Orissa High Court
Subhajit Banerjee vs Union Of India And Others .... Opp. ... on 6 May, 2025
Author: S.K. Sahoo
Bench: S.K. Sahoo
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
W.P.(C) No.10973 of 2025
Subhajit Banerjee .... Petitioner
Mr. Upendra Kumar Samal,
Advocate
-versus-
Union of India and others .... Opp. Parties
Nr. B. Maharana,
Senior Panel Counsel for
opposite parties nos.1 to 3
Mr. P.S. Nayak,
Addl. Government Advocate for
opposite party no.4
CORAM:
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.K. SAHOO
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.S. MISHRA
ORDER
Order No. 06.05.2025
02. This matter is taken up through Hybrid arrangement (video
conferencing/physical mode).
Heard Mr. Upendra Kumar Samal, learned counsel for the
petitioner, Mr. B. Maharana, learned Senior Panel Counsel
appearing for the opposite parties nos.1 to 3 and Mr. P.S. Nayak,
learned Additional Government Advocate appearing for the
opposite party no.4.
This writ petition has been filed by the petitioner Subhajit
Banerjee with a prayer to quash the order dated 10.03.2025
passed by the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Railway
Board under Annexure-9 with a further prayer to direct the
opposite parties to provide the Employment and Resettlement to
the petitioner as per the provision of the Odisha Resettlement and
Rehabilitation Policy, 2006, the Right to Fair Compensation and
Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement
Act, 2013 and the circulars/Guidelines issued by the Government
of India, Ministry of Railways (Railway Board) within a stipulated
time.
It appears that the petitioner previously approached this
Court in W.P.(C) No.29088 of 2024, which was disposed of on
26.11.2024 and direction was issued, without expressing any
opinion on the merits of the case, to the opposite party no.1, the
Chairman and C.E.O., Railways Board, Ministry of Railways, Rail
Bhawan, New Delhi to take a decision on the application of the
petitioner and pass appropriate order in accordance with law.
In terms of the aforesaid order dated 26.11.2024, the
following order has been passed by the Chairman and Chief
Executive Officer, Railway Board, which has been annexed as
Annexure-9, is quoted hereunder:-
"GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
MINISTRY OF RAILWAYS
(RAILWAYBOARD)
No.E(NG)II/2024/RC-5/17 New Delhi, Dated: 10.03.2025
SPEAKING ORDER
Hon'ble High Court of Orissa vide their orders
dated 26.11.2024 in WP (C) no.29034 of 2024 (Sujata
Mahto), WP (C) no.29057 of 2024 (Alok Kumar Mahto)
and 27.11.2024 in WP (C) no.29088 of 2024 (Subhajit
Banerjee) have passed the following directions:
".. we dispose of the writ petition directing the
opposite party no-1- the Chairman and CEO,
railway Board, Ministry of Railways, New Delhi
to take a decision on the application filed by
the petitioner and pass appropriate order in
accordance with law within a period of three
months from date of production of a certified
copy of this order and communicate the
result/decision taken thereon to the petitioner
within two weeks thereafter."
2 The copy of the above orders has been received in
the office of Ministry of Railways on 16.12.2024. In
compliance to the directions of Hon'ble High Court of
Orissa, the undersigned working as Chairman and Chief
Executive Officer, Railway Board has gone through the
facts of this case, the policy provisions of the Ministry
of Railways on the subject as well as the directions
given by the Hon'ble High Court. After careful
consideration of all the above my observations are as
under:
(i) The basic demand raised by the applicants
is for employment assistance to land losers
allegedly displaced due to land acquisition by
South Eastern Railway. All the three cases are
similar in nature and belong to the same time
period, area and Railway.
(ii) It has been learnt that the land of
petitioners (i) Smt Sujata Mahto and (ii) Shri
Alok Kumar Mahto was acquired by the govt.
of Orissa, during 1955-59 as per Gazette
Notification of Govt. of Odisha dated
10.12.1956 & 14.02.1958, District:
Sundargarh (Odisha), at that point of time for
Hindustan Steel Limited (HSL now Rourkela
Steel Plant). Further, in the case of Shrl
Subhajit Banerjee, the land had been acquired
by the Govt. of Orissa as per Gazette
Notification dated 22.02.1954 of Revenue
Disaster Management. Govt. of Orissa for
establishment of Rourkela Steel Plant and
other ancillary projects. All the land owners
had received compensation amount from the
state government and appended their
signatures as a token of payment. The land,
which was acquired for the purpose of steel
plant, in the above three cases was
subsequently transferred to the South Eastern
Railway by Government of Orissa in 1993. As
such, the claim of the applicants that the land
was acquired by the Railways is factually
incorrect.
(iii) All the three applicants are claiming
employment against land acquisition of their
ancestors by relying on a circular issued by
the Railway Board in the year 2006 whereas
the land acquisition was done more than five
decades ago by the State Government not by
the Railways.
(iv) It is mentioned that the land was acquired
by the State Government five decades ago
and further the land was transferred by the
Stale Government to Railways in 1993.
(v) in all these claims of employment, there
was no policy at the material time of providing
employment to land losers in the Railways.
The instructions issued subsequently from
time to time were applicable prospectively.
Applying the policies retrospectively is likely to
lead to an incomprehensible situation of an
unfathomable magnitude. The policies issued
at a later date cannot be applied in cases of
land acquisitions made several decades ago.
Further the policy of offering job to land losers
whose land was acquired for railway projects
has since been withdrawn vide instructions
issued on 11.11.2019. As such, there is no
scope of extending employment to the
applicants.
(vi) The applicants are citing the judgments
passed by the Hon'ble High Court of Orissa in
WP (C) no.5102 of 2013 (Krushna Ch. Nayak
case) and by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
Civil appeal no.1958 of 2019 (Anil Kumar vs
Uol & Ors.). The said judgments cannot be
applied in the case of instant applicants as the
material facts of those cases are entirely
different than those of these applicants. In
both the abovementioned cases, the land was
acquired for the purpose of Railway use,
whereas in the instant case land was acquired
for the purpose of Steel plant by the State
Government. As such. Railway has no
employment liability. Further, land acquisition
for Government projects are done as per the
policy prevalent at that particular point of
time. Here, it is pertinent to mention that
Railway has not acquired the land directly
from the land owners; hence, the question of
giving employment assistance in lieu of land
doesn't arise, when there was no such policy.
3. Keeping in view the above-stated position, there is
no relationship between the applicant and the Indian
Railways in the matter of land acquisition and thus the
demand of the applicant for grant of employment in lieu
of land acquisition made by Government of Orissa
several decades ago is not tenable. The orders may be
conveyed to them.
Sd/-
(Satish Kumar)
Chairman & Chief Executive Officer,
Railway Board"
From the impugned order, it reveals that the circular
issued by the Railway Board in the year 2006, on the basis of
which the petitioner is claiming employment was not in force
when the lands were acquired and compensation was paid.
Railway Board was nowhere in picture at the time of acquisition of
land and payment of compensation. The policy has been
withdrawn since 11.11.2019. The petitioner has not offered any
cogent explanation in approaching the Court at a belated stage.
Although the Limitation Act is not strictly applicable to a
writ petition, but the principles apply. It is also the settled
principle of law that delay defeats equity. While exercising
discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India, delay or laches is one of the factors which is to be kept in
mind by the High Court as a party who is guilty of delay and
laches cannot be granted any relief.
In the case of Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply &
Sewerage Board -Vrs.- T.T. Murali Babu reported in (2014)
4 Supreme Court Cases 108, the Hon'ble Supreme Court
discussed the effect of laches in litigation and held as follows:
"16. Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should
not be lightly brushed aside. A writ court is required
to weigh the explanation offered and the
acceptability of the same. The court should bear in
mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and
equitable jurisdiction. As a constitutional court it has
a duty to protect the rights of the citizens but
simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the
primary principle that when an aggrieved person,
without adequate reason, approaches the court at
his own leisure or pleasure, the court would be
under legal obligation to scrutinise whether the lis at
a belated stage should be entertained or not. Be it
noted, delay comes in the way of equity. In certain
circumstances delay and laches may not be fatal but
in most circumstances inordinate delay would only
invite disaster for the litigant who knocks at the
doors of the court. Delay reflects inactivity and
inaction on the part of a litigant - a litigant who has
forgotten the basic norms, namely, "procrastination
is the greatest thief of time" and second, law does
not permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix.
Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the
lis.
17. In the case at hand, though there has been four
years' delay in approaching the court, yet the writ
court chose not to address the same. It is the duty
of the court to scrutinise whether such enormous
delay is to be ignored without any justification. That
apart, in the present case, such belated approach
gains more significance as the respondent employee
being absolutely careless to his duty and nurturing a
lackadaisical attitude to the responsibility had
remained unauthorisedly absent on the pretext of
some kind of ill health. We repeat at the cost of
repetition that remaining innocuously oblivious to
such delay does not foster the cause of justice. On
the contrary, it brings in injustice, for it is likely to
affect others. Such delay may have impact on
others' ripened rights and may unnecessarily drag
others into litigation which in acceptable realm of
probability, may have been treated to have attained
finality. A court is not expected to give indulgence
to such indolent persons - who compete with
"Kumbhakarna" or for that matter "Rip Van Winkle".
In our considered opinion, such delay does not
deserve any indulgence and on the said ground
alone the writ court should have thrown the petition
overboard at the very threshold."
In the case of Mrinmoy Maity -vrs.- Chhanda Koley
and others : A.I.R. 2024 S.C. 2717 : 2024 LiveLaw SC 318,
where an application under Article 226 had been filed by an
applicant for grant of LPG distributorship after a delay of four
years challenging the selection of a rival applicant, the Supreme
Court has held as follows:-
"9. Having heard rival contentions raised and on
perusal of the facts obtained in the present case, we
are of the considered view that writ petitioner ought
to have been nonsuited or in other words writ
petition ought to have been dismissed on the ground
of delay and laches itself. An applicant who
approaches the court belatedly or in other words
sleeps over his rights for a considerable period of
time, wakes up from his deep slumber ought not to
be granted the extraordinary relief by the writ courts.
This Court time and again has held that delay defeats
equity. Delay or laches is one of the factors which
should be born in mind by the High Court while
exercising discretionary powers under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India. In a given case, the High
Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers
if laxity on the part of the applicant to assert his right
has allowed the cause of action to drift away and
attempts are made subsequently to rekindle the
lapsed cause of action.
10. The discretion to be exercised would be with care
and caution. If the delay which has occasioned in
approaching the writ court is explained which would
appeal to the conscience of the court, in such
circumstances it cannot be gainsaid by the contesting
party that for all times to come the delay is not to be
condoned. There may be myriad circumstances which
gives rise to the invoking of the extraordinary
jurisdiction and it all depends on facts and
circumstances of each case, same cannot be
described in a straight jacket formula with
mathematical precision. The ultimate discretion to be
exercised by the writ court depends upon the facts
that it has to travel or the terrain in which the facts
have travelled.
11. For filing of a writ petition, there is no doubt that
no fixed period of limitation is prescribed. However,
when the extraordinary jurisdiction of the writ court
is invoked, it has to be seen as to whether within a
reasonable time same has been invoked and even
submitting of memorials would not revive the dead
cause of action or resurrect the cause of action which
has had a natural death. In such circumstances on
the ground of delay and laches alone, the appeal
ought to be dismissed or the applicant ought to be
nonsuited. If it is found that the writ Petitioner is
guilty of delay and laches, the High Court ought to
dismiss the petition on that sole ground itself, in as
much as the writ courts are not to indulge in
permitting such indolent litigant to take advantage of
his own wrong. It is true that there cannot be any
waiver of fundamental right but while exercising
discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226, the High
Court will have to necessarily take into consideration
the delay and laches on the part of the applicant in
approaching a writ court. This Court in the case of
Tridip Kumar Dingal and others -vrs.- State of
W.B and others reported in (2009) 1 S.C.C. 768
has held to the following effect:
"56. We are unable to uphold the
contention. It is no doubt true that there
can be no waiver of fundamental right. But
while exercising discretionary jurisdiction
under Articles 32, 226, 227 or 136 of the
Constitution, this Court takes into account
certain factors and one of such
considerations is delay and laches on the
part of the applicant in approaching a writ
court. It is well settled that power to issue
a writ is discretionary. One of the grounds
for refusing reliefs under Article 32 or 226
of the Constitution is that the petitioner is
guilty of delay and laches.
57. If the petitioner wants to invoke
jurisdiction of a writ court, he should come
to the Court at the earliest reasonably
possible opportunity. Inordinate delay in
making the motion for a writ will indeed be
a good ground for refusing to exercise
such discretionary jurisdiction. The
underlying object of this principle is not to
encourage agitation of stale claims and
exhume matters which have already been
disposed of or settled or where the rights
of third parties have accrued in the
meantime (vide State of M.P. v. Bhailal
Bhai [AIR 1964 SC 1006 : (1964) 6
SCR 261], Moon Mills Ltd. v. Industrial
Court [AIR 1967 SC 1450] and Bhoop
Singh v. Union of India [(1992) 3 SCC
136 : (1992) 21 ATC 675 : (1992) 2
SCR 969]). This principle applies even in
case of an infringement of fundamental
right (vide Tilokchand Motichand v.
H.B. Munshi [(1969) 1 SCC 110],
Durga Prashad v. Chief Controller of
Imports & Exports [(1969) 1 SCC 185]
and Rabindranath Bose v. Union of
India [(1970) 1 SCC 84]).
58. There is no upper limit and there is no
lower limit as to when a person can
approach a court. The question is one of
discretion and has to be decided on the
basis of facts before the court depending
on and varying from case to case. It will
depend upon what the breach of
fundamental right and the remedy claimed
are and when and how the delay arose."
In view of the settled principle of law and after going
through the impugned order dated 10.03.2025 passed by the
Chairman & Chief Executive Officer, Railway Board, we do not find
any illegality or infirmity in the aforesaid order and more
particularly when the writ petition suffers from delay and laches,
we are not inclined to entertain the same.
Accordingly, the writ petition being devoid of merits,
stands dismissed.
Urgent certified copy of this order be granted on proper
application.
( S.K. Sahoo)
Judge
Signed by: RABINDRA KUMAR MISHRA
RKM Authentication
( S.S. Mishra)
Location: HIGH COURT OF ORISSA, CUTTACK
Date: 07-May-2025 16:47:00 Judge
