnes Peacock, long ago, in Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Hurd [(1874) 5 PC 221] thus:

"Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy, either because the party has, by his conduct, done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has, though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation, in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute or limitations, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances, always important in such cases, are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval, which might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as it relates to the remedy."

xxx xxx xxx

23. Therefore, where a High Court in exercise of its power vested under Article 226 of the Constitution issues a direction, order or writ for granting relief to a person including a citizen without considering his disentitlement for such relief due to his blameworthy conduct of undue delay or laches in claiming the same, such a direction, order or writ becomes unsustainable as that not made judiciously and reasonably in exercise of its sound judicial discretion, but as that made arbitrarily."

5. In a subsequent decision rendered by the apex Court in

case of Leelawanti and others v. State of Haryana and others,

reported in (2012) 1 SCC 66, the two Judge Bench of the Supreme

Court upon noticing the constitution Bench decision rendered in

case of State of Madhya Pradesh and another v. Bhailal Bhai

and others, reported in AIR 1964 SC 1006 held that the Court

should not dismiss the petition under Article 226 of the

Constitution of India on the ground of delay and laches, if the

prescribed period for filing a suit has not expired in the following:

"14. In State of M.P. v. Bhailal Bhai3 a Constitution Bench of this Court held that even though no period of limitation has been prescribed for filing a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court can non-

suit the petitioner who is guilty of laches. The Constitution Bench also observed that if the delay is more than the period prescribed for filing a suit then the same would ordinarily be treated as unreasonable and the High Court will be fully justified in denying relief to the petitioner unless cogent explanation is offered for the delay.

15. These propositions are borne out from the following extracts of the judgment: (Bhailal Bhai case,3 AIR pp. 1011-12, paras 17 & 21) "17. ... It has been made clear more than once that the power to give relief under Article 226 is a discretionary power. This is specially true in the case of power to issue writs in the nature of mandamus. Among the several matters which the High Court rightly takes into consideration in the exercise of that discretion is the delay made by the aggrieved party in seeking this special remedy and what excuse there is for it. Another is the nature of controversy of facts and law that may have to be decided as regards the availability of consequential relief. Thus, where, as in these cases, a person comes to the Court for relief under Article 226 on the allegation that he has been assessed to tax under a void legislation and having paid it under a mistake is entitled to get it back, the court, if it finds that the assessment was void, being made under a void provision of law, and the payment was made by

mistake, is still not bound to exercise its discretion directing repayment. Whether repayment should be ordered in the exercise of this discretion will depend in each case on its own facts and circumstances. It is not easy nor is it desirable to lay down any rule for universal application. It may however be stated as a general rule that if there has been unreasonable delay the court ought not ordinarily to lend its aid to a party by this extraordinary remedy of mandamus.

*** *** ***

21. ... Learned counsel is right in his submission that the provisions of the Limitation Act do not as such apply to the granting of relief under Article 226. It appears to us however that the maximum period fixed by the legislature as the time within which the relief by a suit in a civil court must be brought may ordinarily be taken to be a reasonable standard by which delay in seeking remedy under Article 226 can be measured. This Court may consider the delay unreasonable even if it is less than the period of limitation prescribed for a civil action for the remedy but where the delay is more than this period, it will almost always be proper for the court to hold that it is unreasonable. The period of limitation prescribed for recovery of money paid by mistake under the Limitation Act is three years from the date when the mistake is known. If the mistake was known in these cases on or shortly after

17-1-1956 the delay in making these applications should be considered unreasonable."

(emphasis supplied)

6. In view of the exposition of law emanating from the above

reports, the application under Article 226 of the constitution of

India should not be nipped in the bud at the threshold on the

ground of delay and laches, if the same is filed within a normal

period of limitation provided for filing a suit on the selfsame cause

of action. In case of a suit having filed within the period of

limitation, there is no obligation imposed upon the plaintiff to

explain the delay, even if, such suit is filed on the eve of the expiry

of the limitation period.

7. We fail to understand that why there should be an

explanation for a period commencing from the date of the accrual

of the cause of action till its institution when on the face of it, it is

filed within the normal period of limitation provided for filing the

suit on the said cause of action.

8. We thus could not concur with the decision rendered by

the Single Bench in the instant matter. The impugned order dated

15.07.2022 passed in W.P.(C) No.32422 of 2024 is thus set aside.

The writ petition is restored to its original file and number. We

expect that the single Bench will decide the writ petition on merit.

9. The writ appeal is thus disposed of.

(Harish Tandon) Chief Justice

(M.S. Raman) Judge

S.K. Jena, Secy/ S.K. Behera

Signature Notof Verified W.A. No.539 2025 Digitally Signed Signed by: SISIRA KUMAR BEHERA Designation: Junior Stenographer Reason: Authentication Location: High Court of Odisha, Cuttack Date: 02-May-2025 18:05:48